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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter March 2, 2010

Technology Uncertainty and Market Collusion

  • Paola Labrecciosa and Luca Colombo


In this paper, we propose technology uncertainty as a new factor relevant to market collusion. We analyze an infinitely repeated quantity game where, for each firm, the marginal productivity of the input employed in the production process is affected by an unobservable shock. Each firm faces technology uncertainty, measured by the variance of the shocks, in every period. We show that, under both grim trigger strategies and optimal punishments, technology uncertainty enhances cartel stability, suggesting that, in industries characterized by technology uncertainty, the actions of the antitrust authorities should be intensified. We also show that collusion is less likely when technology shocks are highly correlated, implying that regulators interested in deterring collusion should promote the formation of industrial clusters.

Published Online: 2010-3-2

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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