Consumer Awareness and the Use of Payment Media: Evidence from Young Finnish Consumers

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Abstract

We provide evidence that increasing consumer awareness may have been underlying the rise of debit card use. We find that consumers typically use multiple payment media and that this behavior is closely related to the use of debit cards besides cash. Moreover, it turns out that the use of multiple payment media is directly related to consumer awareness but that not controlling for the endogeneity of awareness can bias its effect downwards. Conditional on the use of multiple payment methods, however, awareness does not distinguish those making debit a primary payment method from those making it secondary to cash.

1 Introduction

The technological breakthroughs and regulatory reforms of the past decades have brought payment media to the forefront of business, social and political interest. Spreading of debit and credit cards has thoroughly changed the way people pay for good and services (see, for example, Humphrey, 2004, Klee, 2006a, and Amromin and Chakravorti, 2007). New payment instruments, such as smart cards and those embedded in mobile phones, are entering commercial use and making money more digital and less tangible. The new payment media also hold a promise to enhance the access of the poorest to basic financial services. But the development is not free of concerns. As money has become less tangible,

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consumer protection authorities worry that people spend and borrow too much, whereas central banks worry that the traditional instruments of monetary policy become obsolete. The increased concentration of payment card industry has alarmed competition policy authorities, who have begun to scrutinize card platforms' practices (see, for example, Hunt, 2003, and Evans and Schmalensee, 2005, chapter 12).

Whether and how benefits and concerns from the digitalization of money materialize depend on the diffusion of new payment media. Monetary history is full of examples where new payment media have taken off only slowly if at all. It is not well understood what hampers the adoption of these financial innovations, notably because of a lack of systematic evidence.¹ It can be hard to obtain consumer-level data on early adopters of emerging payment media. In this paper, we take advantage of a special feature of the payment media market that some consumers only use one medium, while others use simultaneously many. Such payment behavior essentially reflects the diffusion of new payment media, because even the most recent major innovations, coins, checks, paper money, and the payment card, have long been used in chorus with the previously established payment media (Evans and Schmalensee, 2005).²

We focus on the role of consumer awareness in the use of payment media. Previous research has shown that the rate of adoption of new payment methods varies with consumers' demographic and financial characteristics, such as age, education, income and home-ownership status (for example, Carow and Staten, 1999; Mantel, 2000; Stavins, 2001; and Mester, 2003), and that localized feedback loops between consumers and merchants matter (Rysman, 2007). Holding consumer characteristics and merchant acceptance constant, pricing and information provision are the main instruments that policy makers and issuers can adopt to boost consumer use of modern payment media. While there is growing evidence that consumers react strongly to explicit pricing of paying (Humphrey, Kim and Vale, 2001; and Borzekowski, Kiser and Ahmed, 2008), the quantitative importance of consumer awareness or information provision in the market for payment media is not known.

There is some indirect and qualitative evidence suggesting that the role of awareness should not be ignored: Chakravorti (2004) argues that greater awareness is needed for wide-spread acceptance of stored value cards. Evans and Schmalensee (2005) conjecture that Visa's massive advertisement campaigns to improve consumer awareness of its debit products in the 1990s have contributed to the rise of signature debit in the U.S. Marketing and industrial economics literature suggests that providing information about any new product should foster its diffusion, especially if the adoption is held back by non-monetary costs, such as the costs arising from imperfect consumer information, and learning and searching costs. But, prior to our study, virtually no quantitative evidence exists on the effects of the information provision on the adoption of new payment media.³

¹ See Frame and White (2004) for a review of the scant empirical literature on financial innovations and their diffusion.

² This is one indication of sluggish diffusion of new payment media innovations. For example, payment cards were introduced in the 1950s, but only over the past two decades they have begun to replace checks and, to lesser extent, cash (see, for example, Humphrey, 2004; and Amromin and Chakravorti, 2007). Similarly, while mobile and smart money are (finally) spreading, the slow pace of change has been considered puzzling.

³ An important exception is Hayashi and Klee (2003), who provide related evidence by showing that the adoption of electronic payment media correlates with the adoption of other new technologies.

There is a link from our study to the literature on multihoming in the market for payment media (see, for example, Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). In this literature, a consumer is said to be engaged in multihoming if she carries, say, multiple different *brands* of credit cards, whereas we focus on the use of multiple different *methods* of payment.⁴ Our paper is also complementary to the emerging literature on the determinants of the use of one payment media versus another at the point of sale in the U.S. (for example, Carow and Staten, 1999; Klee, 2006b; Borzekowski and Kiser, 2008; Fusaro, 2008; and Zinman, 2009). This literature has begun to produce important insights on what drives the discrete choice between using “paper or plastic” and “debit or credit” by emphasizing the differences across various payment media and documenting how payment choice depends on the characteristics of transactions. In contrast, we emphasize how consumers’ payment behavior depends on their awareness.

To study how the use of payment media and consumer awareness are related in the market for payment media, we exploit some unique features of the survey data on young Finnish consumers available to us:

- The Finnish market for payment media is by international standards advanced and Finns have for long relied on an access to electronic payment networks when paying point-of-sale. Because young consumers typically show a great rate of adoption of new payment media (Carow and Staten, 1999; Mantel, 2000; Humphrey *et al*, 2001; Stavins, 2001; and Stix, 2003), we can study whether and how information provision affects the likely early adopters.
- The data provide direct measures of the point-of-sale paying habits of individual consumers. We can hence generate a dependent variable at the level of individual consumers that distinguishes the point-of-sale paying from settling bills and the actual use of the different payment media from having a passive access to them. The measures also allow us to study whether awareness leads to the use of multiple payment media, and if so, whether it affects the composition of the used payment media.
- As Guiso and Jappelli (2005) point out, consumer awareness in financial markets can take many guises and be an elusive concept. It can be both about the existence and characteristics of payment media. Our data include a series of questions capturing the consumers’ exposure to the provision of information about financial services and payment media. The data also yield instruments, which allow us to control for the potential endogeneity of consumer awareness.
- Our consumer-level data contain extensive demographic and socio-economic information, and an unusual degree of detail on consumers’ banking relationship. This provides a wide-ranging list of consumer characteristics that in some respects goes beyond the standard control variables used in the literature.

We find that the majority of the young Finnish customers in our sample use more than one payment media when paying at the point-of-sale and that this use of multiple payment media is closely associated with the decision to use debit card in addition to cash. The

⁴ In this respect, a close paper to ours is Klee (2006a) who addresses the question of the family’s use of multiple payment media.

effect of awareness on the probability of using multiple payment media is quantitatively large, especially if the potential endogeneity of consumer awareness is controlled for. The effect of awareness also survives a number of robustness checks, including using an alternative measure of consumer awareness and alternative methods of estimation.

It turns out, however, that the link from awareness to debit use is subtle. The consumers who use only one payment method use cash irrespective of their awareness. Moreover, while awareness induces a shift towards using many payment methods, the shift means that some begin to use debit as their *primary* method of paying, whereas the others begin to use it as their *secondary* method. Conditional on the young using multiple payment methods, the awareness of the primary users of debit does not appear to be different from the awareness of the secondary users of debit. In our data, the consumers regarding debit as a primary method of payment earn more, work more often full time, are more educated, a little older, and wealthier, on average, than the consumers regarding debit as secondary to cash.

In the next section, we describe the institutional environment and some special characteristics of the Finnish market of payment media that make Finland a neat case for our study. In Section 3, we describe our data and the construction of variables. We analyze the relation between consumer awareness and the use of multiple payment media in Section 4. In Section 5, we consider the potential endogeneity of consumer awareness, and also address the question of whether awareness could lead to using different media (and not just to using more of them). The concluding section includes a discussion of the implications of our findings for the adoption of new payment media.

2 Institutional environment⁵

The Finnish market for payment media has both some distinctive features that simplify our study and some profound differences with the much-studied US market of payment media (see, for example, Ausubel, 1991 and Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala, 2000, Klee, 2006a,b, and Fusaro, 2008, for a description of the US market).

The Finnish market for payment media is relatively advanced, for Finns have for some time now relied on accessing electronic payment networks at the point-of-sale (see, for example, Amromin and Chakravorti, 2007, for a cross-country comparison). Checks disappeared from consumer trade in the 1980s, and debit cards became subsequently popular: In 2002, they accounted for 2/3 of the value of all card payments.⁶ In other words, the shift away from checks towards increasing use of debit cards occurred in Finland much earlier than in the U.S. and many other countries.

The use of cash has decreased rapidly. Between 1999 and 2003, the use of cash as a way of paying for daily consumer goods and services decreased by 18% (13 percentage points, to 58%). Although it still is relatively common in point-of-sale transactions, the ratio of currency in circulation to GDP, was only about 1.8% in 2002. Moreover, a special feature of the Finnish market is that the use of cash is almost invariantly preceded by the

⁵ Most of the industry details come from the various publications of the Finnish Bankers' Association and the Bank of Finland. As our data are from 2002 we use – where possible – 2002 figures to describe the environment.

⁶ Various surveys show that between 1999 and 2003 the use of debit cards as the most common way of paying for daily consumer goods and services increased from 17% to 30%.

use of an ATM: The entire currency in circulation (2,4 billion euros in 2002) goes through the ATMs several times a year, and getting “cash back” when paying by a card (say, at a retail store) is rare. The use of cash in point-of-sale transactions without first accessing one’s bank account via an ATM is restricted to a shrinking population of senior citizens who never learned to use ATMs and to rare circumstances where large value notes (which are not available from ATMs) are needed. Otherwise, using ATMs is convenient, since virtually everyone has a banking account where incomes are credited directly and an ATM (compatible) card. The banks operate a joint ATM network and do not charge its use.

In Finland, credit and debit cards appear to be closer substitutes than in the U.S. This means that studying the discrete choice between “debit versus credit”, which has been one of the research focuses in the U.S. (see, for example, Fusaro, 2008; and Zinman, 2009), is less of interest to us. Besides the four margins (acceptance, security, portability and time costs) in which credit and debit cards are close substitutes also in the U.S., there are additional reasons for their substitutability in the Finnish market: First, Finns in general and young Finns in particular use their credit cards primarily for paying and *not* for borrowing: Our data (described more closely in Section 4) tell us that in 2002, 37% of the young had an outstanding credit balance, but only for 5% it originated from payment card borrowing (for 4% from credit cards).⁷ Further, there are few “revolvers” in Finland who do not pay their credit card balance in full by the payment due date. Instead of borrowing, the young have other, convenience related motivations to use a credit card, such as a Visa or a MasterCard. One of them is the desire to use it abroad in the point-of-sale transactions. Second, the benefit of float (that is, interest-free loan) that a typical Finnish consumer (who pays the balance in full) foregoes if she uses debit instead of credit, has been small at least in the euro era.⁸ Third, at the time when our data were collected, there were almost no rewards, such as rebates or airline miles, available for a debit or a credit card user.

The Finnish market for payment media is concentrated, because the few main deposit banks that dominate the banking sector are the main issuers of payment media. Because the issuers of payment media are relatively homogenous the payment media, their pricing, and the ways of providing them with customers tend to be similar across the issuers, at least after controlling for the banking relationships of consumers.

The pricing of the payment media is also quite simple (see Koskinen, 2001). At least one ATM or payment card is often automatically attached to a banking account as a part of a banking service package. The packages can include various payment media, whose pricing hence depends on the pricing of the banking service packages. Their pricing in turn is tied to the age of a consumer. It is typical that the basic packages are free of charge until the age of 26, which applies to most individuals in our data.

⁷ For the rest, the loan was either a mortgage or a student loan. Borrowing via payment cards is directly related to age even within the young.

⁸ We do not have exact figures. Zinman (2009) computes the foregone float to be about 3\$ for a typical U.S. customer.

3 Data and definition of variables

3.1 Data

The data for our analysis come from a survey conducted by the Finnish Bankers' Association between the 21st February and 5th March, 2002. The primary aim of the survey was to collect data on the consumption habits of young Finns and their views about banking and financial products and services. The survey was based on a random sample of 1004 young adults aged between 15 and 28. We use the entire sample, which represents approximately 1/900 of the total population in the age group.

The data are rich in detail concerning the young adults' demographic and socio-economic characteristics, financial affairs, banking relationships, and information about banking products and financial affairs, including payment media. The data also include information about the use of various payment media in retail transactions.

3.2 Definition of variables

3.2.1 Use of payment media

The survey contains the following three questions⁹, Q1-Q3, about how the young pay for their purchases and consumption of services:

Q1: What is the most typical way you pay for your purchases or consumption of services? i) cash, ii) debit card, iii) combined debit-credit card, iv) credit card, v) debit or credit card issued by a retailer, vi) Visa Electron, vii) stored value card, viii) GSM or WAP phone, ix) by other means, how? (specify);

Q2: What about the second most typical way? Is it i) cash, ii) debit card, iii) combined debit-credit card, iv) credit card, v) debit or credit card issued by a retailer, vi) Visa Electron, vii) stored value card, viii) GSM or WAP phone, ix) by other means, how? (specify), x) there is no second way;

Q3: Is there yet another way you pay for your purchases or consumption of services? If yes, is it i) cash, ii) debit card, iii) combined debit-credit card, iv) credit card, v) debit or credit card issued by a retailer, vi) Visa Electron, vii) stored value card, viii) GSM or WAP phone, ix) by other means, how? (specify), x) there are no additional ways.

These questions allow measuring the number of different payment media a young consumer uses and characterizing which media she uses when paying for her purchases or consumption of services. Note that questions Q1-Q3 identify virtually all the payment media consumers could use when paying for consumption or services at the point-of-sale in Finland. Even if a payment medium were not properly identified, the respondents had three possibilities to identify such a medium by themselves. But no one did. Moreover, questions Q1-Q3 concern actually using a payment medium, not having an access to it (that is, carrying it passively in one's wallet). We therefore need not to worry about card owners who never use their cards.¹⁰

We let n_i denote the number of different payment media consumer i uses. We also define dummy variable $USEMANY_i$ to equal zero if $n_i = 1$ and one if $n_i > 1$.

⁹ Translation from Finnish by the authors.

¹⁰ Yet another useful feature of the survey is that just before the questions of the use of payment media in retail transactions were presented, the respondents had been asked about their habits of paying for their bills. The questions should thus capture the young adults' payment habits in point-of-sale-transactions instead of their bill-paying habits.

3.2.2 Consumer awareness

The previous literature unfortunately provides little help in choosing a proxy for a consumer's awareness, a_i .¹¹ We measure it based on a series of questions included in the survey that concern the provision of information about payment media. The questions were introduced as follows:

Q4: I will next list a number of different banking services or products. Please indicate for each item whether you have either received or been offered (i) a lot of information, (ii) some information, or (iii) no information about it.

We code an indicator variable that equals 1, if the respondent chose (i) to items {"Debit and credit cards", "Other loans, such as consumer credit and borrowing using cards", "Transaction accounts, that is those designed for frequent, daily usage", "Ways of paying bills"}. The value of the indicator is zero otherwise, that is, only "a lot of information" is counted as awareness.

The rationale for our definition of a_i is that a consumer's awareness of the existence and characteristics of payment media is likely to be directly related to the amount of information the consumer has been offered about them. The amount should, in turn, be directly related to the systematic and unsystematic forms of information provision by the various issuers of payment media.

Although our measure of consumer awareness is certainly imperfect, we can show that our results hold in instrumental variable estimations that allow for a measurement error in a_i . We also establish the robustness of our results with respect to an alternative proxy for awareness.

3.2.3 Control variables

We construct two sets of variables. The first set consists of demographic and socio-economic characteristics: sex ($SEX_i = 1$ if the respondent is female), age in years (AGE_i), age squared ($AGESQ_i$), employment status ($EMP_i = 1$ if employed, $UNEMP_i = 1$ if unemployed, the omitted category being for students), level of completed or on-going education ($HIGH_i = 1$ if university, $MEDIUM_i = 1$ if high school or equivalent, the omitted category being for those with elementary school education), household type ($NOHOUSEH_i = 1$ if lives with parents), type of family ($CHILDREN_i = 1$ if has at least one child), residential area ($CITY_i = 1$ if lives in a city with more than 30 000 inhabitants), geographic region of residence ($WEST_i = 1$, $EAST_i = 1$, and $NORTH_i = 1$, if lives in these parts of Finland, the omitted category representing the respondents living in south), income ($INCOME_i$, in thousands of EUR), income squared ($INCOMESQ_i$), the type of real wealth ($RWEALTH_i = 1$ if owns a real estate, a house or a condominium), financial wealth ($FWEALTH_i = 1$ if has savings in deposit or savings accounts, or if owns stocks, shares of mutual funds, bonds, private pension insurance, or if has made other financial investments), and liquid wealth ($LWEALTH_i = 1$ if has savings in transaction accounts).

The previous literature suggests that demographic and education variables should be included to control for heterogeneity in adoption costs and consumption behavior (for example, Carow and Staten, 1999, Mantel, 2000, Stavins, 2001, and Mester, 2003). Similarly, the literature suggests that we should control for income and the type of wealth, because they affect consumption patterns and measure the importance of fixed monetary adoption costs. Dummies for the residential area and region aim at acknowledging the two-

¹¹ On measuring consumer awareness in financial markets, see Guiso and Jappelli (2005). Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) provide an overview of a related literature on financial literacy and investor sophistication.

sided nature of payment media market and capturing related adoption determinants considered by Attanasio, Luigi and Japelli (2002), Stix (2003) and Rysman (2007), such as regional variation in the number of ATMs and in the acceptance of payment media by retailers. They also capture other regional variation affecting use of payment media. For example, the determinants of consumer awareness uncovered by Guiso and Jappelli (2005) include geographical variations in the intensity of social networks and learning, as well as in the costs of spreading information about payment media.

The second set of control variables is more unusual and comes from the variables depicting consumers' relationship to their deposit banks: Identity of a consumer's main bank ($MBANK_{hi} = 1$ if the responded principally uses the services of bank h , $h = 1, 2, \dots, 6$, the omitted category being for those who principally use the services of bank 7), use of other banks ($NOSBANK_i = 1$ if uses the services of other banks in addition to the main bank), choice of the main bank ($BCHOICE_i = 1$ if the main bank has been chosen by the respondent herself and not, for example, by her parents or spouse), duration of the relationship with the main bank ($BLENGHT_i = 1$ if has been a customer of the current main bank since her birth), membership in the main bank's youth club ($BCLUB_i = 1$ if has been a member), and recent switch of main bank ($SWBANK_i = 1$ if has changed the main bank over the past 12 months).

Controlling for the banking relationships is quite natural because of the prominent role of the deposit banks in the Finnish market for payment media (see Section 2). We trust that these regressors reflect heterogeneity in adoption costs: The $MBANK_{hi}$ -dummies and $NOSBANK_i$ should capture, for example, differences in the pricing of various cards and marketing strategies across the banks. Moreover, we can conjecture that $BCLUB_i$ proxies the initial level of consumer awareness about payment media, as a former member of a bank's youth club should be relatively well informed about banking products and services.

We introduce the two sets of controls sequentially into the model to ensure that our results are not driven by potential (unmodelled) endogeneity of some of the control variables in the second set of regressors. Variable $SWBANK_i$ is for example potentially endogenous, because consumers could self-select, that is, switch their main bank on the basis of anticipated demand for payment media.¹²

4 Use of multiple payment media

4.1 Descriptive statistics

The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. They show that the respondents are on average 21 years old and have annual income of about 8100 EUR. A bit more than half of them are female, some 60% of them are students and around 28% have a university degree or are studying for one. The average of a_i , our indicator for consumer awareness, is 0.7.

The table also indicates that consumers use multiple payment media but their number is rather restricted. The mean of the dummy variable $USEMANY_i$ is 53%, which indicates that a bit more than half of the young Finns use more than one payment medium in their point-of-sale transactions. The count variable, n_i , varies from 1 to 3 and has a mean of 1.6.¹³

¹² Besides the control variables described here we have tried several other groupings and sets. Our results are robust to such alternative specifications as also the robustness tests of the next section indicate.

¹³ One respondent used four payment methods. We recoded her answer to equal three.

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>n</i>	946	1,59	0,61	1	3
<i>USEMANY</i>	946	0,53	0,50	0	1
<i>a</i>	946	0,70	0,46	0	1
<i>INCOME</i>	946	8,14	9,64	0	37,80
<i>AGE</i>	946	21,22	3,99	15	28
<i>SEX</i>	946	0,51	0,50	0	1
<i>LIVCITY</i>	946	0,48	0,50	0	1
<i>WEST</i>	946	0,38	0,48	0	1
<i>EAST</i>	946	0,12	0,33	0	1
<i>NORTH</i>	946	0,13	0,34	0	1
<i>EMP</i>	946	0,32	0,47	0	1
<i>UNEMP</i>	946	0,07	0,25	0	1
<i>HIGH</i>	946	0,28	0,45	0	1
<i>MEDIUM</i>	946	0,62	0,49	0	1
<i>NOHOUSEH</i>	946	0,44	0,50	0	1
<i>CHILDREN</i>	946	0,09	0,28	0	1
<i>RWEALTH</i>	946	0,14	0,35	0	1
<i>FWEALTH</i>	946	0,27	0,44	0	1
<i>LWEALTH</i>	946	0,25	0,44	0	1
<i>MBANK_1</i>	946	0,33	0,47	0	1
<i>MBANK_2</i>	946	0,39	0,49	0	1
<i>MBANK_3</i>	946	0,06	0,23	0	1
<i>MBANK_4</i>	946	0,15	0,36	0	1
<i>MBANK_5</i>	946	0,02	0,14	0	1
<i>MBANK_6</i>	946	0,03	0,17	0	1
<i>NOSBANK</i>	946	0,74	0,44	0	1
<i>BCHOICE</i>	931	0,36	0,48	0	1
<i>BLENGTH</i>	849	0,64	0,48	0	1
<i>BCLUB</i>	937	0,57	0,50	0	1
<i>SWBANK</i>	934	0,03	0,16	0	1

Table 1: Descriptive statistics.

Note: Data source is “Nuorisotutkimus” – survey of the Finish Banker’s Association.

Figure 1 displays the distribution of n_i conditional on a_i . The figure suggests that use of multiple payment media and consumer awareness are not independent, as consumer awareness clearly shifts the distribution of n_i to the right. As many as 65.4% of the uninformed consumers (with $a_i = 0$) use only one payment medium, while the corresponding percentage for the informed is 39.1%. Put differently, 83% of those who use many payment methods are better informed. To formally assess for the presence of dependence between n_i and awareness, we compute Pearson’s χ^2 -test. The test for

independence obtains a value of 55.75 (d.f. = 2), which allows us to firmly reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level.

Figure 1: Use of multiple payment media.

Note: Data source is “Nuorisotutkimus 2002” – survey of the Finnish Banker’s Association.

Figure 2 displays the distribution of cash as the most typical way of payment (based on answers to Q1), conditional on n_i and a_i . Approximately 3/4 of the respondents keep cash as their most typical way of payment for their purchases or consumption of services. If a young only uses a single payment method ($n_i = 1$), she uses cash almost certainly. The figure also shows that of those who use many payment methods ($n_i > 1$), slightly more than a half regards cash as their first choice.¹⁴ Awareness, or lack of it, is not associated with the use of cash as a primary method of payment, conditional on $n_i = 1$ or $n_i > 1$. Pearson’s χ^2 -tests confirm that the null hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected in either case.

¹⁴ A simple t -test allows us to reject at 5% significance level (but not at 1% level) the null hypothesis that the binary variable indicating that the most typical way of payment is cash has a mean of 0.5 (conditional on $n_i > 1$).

Figure 2: The most typical way of paying.

4.2 Econometric analysis

To provide quantitative evidence on the relationship between the use of multiple payment media and information provision, we estimate a number of regression models. In these models, the dependent variable is the use of multiple payment media (n_i or $USEMANY_i$) and the main interest is in estimating the effect of consumer awareness (a_i) on the use of multiple payment media. We postpone the discussion of the potential endogeneity of consumer awareness, and the question of whether awareness could also affect the composition of the used payment media in the next section.

4.2.1 Main results

In column (1) and (2) of Table 2A, we present the results of Ordered-Probit (O-Probit) and quasi maximum-likelihood Poisson (QML-Poisson) estimations of models in which n_i is the dependent variable and in which only the first set of control variables is included.¹⁵ In column (3), the dependent variable is $USEMANY_i$ and the method of estimation Probit. Table 2B reports the results for the same models, but with both sets of controls included. We use the standard Huber-White sandwich estimator to obtain heteroscedasticity-robust variance-covariance matrices.

The results of Table 2A and Table 2B show that the dummy for consumer awareness obtains a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1% level, irrespective of the estimation method and the included set of control variables. This finding confirms that

¹⁵ An advantage of the Poisson quasi-likelihood method is that the consistency of estimation requires only a correct specification of the (conditional) mean function (see, for example, Wooldridge, 1997). Moreover, in an earlier working paper version (Hyytinen and Takalo, 2004) we show how such a conditional mean of a count (Poisson) regression model can be derived from a simple consumer payment behaviour model of the Baumol-Tobin type and given structural interpretation.

the use of multiple payment media by a Finnish young is related to her awareness. The Probit results allow us to compute that holding the other variables constant, the difference between $Prob(USEMANY_i = 1 | a_i = 1)$ and $Prob(USEMANY_i = 1 | a_i = 0)$ is on average 12.6 percentage points (= 56.6%-44.0%). This difference is not negligible when compared, for example, to the mean of $USEMANY_i$.

As to other determinants of n_i and $USEMANY_i$, they are mostly in line with expectations. Propensity to use many payment media is increasing in $INCOME_i$, but the positive relation begins to weaken after a threshold. Financial asset ownership also increases the likelihood of using multiple payment media. If the findings are not entirely driven by different consumption patterns of the affluent, they may also indicate that the young care about the monetary costs of adoption. As the coefficients of SEX_i and $HIGH_i$ suggest, females, university students and graduates use more payment media than their otherwise identical counterparts. From Table 2B, we can observe that a considered choice of bank relationship and membership in a bank's youth club also have an effect on the likelihood of using multiple payment media.

	$Y = n$			$Y = n$			$Y = USEMANY$		
	Ordered Probit			Poisson			Probit		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.	
a	0,37	0,10	***	0,09	0,02	***	0,42	0,10	***
$INCOME$	0,04	0,01	***	0,01	3,9E-03	***	0,04	0,02	***
$INCOMESQ$	-8,0E-04	4,7E-04	*	-2,2E-04	1,2E-04	*	-1,1E-03	5,2E-04	**
AGE	0,38	0,18	**	0,11	0,04	**	0,18	0,20	
$AGESQ$	-0,01	3,8E-03	*	-1,8E-03	9,5E-04	*	-1,7E-03	4,4E-03	
SEX	0,24	0,09	***	0,06	0,02	***	0,30	0,10	***
$LIVCITY$	0,11	0,09		0,03	0,02		0,24	0,10	**
$WEST$	-0,11	0,10		-0,03	0,03		-0,02	0,11	
$EAST$	0,07	0,14		0,02	0,04		0,20	0,16	
$NORTH$	0,03	0,13		0,01	0,03		0,15	0,15	
EMP	0,03	0,14		5,7E-03	0,04		0,11	0,16	
$UNEMP$	-0,07	0,17		-0,02	0,05		0,06	0,20	
$HIGH$	0,77	0,25	***	0,17	0,06	***	0,86	0,27	***
$MEDIUM$	0,50	0,22	**	0,10	0,05	**	0,53	0,22	**
$NOHOUSEH$	-0,05	0,13		-0,01	0,03		-0,01	0,13	
$CHILDREN$	0,08	0,15		0,02	0,04		0,04	0,19	
$RWEALTH$	0,21	0,13	*	0,06	0,03	*	0,32	0,16	**
$FWEALTH$	0,30	0,10	***	0,08	0,02	***	0,28	0,11	**
$LWEALTH$	0,15	0,10		0,04	0,02		0,06	0,11	
Observations	946			946			946		
Log likelihood	-670,75			-1185,76			-489,08		
Pseudo R^2	0,20			0,03			0,25		

Table 2A: Regression results: Exogenous awareness with the short control vector.

Note: i) *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level; ii) Standard errors based on the robust Huber-White covariance-matrix.

	$Y = n$			$Y = n$			$Y = USEMANY$		
	Ordered-Probit			Poisson			Probit		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.	
α	0,33	0,10	***	0,08	0,03	***	0,36	0,11	***
<i>INCOME</i>	0,04	0,02	***	0,01	4,1E-03	***	0,05	0,02	*
<i>INCOMESQ</i>	0,00	0,00	**	-2,8E-04	1,3E-04	**	-1,3E-03	5,8E-04	*
<i>AGE</i>	0,16	0,19		0,05	0,05		-0,06	0,21	
<i>AGESQ</i>	0,00	0,00		-6,8E-04	1,0E-03		0,00	0,00	
<i>SEX</i>	0,20	0,09	**	0,05	0,02	**	0,23	0,11	*
<i>LIVCITY</i>	0,16	0,10	*	0,04	0,02	*	0,32	0,11	***
<i>WEST</i>	-0,08	0,10		-0,02	0,03		-0,01	0,12	
<i>EAST</i>	0,00	0,14		1,8E-03	0,04		0,10	0,17	
<i>NORTH</i>	0,04	0,15		0,01	0,04		0,16	0,17	
<i>EMP</i>	0,05	0,15		9,8E-03	0,04		0,13	0,17	
<i>UNEMP</i>	-0,03	0,19		-0,01	0,05		0,12	0,22	
<i>HIGH</i>	0,87	0,27	***	0,20	0,06	***	0,99	0,29	***
<i>MEDIUM</i>	0,57	0,23	**	0,13	0,05	**	0,65	0,24	***
<i>NOHOUSEH</i>	-0,07	0,14		-0,02	0,04		-0,01	0,14	
<i>CHILDREN</i>	0,13	0,17		0,03	0,04		0,16	0,21	
<i>RWEALTH</i>	0,26	0,13	**	0,07	0,03	**	0,39	0,16	*
<i>FWEALTH</i>	0,21	0,10	**	0,05	0,03	**	0,20	0,12	*
<i>LWEALTH</i>	0,13	0,10		0,03	0,03		0,02	0,12	
<i>MBANK_1</i>	0,64	0,47		0,14	0,12		0,53	0,54	
<i>MBANK_2</i>	0,77	0,47		0,18	0,12		0,73	0,54	
<i>MBANK_3</i>	1,05	0,50	**	0,25	0,12	**	1,10	0,57	*
<i>MBANK_4</i>	0,66	0,48		0,15	0,12		0,49	0,55	
<i>MBANK_5</i>	1,05	0,56	*	0,25	0,14	*	0,60	0,59	
<i>MBANK_6</i>	0,83	0,54		0,19	0,13		0,88	0,62	
<i>NOSBANK</i>	-0,12	0,10		-0,03	0,03		-0,06	0,12	
<i>BCHOICE</i>	0,25	0,11	**	0,07	0,03	**	0,29	0,13	*
<i>BLENGTH</i>	0,00	0,11		3,6E-03	0,03		0,11	0,13	
<i>BCLUB</i>	0,24	0,09	***	0,06	0,02	***	0,29	0,10	***
<i>SWBANK</i>	-0,24	0,21		-0,06	0,05		0,14	0,29	
Observations	840			840			840		
Log likelihood	-599,23			-1059,55			-430,73		
Pseudo R ²	0,20			0,03			0,25		

Table 2B: Regression results: Exogenous awareness with the full list of controls.

Note: i) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level; ii) Standard errors based on the robust Huber-White covariance-matrix.

4.2.2 Robustness tests

We have run a number of additional regressions to assess the robustness of the documented effect of awareness. In these regressions, the regressors are the same as those used in Table 2B. For brevity, we discuss the results only informally.

Robustness test 1: To address the potential problem of omitted variables, we construct a new set of control variables that allows us to better control for heterogeneity in the young Finns' consumption habits (beyond what their basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics capture). The new set of controls consist of loan market status ($BORROWS_i = 1$ if the responded currently has outstanding debt), use of the Internet ($USEINT_i = 1$ if uses the Internet regularly), and planned consumption ($SPEND_{ci} = 1, c = 1, 2, \dots, 6$, in which c indexes planned near-term spending on education ($c=1$), housing ($c=2$), traveling ($c=3$), computers ($c=4$), sport or outdoor clothing and equipment ($c=5$), and other ($c=6$);

the omitted seventh category being for the respondents without near-term spending plans). The use of the new set of controls does not change the main finding: In all estimations (O-Probit, QML-Poisson, and Probit) the coefficient of consumer awareness is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.

Robustness test 2: Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that pricing of the payment media matters for the rate of adoption and use of many payment methods (Santomero and Seater, 1996; Humphrey *et al.*, 2001; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; and Borzekowski *et al.*, 2008). While we trust that the regressors reflecting consumers' banking relationships also capture differences in the pricing, a further robustness check is in order. As explained in Section 2, it is typical that at the age of 26, the various banking service packages to which cards are often attached cease to be free of charge. Crossing this age may thus trigger search and re-optimization. We therefore include a dummy variable equaling one for those who are 26 or over. The dummy does not get a significant coefficient.¹⁶ The coefficient of consumer awareness changes only a little, if at all, and it is highly significant in all three cases (O-Probit, QML-Poisson, and Probit).

Robustness test 3: To check out whether the results are sensitive to the definition of consumer awareness, we use an alternative proxy for a_i . The alternative proxy equals 1 if the respondent, in addition to acknowledging that she had either received or had been offered a lot of information about debit or credit cards, ways of paying bills, use of transaction accounts, or borrowing using credit cards, indicated in another series of questions that she needed no further information about these products and services. The new proxy effectively captures consumers whose demand for information is 'saturated'. Using the new proxy reduces slightly the estimated effect of consumer awareness. Nonetheless, the effect remains positive and significant in the Probit model at the 5% level and in the O-Probit and QML-Poisson at the 10% level.

Robustness test 4: As a final robustness test, we use a log-transformed dependent variable, $\log(n_i)$, and estimate the model (Table 2B) using OLS. The results do not change.

5 Extensions

So far, we have taken consumer awareness as exogenous and focused on estimating its effect on the use of multiple payment media. In what follows, we first reconsider the assumption of exogenous consumer awareness. We then discuss whether awareness also leads to using different payment methods, and not just more of them.

5.1 Is consumer awareness endogenous?

5.1.1 Sources of endogeneity

Measurement error is perhaps the most obvious source of endogeneity of a_i : In a standard linear regression model, a (classical) measurement error in an explanatory variable typically leads to a downward bias. When the dependent variable is discrete (and the model nonlinear), the direction of the bias is harder to establish.

¹⁶ It is still possible that in the anticipation of re-optimization, consumers begin adjusting their demand for payment media before they reach the threshold age. But dummies allowing for this type of forward-looking behavior gain no significance.

Besides measurement error, endogeneity of a_i can originate from the marketing strategies of the issuers of the payment media.¹⁷ Some consumers are more likely to be a target of (informative) advertising campaigns than others. Endogeneity arises if the propensity to be a target of a campaign is related to consumers' unobserved propensity to use multiple payment media. Signing the direction of such an endogeneity bias is difficult a priori, as it can go either way. For example, we cannot identify which consumers in our data have parents who use multiple payment media. Such heirs of multihomers can be subjected to campaigns of the payment media issuers and simultaneously have, say, a lower than average cost of adoption. This source of endogeneity would presumably bias the estimated effect of consumer awareness upwards. In contrast, a downward bias could follow, if the heirs systematically receive payment media from their parents as an "intergenerational transfer" even when they are not exposed to as systematic information provision as the other adopters are.

Because the ability to pay abroad often prompts young Finns to acquire a payment card (see Section 2), travelling is another potential source of endogeneity where the bias can go either direction. On the one hand, frequent travelers are likely to be targets of advertisement campaigns and heavy users of payment media. An upward bias might therefore follow. On the other hand, many young Finns spend long periods abroad, for example, as exchange students or working. Consequently, they could acquire cards but might receive systemically less information from their domestic issuers, suggesting a downward bias.¹⁸

5.1.2 Estimation and instruments

To relax the assumption of exogenous consumer awareness, we use two different methods of estimation: The first one corresponds to a standard count regression (see column (2) of Table 2A and Table 2B), but allows for "an endogenous treatment effect" (Mullahy, 1997; and Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997). The method of estimation is GMM (GMM-Poisson). The second method is a recursive Bivariate Probit, which is an extension of the Probit model of column (3) of Table 2A and Table 2B (see, for example, Greene, 2008, pp.823-826): In this two-equation model, the dependent variables are $USEMANY_i$ and a_i , and the latter is included in the former's equation as an (endogenous) binary-regressor. We identify the model by excluding some variables (the instruments) from the equation for $USEMANY_i$.

We use two sets of instruments: The first set consists of two indicators that capture whether a respondent had received or had been offered a lot of information about some banking products other than those related to paying and payment media: The first indicator, $INFO_F_i$, equals 1 if the information was about housing loans, student loans,

¹⁷ As we have defined it, consumer awareness reflects a consumer's knowledge about the existence and characteristics of payment media. If a consumer's awareness reflects existence, it can hardly be her choice variable: One can rarely choose to know something that is not known to exist. If a consumer's awareness reflects characteristics of the payment media she knows to be available, awareness could be a choice variable – but it does not have to be.

¹⁸ If a consumer's awareness is her choice variable (cf. footnote 17), endogeneity can also originate from self-selection. This occurs if consumers choose their level of awareness on the basis of their unobservable propensity to use multiple payment media. For example, there can be such early adopters that are enthusiastic about new technologies, and choose to be knowledgeable about the payment media and start to use them eagerly. This self-selection results in an upward bias. A downward bias would instead follow, if some consumers actively acquire information about the payment media but have (for some unobserved reason, for example, heavy indebtedness, criminal record, past credit defaults) a limited access to them.

term deposits, or investing in stocks, mutual funds, etc., and is 0 otherwise. The second indicator, $INFO_M_i$, equals 1 if the information was about using banking services via the Internet or via mobile phone, and is 0 otherwise. The assumption underlying the instruments is that there are advantages associated with the joint marketing and production of financial services (see, for example, Berger, Humphrey and Pulley, 1996).¹⁹ These instruments are valid (that is, relevant and exogenous) if they are a determinant of consumer awareness (a_i) and if the extent to which a consumer is supplied information, for example, about term deposits or housing loans, have no direct effect on her propensity to use multiple payment media.

The second set of instrumental variables is built on the following three indicators: FIN_FO_i equals 1, if the consumer responded that she follows regularly banking and financial news in media and is 0 otherwise, FIN_IM_i equals 1, if she found it important to be literate in banking and financial issues and is 0 otherwise, and FIN_IN_i equals 1, if she were interested to know more about banking and banking services, and is 0 otherwise. These instruments are valid if a consumer's overall interest in financial and banking affairs determines her awareness about payment media and if the overall interest has no direct impact on the use of multiple payment media.

We report below two test statistics to illustrate how these two sets of instruments work. The first is an F -test statistic for "weak instruments" (Staiger and Stock, 1997), which we implement by testing the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage. The second is an over-identification test.

5.1.3 Results

Table 3 reports the results of the estimations that allow for the (potential) endogeneity of a_i .²⁰ The exogenous variables are the same as those used in Table 2A. The set of instruments is $\{INFO_F_i, INFO_M_i\}$ in columns (1)-(2) and $\{INFO_F_i, INFO_M_i, FIN_FO_i, FIN_IM_i, FIN_IN_i\}$ in columns (3)-(4).

The results confirm our earlier findings: Consumer awareness is directly related to the propensity of consumers to use multiple payment media, since the coefficient of a_i is positive and statistically significant at better than the 1% level in all columns.²¹ The GMM-Poisson estimates of column (1) suggest, for example, that the informed use about 1.2 times more payment media than the less informed. Another interpretation can be obtained from the Bivariate-Probit: Using the estimated parameters we find that the difference between $\text{Prob}(USEMANY_i = 1 \mid a_i = 1)$ and $\text{Prob}(USEMANY_i = 1 \mid a_i = 0)$ is 23.9 percentage points (=60.0%-36.1%). This effect is quantitatively significant and confirms that awareness increases the likelihood using multiple payment media, particularly the likelihood of using a debit card either as a primary or as a secondary method of payment.

¹⁹ If there are such advantages, it pays for banks to cross-sell financial products and services and pursue "one-stop banking". Cross-selling means that when consumers are informed about a banking product, they are *simultaneously* offered information about other financial services, such as payment media.

²⁰ The GMM estimations of the Poisson model were implemented using a Gauss program ExpEnd, written by Frank Windmeijer. The program contains an estimation code for non-linear GMM estimation of exponential models with endogenous regressors (for details, see Windmeijer, 2002). The reported numbers are based on the two-step estimates and multiplicative moment conditions (see Mullahy, 1997; Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997; and Windmeijer, 2002). Somewhat surprisingly, using additive moment conditions yield almost identical results.

²¹ The null hypothesis that the residual correlation in the Bivariate-Probit is zero is not rejected at the 5% level (p -value of the LR-test is 0.0673).

This shows that not controlling for the endogeneity of awareness may result in a downward biased estimate. Given that the direction of the bias was ambiguous a priori, the magnitude of the bias in the estimate is surprisingly large.

	$Y = n$			$Y = USEMANY$			$Y = n$			$Y = USEMANY$		
	GMM-Poisson			Bivariate-probit			GMM-Poisson			Bivariate-probit		
	Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.		Coef.	Std. Err.	
a	0,18	0,05	***	0,77	0,22	***	0,19	0,05	***	0,77	0,22	***
$INCOME$	0,01	3,9E-03	**	0,04	0,02	*	0,01	3,9E-03	**	0,04	0,02	*
$INCOMESQ$	-2,0E-04	1,0E-04	*	-1,0E-03	5,3E-04	*	-2,0E-04	1,0E-04		-1,0E-03	5,3E-04	*
AGE	0,07	0,05		0,10	0,20		0,07	0,05		0,10	0,20	
$AGESQ$	-1,0E-03	1,0E-03		-1,4E-04	4,5E-03		-1,0E-03	1,0E-03		-1,4E-04	4,5E-03	
SEX	0,07	0,02	***	0,30	0,10	***	0,07	0,02	***	0,30	0,10	***
$LIVCITY$	0,04	0,02	*	0,24	0,10	*	0,04	0,02	*	0,24	0,10	*
$WEST$	-0,02	0,03		-0,01	0,11		-0,01	0,03		-0,01	0,11	
$EAST$	0,02	0,04		0,17	0,16		0,02	0,04		0,17	0,16	
$NORTH$	0,02	0,03		0,18	0,15		0,02	0,03		0,18	0,15	
EMP	0,02	0,04		0,11	0,16		0,01	0,04		0,11	0,16	
$UNEMP$	-0,02	0,05		0,02	0,20		-0,02	0,05		0,02	0,20	
$HIGH$	0,18	0,06	***	0,83	0,27	***	0,17	0,06	***	0,83	0,27	***
$MEDIUM$	0,09	0,05	**	0,53	0,22	*	0,09	0,05	**	0,53	0,22	*
$NOHOUSEH$	-0,01	0,04		0,01	0,13		-0,01	0,04		0,01	0,13	
$CHILDREN$	0,02	0,04		0,02	0,19		0,02	0,04		0,02	0,19	
$RWEALTH$	0,06	0,03	*	0,31	0,15	*	0,06	0,03	*	0,31	0,15	*
$FWEALTH$	0,08	0,03	***	0,26	0,11	*	0,08	0,02	***	0,26	0,11	*
$LWEALTH$	0,03	0,03		0,05	0,11		0,03	0,03		0,05	0,11	
Instruments:	INFO_F, INFO_M			INFO_F, INFO_M			INFO_F, INFO_M, FIN_FO, FIN_IM, FIN_IN			INFO_F, INFO_M, FIN_FO, FIN_IM, FIN_IN		
Observations		942			942			942			942	
Log likelihood					-920,99						-916,49	
Over-identif. test (p-value)	0,88						0,12					

Table 3. Regressions results: Endogenous a_i .

Note: i) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level; ii) The GMM-Poisson is based on two-step estimates and multiplicative moment conditions; iii) The instrumented variable in the GMM-Poisson is “ a ”; iv) The dependent variable in the second equation of the Bivariate-Probit is “ a ”; v) The excluded variables from the equation for $USEMANY$ in the Bivariate-Probit are the instruments.

It seems that weak instruments do not bias the instrumental variable estimations: For example, when we estimate a first stage regression by OLS, the value of the F -test statistic is 106.24 and 49.05 when the joint significance of $\{INFO_F_i, INFO_M_i\}$ and $\{INFO_F_i, INFO_M_i, FIN_FO_i, FIN_IM_i, FIN_IN_i\}$ is tested, respectively.²² These values exceed clearly the rule-of-thumb threshold (F -statistic >10), suggested by Steiger and Stock (1997). The (Sargan) over-identification tests, implemented using the GMM-procedure, do not reject the exogeneity of the instruments.

We can also consider the robustness of the estimations that allow for the endogeneity of a_i . First, we repeat the estimations using the alternative proxy for consumer awareness

²² As for the other determinants of the consumer awareness, our results are less clear cut: Most of the demographics (that is, the exogenous variables) do not seem to predict it.

(described in robustness test 3 of Section 4.2). The estimated effect increases and is statistically significant at (better than) the 5% level in both the GMM-Poisson and recursive Bivariate-Probit estimations. Second, the results do not change, when we use the full set of exogenous variables (that is, the specification used in Table 2B). For example, when we use recursive Bivariate-Probit and the set of instruments is $\{INFO_F_i, INFO_M_i\}$, the coefficient of a_i is positive and highly significant. Third, some may find the exclusion restriction underlying $\{FIN_FO_i, FIN_IM_i, FIN_IN_i\}$ more convincing than that underlying $\{INFO_F_i, INFO_M_i\}$. When we use recursive Bivariate-Probit and the set of instruments is restricted to $\{FIN_FO_i, FIN_IM_i, FIN_IN_i\}$, the coefficient of a_i is positive and highly significant. Finally, the results of Table 3 hold if the depend variable is $\log(n_i)$ and the method of estimation 2SLS.

5.2 Awareness and the use of different payment media

It is also possible that awareness results in using different methods, not just more of them. To address the issue we take in Figures 3A and 3B a closer look at the methods of payment among the young who use many methods. Figure 3A displays the distribution of the most typical way of paying (based on answers to Q1), conditional on $n_i > 1$ and the first choice not being cash.

Figure 3A: The most typical way of paying, conditional on $n_i > 1$ and the first choice not being cash.

Figure 3B displays, in turn, the distribution of the second most typical way of paying (based on answers to Q2), conditional on $n_i > 1$ and the first choice being cash.²³

²³ While not shown in the figures, we report that 95% of the young use cash as their secondary payment method, conditional on $n_i > 1$ and the first choice not being cash.

Figure 3B. The second most typical way of paying, conditional on $n_i > 1$ and the first choice being cash.

These figures show that debit card is the most typical way of paying among those who use many payment media and who do not use cash as their primary method of payment. Together with Visa Electron (which from the consumer's point of view is close to a regular debit card), debit card is also the second most typical way of paying among those who use many payment media and whose first choice is cash. The figures do not, however, suggest that awareness is related to the choice of debit card as a primary or as a secondary method of payment. Pearson's χ^2 -tests indicate that these (conditional) choices are not related to awareness: The null hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected in either case.

Our analysis so far shows that the use of multiple payment media is both correlated with awareness and closely related to the decision to use debit card either as a primary or a secondary method of payment in addition to cash. However, the relationship between awareness and debit card use is nuanced: The consumers using only one payment method use cash irrespective of their awareness, and while awareness correlates with a shift towards the use of multiple media, the shift means that some begin to use debit as their primary method of payment, whereas the others begin to use it secondary to cash.

In Table 4, we condition on $n_i > 1$ and compare the characteristics of the consumers who consider debit card their primary method of payment (cash being the secondary) to those regarding debit as secondary to cash.

	Mean	Mean			
	Debit secondary	Debit primary	<i>t</i> -test	<i>p</i> -value of <i>t</i> -test	
<i>a</i>	0,79	0,82	-0,84	0,40	
<i>INCOME</i>	9,21	13,57	-4,76	0,00	***
<i>AGE</i>	22,19	24,13	-6,19	0,00	***
<i>SEX</i>	0,53	0,54	-0,20	0,84	
<i>LIVCITY</i>	0,51	0,56	-1,11	0,27	
<i>WEST</i>	0,41	0,32	2,03	0,04	**
<i>EAST</i>	0,13	0,14	-0,22	0,82	
<i>NORTH</i>	0,10	0,13	-1,12	0,26	
<i>SOUTH</i>	0,36	0,41	-1,12	0,26	
<i>EMP</i>	0,37	0,51	-2,96	0,00	***
<i>UNEMP</i>	0,07	0,09	-0,66	0,51	
<i>SCHOOL</i>	0,56	0,40	3,30	0,00	***
<i>HIGH</i>	0,31	0,51	-4,42	0,00	***
<i>MEDIUM</i>	0,65	0,49	3,41	0,00	***
<i>LOW</i>	0,04	0,00	3,04	0,00	***
<i>NOHOUSEH</i>	0,35	0,12	6,16	0,00	***
<i>CHILDREN</i>	0,11	0,15	-1,30	0,19	
<i>RWEALTH</i>	0,17	0,28	-2,92	0,00	***
<i>FWEALTH</i>	0,27	0,38	-2,58	0,01	**
<i>LWEALTH</i>	0,24	0,27	-0,90	0,37	
<i>MBANK_1</i>	0,33	0,26	1,46	0,14	
<i>MBANK_2</i>	0,43	0,39	0,82	0,41	
<i>MBANK_3</i>	0,08	0,07	0,43	0,67	
<i>MBANK_4</i>	0,13	0,21	-2,28	0,02	**
<i>MBANK_5</i>	0,01	0,02	-1,02	0,31	
<i>MBANK_6</i>	0,02	0,03	-0,96	0,34	
<i>MBANK_7</i>	0,00	0,01	-0,77	0,44	
<i>NOSBANK</i>	0,74	0,68	1,25	0,21	
<i>BCHOICE</i>	0,42	0,49	-1,51	0,13	
<i>BLENGTH</i>	0,61	0,61	0,11	0,91	
<i>BCLUB</i>	0,64	0,69	-1,23	0,22	
<i>SWBANK</i>	0,03	0,04	-0,69	0,49	
Obs.	257	208			
(conditional on $n > 1$)					

Table 4: Characteristics of the primary users of debit vs. the secondary users of debit.

Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

The table reports group means, *t*-tests for the difference in the group means and associated *p*-values. The results show that, on average, the consumers keeping debit as a primary method earn more, work more often full time, have more real and financial wealth, and are more educated and a little older. If the use of debit card as a primary method of payment is a sign of a more “digitalized” payer or an “early adopter” of a new payment

method, the findings are in line with the prior literature. The negative result for awareness in this table supports our earlier findings: Conditional on $n_i > 1$, awareness is not tightly related to the decision to use debit as a primary method of payment instead of using it as a secondary method.

We have also experimented with a standard multinomial logit model to investigate the question of whether awareness leads to the use of different payment media, conditional on the young using many of them. The results of the estimations (for brevity, not reported in a table) confirm that when the dependent variable allows for the three outcomes, ‘1 if the respondent uses only one payment medium’, ‘2 if the respondent uses many payment media and considers cash the primary’, and ‘3 if the respondent uses many payment media and considers debit as the primary’, awareness differentiates the consumers using many payment media from those using only one medium but does not differentiate the primary users of debit from the secondary users of debit.²⁴

6 Conclusions

It is widely thought that besides pricing, information provision could be used to enhance the diffusion of payment media. However, there is little evidence on the quantitative importance of consumer information in the market for payment media. This paper delivers such evidence using a random sample of young Finnish consumers.

We find that the majority of young consumers use more than one payment medium. We also find that the better informed a consumer is, the more likely she is to use many payment methods. It turns out that the use of multiple payment media is closely related to the decision to use debit card in addition to cash. The effect of awareness on the probability of using multiple payment media is quantitatively large, especially if the potential endogeneity of consumer awareness is controlled for.

However, there is no straightforward link from awareness to debit use: The consumers who use only one payment method use cash irrespective of their awareness, and while awareness induces a shift towards using many payment methods, the shift means that some begin to use debit as their primary method of paying, whereas the others begin to use it as their secondary method. It seems, in particular, that conditional the young using many payment methods, awareness does not allow us to distinguish the consumers using debit as a primary method from those using it as secondary to cash. We show that the primary users of debit share some characteristics with “early adopters” of new payment methods or more “digitalized” payers found in the prior studies, since they earn more, work more often full time, and are more educated, a little older, and wealthier.

Our findings imply that holding income, wealth, banking relationship and other consumer characteristics constant, consumers react to information provision about payment methods. Making consumers better informed about these financial products could thus accelerate the adoption of new payment media, such as electronic money and mobile payments. The findings also suggest that increases in consumer awareness may have been

²⁴ The coefficient of a_i is positive and significant in outcome equations ‘2’ ($n_i > 1$, cash being the primary) and ‘3’ ($n_i > 1$, debit being the primary) when compared with the base outcome equation ‘1’ ($n_i = 1$). The coefficient of a_i is, however, not larger when outcome equation ‘2’ is compared to outcome equation ‘3’, or vice versa. An experiment with a nested logit model resulted in similar conclusions. It should be noted, however, that awareness is assumed to be exogenous in these estimations.

underlying the rise of debit card use around the world. Beyond this, the implications of our findings for the payment media industry are less clear-cut. Because consumer multihoming intensifies platform competition over merchants (Rochet and Tirole, 2003), increasing consumer awareness may be a two-edged sword for the payment media industry. On the one hand, it could be advantageous for the merchants, but on the other hand, the issuers of payment media may encounter a dilemma of prisoner type: Each issuer can have an incentive to increase consumer awareness of its own preferred medium, but the industry as a whole may be better off with a limited number of consumers who use multiple payment media.

Although the positive effect of consumer awareness on the use of multiple payment media suggests that allocating more resources on marketing new payment media may increase their adoption rates, a caveat should be borne in mind. We are unfortunately unable to identify whether consumer awareness reflects the consumers' exposure to informative advertising or persuasive advertising, or something else (cf. Akerberg, 2001). We cannot therefore tell what kind of information provision or advertising would boost the demand for payment media. Isolating the mechanisms through which consumer awareness influences the adoption of new payment media is an area that clearly deserves further research.

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