The last two decades have witnessed a renaissance of philosophical interest in Thomas Hobbes, the result of which has been an outpouring of studies of his philosophy. If there is anything in particular that distinguishes this renewal of interest in Hobbes, it is the desire to purge his philosophy of its infamous egoism and neutralize the determinist implications of his metaphysical materialism. The problem, according to his contemporary critics, is that his philosophy can produce neither a valid contract theory nor a valid theory of moral obligation so long as human behaviour is governed by the influence of self-interest or fixed by the forces of causal determinacy.

These recent studies have contributed greatly to our knowledge of Hobbes, but at some expense. As a result of these studies, we today know both more and less about Hobbes than ever before. The Hobbes that comes about as a result of these studies is more respectable, more harmless, perhaps philosophically more useful, but also much more unrecognizable. The insight that made him an important philosophical antecedent to Leibniz, Spinoza, and Hegel, as well as to Locke, Rousseau, and numerous others, has been lost. Those elements of his philosophy for which he has become famous have been purged as he has become more respectable. His account of the passions governing all human behaviour has been isolated or, what is worse, inverted. His physics has been reduced to a methodological remnant of the notorious thesis it was originally thought to be. And his intention to produce a complete system of philosophy has been laid aside, a casualty of his contemporary restoration.

The purpose of this book is to work back to a view of Hobbes that relo-
cates him at the inception of a philosophical tradition that leads through Leibniz to Hegel. The intention is to restore Hobbes's thought to its more traditional philosophical location, first, by taking seriously his clearly stated intention to produce a "system" of philosophy, grounded upon physics, working through an egoistic account of human nature to a realistic account of civil association. The argument of the book is that there is a mature philosophical system in Hobbes that can be discovered in those writings that were published on or around 1650 (especially *Leviathan* and *De Corpore*). Those writings show the influence of his eleven-year stay in Paris from 1640 to 1651, during the English civil wars. Hobbes fled England in 1640, anticipating the collapse of Charles I's authority, the inevitable civil chaos, and his own vulnerability as a pro-royalist. During his long stay in Paris, he enjoyed the intellectual company of Maren Mersenne, Pierre Gassendi, Samuel Sorbière, François Bonneau (Du Verdus), and others, and lived at least in the intellectual environs of (and became a philosophical competitor of) René Descartes. One can surmise that this intellectually charged environment contributed to the changes in his philosophy detectable around this time. *Leviathan* is no less distinct from the earlier *De Cive* and *Elements of Law* than *De Corpore* is from his earlier "scholastic" physics.

The primary difficulty in understanding Hobbes "systematically" has always been connecting his physics (which has traditionally been perceived to be a mechanistic materialism) with his theory of sense perception or his psychology (grounded as it is on the primacy of fear and desire). A systematic philosophy would require deriving consciousness from motion, on the one hand, and passion or desire from mere motion, on the other. Hobbes seems never to have been bothered by the problem. The reason for his lack of concern, we will see, is the integrating and mediating function of the gradually evolving concept of "conatus" in his thought. The concept, sometimes translated by Hobbes as "motion," sometimes as "endeavour," depending on the context, runs through every segment of his mature philosophy. Its omnipresence inspired Frithiof Brandt to refer to him as "the philosopher of motion as Descartes is the philosopher of extension." The concept, in its most mature expression, prevents Hobbes's physics from being reducible to a simple mechanistic materialism from which, admittedly, neither consciousness nor desire could be extracted. It also explains why the doctrine of inertia, the centrepiece of seventeenth-century mechanics, has virtually no role to play in Hobbes's philosophy of nature. Hobbes's philosophy, developed out of this concept of "conatus," takes the form of an internally coherent philosophical system that provides us with a dynamic—even dialectical—theory of nature, man, and society. Hobbes's philosophy, so understood, emerges as an important catalyst in
the transformation of the "speculative enterprise" of School Philosophy into the historicist enterprise of philosophical modernity, the principle Hobbesian insight of which is that we know only what we make.

Chapter 1 of the book begins with a discussion of Hobbes's philosophical intention, his rejection of the ancients and the relocation of the objective of philosophy in man's mastery of nature. The chapter outlines the general conceptual development that takes place between his earlier and his later writings. Chapter 2 traces this conceptual development as it occurs in his philosophy of nature, following Hobbes's thought through his accounts of body and space, and his disputes with Descartes on these issues. It shows that Hobbes's materialism is phenomenal, rather than metaphysical, in the sense that it does not involve the simple self-identity of externally related objects. Externality is not a relationship between independently existing objects, but rather a product of the reciprocal determinacy of their individuating motions (or "conatus"). As part of this notion of reciprocal determinacy, Hobbes rejects the distinction between the sense objects and things themselves.

The sense in which this natural philosophy can be made consistent with an account of volition, that is, man's liberation from natural necessity, is discussed in chapter 3. Hobbes shows that voluntary motions are a product not of spontaneity but of the transcendence of the immediacy of natural relations that occurs through the mediating and stabilizing function of language.

Chapter 4 analyzes the historical development of Hobbes's account of the passions. His theory of the passions has often been dismissed precipitantly as a mere regurgitation of Aristotle's earlier account. The fact is that Hobbes's theory of the passions is the centrepiece of his philosophical system. The peculiarity of Hobbes's account is brought out in a comparison with that of Descartes which shows the disagreement that existed between them and the implications that follow from their disagreement. An analysis is made of the "dialectic" by which desire proceeds, how it culminates in the seventeenth-century notion of philosophy as the project to make man "master and possessor of nature" and in Hobbes's account of the magnanimous and generous few in whom that mastery reaches its apex. Hobbes's theory issues in an account of "the morality of natural reason" that opens the door to his theory of moral and political existence, and simultaneously anticipates the problems of creativity and paradoxes of historicism that have preoccupied much of contemporary philosophy.

Chapter 5 discusses the philosophical evolution of Hobbes's arguments for natural equality, and considers the sense in which his doctrine of equality follows from—and is consistent with—a physics and psychology that do not preclude the natural inequality of beings. The book concludes
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with an examination of the philosophical evolution of Hobbes's political philosophy from its earlier origins in an exclusively social idea of volition and desire to those later, mature accounts of the nature of man that ground all human action on the irrepressible, natural character of "conatus" (endeavour). It is that mature account of conatus, or desire, that creates the problem of getting from a Hobbesian state of nature into the social contract. It precludes our relying on unHobbesian trust in others to perform covenants they have made, and thereby shows the way to Hobbes's resolution of the problem.

The conclusion to which the book as a whole aims is that, for Hobbes, the pursuit of morality is not only inseparable from man's irrepressible concern for his self-interest; it is also inseparable from the pursuit of science, insofar as the "unforeseen mischances" that threaten man's welfare cannot be entirely alleviated by civil existence alone. Hobbes is in company with Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and others of his time who recognized that the ultimate benefactor of man will be found in philosophical science. The magnanimity and generosity of the philosophical and scientific few—those who are moved only by a desire for a "continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge"—makes them the true benefactors of mankind. Because of their preoccupation with, and preference for, philosophical and scientific issues, they have the unique characteristic of being morally and politically generous without the threat of sovereign coercion. So understood, Hobbes's philosophy can be seen to be an antecedent of currents of thought in our own times. The pre-eminence and power of philosophical science as Hobbes perceived it anticipates the political power and moral authority of modern technological science and the dangers thereof. Hobbes, of course, could not have been expected to see the dangerous implications of his thought as they occur in a technologically dominated society. It is enough, for our purposes, to re-establish a focus on Hobbes's thought that reintegrates his philosophy with the philosophical, scientific, and political history of his own time.