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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter April 7, 2010

Carbon Taxes and Innovation without Commitment

  • Rolf Golombek , Mads Greaker and Michael Hoel

Abstract

Climate mitigation policy should be imposed over a long period, and spur innovation of new technologies in order to make stabilization of green house gas concentration economically feasible. The government may announce current and future policy packages that stimulate current R&D in climate-friendly technologies. However, once climate-friendly technologies have been developed, the government may have no incentive to implement the pre-announced future policies, that is, there may be a time inconsistency problem. We show that if the government can optimally subsidize R&D today, there is no time inconsistency problem. Thus, lack of commitment is not an argument for higher current R&D subsidies than the first-best subsidy. If the offered R&D subsidy is lower than the optimal subsidy, the current (sub-game perfect) carbon tax rate exceeds the first-best carbon tax rate.

Published Online: 2010-4-7

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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