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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter August 31, 2011

Mother or Child? Intra-household Redistribution under Gender-Asymmetric Altruism

  • Indraneel Dasgupta

I examine a non-cooperative model of voluntary contribution to children’s goods in a two-adult household, where both parents may have marginal rates of substitution across paternal, maternal and public contributions that differ from unity. I find a conflict of interest between women and their children. Depending on the marginal rate of substitution between paternal and maternal contributions, a lump-sum redistribution from fathers to mothers may make children better off, but their mothers worse off, or vice versa. Additional public contribution funded by a lump-sum tax on fathers may make children better off at the cost of mothers.

Published Online: 2011-8-31

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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