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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter August 23, 2010

The Value of Information in Regulation

  • Arvind Magesan and Matthew A Turner

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of an imperfectly informed regulator constrained in his choice of environmental regulation by the political opposition of those affected by the policy. We compare the value of two types of information to the regulator: the social cost of pollution and the profitability of firms present in the economy. We find that in environments where small increases in the losses to regulated firms greatly affect the regulator's ability to implement the policy, it is most valuable to learn the types of firms whereas it is most valuable to learn the social cost of pollution when small increases in losses are relatively ineffectual.

Published Online: 2010-8-23

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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