Accounting, Economics, and Law

A Convivium

Volume 1, Issue 3

2011

Article 1

CORPORATIONS AND THE US CONSTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON
"CITIZENS UNITED" AND ITS AFTERMATH

Citizens United and the Corporate Form

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Recommended Citation:

Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. (2011) "Citizens United and the Corporate Form," *Accounting, Economics, and Law*: Vol. 1: Iss. 3, Article 1.

Citizens United and the Corporate Form

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Abstract

In *Citizens United vs. FEC*, the Supreme Court struck down a Federal statute banning direct corporate expenditures on political campaigns. The decision has been widely criticized and praised as a matter of First Amendment law. But it is also interesting as another step in the evolution of our legal views of the corporation. This article argues that by viewing *Citizens United* through the prism of theories about the corporate form, it is possible to see that the majority and the dissent departed from previous Supreme Court jurisprudence on the First Amendment rights of corporations. It is also possible to then predict what arguments can be expected next.

KEYWORDS: corporation, legal fiction, legal person, real entity, constitutional rights, free speech

JEL Classification Codes: K10, k22, l50, l20

Acknowledgements: Irwin I. Cohn, Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. A previous version of this paper was published by the *Wisconsin Law Review* (2010: 999-1047).

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Introduction

In *Citizens United vs. FEC*,¹ the Supreme Court struck down a Federal banning direct corporate expenditures on political campaigns.² The decision has been both widely criticized and praised as a matter of First Amendment law.³ But it is also interesting as another step in the evolution of our legal views of the corporation.⁴ The thesis of this Article is that by viewing *Citizens United* through the prism of theories about the corporate form, it is possible to understand how both the majority and the dissent departed from previous Supreme Court cases on the First Amendment rights of corporations and to predict what arguments can be expected next.

The corporation has evolved from its origins in Roman law through a series of four major transformations. First, the concept of the corporation as a separate legal person from its owners or members developed with the work of the civil law Commentators in the fourteenth century.⁵ By the end of the Middle Ages, the membership corporation—i.e., a corporation that had legal personality (the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal responsibility), unlimited life, and in which members chose their successors—was well

1. 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).

2. *Id.* at 917 (striking down 2 U.S.C § 441b (2006), which banned corporate-funded independent expenditures).

3. *See, e.g.*, Matt Bodie, *Two Small Thoughts on Citizens United*, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:13 PM), <http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/01/two-small-thoughts-on-citizens-united.html>; Ira Glasser, *Understanding the Citizens United Ruling*, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2010, 9:28 PM), http://huffingtonpost.com/ira-glasser/understanding-the-emcitiz_b_447342.html; Lawrence Lessig, *Institutional Integrity: Citizens United and the Path to a Better Democracy*, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2010, 3:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/institutional-integrity-c_b_433394.html?view=screen; Lawrence Lessig, *The Democrats' Response to Citizens United: Not (Even Close to) Good Enough*, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2010, 6:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Lawrence-lessig/the-democrats-response-to_b_462412.html?view=screen; Eugene Volokh, *Citizens United and the Mainstream Media*, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:01 PM), <http://volokh.com/2010/01/21/citizens-united-and-the-mainstream-media>; Howard Wasserman, *Further Thoughts on Citizens United*, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:15 AM), <http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/01/further-thoughts-on-citizens-united.html>.

4. *See generally* Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, *The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility*, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, *Cyclical Transformations*].

5. *Id.* at 780-82 (showing that by the time of Bartulos of Sassoferato (1314-1357), the leading Commentator on the Corpus Juris Civilis in the fourteenth century, the concept of the corporation as a separate legal person was fully developed).

established in both civil and common law jurisdictions.⁶ The next important step was the shift from non-profit membership corporations to for-profit business corporations, which took place in England and the U.S. at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.⁷ The third transformation was the shift from closely held corporations to corporations whose shares are widely held and publicly traded. This also included the rise of limited liability and freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.⁸ Finally, the last major transformation was from corporations doing business in one country to multinational enterprises whose operations span the globe, which began after World War II and is still ongoing.⁹

Each of these four transformations was accompanied by changes in the legal conception of the corporation. What is remarkable, however, is that throughout all of these changes, spanning two millennia, the same three theories of the corporation can be discerned. Those theories are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of the State; and the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.¹⁰

In this Article, I will first discuss how the three theories of the corporation are reflected in our historical jurisprudence, and then I will show how *Citizens United* fits within this tradition. Part I discusses the cyclical evolution of the three corporate theories from the eighteenth century onward and shows that each transformation brought forth all three theories, the real entity view always won and was the established view during periods of stability. Part II applies this analysis to *Citizens United* and its antecedents *Bellotti* and *Austin*, demonstrating that all three theories arise in *Bellotti* and *Austin*, but that both the majority and the dissent in *Citizens United* adopt the real entity view. Part III concludes by predicting that the next confrontation will distinguish between domestic and foreign corporations for First Amendment purposes, that all three theories will be advanced, and that ultimately the real entity view will prevail in this context as well.

6. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455-73 (describing the corporate form); Avi-Yonah, *Cyclical Transformations*, *supra* note 4, at 783.

7. Avi-Yonah, *Cyclical Transformations*, *supra* note 4 at 785-86; see, e.g., JOSEPH ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE, at v (1st ed., Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1832).

8. Avi-Yonah, *Cyclical Transformations*, *supra* note 4, at 793-94.

9. *Id.* at 810-12.

10. These three are standard theories found in literature. See, e.g., David Millon, *Theories of the Corporation*, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201.

1. The Cyclical Evolution of Corporate Theories¹¹

1.1. From Nonprofit to For-Profit Corporations

By the time the American colonies declared themselves to be “free and independent states,” the corporation was well established in English law as a membership corporation, i.e., a corporation made up of members who selected their own successors, like the President and Fellows of Harvard College still do today. As such, a corporation had legal personality—the right to own property, sue and be sued, act under a common seal, and other such “chestnuts.”¹² Private corporations were used primarily for nonprofit purposes (e.g., hospitals and universities), but by the eighteenth century there were also some commercial ones (e.g., the East India Company).¹³

There were two important limitations on corporations in this period. The first was royal control over corporations; in England and other European countries corporations could only be established by royal charter. Blackstone notes that although in Roman law corporations could be established without “the prince’s consent,” “with us in England, the king’s consent is absolutely necessary.”¹⁴ Second, some degree of outside control over management was established through the institution of the committee of visitors, which represented the interests of the founder and of the wider community.¹⁵

But other than in extraordinary cases, the real entity view of the corporation prevailed throughout this period, and management (the members) was firmly in control. “[A] corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the law”¹⁶ As such, it was a self-perpetuating body subject to relatively little outside regulation. Corporations, Blackstone notes, are “artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.”¹⁷ When the members

11. Part II is based on Avi-Yonah, *Cyclical Transformations*, *supra* note 4.

12. ROBERT C. CLARK, *CORPORATE LAW* 17 (1986). For a discussion of how these basic features of corporate legal personality were established, see Avi-Yonah, *Cyclical Transformations*, *supra* note 4.

13. BLACKSTONE, *supra* note 6, at ch. XVIII (classifying and describing various corporations).

14. *Id.* at 460; *Tipling v. Pexall*, (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1085 (K.B.) 1085 (“the King creates them”); *see also The Case of Sutton’s Hospital* (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) (providing an example of a charter enumerating corporate legal rights).

15. BLACKSTONE, *supra* note 6, at *467-69.

16. *The Case of Sutton’s Hospital* (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.) 973.

17. BLACKSTONE, *supra* note 6, at *455.

are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their successors are then considered as one person in law: as one person, they have one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the individuals . . . for all the individual members that have existed from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person in law, a person that never dies¹⁸

This “one person” then acquires all the rights of corporations, including perpetual succession.¹⁹ The King constituted corporations, and the King or other visitors exercised some degree of supervision over them, but once established the corporation remained subject to relatively little outside regulation.²⁰

This situation meant that corporate status was very desirable, especially since the members also enjoyed limited liability for corporate debts.²¹ But the English kings were very cautious with granting corporate charters, especially in the case of for-profit enterprises; only corporations that were clearly vested with a public purpose and benefited the public fisc, like the East India and Hudson Bay Companies, received royal approval and accumulated vast power.²² As more capital was required for commercial enterprises, promoters organized corporations with transferable shares and claimed that under the authority of a lost or obsolete charter the shareholders enjoyed limited liability.²³ Then, after the South Sea Bubble burst in 1720, this problem (and the desire of the East India Company to retain its monopoly) led to the Bubble Act, under which it became a crime to organize such corporations without explicit royal consent.²⁴ Although prosecutions under the Bubble Act were rare, it meant that the entire Industrial Revolution in England (1760-1820) took place outside the corporate form and without limited liability.²⁵ The Bubble Act was ultimately repealed in 1825, after the Industrial Revolution was over, but the provision of unlimited liability for shareholders continued to be the rule in England until 1855.²⁶

18.*Id.* at *456.

19.*Id.* at *463-64.

20.*See generally* Ron Harris, *Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844* (2000) (discussing historical development of corporations in England).

21.Although this was not clear in the Roman sources, it was well established by Blackstone’s time for royally chartered corporations. “The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally extinguished by its dissolution; so that the members thereof cannot recover, or be charged with them, in their natural capacities.” BLACKSTONE, *supra* note 6, at *472.

22.*See* Harris *supra* note 20, at 43-49 (discussing colonial corporations).

23.*Id.* at 127-32.

24.Bubble Act, 1719, 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (Gr. Brit.); *see* Harris, *supra* note 20.

25.For attempts to avoid the Bubble Act which led to prosecutions, *see The King v. Webb*, (1811) 104 Eng. Rep. 658; *The King v. Dodd*, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 670 (K.B); *see* Harris, *supra* note 19, at 78-79.

26.Bubble Act Repeal, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 91 (UK); Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 133 (UK.).

This situation, which can be seen as a way of maintaining state control over corporations through restrictions on charters, meant that the next great shift in the use of corporate form took place in the fledgling United States. There, once the revolution was over, every state could issue corporate charters.²⁷ The result was an explosion of charters for commercial enterprises.²⁸ Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames's wrote one of the first treatises on corporate law, *Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate*, published in Boston in 1832.²⁹ Angell and Ames begin their book by stating:

The reader does not require to be told, that we have in our country an infinite number of corporations aggregate, which have no concern whatever with affairs of a municipal nature. These associations we not only find scattered throughout every cultivated part of the United States, but so engaged are they in all the varieties of useful pursuit, that we see them directing the concentration of mind and capital to . . . the encouragement and extension of the great interests of commerce, agriculture, and manufactures. There is a great difference in this respect between our own country, and the country from which we have derived a great portion of our laws. What is done in England by combination, unless it be the management of municipal concerns, is most generally done by a combination of individuals, established by mere articles of agreement. On the other hand, what is done here by the co-operation of several persons, is, in the greater number of instances, the result of a consolidation effected by an express act or charter of incorporation.³⁰

The main reason for this proliferation of corporations in the United States was the second great transformation in the role of the corporation in society from primarily a nonprofit to primarily a for-profit enterprise. As Judge Kent stated:

27. See Angell & Ames, *supra* note 7, at 35. For general discussions of state corporate charters, see Lawrence M. Friedman, *A History of American Law* 177-202 (1985); Kermit L. Hall et al., *American Legal History: Cases and Materials* 115-17 (1991); Morton J. Horwitz, *The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860*, at 63-139 (1977).

28. ANGELL AND AMES, *supra* note 7, at 35.

29. Angell and Ames's work was preceded by the English work of Stewart Kyd, published in London in 1793, but that treatise was devoted primarily to municipal corporations. See ANGELL & AMES, *supra* note 7, at vi. The Angell and Ames treatise was very successful, with eleven editions published through 1882.

30. *Id.* at v; see also *id.* at 35 ("In no country have corporations been multiplied to so great an extent, as in our own There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our community, who is not a member of, at least, one private company or society which is incorporated. . . . Acts of incorporation are moreover continually solicited at every session of the legislature . . .").

[T]he multiplication of corporations in the United States, and the avidity with which they are sought, have arisen in consequence of the power which a large and consolidated capital gives them over business of every kind; and the facility which the incorporation gives to the management of that capital, and the security which it affords to the persons of its members, and to their property not vested in the corporate stock.³¹

This was a profound shift, and not surprisingly it led to a revival of the centuries-old debate about the nature of the corporate form and its relationship to the shareholders and the state. This debate can be seen if we examine the opinions on the subject issued by the first great American jurist, John Marshall. Three of Marshall's opinions, written decades apart, are particularly relevant here: *Bank of the United States v. Deveaux*,³² *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*,³³ and *Bank of the United States v. Dandridge*.³⁴ These opinions represent the evolution of his thinking on corporations, which moved from the aggregate view, *Deveaux*, to the artificial entity view *Dartmouth College* to the real entity view *Dandridge*.

Deveaux involved an attempt by the state of Georgia to tax the Savannah branch of the Bank of the United States, a corporation established by Congress in 1791, as part of the early struggles around federalism.³⁵ The Bank was a membership corporation ("The president, directors and company of the bank of the United States") and all the members were citizens of Pennsylvania.³⁶ The Bank refused to pay the tax, and the State sent its collectors to enforce payment, whereupon the Bank sued the collectors in federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction.³⁷ The issue facing the court was whether a corporation made up of members from one state could sue citizens of another state in federal court on diversity grounds. This in turn required deciding between the view that "the individual character of the members is so wholly lost in that of the corporation, that the court cannot take notice of it," and the contrary view that "a corporation is composed of natural persons," that is, between the entity (artificial or real) and aggregate views.³⁸

Marshall decided in favor of the aggregate view. He stated that the corporation itself, "that mere legal entity," cannot be a citizen or sue in federal

31.*Id.* at 36 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 219 (New York City, O. Halsted 1827). The last sentence refers to limited liability, which will be discussed below.

32.9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).

33.17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

34.25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).

35.*Deveaux*, 9. U.S. (5 Cranch) at 63, 73.

36.*Id.* at 74.

37.*Id.* at 63.

38.*Id.* at 63-64.

court unless it can be regarded as “a company of individuals.”³⁹ However, since the reasons that led Congress to enact diversity jurisdiction applied to corporations as well, Marshall was inclined to see the controversy as being between the members “suing in their corporate character” and their opponents.⁴⁰ “The controversy is substantially between aliens, suing by a corporate name, and a citizen . . . in this case the corporate name represents persons who are members of the corporation.”⁴¹ The Court therefore held that federal jurisdiction existed.

Ten years later Marshall was faced with another difficult issue involving corporations. In the famous *Dartmouth College*⁴² case, the state of New Hampshire attempted to alter the charter of Dartmouth College (incorporated as a membership corporation by George III in 1769, under the name of The Trustees of Dartmouth College),⁴³ by transferring the appointment of trustees to the state, thereby effectively taking it over.⁴⁴ The trustees objected, arguing that the charter constituted a contract and that altering it violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.⁴⁵

Marshall held that as the College was a private corporation, its charter was a contract and was protected by the contracts clause.⁴⁶ He began by noting that neither the funds for the College, which came from private sources, or its educational character made it a public corporation.⁴⁷ He then got to the heart of the issue—whether the act of incorporation by the state makes it possible for the state to take it over. In frequently quoted language, Marshall held that “[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”⁴⁸

This language reflects the artificial entity view of the corporation. Marshall then went on to note that, having created the corporation, the state may not treat it as a mere extension of itself: “this being does not share in the civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created.”⁴⁹ Even though its object is to promote governmentally approved aims, this does not make corporations into mere instruments of government. Instead, the corporation exists

39.*Id.* at 86-87.

40.*Id.* at 87-88.

41.*Id.* at 91.

42.17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518.

43.*Id.* at 518-25.

44.*Id.* at 626.

45.*Id.* at 588-89.

46.*Id.* at 650.

47.*Id.* at 635.

48.*Id.* at 636.

49.*Id.*

to represent the interest of the founder and his descendants in the aims for which it was founded. In the United States, this interest is protected by the contracts clause, although in England, Marshall recognized, Parliament had the power to annul the charter.⁵⁰ In this country “the body corporate, as possessing the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, for the purpose of executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the constitution.”⁵¹

It should be noted that while Marshall held that the state may not take over a private corporation, even one founded for public ends, the emphasis on the artificial nature of the corporation left ample room for state regulation via the original charter. Since states were busy granting charters by the hundreds, the *Dartmouth* opinion thus enabled the states to regulate corporations, should they wish to do so.

Finally, six years later, Marshall was once more called to opine on the nature of corporations in another case involving the Bank of the United States.⁵² *Dandridge* involved a suit by the Bank, regarding a bond executed by one of its cashiers, in which the defendant argued that the bond had never been approved by the Board of Directors, as required by the charter of incorporation. The key issue was whether the level of evidence required of corporations was higher than that required of individuals, since corporations are incapable of acting without writing.⁵³ Justice Story, writing for the Court, held that no distinction should be made: “The same presumptions are . . . applicable to corporations.”⁵⁴ Marshall, however, dissented. He argued that

The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, distinct from the individuals who compose it, must be endowed with a mode of action peculiar to itself, which will always distinguish its transactions from those of its members. This faculty must be exercised according to its own nature . . . This can be done only by writing.⁵⁵

The Court’s view was the more pragmatic one, but Marshall’s view was more consistent with the real entity view of the corporation as distinct from its members, individually or collectively. It certainly forms an interesting contrast with the views he expressed in the *Deveaux* case sixteen years earlier.

How can one explain the shift in Marshall’s view of the corporation from aggregate (*Deveaux*) to artificial (*Dartmouth College*) to real (*Dandridge*)? In part, it stems from the circumstances of these particular cases. In *Deveaux*,

50.*Id.* at 643.

51.*Id.* at 654.

52.*Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge*, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1825) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).

53.*Id.* at 65-67.

54.*Id.* at 70.

55.*Id.* at 91-92 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).

Marshall wanted to confer diversity jurisdiction to protect a federal institution (he was, after all, a Federalist), and the only way to do so was to look through the corporation to its members. In *Dartmouth College*, the issue involved the relationship of private corporations (albeit “imbued with a public purpose,” the full-fledged private/public distinction had not yet evolved) to the state, and thus Marshall emphasized the role of the state in creating the corporation, while placing clear limits on its ability to regulate corporations thereafter. These limits were required as the result of the proliferation of corporations, especially for-profit business corporations, since otherwise the state would be able to take over purely private businesses. In practice, the result in *Dartmouth College* favored the real entity view: once a private corporation was created, it could no longer be taken over—or perhaps even overly regulated—by the state. Thus, it may not be surprising that by the time he came to write his *Dandridge* dissent Marshall took the real entity view, even though it contradicted his opinion in *Deveaux* (which was not mentioned).

Two important legal developments during the same period strengthened the real entity view and weakened the aggregate and artificial entity views of the corporation: the rise of limited liability and the spread of general incorporation laws. Limited liability weakened the aggregate view, and general incorporation weakened the artificial entity view. First, limited liability: As we have seen in England, limited liability did not exist for corporations until 1855.⁵⁶ In the United States, however, most states adopted limited liability in the 1830s.⁵⁷ In their first edition, Angell and Ames explain the primary distinction between a partnership and a corporation:

In every private unincorporated company, the members are liable for the debts without limitation; whereas in incorporated societies, they are only liable to the extent of their shares It is frequently the principal object, in this and in other countries, in procuring an act of incorporation, to limit the risk of the partners to their shares in the stock of the association; and prudent men are always backward in taking stock, when they become mere copartners as regards their personal liability for the company debts.⁵⁸

56. Phillip I. Blumberg, *The Multinational Challenge To Corporation Law* 17 (1993).

57. *Id.* at 10-12.

58. ANGELL & AMES, *supra* note 7, at 23; *see also id.*, at 349 (“No rule of law, we believe, is better settled, than that, in general, the individual members of a private corporate body are not liable for the debts.”); *id.* at 36 (citing a quote from Judge Kent emphasizing limited liability as a reason to incorporate).

When Angell and Ames wrote this, limited liability was by no means a universally established rule for corporations;⁵⁹ the authors were thus trying to establish the law as much as describe the law that existed. Their main argument, familiar from current debates on limited liability,⁶⁰ was that “[t]he public, therefore, gain by acts incorporating trading associations, as by such means persons are induced to hazard a certain amount of property for the purposes of trade and public improvement, who would abstain from so doing, were not their liability thus limited.”⁶¹

Eventually this argument won the day, and by 1840 most of the states had established limited liability.⁶²

Limited liability, in turn, led to a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate theory, because the aggregate view of corporations tended to reduce the distinction between the corporation and its members or shareholders, which is at the heart of limited liability.⁶³

The decline of the aggregate view can clearly be seen in two cases from the period of 1839 to 1844, in which the Supreme Court repudiated Marshall’s opinion in *Deveaux*. In *Bank of Augusta v. Earle*⁶⁴ the Court held that a corporation incorporated by Georgia could execute a valid contract in Alabama on comity grounds.⁶⁵ However, the Court rejected the argument that Alabama was required to accept the contract on the basis that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applied directly to the corporation’s members (as required by the aggregate

59. BLUMBERG, *supra* note 56, at 10.

60. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability?: A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427 (1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002).

61. ANGELL & AMES, *supra* note 7, at 24; see also *id.* at 362 (arguing that states who pursue the contrary policy, like Massachusetts, “drive millions of capital into the neighboring states for investment”—an early instance of a “race” (to the top or bottom)).

62. This was subject to one limitation, the “trust fund” doctrine, which said that the capital stock of a corporation was to be held in trust to pay corporate debts and thus could not be distributed to shareholders while debts were outstanding. See *Wood v. Dummer*, 30 F. Cas. 435 (D. Me. 1824).

63. See generally Margaret M. Blair, *Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century*, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003) (arguing that the main purpose of incorporation in the nineteenth century was to “lock in” capital in the firm because shareholders could not force distributions in exchange for limited liability); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *The Essential Role of Organizational Law*, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000) (describing the “core defining characteristic of a legal entity” as the “partitioning off of a separate set of assets in which the creditors of the firm have a prior security interest”).

64. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).

65. *Id.* at 585, 596.

view), stating that *Deveaux* had never been extended that far.⁶⁶ Chief Justice Taney emphasized that he rejected the aggregate view because of its implications for limited liability, as well as the implications for state regulation of the corporations:

The result of this [aggregate view] would be to make the corporation a mere partnership in business, in which each stockholder would be liable to the whole extent of his property for the debts of the corporation Besides, it would deprive every state of all control over the extent of corporate franchises proper to be granted in the State⁶⁷

In *Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson*,⁶⁸ decided in 1844, the Court explicitly limited *Deveaux* to its facts, holding that diversity jurisdiction may arise even when some of the members of a defendant corporation are citizens of the same state as the plaintiff.⁶⁹ The Court stated that the *Deveaux* results “have never been satisfactory to the bar” and that a corporation “seems to us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that State [of incorporation], and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that State.”⁷⁰

This result was required by the proliferation of business corporations having many shareholders in many states, as opposed to the membership corporations of Marshall’s early days. As Angell and Ames state, by 1832 “[j]oint stock companies are composed of persons who seldom know any thing of the business of the company, but who leave the management of it entirely to the board of directors, and are contented with receiving such periodical dividends as the directors think proper to make.”⁷¹ The separation of management from ownership, and the rise of limited liability, rendered the aggregate view implausible.⁷²

66.*Id.* at 586-87.

67.*Id.*

68.43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).

69.*Id.* at 554-55.

70.*Id.* at 555. See also *Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.*, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853) (holding that for diversity purposes a corporation should be deemed a resident of its place of incorporation). This led to the current rule, adopted in 1958, under which a corporation is for diversity purposes a citizen of both the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).

71.ANGELL & AMES, *supra* note 7, at 32 (emphasis omitted).

72.See Chief Justice Shaw’s statement:

A board of directors of the banks of Massachusetts is a body recognized by law. By the by-laws of these corporations, and by a usage, so general and uniform as to be regarded as part of the law of the land, they have the general superintendence and active management of all the concerns of the bank, and constitute, to all purposes of dealing with others, the corporation.”

Second, general incorporation: In the 1820s and 1830s the granting of corporate charters by state legislatures became a process fraught with corruption.⁷³ Some Jacksonians reacted by advocating elimination of the rights of states to grant corporate charters.⁷⁴ But the corporate form was so widely used that this was impracticable; instead, laws were passed in all the states permitting anyone to form a corporation on payment of a fee without permission by the state legislature.⁷⁵ This democratizing move meant that the artificial entity theory, under which the corporation derives its powers from the state, lost most of its appeal, since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations. Instead, corporations were viewed as separate from both their shareholders and the state, and the real entity view reigned supreme.⁷⁶

1.2. From Closely Held to Widely Held Corporations

The situation between the 1820s and the end of the Civil War was thus the proliferation of for-profit corporations, incorporated under general incorporation

Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 163, 166-67 (1840) (emphasis added). It is hard to imagine a clearer rejection of the aggregate view. See also *Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor*, in which the New York Court of Appeals held

[I]n corporate bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a very important sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor can they revoke those powers. They are derivative only in the sense of being received from the State in the act of incorporation. The directors convened as a board are the primary possessors of all the powers which the charter confers, and like private principals they may delegate to agents of their own appointment the performance of any acts which they themselves can perform. The recognition of this principle is absolutely necessary in the affairs of every corporation whose powers are vested in a board of directors. Without it the most ordinary business could not be carried on, and the corporate powers could not be executed.

19 N.Y. (5 Smith) 207, 216 (1859). This constitutes a recognition that the aggregate view derived from the membership corporation could not be maintained as a practical matter in corporations with hundreds or thousands of shareholders, as already existed in the 1850s.

73. See Angell & Ames, *supra* note 7, at 35-36; James W. Hurst, *The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970*, at 33-36 (1970); Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief* 201 (1957).

74. Hurst, *supra* note 73, at ____; Meyers, *supra* note 73, at ____.

75. See, e.g., Act Relating to Joint Stock Corporations, 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49, 49 (permitting incorporation of any "lawful" business); *Nesmith v. Sheldon*, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 812, 817-18 (1849); see also President Jackson's veto of the second bank of the United States: "[i]f [the government] would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing," Andrew Jackson, *Veto Message*, in 2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 576, 590 (1896).

76. The same result was obtained in England by the adoption of the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47 (U.K.).

laws with minimal interference by the state and with shareholders who enjoyed limited liability. Those shareholders were, however, relatively few in number; despite the Angell and Ames quotation above,⁷⁷ few corporations before 1865 required massive amounts of capital, and most were small, closely held enterprises.⁷⁸ This enabled the Civil War income tax on corporate income to be imposed directly on the shareholders of corporations.⁷⁹

This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the railroads, followed by the steel and oil companies. With the rise of large corporate enterprises, massive amounts of capital were required, and between 1865 and the 1890s the widely held, publicly traded, non-owner managed enterprise gradually became the norm for U.S. business activities.⁸⁰ This was followed from 1890 to 1906 by a wave of consolidation that left several important business areas dominated by monopolies run by the Robber Barons.⁸¹

The shift from small, closely held enterprises to massive, publicly held ones once again necessitated a re-examination of the corporate form, and again all three theories of the corporation appear. A classic example of the aggregate view is *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.*,⁸² ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in 1886. This case is famous for Chief Justice Waite's statement that "[t]he court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the [Equal Protection Clause] . . . applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does."⁸³ Some scholars identified this as an application of the real entity view to corporations,⁸⁴ but Professor Horwitz has shown, by examining Justice Field's opinion in the court below, that it actually represented an application of the aggregate view.⁸⁵ Specifically, Field held that the Equal Protection Clause must apply to corporations for the following reasons:

[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of individuals united for some lawful purpose, and permitted to use a common name in their business and have succession of membership without dissolution But the members do not, because of such association, lose their right to protection, and equality of protection. . . .

77. See *supra* note 58 and accompanying text.

78. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax", 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 1213 (2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, *Corporations*].

79. *Id.*

80. *Id.* at 1227, 1232.

81. *Id.* at 1227.

82. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).

83. *Id.* at 396. See Morton J. Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory", 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 173-74 (1985).

84. Horwitz, *supra* note 82, at 178.

85. *Id.* at 174, 177-78, 223.

Whatever affects the property of the corporation—that is, of all the members united by the common name—necessarily affects their interests. . . . So, therefore, whenever a provision of the constitution or of a law guaranties to persons protection in their property . . . the benefits of the provision . . . are extended to corporations; not to the name under which different persons are united, but to the individuals composing the union. The courts will always look through the name to see and protect those whom the name represents.⁸⁶

A clearer statement of the aggregate view can hardly be imagined; most remarkable is Field's reliance on *Deveaux* despite the fact that the Supreme Court overturned its results forty years earlier.⁸⁷ Similarly, in *Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania*,⁸⁸ decided two years later, Justice Field stated that, "[u]nder the designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose."⁸⁹

However, the artificial entity view was also raised in these cases. In *Santa Clara*, the railroad corporations made the argument that because they were operating under special congressional legislation, they should be regarded as an extension of the federal government and therefore California could not tax them.⁹⁰ Field rejected this view (citing *Dartmouth College*), but noted that "when the instrumentality is the creation of the state,—a corporation formed under its laws,—and is employed or adopted by the general government for its convenience . . . it remains subject to the taxing power of the state."⁹¹ And notably, in *Pembina*, Field followed Taney in rejecting the argument that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applied to corporations because they were not "citizens," even though the aggregate view he adopted in *Santa Clara* might have led to the contrary position.⁹² Instead, Field emphasized the relationship between the corporation and the incorporating state under the artificial entity view:

[T]he term citizens, as used in the clause, applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only such attributes as the legislature has prescribed . . . a grant of corporate existence was a grant of special privileges to the corporators, enabling them to act for certain specified purposes as a single individual, and

86.*Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.*, 18 F. 385, 402-03 (D. Cal. 1883).

87.*Id.* at 403.

88.*Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 125 U.S. 181 (1888).

89.*Id.* at 189. See also *Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co.*, 133 U.S. 50, 59 (1890) ("We do not see that the rights of the parties in regard to the assets of this corporation differ from those of a partnership on its dissolution.").

90.*Santa Clara*, 18 F. at 387.

91.*Id.* at 389.

92.*Pembina*, 125 U.S. at 187.

exempting them, unless otherwise provided, from individual liability.⁹³

Moreover, all three views of the corporation appear in *Hale v. Henkel*,⁹⁴ decided by the Supreme Court in 1906. The issue was whether an agent of a corporation could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure in the name of the corporation.⁹⁵ On the Fifth Amendment issue, the Court held that the right against self-incrimination did not apply to corporations:

The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness The question whether a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of this Amendment really does not arise . . . since it can only be heard by oral evidence in the person of some one of its agents or employes.⁹⁶

This is closest to the real entity view, since it rejects (like Marshall in *Dandridge*) the aggregate position of looking through a corporation to its shareholders and takes into account the special characteristics of the corporation itself.

On the other hand, regarding the Fourth Amendment question, the Court at first emphasized the artificial entity view, using it to justify regulation by the state:

Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation under investigation, and that he was entitled to assert the rights of the corporation with respect to the production of its books and papers, we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. . . .

Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises,

93.*Id.* at 187-88.

94. *Hale v. Henkel*, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).

95.*Id.* at 51.

96.*Id.* at 69-70.

could not in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.⁹⁷

However, having clearly stated its reasons for limiting the application of the constitutional right, the Court suddenly reverted back to the aggregate view when faced with the question of whether corporations have any Fourth Amendment rights at all:

[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises.⁹⁸

What can explain this remarkable oscillation between the three views? The key is the last sentence quoted. As noted above, the period between 1890 and 1906 marked the height of the debate on the rise of the great corporations. The Court is trying to strike a balance between the rights of the corporations, which

97.*Id.* at 74-75. Remarkably, the court applied this analysis to give powers to the federal government over state corporations:

It is true that the corporation in this case was chartered under the laws of New Jersey, and that it receives its franchise from the legislature of that State; but such franchises, so far as they involve questions of interstate commerce, must also be exercised in subordination to the power of Congress to regulate such commerce, and in respect to this the General Government may also assert a sovereign authority to ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised in a lawful manner, with a due regard to its own laws. Being subject to this dual sovereignty, the General Government possesses the same right to see that its own laws are respected as the State would have with respect to the special franchises vested in it by the laws of the State. The powers of the General Government in this particular in the vindication of its own laws, are the same as if the corporation had been created by an act of Congress. It is not intended to intimate, however, that it has a general visitatorial power over state corporations.

Id. at 75. This issue came up in the corporate tax debate as well. Avi-Yonah, *Corporations*, *supra* note 78, at 1214-19.

98.*Hale*, 201 U.S. at 76 (emphasis removed) (citation omitted).

can best be protected under either the aggregate or the real entity views, and the regulatory power of the state, which is best reflected in the artificial entity view. On the one hand, as the Court states, “[c]orporations are a necessary feature of modern business activity” and must be protected.⁹⁹ On the other hand, the right of the state to regulate must also be preserved, especially since the context of *Hale* was an antitrust investigation into two major corporations, the American Tobacco Company and McAndrews & Forbes Inc.

Ultimately, however, the real entity view prevailed.¹⁰⁰ This first involved the rejection of the aggregate view. For example, in *Western Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg*,¹⁰¹ decided just one year after *Hale*, Justice Harlan emphasized that a corporation is a separate entity from its shareholders, and therefore it is not a “citizen” for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause or entitled to the protection of the due process clause: “the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.”¹⁰² But by itself this position would have led to too much state regulation for the Lochner Court. Thus, in *Southern Railway Co. v. Greene*,¹⁰³ decided in 1909, the Court came out clearly for the position that the corporation as such was entitled to constitutional protection under the Equal Protection Clause, without any reference to its shareholders: “the corporation . . . is within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a person within the jurisdiction of the State of Alabama, and entitled to be protected against any statute of the State which deprives it of the equal protection of the laws.”¹⁰⁴

Once again, the triumph of the real entity view can be explained by several factors. The aggregate view was raised by Field and others to protect the rights of corporations, but it was even more incongruous in the context of the mega-

99.Id.

100.This view was also reflected in contemporary books and law review articles. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 81-83 (1897); George F. Deiser, *The Juristic Person*, 57 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 131, 131-133 (1908); Harold J. Laski, *The Personality of Associations*, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 413 (1916); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., *Corporate Personality*, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 261-62 (1911); I. Maurice Wormser, *Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity*, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 516 (1912) (all rejecting the aggregate view). But see VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (supporting the aggregate view, stating that “the existence of a corporation independently of its shareholders is a fiction”).

101.204 U.S. 359 (1907).

102.Id. at 363.

103.216 U.S. 400 (1910).

104.Id. at 417. Remarkably this case involves a discriminatory state tax similar to the one struck down by Field on aggregate grounds in *W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas*, 216 U.S. 1, 36 (1910); *Pullman Co. v. Kansas*, 216 U.S. 56, 64 (1910) (White, J., concurring) See also *Ludwig v. W. Union Tel. Co.*, 216 U.S. 146, 157 (1910) (eliminating the restrictions imposed by *Bank of Augusta v. Earle*, 38 U.S. 519 (1839)); see also, Horwitz, *supra* note 82.

corporations of the 1890s, with thousands of shareholders, than in the pre-Civil War days. It also gave the corporation too many rights vis-a-vis the state, as seen in *Hale* and in *Greenberg*. The artificial entity view gave the state too much power to regulate corporations, as the *Hale* court came to realize when it laid out its implications. The real entity view was most congruent with business realities as well as the one most suited to a corporation-state balance. By 1909, it was well established as the dominant view of the corporation, as reflected in contemporary debates surrounding the enactment of the corporate tax.¹⁰⁵

The rise of the real entity view is also reflected in two other contemporary developments: the rise of the business judgment rule and the decline of the ultra vires doctrine.¹⁰⁶ The business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in holding that the board of directors possessed powers that were not delegated from the shareholders and that shareholders could not normally call into question the exercise of those powers. The ultra vires doctrine represented the ability of the state to require corporations to adhere to their charter, and was thus based on the artificial entity view; its decline thus reinforced the rejection of that view.

The first full statement of the business judgment rule was made in *Leslie v. Lorillard*,¹⁰⁷ decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888. The court held

In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their directors or trustees, courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally or unconscientiously executed Mere errors of judgment are not

105. See Avi-Yonah, *Corporations*, *supra* note 78.

106. Another related development was the strengthening of limited liability resulting from the demise of the “trust fund” doctrine, which held that the capital stock of a corporation must be held in trust for the benefit of its creditors. This doctrine, which originated from Justice Story’s opinion in *Wood v. Dummer*, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436-37 (D. Me. 1824), was upheld by the Supreme Court in *Sawyer v. Hoag*, 84 U.S. 610, 623 (1873), on the basis of the aggregate view (“after all, this artificial body is but the representative of its stockholders, and exists mainly for their benefit, and is governed and controlled by them through the officers whom they elect”). See also WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS 322 (New York City, Baker, Voorhis & Co., Law Publishers 1887) [hereinafter COOK, LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS]. However, in 1892 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held in *Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co.*

This trust-fund doctrine . . . is not sufficiently precise or accurate to constitute a safe foundation upon which to build a system of legal rules Corporate property is not held in trust Absolute control and power of disposition are inconsistent with the idea of a trust. The capital of a corporation is its property . . . [A] corporation is in law as distinct a being as an individual is, and is entitled to hold property (if not contrary to its charter) as absolutely as an individual can hold it.

48 Minn. 174, 192-193 (1892). The doctrine then fell into desuetude, reinforced by the invention of no par stock in the early twentieth century. See Horwitz, *supra* note 82, at 207-14.

107. 110 N.Y. 519, 532 (1888).

sufficient as grounds for equity interference; for the powers entrusted with corporate management are largely discretionary.¹⁰⁸

A year later the same court expanded this statement

All powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly granted, of necessity, must be exercised by the directors who are constituted by the law as the agency for the doing of corporate acts. The expression of the corporate will and the performance of corporate functions, in the management of a corporation, may originate with its directors Within the chartered authority they have the fullest power to regulate the concerns of a corporation, according to their best judgment In the management of the affairs of the corporation, they are dependent solely upon their own knowledge of its business and their own judgment as to what its interests require.¹⁰⁹

This rule became well established, so that by 1905 a court could write that “it is [the board’s] judgment, and not that of its stockholders outside of the board of directors . . . that is to shape [a corporation’s] policies or decide upon its corporate acts. This principle is not disputed, and the citation of authorities in its support is unnecessary.”¹¹⁰ The rule reflected the real entity view, which equates the corporation with its management, and rejected the view of the corporation as an aggregate of its shareholders.¹¹¹

The one potential limitation on the power of the board was the ultra vires doctrine, which held that a board could not act contrary to the powers conferred on it by the state. The ultra vires doctrine thus represented the artificial entity view. The doctrine originated in the pre- Civil War Era,¹¹² but became prominent in the arguments on the relationship of the state and the corporation in the 1880s and 1890s.¹¹³ The artificial entity argument for upholding the limitation was stated clearly by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888:

In the granting of charters the legislature is presumed to have had in view the public interest; and public policy is (as the interests of

108.Id.

109.Beveridge v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 112 N.Y. 1, 22 (1889).

110.*Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co.*, 140 F. 117, 118 (D.N.J. 1905); *see also Manson v. Curtis*, 223 N.Y. 313, 323 (1918) (“Directors are the exclusive, executive representatives of the corporation and are charged with the administration of its internal affairs and the management and use of its assets. Clearly the law does not permit the stockholders to create a sterilized board of directors.” (citation omitted)).

111.It also represented a transition from an agency to a trustee model of the relationship between shareholders and management. *See* Millon, *supra* note 10.

112.*See, e.g., Abbott v. Am. Hard Rubber Co.*, 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861).

113.*See generally* COOK, LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, *supra* note 105, at chs. 19, 38.

stockholders ought to be) concerned in the restriction of corporations within chartered limits, and a departure therefrom is only deemed excusable when it cannot result in prejudice to the public or to the stockholders. As artificial creations, they have no powers or faculties, except those with which they were endowed when created¹¹⁴

. . . .
. . . Corporations are great engines for the promotion of the public convenience, and for the development of public wealth, and, so long as they are conducted for the purposes for which organized, they are a public benefit; but if allowed to engage, without supervision, in subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to control and monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are engaged, they become a public menace; against which public policy and statutes design protection.¹¹⁵

The artificial entity doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court the following year:

It may be considered as the established doctrine of this court in regard to the powers of corporations, that they are such and such only as are conferred upon them by the acts of the legislatures of the several States under which they are organized. A corporation in this country, whatever it may have been in England at a time when the crown exercised the right of creating such bodies, can only have an existence under the express law of the State or sovereignty by which it is created. And these powers, where they do not relate to municipal corporations exercising authority conferred solely for the benefit of the public, and in some sense parts of the body politic of the State, have in this country until within recent years always been conferred by special acts of the legislative body under which they claim to exist. But the rapid growth of corporations, which have come to take a part in all or nearly all of the business operations of the country, and especially in enterprises requiring large aggregations of capital and individual energy, as well as their success in meeting the needs of a vast number of most important commercial relations, have demanded the serious attention and consideration of law makers. And while valuable services have been rendered to the public by this class of organizations, which have stimulated their formation by numerous special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they were attended by many evils in their operation as well as much good, and that the hasty manner in which they were created by the legislatures, sometimes with exclusive privileges, often without due consideration and under the influence of improper motives, frequently led to bad results.¹¹⁶

114. *Leslie v. Lorillard*, 110 N.Y. 519, 531.

115. *Id.* at 533.

116. *Oregon Ry & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Ry*, 130 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1889).

The reference to corporate abuses relates to the rise of trusts, and indeed the ultra vires doctrine was used to dissolve sugar and oil trusts under New York and Ohio law.¹¹⁷ However, in 1895 the Supreme Court rejected an antitrust challenge to the sugar trust on the grounds that the Sherman Act applied only to corporations engaged directly in interstate commerce.¹¹⁸ And in 1896 the Court rejected an ultra vires challenge on the ability of the Union Pacific Railway to lease its tracks for 999 years to another railroad, when the charter would not permit an outright sale.¹¹⁹ This literal decision significantly reduced the power of the ultra vires doctrine.¹²⁰

The ultimate demise of the doctrine resulted not from a court decision but from the competition among states to attract corporate charters, which was begun by New Jersey in 1890 and continued by Delaware in the 1900s.¹²¹ This competition meant that New Jersey and Delaware had every incentive to relax any limiting elements in their charters that restricted the power of corporate management.¹²² Thus, for example, the long-lasting prohibition against corporations owning stock in other corporations, which led to the necessity of “trusts,” was eliminated by New Jersey in its 1896 law.¹²³ As a result, although the Supreme Court still held in 1899 that such a combination was ultra vires under

117. See *People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co.*, 121 N.Y. 582 (1890); *State, ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co.*, 49 Ohio St. 137, 184-85 (1892); see also WILLIAM COOK, *THE CORPORATION PROBLEM* 225 (1891); Theodore Dwight, *The Legality of Trusts*, 3 POLI. SCI. Q. 592 (1888).

118. *United States v. E.C. Knight Co.*, 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895).

119. *Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co.*, 163 U.S. 564, 585 (1896).

120. See 2 William W. Cook, *A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders, Bonds, Mortgages, and General Corporation Law* 971, 971-72 (3d ed. 1894) [hereinafter 2 Cook, *Stock and Stockholders*] (“The courts are becoming more liberal, and many acts which fifty years ago would have been held to be ultra vires would now be held to be intra vires.”). By 1898 Cook wrote that “the doctrine of ultra vires is disappearing.” 1 William W. Cook, *A Treatise on the Law of Corporations Having a Capital Stock*, at vii (4th ed. 1898) [hereinafter 1 Cook, *Corporations*]. See also Horwitz, *supra* note 82, at 186-88 (discussing this development).

121. See RUSSEL CARPENTER LARCOM, *THE DELAWARE CORPORATION* 1-26 (1937); Edward Q. Keasbey, *New Jersey and the Great Corporations*, 13 HARV. L. REV. 198, 201 (1899); Lincoln Steffens, *New Jersey: A Traitor State*, 25 MCLURE’S MAGAZINE 41 (1905). On the “race to the bottom/race to the top” debate, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, *Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law*, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444-46 (1992); William L. Cary, *Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware*, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974); Robert Daines, *Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?*, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 526-28 (2001); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., *State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation*, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977).

122. See *New Jersey Legislating for the United States*, INDIANAPOLIS J. (Nov. 11, 1901); James B. Dill, Address Before the Merchants’ Club of Chicago, Illinois: Trusts: Their Uses and Abuses (Nov. 9, 1901).

123. General Corporation Act of New Jersey, N.J. Comp. Stat. § 51 (1896); see also *id.* § 104 (authorizing mergers); 1 COOK, *CORPORATIONS*, *supra* note 120, at vi.

New York law, this holding became rather meaningless since most large, publicly traded corporations were incorporated in New Jersey.¹²⁴ As the New Jersey statute explains, “[i]t was formerly the rule in this State that acts of a corporation in excess of its express powers, or those necessarily implied, were void, and contracts which were ultra vires the corporation were incapable of enforcement or ratification. . . . This rule no longer obtains.”¹²⁵

The decline of the ultra vires doctrine was sealed by the spread of corporate laws permitting incorporation for “any lawful activity.”¹²⁶ With the doctrine gone, the artificial entity view of the corporation became less plausible, and the real entity view reigned supreme again.¹²⁷

1.3. The Hostile Takeover Crisis

In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the *Yale Law Journal* in which he dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and real entity views of the corporation.¹²⁸ These views, he explains, could be deployed to suit any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature of these theories.¹²⁹ His conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination of reality.¹³⁰

Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on corporate personality largely disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter, however, the real entity view predominated for large, publicly traded corporations. The board ran the corporation as it saw fit, protected from the shareholders by the separation of ownership from management noted by Berle and Means in the 1930s¹³¹ and by the business judgment rule. The board was also protected from the

124.*De la Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst.*, 175 U.S. 40, 52 (1899).

125.James B. Dill, *The General Corporation Act of New Jersey* 11 (1903).

126.Michael A. Schaeftler, *Ultra Vires—Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts of Business Corporations*, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 89 (1983).

127.*See Machen*, *supra* note 99, at 260-61. Another significant development in this period was states passing statutes that allowed a majority of shareholders to sell corporate assets (before the 1890s, shareholder unanimity was required). This greatly facilitated mergers and also represented the decline of the aggregate view. *See Horwitz*, *supra* note 82, at 200-02.

128.John Dewey, *The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality*, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 (1926).

129.*Id.* at 669.

130.*Id.* at 673.

131.Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* 4-5 (1932).

state by the relaxation of corporate law limits begun by New Jersey and continued by Delaware.¹³²

The next significant practical change in this state of affairs only arose in the 1980s. As a result of the invention of the junk bond market, it suddenly became possible for hostile raiders to threaten takeovers of even the largest corporations. After RJR Nabisco was taken private for \$25 billion in 1988,¹³³ it was clear that no board was safe. As a result, debates on the nature of the corporation and its relationship to the shareholders and the state, which began in the academic literature in the 1970s, once again became a matter of practical concern. And once again all three theories of the corporation reappeared, as can be seen if one examines three seminal cases decided between 1982 and 1989 by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Delaware.

Edgar v. MITE Corp.,¹³⁴ decided by the Supreme Court in 1982, involved the constitutionality of an anti-takeover act enacted by the state of Illinois.¹³⁵ Under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, a hostile tender offer for the shares of a company covered by the act had to be registered by the Secretary of State, and the offeror had to give both the target and the state a twenty-day notice during which only the target could communicate with its shareholders regarding the offer.¹³⁶ The act applied both to corporations in which 10 percent of the shareholders were residents of Illinois and to corporations that were either incorporated in the state or had their principal office in it.¹³⁷ The MITE corporation made a hostile offer for an Illinois corporation and refused to comply with the act, arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause.¹³⁸

The Supreme Court agreed with MITE. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice White held that the Illinois act was unconstitutional because it could apply to tender offers that did not affect a single Illinois shareholder, specifically, that “the State has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders.”¹³⁹

132. This state of affairs prompted Adolph Berle, the prime intellect behind the shareholder primacy doctrine in the 1930s, to concede defeat in 1956:

Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E. Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers were powers in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for the entire community. The argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's contention.

See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., *The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution* 169 (1954).

133. Bryan Burrough & John Helyar, *Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco* (1990) (describing the \$25 billion leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco).

134. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).

135. *Id.* at 626.

136. *Id.* at 634-35.

137. *Id.* at 627.

138. *Id.* at 627-28.

139. *Id.* at 644.

Moreover, the fact that the target corporation was an Illinois corporation was irrelevant since state regulation only applied to the corporation's internal affairs: "[t]ender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company."¹⁴⁰ Instead, the focus should be entirely on the impact of blocking the tender offer on the company's shareholders and their relationship with management:

The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.¹⁴¹

This part of the opinion clearly reflects the aggregate view. The focus is entirely on the impact on the corporation's shareholders, and the corporation itself (including its management) barely exists—as indicated by the statement that a change in corporate control has no relevance to the internal affairs of the corporation. The market for corporate control is praised because of its ability to overcome the agency cost problem and the incentive it provides for management to maximize stock prices. Moreover, White quotes the work of Easterbrook and Fischel, who are among the principal proponents of the “nexus of contracts” theory of the corporation, according to which the corporation is merely a convenient legal term for a series of contracts, the most important of which is the contract between shareholders and management.¹⁴²

This part of the opinion, which rejects both the artificial entity and the real entity theories, evoked some misgivings on the part of Justice Powell, even though he joined to provide the crucial fifth vote.¹⁴³ Powell noted that in some cases the state may have a legitimate interest because the corporation has a real presence that goes beyond a contract between management and the shareholders, reflecting both the artificial and real entity views:

140.*Id.* at 645.

141.*Id.* at 643-44 (citations omitted).

142.*See* Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, *The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer*, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel, *The Corporate Governance Movement*, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 1273 (1982) (“A corporation . . . is nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual benefit.”). The point that the nexus of contracts theory is a reinvention of the aggregate view has been made repeatedly. *See, e.g.*, William W. Bratton, Jr., *The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History*, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1478-79 (1989); Millon, *supra* note 10, at 229.

143.*Edgar v. MITE Corp.*, 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).

I join Part V-B because its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers. This period in our history is marked by conglomerate corporate formations essentially unrestricted by the antitrust laws. Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of professional personnel experienced in takeovers as well as of capital, that vastly exceed those of the takeover target. This disparity in resources may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional target corporation. Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences in terms of general public interest when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and State.*

* The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations tend to be located in the large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters are transferred out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. Management personnel—many of whom have provided community leadership—may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and educational life—both in terms of leadership and financial support—also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.¹⁴⁴

Five years later Powell had the opportunity to translate these misgivings into an opinion for the Court that emphasized instead the artificial entity view of the corporation. *CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America*¹⁴⁵ involved a so-called “second generation” anti-takeover statute, i.e., one that was drafted to get around the problems with the Illinois statute struck down in *MITE*.¹⁴⁶ The Indiana statute applied only to corporations incorporated in Indiana, which have specified levels of shareholders within the state and which opt for its protection.¹⁴⁷ Under the statute, an acquirer who acquired “control shares” in such an Indiana target could vote them only with the approval of a majority of the pre-existing disinterested shareholders, to be obtained in a meeting within fifty days of the acquisition.¹⁴⁸

The Court of Appeals followed *MITE* and declared the statute unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, because it interfered with the market for corporate control:

Even if a corporation’s tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with which they are employed and the proportions in which the earnings they generate are divided between management and

144.*Id.*

145.481 U.S. 69 (1987).

146.*Id.*

147.*Id.* at 72-73.

148.*Id.* at 73-75.

shareholders depends on the market for corporate control—an interstate, indeed international, market that the State of Indiana is not authorized to opt out of¹⁴⁹

The Supreme Court reversed.¹⁵⁰ Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority, stated

No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders We think the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law. As Chief Justice Marshall explained:

"A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created."¹⁵¹

Powell thus rejected the view that states do not have the right to regulate transactions affecting shareholders, including shareholders in other states. He argued that the "free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation . . . is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction. . . . A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters."¹⁵² And he explicitly rejected the market for corporate control, and its underlying aggregate theory:

The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory. . . .¹⁵³

. . . [T]here is no reason to assume that the type of conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive takeovers will result in more effective management or otherwise be beneficial to shareholders. . . .¹⁵⁴

149.*Id.* at 77 (quoting *Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.*, 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir. 1986)).

150.*CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America*, 481 U.S. at 89.

151.*Id.* (quoting *Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).

152.*Id.* at 90-91.

153.*Id.* at 92.

154.*Id.* at 92, n.13

. . . [T]he very commodity that is traded in the “market for corporate control”—the corporation—is one that owes its existence and attributes to state law.¹⁵⁵

This entire opinion, with its quotation from *Dartmouth College*, is clearly based on the artificial entity view that the corporation owes its existence to the incorporating state and that the state may therefore regulate it, including in ways that affect shareholders’ ability to sell their shares. Not surprisingly, Justice White dissented, arguing that while the statute may help Indiana corporations, “particularly in helping those corporations maintain the status quo,”¹⁵⁶ it is inimical to the interests of the shareholders and constitutes “economic protectionism.”¹⁵⁷

After *CTS*, the battle for corporate control moved to state law, and the most important state in this regard was Delaware—the state in which most major U.S. corporations are incorporated. Delaware law was favorable to hostile takeovers until 1989, when the Supreme Court of Delaware issued an opinion in *Paramount v. Time, Inc.*¹⁵⁸ that, in practice, ended the hostile takeover boom.¹⁵⁹ Paramount had made \$175 (later raised to \$200) per share offer (for Time) when Time was about to enter into a \$70 per share merger with Warner.¹⁶⁰ Paramount argued that under the previous decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in *Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.*¹⁶¹ and *Revelon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*,¹⁶² Time was “up for sale,” and therefore, the business judgment rule was suspended and Time’s board was required to maximize shareholder value by accepting the much higher Paramount bid.¹⁶³

The Delaware Supreme Court held in favor of Time. It stated

Two key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law imposes on a board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability. Thus, the question of “long-term” versus “short-term” values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment horizon. Second, absent a limited set of circumstances as defined

155.*Id.* at 94.

156.*Id.* at 98.

157.*Id.* at 100.

158.571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).

159.See *id.* at 1155.

160.*Id.* at 1147-49.

161.493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

162.506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).

163.*Paramount*, 571 A.2d at 1142.

under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.¹⁶⁴

The court thus rejected the view that maximizing short-term shareholder value was always required. Instead, the board was permitted to pursue its view of the best long-term corporate strategy:

Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders' duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.¹⁶⁵

Thus, the board was permitted to prefer preservation of the "Time culture"—its stated goal over maximizing the cash return to shareholders. This effectively killed the takeover threat, because any board could find good long-term share-value maximization reasons to reject a superior cash bid. The Delaware court, thus enhancing managerial power, in effect endorsed the real entity view: a corporation was an entity with its own corporate culture, which should not be subordinated to the shareholders or to the state. This view was ratified when the ALI corporate governance project adopted a rule that corporate boards may take into account the interests of other "stakeholders," not just the shareholders.¹⁶⁶

Why did the real entity view prevail? The obvious answer was that corporate management determines the state of incorporation, and therefore the Delaware Supreme Court felt that it had to side with management once the U.S. Supreme Court had approved the anti-takeover laws of other states, lest corporations choose to relocate there. However, it seems unlikely that this was the only reason; Delaware is very well established as the preferred state of incorporation,¹⁶⁷ and stock values would likely decrease if shareholders perceive that management was leaving Delaware just to protect itself. Instead, it seems likely that the Delaware Supreme Court genuinely believed that a corporation like Time had a corporate existence and culture with implications for other

164.*Id.* at 1150 (citation omitted).

165.*Id.* at 1154 (citations omitted).

166.1 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.01(b)(3) illus. *i.* (1994).

167.Michael Klausner, *Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts*, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 842-45 (1995).

stakeholders, and therefore rejected the aggregate view equating the corporation with its shareholders. In that way, its concerns were similar to those raised by Justice Powell in his concurrence in *MITE*: a corporation is more than a “nexus of contracts,” and courts and legislatures are allowed to take the interests of other stakeholders into account.¹⁶⁸

1.4. From National Corporations to Multinational Enterprises

The last transformation in the nature of the corporation began in the 1950s and is still on-going, so that its ultimate outcome is hard to judge. This is the transformation from corporations based mostly in one country to multinational enterprises based in many countries.

Multinationals, in the sense of corporations owning assets overseas, have existed since the seventeenth century.¹⁶⁹ However, as recently as the 1950s, the shareholders (and other sources of capital), the management, most of the production facilities, and most of the markets of even large multinationals tended to be in one country, so that, essentially, what was good for G.M. was good for America.¹⁷⁰

Since the 1990s, however, this has changed profoundly.¹⁷¹ As more countries opened up to foreign direct investment, communications improved, and many products became lighter and easier to ship, more and more corporations became “globalized.” In a globalized multinational, the sources of capital are in many countries. The shares of large multinationals trade on as many as twenty exchanges, and borrowing facilities are similarly diversified. Research and development and production facilities are likewise spread around the globe, as are markets. The only thing that usually ties a modern multinational to its home country is the location of management.¹⁷²

In this context, the debate over the nature of the corporation has re-opened. There is abundant academic writing on the relationship between multinationals and the state, and most writers from both left and right concede that this relationship has changed profoundly so that the home state—the state of incorporation—has become powerless to control “its” multinationals; it is hard

168. *See supra* note 143 and accompanying text.

169. *See Harris, supra* note 20, at 39-59.

170. Robert Reich, *Who is US?* 90 Harv. Bus. Rev. 53, 54 (1990).

171. *Id.*

172. *Id.* at 53-54.

even to identify to which country multinationals “belong.”¹⁷³ On a practical level this situation has led to attempts by home states to control the behavior of multinationals abroad in areas as diverse as trading with the enemy, antitrust, corruption and others, with varying success.¹⁷⁴ The most recent development in this regard is “inversion” transactions, in which the management changes the country of incorporation of a multinational’s parent corporation.¹⁷⁵ These transactions are undertaken primarily for tax reasons, but they have corporate governance implications as well.¹⁷⁶ Specifically, the artificial entity theory becomes hard to maintain when management can pick weak countries like Bermuda as the country of incorporation for the parent of a multinational.

The relationship with shareholders has also undergone changes as shareholders now tend to come from many countries. One implication of this has been that the securities laws of the weakest country tend to dominate because of cross-country price arbitrage.¹⁷⁷ Another implication is academic proposals to let management choose the country of securities law as well as the country of incorporation.¹⁷⁸ On a practical level, globalization has led the SEC to relax requirements for some foreign issuers.¹⁷⁹ This trend has tended to weaken the applicability of the aggregate view as well. It is hard to predict where these trends will lead, but at the moment they appear once more to favor the real entity view.

173. Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krugman, *Foreign Direct Investment in the United States* 86-93 (3d ed. 1995); Reich, *supra* note 172. *But see* Laura D’Andrea Tyson, *They Are Not Us: Why American Ownership Still Matters*, Am. Prospect, Winter 1991, at 37-38.

174. *See* Raymond Vernon, *In the Hurricane’s Eye: The Troubled Prospects of Multinational Enterprises* 30-51 (1998); *see also* Peter T. Muchlinski, *Multinational Enterprises and the Law* 114-17, 385 (2d ed. 2007); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, *National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization*, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 16-20 (2003) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, *National Regulation*]; Blumberg, *supra* note 56, at 169.

175. *See* Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, *For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions*, 95 Tax Notes 1793, 1793-94 (2002) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, *For Haven’s Sake*].

176. *Id.* at 1794. For the congressional response, *see* I.R.C. § 7874 (2005).

177. *See* Amir N. Licht, “Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets”, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 563, 631-37 (1998).

178. *See*, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, “Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation”, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 907, 947-48 (1998); Roberta Romano, “Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation”, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2362 (1998). *But see* Merritt B. Fox, “Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment”, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1338 (1999).

179. *See* Merritt B. Fox, “The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities”, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696, 707, 709-11 (1998).

1.5. Conclusion

Throughout all the transformations we have studied, the same pattern recurs. As the relationship of the corporation to the state, to society and to its members or shareholders changes, all three views of the corporation emerge, submerge and then re-emerge in a slightly different but fundamentally similar form. In the end, however, the real entity view prevails.

Why does the real entity view prevail? This is no doubt due in part to the fact that it represents the most congenial view to corporate management, because it shields them from undue interference from both shareholders and the state. Corporate management wields political power and it influences the outcome of the debate; judges again and again refer to the importance of corporations, by which they mean corporate management. But the very fact that corporate management wields this power shows that there is another reason why the real entity view prevails: it fits reality much more than the other two. In some periods (e.g., the Roman Empire or eighteenth century Europe) the power of the state was overwhelming, and the artificial entity view seemed plausible. In other periods (the medieval membership corporation or the nineteenth century close corporation), the aggregate view seemed plausible. But for a majority of the time, equating the corporation either with the state or with shareholders must have seemed to most non-academics highly implausible.¹⁸⁰ The real entity view

180. The real entity view is clearly the dominant one in sociology and some branches of economics. As one sociologist has stated, “[t]he recurrent problem in sociology is to conceive of corporate organization, and to study it, in ways that do not anthropomorphize it and do not reduce it to the behavior of individuals or of human aggregates.” Guy E. Swanson, *The Tasks of Sociology*, 192 *Science* 665, 666 (1976). A whole branch of economic sociology centers on the study of organizations, and there are numerous books devoted to the topic. Most of these books revolve around the study of large corporations, since these are the dominant forms of organization in this society. See, e.g., *The Handbook of Economic Sociology* pt. 2, sec. C (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994); *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Jeffrey Pfeffer & Gerald R. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective* (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1978); W. Richard Scott, *Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems* (5th ed. 2003); James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory* (Transaction Publishers 2003) (1967). Moreover, they are informed by the economic perspective inaugurated by Ronald Coase in his classic “Nature of the Firm” article from 1937 and developed by Oliver Williamson and others into transaction cost economics. See generally R. H. Coase, *The Nature of the Firm*, 4 *Economica* 386 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory”, in *The Handbook of Economic Sociology*, *supra* note 166, at 77. For a critique of Williamson’s theory see Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”, 91 *Am. J. Soc.* 481 (1985). This branch of economics, which now forms part of the “new institutional economics,” begins by recognizing that the firm is fundamentally different from the market because of its hierarchical structure, and proceeds to

prevailed because it was more *real* than the others. And this observation enables us to move from the historical to the contemporary and ask how *Citizens United* and its antecedents fit the historical pattern.

2. *Citizens United*: A Real Entity Case

The Supreme Court first addressed the question whether corporations had a right to engage in political speech under the First Amendment in *First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*,¹⁸¹ decided in 1978.¹⁸² *Bellotti* involved a Massachusetts statute that prohibited banks and business corporations from expending funds on advertising to influence the result of political referenda.¹⁸³ In the context of a referendum to introduce progressive taxation on individuals, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the law was constitutional because the First Amendment rights of corporations are limited to issues that “materially affect its business, property, or assets.”¹⁸⁴

The Supreme Court reversed.¹⁸⁵ The three opinions in the case reflect the three theories of the corporation. Justice Powell, for a five Justice majority, adopted the real entity view, stating

If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.¹⁸⁶

The majority thus treated corporations as equivalent to individuals, citing *Santa Clara* for the proposition that corporations are persons for Fourteenth Amendment purposes and therefore protected by the First Amendment (as applied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the states).¹⁸⁷ It explicitly rejected the

investigate when operating as a firm as opposed to buying in the market makes sense (the “make or buy” issue). Transaction cost economics has become the leading explanation for the most recent transformation of the corporation—the rise of multinational enterprises. See generally *The Nature of the Transnational Firm* (Christos N. Pitelis & Roger Sugden, eds., 1991).

181. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

182. *Id.* at 765.

183. *Id.* at 767-68.

184. *Id.* at 767, 769.

185. *Id.* at 767.

186. *Id.* at 777.

187. *Id.* at 780 & n.15.

artificial entity theory advanced by Massachusetts (“corporations, as creatures of the State, have only those rights granted them by the State”),¹⁸⁸ because the national banks that brought the case were “creatures of federal law . . . and their existence is in no way dependent on state law.”¹⁸⁹ The majority also explicitly rejected the aggregate view that the intent of the statute was to protect shareholders from management expressing different views than their own, stating that the normal “procedures of corporate democracy” are sufficient to protect them.¹⁹⁰

The heart of Justice Powell’s opinion lies in his concern that upholding the Massachusetts statute would infringe on corporate activities that he viewed as beneficial, but unrelated to corporate business operations. He stated: “Thus corporate activities that are widely viewed as educational and socially constructive could be prohibited. Corporations no longer would be able safely to support—by contributions or public service advertising—educational, charitable, cultural, or even human rights causes.”¹⁹¹ And Justice Powell rejected as unsupported by the record the view that “corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out other points of view.”¹⁹² This also reflects the real entity view because corporations are judged as standing on their own, not as reflecting the views of shareholders or as creatures of the state. The aggregate view, as reflected in Milton Friedman’s writings from the same period, would object to the same kind of “corporate social responsibility” considerations as not being in the shareholders’ interests.¹⁹³

Justice White’s dissent, on the other hand, advanced the aggregate view. He argued

There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within the scope of the First Amendment. This, however, is merely the starting point of analysis, because an examination of the First Amendment values that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual expression is not. . . . Shareholders in [for-profit corporate] entities do not share a common set of political or social views, and they certainly have not invested their money for the purpose of advancing political or social causes or

188.*Id.* at 778-79 & n.14.

189.*Id.*

190.*Id.* at 794.

191.*Id.* at 782 n.18.

192.*Id.* at 789.

193.*See* Milton Friedman, *The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits*, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33.

in an enterprise engaged in the business of disseminating news and opinion. . . .

Of course, it may be assumed that corporate investors are united by a desire to make money, for the value of their investment to increase. Since even communications which have no purpose other than that of enriching the communicator have some First Amendment protection, activities such as advertising and other communications integrally related to the operation of the corporation's business may be viewed as a means of furthering the desires of individual shareholders. This unanimity of purpose breaks down, however, when corporations make expenditures or undertake activities designed to influence the opinion or votes of the general public on political and social issues that have no material connection with or effect upon their business, property, or assets. Although it is arguable that corporations make such expenditures because their managers believe that it is in the corporations' economic interest to do so, there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are expressive of the heterogeneous beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political issues are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase the value of a particular corporate investment. This is particularly true where, as in this case, whatever the belief of the corporate managers may be, they have not been able to demonstrate that the issue involved has any material connection with the corporate business. Thus when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a political candidate this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals would.¹⁹⁴

This is clearly an aggregate view, and it is congruent with the position taken by Justice White in *MITE* four years later.¹⁹⁵ The emphasis is entirely on the shareholders, not on the corporation itself.

Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, dissented from an artificial entity perspective. He stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment does protect corporations, there are limits to such protection because the corporation is a creature of the state.¹⁹⁶ Citing *Dartmouth College*, he stated:

The appellants herein either were created by the Commonwealth or were admitted into the Commonwealth only for the limited purposes described in their charters and regulated by state law. Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons . . . our inquiry must

194. *Bellotti*, 435 U.S. at 804-06 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

195. See *supra* Part I.C.

196. *Bellotti*, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

seek to determine which constitutional protections are “incidental to its very existence.”¹⁹⁷

There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process of law. Likewise, when a State charters a corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its business. . . . Although the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation’s right of commercial speech, such a right might be considered necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation.

It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes. A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity. It might reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere. Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States permit commercial corporations to exist. So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and Federal Governments remain open to protect the corporation’s interest in its property, it has no need, though it may have the desire, to petition the political branches for similar protection. Indeed, the States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic power to obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed. I would think that any particular form of organization upon which the State confers special privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or a corporation.

. . . .

I can see no basis for concluding that the liberty of a corporation to engage in political activity with regard to matters having no material effect on its business is necessarily incidental to the purposes for which the Commonwealth permitted these corporations to be organized or admitted within its boundaries. Nor can I disagree with the Supreme Judicial Court’s factual finding that no such effect has been shown by these appellants. Because the statute as construed provides at least as much protection as the Fourteenth Amendment requires, I believe it is constitutionally valid.¹⁹⁸

197.*Id.* at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting *Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward*, 4 Wheat. 463, 489 (1819)).

198.*Id.* at 824-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Rehnquist rejected the argument that some of the corporations were not chartered by Massachusetts by pointing out that they were all permitted to do business there. *Id.* at 824 n.2.

The positions taken by Justices Rehnquist and White clearly reflect the artificial entity and aggregate views. But the majority taking the real entity view prevailed, presumably because in 1978 it was hard to view corporations as a mere aggregation of their shareholders or as mere creatures of the state. Surprisingly, the majority opinion was written by Justice Powell, who, as we have seen, took an artificial entity view in *MITE* and *CTS*.¹⁹⁹ The explanation is that the hostile takeover movement threatened the same educational and charitable activities of corporations that Powell sought to defend in *Bellotti*, so in that context he needed to empower the state to save “its” corporations.

The emphasis on the artificial entity view in *CTS* may also have influenced the result in the Court’s next First Amendment case related to corporations, *Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce*,²⁰⁰ decided three years after *CTS*.²⁰¹ The issue in *Austin* was whether a state could ban corporate-direct expenditures in support of or in opposition to candidates for state office, as opposed to expenditures through “Political Action Committees” (PACs) organized for this purpose.²⁰² Justice Marshall, for a six Justice majority that included Rehnquist and White, held that the ban was constitutional.²⁰³ The majority opinion reflects the artificial entity view held by Rehnquist:

State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit them to use “resources amassed in the economic marketplace” to obtain “an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.” . . . the political advantage of corporations is unfair because

“[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.”²⁰⁴

199. See *supra* Part I.C.

200. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).

201. *Id.*

202. *Id.* at 654-55.

203. *Id.* at 668.

204. *Id.* at 658-59 (citations omitted) (quoting *FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.*, 479 U.S. 238, 257-58, 1986).

We therefore have recognized that “the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form.”²⁰⁵

The Chamber argues that this concern about corporate domination of the political process is insufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures. Although this Court has distinguished these expenditures from direct contributions in the context of federal laws regulating individual donors, it has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence candidate elections Michigan’s regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas. . . . We emphasize that the mere fact that corporations may accumulate large amounts of wealth is not the justification for § 54; rather, the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions. We therefore hold that the State has articulated a sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures by corporations.²⁰⁶

Why did the majority emphasize the artificial entity view? It may have been influenced by the adoption of that view in *CTS*. However, it is more likely that what really bothered Justice Marshall was “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth”²⁰⁷ per se, but he could not take that position because it was rejected as to rich individuals by *Buckley v. Valeo*.²⁰⁸ In his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out the weakness of the majority’s position, stating that while the state charters corporations, “[i]t is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights,”²⁰⁹ and that the aggregation of wealth argument is inconsistent with *Buckley*.²¹⁰ Justice Brennan also felt that the majority was on weak ground, and in his concurrence took the aggregate view that the purpose of the statute is to

205.*Id.* at 659 (quoting *FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.*, 470 U.S. 480, 500-01, 1985).

206.*Id.* at 659-61 (citations omitted).

207.*Id.* at 660.

208.This rejection was explicitly recognized by Justice Stevens in *Davis v. FEC*, No. 07-320, slip op. at 2 & n.1 (U.S. 2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

209.494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing *Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 205, Will Cnty.*, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); *Speiser v. Randall*, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).

210.494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

protect dissenting shareholders.²¹¹ Justice Kennedy in his dissent rejected both the aggregate and the artificial entity views, relying on *Bellotti* to argue (in accordance with the real entity view) that corporations are equal to individuals, and therefore their speech must be protected.²¹²

We thus arrive at the most recent addition to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the corporate form, *Citizens United*.²¹³ The question presented in that case was whether Congress could impose the same kind of limits on corporations that Michigan state law applied in *Austin*.²¹⁴ The Court could have ruled narrowly that the limits were unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit corporation formed for advocacy purposes by individuals, but decided instead to use the case as the foundation for a much broader ruling that all corporate direct expenditures are permitted under the First Amendment, overruling *Austin*.²¹⁵

What is remarkable about *Citizens United*, although maybe not surprising to the reader at this point, is that both the majority and the dissent adopted the real entity view of the corporation, so that their only disagreement was in divergent assessments of the implications for the First Amendment. The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy emphasized, for example, that the ban on corporate speech was not alleviated by the fact that a PAC organized and controlled by the same corporation could speak freely because "[a] PAC is a separate association from the corporation."²¹⁶ This assertion can only be made under the real entity view because under the aggregate view both the corporation and the PAC are owned by the same ultimate shareholders, and under the artificial entity view both the PAC and the corporation are created by the same state.

The majority relies on *Bellotti* for the proposition that "the First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker's corporate identity."²¹⁷ It rejects the "antidistortion" rationale of *Austin* as overbroad and inconsistent with *Buckley*, and as permitting the government to ban speech by media corporations.²¹⁸ The aggregate view advanced by the Solicitor General and by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in *Austin* is likewise rejected in reliance on the "procedures of corporate democracy" of *Bellotti*.²¹⁹ Interestingly, the majority does not even mention the artificial entity view, even though it (and not the antidistortion rationale per se) was key to the holding in *Austin*. While the statute at issue is a federal one, and corporations are chartered by states, it could

211.*Id.* at 674-78 (Brennan, J., concurring).

212.*Id.* at 699 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

213.*Citizens United v. FEC*, No. 08-205, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 21, 2010).

214.*Id.* at 1.

215.*Id.* at 12, 49-50.

216.*Id.* at 21.

217.*Id.* at 31 (citing *First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).

218.*Id.* at 34-35, 46.

219.*Id.* at 46 (quoting *Bellotti*, 435 U.S. at 794).

be argued that the federal government also confers benefits on business corporations by protecting the market that enables them to engage in business.²²⁰

Justice Scalia, in concurrence, did admit that the First Amendment was originally intended to apply to individuals, “[b]ut the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons.”²²¹ But this does not mean that he adopted the aggregate view, since that view, as applied to the shareholders, underlays the principal argument of the Government and was soundly rejected by the majority.²²² Instead, what Scalia meant was presumably corporate management working together as an association of persons “to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public debate.”²²³

Nor does the dissent attempt in *Citizens United* to advance any view other than the real entity view. Instead, it emphasizes that corporations are different than natural persons and therefore may be more heavily regulated:

In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.²²⁴

This is all about the corporation itself, not about the shareholders or the state. Similarly:

The same logic applies to this case with additional force because it is the identity of corporations, rather than individuals, that the Legislature has taken into account. As we have unanimously observed, legislatures are entitled to decide “that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation” in an

220. This argument was made to justify a federal tax on state-chartered corporations as early as 1909. See Avi-Yonah, *Corporations*, *supra* note 77, at 1218; see also *Hale v. Henkel*, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).

221. *Citizens United*, No. 08-205 at 7 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).

222. *Id.* at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring).

223. *Id.* at 9 (Scalia, J., concurring).

224. *Id.* at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

electoral context Campaign finance distinctions based on corporate identity tend to be less worrisome, in other words, because the “speakers” are not natural persons, much less members of our political community, and the governmental interests are of the highest order. Furthermore, when corporations, as a class, are distinguished from noncorporations, as a class, there is a lesser risk that regulatory distinctions will reflect invidious discrimination or political favoritism.²²⁵

Not a word is written here on the corporation’s relationship to the state or to the shareholders. The artificial entity theory is discussed later in the dissent, but purely in a historical context: when explaining the Framers’ view of corporations, Justice Stevens emphasized their relationship to the state.²²⁶ But he emphasized that this was a historical artifact that disappeared with general incorporation statutes, and that “many legal scholars have long since rejected the concession theory of the corporation.”²²⁷ He mentioned briefly the artificial entity rationale for *Austin*, but did not emphasize it in comparison with corporate power.²²⁸

The dissent also addressed the aggregate theory at the very end when discussing the dissenting shareholder rationale of Brennan’s concurrence in *Austin*, but only as a limited and secondary argument “beyond the distinctive legal attributes of the corporate form.”²²⁹ The main emphasis in this section of the dissent was on the weakness of the “procedures of corporate democracy.”²³⁰ This is very far from viewing the corporation as a mere “nexus of contracts” with the primary contract being that with the shareholders.²³¹

The entire *Citizens United* opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are thus reflective of the real entity view. Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that created them and the shareholders that own them. The debate between the majority and the dissent is about what follows from this perspective on corporations. In the majority’s opinion, this means that corporations are speakers just like individuals and entitled to the same First

225.*Id.* at 32-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting *FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm.*, 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982)).

226.*Id.* at 36. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Corporations were created, supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities”).

227.*Id.* at 36-37, 41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

228.*Id.* at 47-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

229.*Id.* at 89 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

230.*Id.* at 87-88 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, *A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law*, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 320 (1999)) (voting and shareholder derivative suits are “so limited as to be almost nonexistent” and selling the stock faces many practical difficulties).

231.*See* Fischel, *supra* note 135, at 1273 (“A corporation . . . is nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual benefit.”).

Amendment protection, while the dissent takes the view that because of the special characteristics of corporations, they have more limited First Amendment rights.²³² The dissent remarks:

The fact that corporations are different from human beings might seem to need no elaboration, except that the majority opinion almost completely elides it. *Austin* set forth some of the basic differences. Unlike natural persons, corporations have “limited liability” for their owners and managers, “perpetual life,” separation of ownership and control, “and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders’ investments.”²³³ Unlike voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign controlled. Unlike other interest groups, business corporations have been “effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s economic welfare”²³⁴; they inescapably structure the life of every citizen. “[T]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation,” furthermore, “are not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas.”²³⁵ “They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas.”²³⁶

It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their “personhood” often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of “We the People” by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.²³⁷

....

It is an interesting question “who” is even speaking when a business corporation places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the customers or employees, who typically have no say in such matters. It cannot realistically be said to be the shareholders, who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions of the firm and whose political preferences may be

232. *Citizens United*, No. 08-205 at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

233. *Id.* at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting *Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce*, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990)).

234. *Id.* at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Milton C. Regan, Jr., *Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue*, in *Debating Democracy’s Discontent* 289, 302 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998)).

235. *Id.* at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting *Austin*, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting *FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.*, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986))).

236. *Id.* at 75-76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting *Austin*, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting *FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.*, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986))).

237. *Id.* at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

opaque to management. Perhaps the officers or directors of the corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, except their fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds for personal ends. Some individuals associated with the corporation must make the decision to place the ad, but the idea that these individuals are thereby fostering their self-expression or cultivating their critical faculties is fanciful. It is entirely possible that the corporation's electoral message will *conflict* with their personal convictions. Take away the ability to use general treasury funds for some of those ads, and no one's autonomy, dignity, or political equality has been impinged upon in the least.²³⁸

It is hard to imagine a more forceful statement of the real entity view: actual human beings disappear almost completely. In a footnote, Justice Stevens does acknowledge the existence of other theories of the corporation, but it is clear which theory he favors.²³⁹ The artificial entity theory advanced by Justice Rehnquist in *Bellotti*, and relied upon by the majority in *Austin*, and the aggregate theory advanced by Justice White in *Bellotti* and Justice Brennan in *Austin* have almost disappeared, and both the majority and the dissent take the real entity view. Like so many times before, the real entity view reigns supreme once again.

Conclusion: What's Next?

As the reader can expect by now, it is hardly likely that this state of affairs will remain stable forever. When the next transformation in the status of corporations is addressed by the Court, it is inevitable that the artificial entity and aggregate theories of the corporation will re-emerge to once again contend with the real entity view. In fact, one can see this process germinating even now within *Citizens United*.

238.*Id.* at 75-77 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

239. Justice Stevens writes:

Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized model. *Austin* referred to the structure and the advantages of corporations as "state-conferred" in several places, but its antidistortion argument relied on only the basic descriptive features of corporations, as sketched above. It is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural persons in fundamental ways, and that a legislature might therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human welfare that is the object of it concern.

Citizens United, 08-205 at 76 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted) (quoting *Austin*, 494 U.S. at 660, 665, 667).

An important rhetorical comment made by Justice Stevens in his dissent, and echoed by other critics of the decision (like President Obama in the State of the Union address),²⁴⁰ is its impact on the rules restricting foreigners from participating in U.S. elections. Justice Stevens stated that the majority's approach "would appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans."²⁴¹ This drew a strong disclaimer from the majority, arguing that even if the Government has a compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process, the corporate expenditure ban is overbroad because it "is not limited to corporations or associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by foreign shareholders."²⁴²

Predictably, Congress will react by reaffirming that the ban on contributions and expenditures made by foreign nationals applies to foreign corporations.²⁴³ But how will Congress define what is a foreign corporation?

The majority in *Citizens United* envisaged two possibilities. One was to define foreign corporation as a corporation created by a foreign state.²⁴⁴ This approach is one taken by our tax laws, and it follows the artificial entity view.²⁴⁵ The problem, of course, would be that if this were the only definition, it would be too easy for foreigners to become Americans merely by incorporating a shell in one of the states.

The other approach mentioned by the majority was to take the aggregate view and look at the identity of the shareholders, so that a corporation the majority of whose shareholders are U.S. citizens will count as American and others as foreign.²⁴⁶

240. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) in 156 CONG. REC. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) ("[L]ast week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.").

241. *Citizens United*, No. 08-205 at 33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

242. *Id.* at 47.

243. See 2 U.S.C. section 441(e)(2006). The DISCLOSE Act, introduced by Sen. Schumer and Rep. Van Hollen, defines foreign corporation as any corporation incorporated overseas and any domestic corporation that is either 20 percent owned or de facto controlled by foreign nationals, which is a combination of all three views. See H.R. 5175, S. 3295 (111th Cong. Sess. 2), § 102.

244. *Citizens United*, No. 08-205 at 47.

245. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (5), (30) (2006). But see I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B) (defining some foreign corporations as domestic based on the identity of their shareholders).

246. *Citizens United*, No. 08-205 at 47.

This may work for closely held corporations. For example, this approach is used in determining foreignness for purposes of the rules restricting foreign ownership of media and transportation corporations.²⁴⁷ But for publicly traded multinational enterprises, the aggregate view is very difficult to maintain because the shares trade on multiple exchanges, the ownership is constantly shifting, and most of the owners trade under “street names” that make it very hard even for the IRS to know their true identities. Thus, I predict that the same reasons that forced the Court to abandon the aggregate view for diversity jurisdiction will apply in this context as well.

A third possibility would be to take the real entity view and confront directly the question of whether corporations in a globalized world have a meaningful nationality. As discussed above this issue is extensively debated and reasonable minds can differ.²⁴⁸ It lies at the heart of the current transformation of the corporate form from mainly national to multinational enterprises that do not owe any particular allegiance to any state.

Whatever the ultimate outcome of this debate, it is already possible to predict that once again the real entity definition of the nationality of corporations, which focuses on where they are “managed and controlled,” will triumph over a narrow focus on the creating state, too remote and manipulable, and the shareholders, too remote and diffused.²⁴⁹ To be continued...

247. See Gregory P. Cirillo & Christopher M. Mills, *Federal Restrictions on Foreign Participation in Commercial Aviation and Related Fields*, in 2 MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 11-13 (J. Eugene Marans et al., eds., 3d ed. 2004); Christina H. Burrow et al., *Foreign Investment in the United States Communications Industry*, in 2 MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, *supra* at 247.

248. See Reich, *supra* note 169, at 53-54; Tyson, *supra* note 172, at 37-38.

249. “Managed and controlled” is a familiar definition of corporate residency from the tax laws of many countries, relying on a U.K. House of Lords decision from the nineteenth century. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH ET AL., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON TAX LAW (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 195-96) (on file with author). Justice Stevens seems to take this view because he speaks of corporations “managed and controlled” by foreigners. See *Citizens United*, No. 08-205 at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

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