Skip to content
Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter June 13, 2008

Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators

  • Leonardo Boncinelli

In this paper I apply stochastic stability to compare the effect on welfare of local information and global information when agents adopt imitative behavioral rules. Under global information, agents can potentially imitate anyone, while under local information, the sets of observable agents are choice-dependent. The evaluation of information in terms of welfare enhancement is ambiguous over finite time horizons, while in the long run global information is worse (better) in the presence of pure negative (positive) spillovers. However, when preferences also depend on the choice itself, further ambiguity emerges, generally making the comparison uncertain.

Published Online: 2008-6-13

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 25.2.2024 from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.2202/1935-1704.1439/html
Scroll to top button