Tucker, Paul. "Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics".
Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018, pp. 569-572.
https://doi.org/10.23943/9781400889518-027
Tucker, P. (2018). Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics. In
Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State (pp. 569-572). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
https://doi.org/10.23943/9781400889518-027
Tucker, P. 2018. Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics.
Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 569-572.
https://doi.org/10.23943/9781400889518-027
Tucker, Paul. "Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics" In
Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State, 569-572. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.23943/9781400889518-027
Tucker P. Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics. In:
Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2018. p.569-572.
https://doi.org/10.23943/9781400889518-027
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