Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Amy Finkelstein

Published by Columbia University Press 2014

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Amy Finkelstein
In collaboration with: Kenneth Arrow , Jonathan Gruber , Joseph Newhouse and Joseph E. Stiglitz

In the series Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series

https://doi.org/10.7312/fink16380

Overview
Contents

About this book

Amy Finkelstein examines the implications of moral hazard for health care in the context of contemporary American health care policy. She presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this.

Author information

Amy Finkelstein is the Ford Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, codirector of JPAL North America, and codirector of the Public Economics Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research. She is a recipient of the John Bates Clark medal from the American Economic Association, the ASHEcon Medal from the American Society of Health Economics, and the Elaine Bennett Research Prize, awarded by the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession.

Reviews

[Moral Hazard in Health Insurance] reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.

Mark V. Pauly, University of Pennsylvania:
This thorough and lucid work by Amy Finkelstein should convince anyone of the existence and importance of moral hazard in health insurance. Patient cost sharing powerfully affects not only the use, quality, and price of care for consumers at all income levels, but also the costs and premiums of public and private insurances. She also clearly outlines the challenge in harnessing the power of cost sharing to discourage beneficial care that is not worth its cost, so that medical spending is controlled but care of high value is sustained.

Michael Grossman, City University of New York and National Bureau of Economic Research:
The relationship between health insurance and medical care, termed moral hazard, is one of the most fundamental in health economics. This volume focuses on that relationship, and with her crisp, clear writing, Amy Finkelstein makes state-of-the-art research in health economics accessible to readers with limited technical backgrounds—while also providing the intuition that underlies this research and that often escapes the technically sophisticated. I can only say "Bravo!" for the superb contribution made by this book.

Randall P. Ellis, Boston University:
Any course in health economics will benefit from Amy Finkelstein's concise and accessible synthesis of the literature on moral hazard (a.k.a. demand response). I recommend it highly.

Topics

Frontmatter Publicly Available Download PDF	i
Contents Publicly Available Download PDF	v
Foreword Joseph E. Stiglitz Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	vii
Introduction Joseph P. Newhouse Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	1
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Developments Since Arrow (1963) Amy Finkelstein Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	13
Commentary Jonathan Gruber Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	45
Commentary Kenneth J. Arrow Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	55
Commentary Joseph E. Stiglitz Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	65
Discussion Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	73
Arrow (1963): Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care Notes On Contributors Kenneth J. Arrow Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	81
Notes on Contributors Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	137
Index Requires Authentication Unlicensed Licensed Download PDF	140

Language: English
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Audience: Professional and scholarly;
Pages
- Main content: 160
Illustrations
- Other: <B>Figures: </B>3,

eBook

Published: December 2, 2014
ISBN: 9780231538688