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BY 4.0 license Open Access Published by De Gruyter Open Access August 21, 2018

Social status, preferences for redistribution and optimal taxation: a survey

  • Andrea Gallice EMAIL logo
From the journal Economics

Abstract

The author reviews recent studies that investigate how social status concerns influence individual preferences for redistribution and impact the design of optimal tax policies. He focuses on two aspects: the relevant dimension over which relative concerns are defined and the different formalizations of the notion of social status that the authors provide.

JEL Classification: D31; D62; H21; H23

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Received: 2018-03-30
Revised: 2018-07-25
Accepted: 2018-07-30
Published Online: 2018-08-21
Published in Print: 2018-12-01

© 2018 Andrea Gallice, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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