A PREFACE TO PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS

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The practice of philosophy is not linear. It is more of an interruption. And it defies any conventional notion of progress. Although we like to imagine that a philosophical advance represents enduring progress from more rudimentary times, more often it overcomes an obstacle in the moment. It confronts a new problem. It finds a new way out.

Philosophical methods evolve, but that does not mean that earlier approaches are wrong or no longer operative. Nor does it mean that those earlier approaches gave birth to better ones. They addressed a different time. They faced a different conjuncture. They resolved a discrete problem. They served a special purpose. And often, they unveiled one illusion only to expose another.

Indeed, a philosophical praxis from an earlier time may be just as performative today, perhaps even more so. It depends on the situation it confronts. We may need it just as badly, or even more than we did at an earlier time. The exigencies of a new crisis may demand a return—though even that is never simply a repetition.

To believe otherwise would be to buy into a speculative philosophy of history that has no purchase today. We have long

been warned not to believe in origin stories, but instead to see in them a will to know and a will to power.

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The two sets of lectures on sexuality in this volume—the first from 1964, the second from 1969—address two very different political moments, separated by the upheaval of the student revolution of May 1968. Both of those moments, moreover, differ greatly from the political situation in 1976, when Michel Foucault published the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, or in 1984, when he published volumes 2 and 3 and made final revisions to volume 4. Those earlier moments differ even more radically from our political times today—even putting aside the digital revolution that gave birth to our expository society and the myriad ways it intersects with sexual regulation and prohibitions. The term “transgender”—in its current connotation, using the notion of “gender” rather than “transsexual”—would not even have been entirely comprehensible at those earlier times. As Jack Halberstam remarks, “only a few decades ago, transsexuals in Europe and the United States did not feel that there was a language to describe who they were or what they needed.”¹

The first set of lectures—Foucault’s 1964 lectures on “Sexuality” delivered at the University of Clermont-Ferrand—were delivered at a time marked by a resurgence of a soft humanism surrounding sexuality following the publication of Simone de Beauvoir’s influential book *The Second Sex* (1949) and the rise of second-wave feminism. This was a humanism that sought to place sexuality within the ethical framework of loving, equal, respectful relations between men and women; but in the process of ethicizing and equalizing heterosexual relations, it further entrenched homosexuality and other “perversions” into officially diagnosed mental disorders, as in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, first published in 1952, in which

homosexuality was listed as a sociopathic personality disturbance. The new humanism of sexuality went hand in hand with a demonization of alternative forms of sexuality—of anything that did not fit comfortably in a film like *A Man and a Woman* (released at around the same time, in 1966).²

In the face of this mounting sexual humanism, Foucault turned to the writings of Georges Bataille and, before him, the Marquis de Sade to highlight the experiences of sexuality that were excluded from the dominant ethical conception of sexuality and human nature. Foucault deployed the notions of exclusion, limits, and transgression in 1964 in order to more precisely delineate the character of contemporary Western culture. The spaces of transgression identified precisely the limits of social acceptance—what could not be allowed to be seen or heard in Western society. Foucault shone a light on “perversions” precisely to reveal how Western culture idiosyncratically developed its own unique troubled consciousness of sexuality: how it alone had developed a “science” of sexuality on the basis of those very behaviors; how that science of sexuality had given birth to the social sciences and, at their head, psychoanalysis; how psychoanalysis had begun, thanks to Freud, to reintegrate those “perversions” into more ordinary conceptions of sexuality; in sum, how Western culture had transformed sexuality into an object of scientific knowledge in order to regulate it. Foucault held a mirror up to contemporary Western society to expose the cunning, hidden devices it used to judge and regulate human behavior—and at what cost.

Five years later, in 1969, in the wake of massive student uprisings, of a more hegemonic Marxist (and Maoist and post-Marxist) discourse, and of movements for supposed sexual liberation, the political landscape was radically different. The moment was now marked by Herbert Marcuse’s unique blend of

Freudo-Marxism, in *Eros and Civilization*, and that of Wilhelm Reich. Foucault's philosophical engagement would take new shape. Now at the brand-new university campus just outside Paris—"experimental" was in the official name of the new campus, opened just months after May 1968: "*le Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes*"³—Foucault faced not only a different political conjuncture and different political struggles, but also an entirely different audience: surrounded by hundreds of Parisian students who had just lived through a revolution, Foucault confronted an intellectual milieu that was thoroughly imbued with Marxist, Maoist, and Althusserian theories of ideology and of the reproduction of power, and Marcusean notions of sexual emancipation. His own earlier proximity and distancing from Marxism—he had been a member of the French Communist Party during his time at the École Normale Supérieure (1950–1952)—would be tested, even as he himself began to embrace a more *marxisant* language.

In the second set of lectures—"The Discourse of Sexuality," delivered at Vincennes in 1969—Foucault deployed a Marxian framework to motivate his own new unique philosophical method, as applied once again to the domain of sexuality. Foucault developed an analysis of the discourse of sexuality, focusing on the literary, philosophical, scientific, medical, and juridical texts and practices that made sexuality their object—a method we would come to call "discourse analysis." He built common ground with his audience on the basis of a structural analysis of economic forces, tracing the emergence of capitalism from "primitive accumulation" to the "need for labor for the reserve army of capitalism" and discussing "forces of production," "ideology," and "ideological effects."⁴ These are all Foucault's words, or rather Marx's—clear catchwords from the hegemonic Marxist discourse that permeated the times—none of them used ironically by Foucault.

No, instead, Foucault plies this Marxian framework to develop his own unique philosophical approach: an analysis of discourse intended to show how sexuality was transformed through complex and pervasive social practices into an explicit focus of literary, scientific, and juridical discourse in modern times. Foucault demonstrates how deeply and seamlessly judgment is woven into the fabric of culture, in domains we would never have imagined: how, in realms apparently so distant from the public sphere of politics—our private bedrooms and closets—cultural norms are woven into our daily lived experience and shape our deepest subjective reality; how they pervade our consciousness and experience of life; how they shape our very epistemology—the way we see and understand the world, distinguish between science and opinion, make claims to truth; and how much work and social practice it takes to make these cultural ways of being natural and invisible throughout our lived experience.

Foucault extends his new archaeological method to the domain of sexuality and, in the process, displaces the traditional notion of ideology in order to underscore both the amount and the pervasiveness of the social practices necessary to achieve the invisibility of cultural norms, and to expose how the latter undergird, even more invisibly, our deepest judgments of morality and truth. In the place of Marxian notions of ideology, of false consciousness, of Althusserian theories of ideological effects, Foucault excavates the layers of discourse that limit our ability even to judge truth or falsity. As Foucault would emphasize a year later, on December 2, 1970, in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France: “before [a proposition] can be pronounced true or false it must be, as Monsieur Canguilhem might say, ‘within the true.’”⁵ Critiques of ideology that merely invert the base and the superstructure do not adequately take account of the deeper epistemological structures of discourse that would

allow someone even to articulate a legible claim to truth, one that could be heard by their contemporaries.

This entails for Foucault a fundamental reorientation from theory to critical praxis. What we tend to call, too easily, “ideology” is not merely ideational or superstructural; it is not merely in our heads, nor for that matter in our subconscious. It is, rather, the product of persistent and deeply penetrating social practices that shape the way we understand ourselves and the world around us, how we judge and comport ourselves in every facet of our existence, and how we can utter and understand judgments of truth and falsity. The domain of discourse is not in an ideational realm only. It is shaped by extensive and pervasive social practices. And changes over time—the diachronic dimension—are the result of changing social practices. Thus, what human agents must work on, in order to transform society, is not just ideas or theories, but praxis. Foucault formulated this even more crisply a few years later in his lectures on *The Punitive Society*, where he notes: “The conclusion to be drawn from this is that morality does not exist in people’s heads; it is inscribed in power relations and only the modification of these power relations can bring about the modification of morality.”⁶

Sexuality, again, is the space where this is most hidden from sight, but at the same time most operative. Note that Foucault is teaching philosophy at Vincennes in 1969, no longer psychology, as he was at Clermont-Ferrand (1960–1966) and Lille before that (1952–1955), where sexuality formed part of the ordinary curriculum of general psychology. Foucault turns sexuality—as he had madness and death—into prime soil for philosophical investigation.

As the times change, so do the philosophical concepts. The struggles Foucault faced in 1964—regarding the resurgence of a humanist heterosexuality coupled with the science of homosexual perversion—differed from the political struggles he would

face in 1969, during a more hegemonic period of Marxist ideology critique, or for that matter in 1976, a time of even greater dominance of the repressive hypothesis. Earlier notions of transgression, limits, or exclusion were less operative, necessary, or useful in 1969.

Foucault's philosophical method evolves as the political context changes. Lecturing several years later at the Collège de France, Foucault openly critiques the notions of exclusion and transgression he had used so fruitfully in 1964. "For a given period they were critical reversers in the sphere of juridical, political, and moral representation," Foucault states in his lectures on *The Punitive Society* on January 3, 1973. They "made it possible to circumvent notions like abnormality, fault, and law" and to understand Western culture through the metaphor of limits and boundaries. But new circumstances and new problems call for new methods of analysis, to pursue "new dimensions in which it is no longer a question of law, the rule, the representation, but of power rather than the law, of knowledge rather than representation." Those earlier philosophical approaches "were important historically"; but different times call for different philosophical praxis.⁷

Here is where we must remind ourselves to eschew the naïve idea of philosophical progress or linearity. The philosophical texts in this volume are political interventions. They are punctual, of the moment—a new theoretical method to address a new political conjuncture. They are philosophical acts.⁸ They constitute a form of praxis.

In the end, philosophical praxis is a political intervention. It addresses political problems. It constitutes a political engagement. This is especially true for a philosopher and social critic like Foucault, who so adamantly believed, with Nietzsche, that knowledge can never be divorced from relations of power in society—and that we must do everything we can to liquidate,

in every aspect of our theorizing and praxis, the naïve belief that knowledge is only true when it is detached from power.⁹

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With this publication of Foucault's early lectures on sexuality from the 1960s—never before published in the original French nor in English—we now have access to some of his earliest thinking on the topic of sexuality. The year 1964 was by no means the first time Foucault wrote or lectured on sexuality. His "Preface to Transgression," published in 1963 and written in tribute to Georges Bataille, could well serve as a preface to the 1964 lectures, and Foucault had been reflecting and lecturing on sexuality as part of his general instruction in psychology at Clermont-Ferrand and Lille before that. Even earlier, for his master class during his *agrégation* examination in philosophy in 1951, Foucault was assigned, by lot, the topic of "sexuality," a new topic that had been proposed for the first time by Georges Canguilhem.¹⁰ But these are the first preserved lectures on sexuality, and with them, we finally begin to see one bookend of a lifelong project on the subject.

The publication comes at an especially interesting time: the other bookend, the fourth and final volume of *The History of Sexuality*, *Les Aveux de la chair* (Confessions of the flesh), has finally been published as well. The manuscript of the fourth volume had been corrected by Foucault, but set aside, and was published posthumously in French in 2018 and is being published in English contemporaneously with these early lectures.¹¹ And even though we are mostly familiar with the broad strokes of the historical analysis of *The History of Sexuality*, the fourth volume performs important new work that had been heretofore missing.

The various times of publication of the earlier volumes of *The History of Sexuality* are, again, important. The first volume,

The Will to Know, was published in 1976 and it announced, on the back cover, a set of five more volumes to appear: *La chair et le corps* (The flesh and the body); *La croisade des enfants* (The children's crusade); *La femme, la mère et l'hystérique* (The woman, the mother, and the hysteric); *Les pervers* (The pervers); and *Populations et races* (Populations and races).¹² Foucault changed course, though, and published instead a second volume called *The Use of Pleasures* and a third volume titled *The Care of the Self* in 1984, only a month before his untimely death.¹³ He explained the change of course in a short chapter titled "Modifications" in the introduction to the second volume—one of his most brilliant clarificatory texts. I could not recommend it more highly.

Those two moments—1976 and 1984—were, importantly, different political times, especially for Foucault and in terms of his own political engagements. The first, 1976, followed on the heels of his deep engagement with prison abolition as part of the Prisons Information Group and the publication in 1975 of the monograph that grew out of those political engagements, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, in which Foucault set forth a model of disciplinary power; but it was a peculiar time, at the cusp of a new political formation, specifically French neoliberalism, with the new presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who assumed power in 1974. The year 1976 is precisely when Foucault began to revise his theory of power from discipline to the biopolitical, and the study of the modern regulation of sexuality was at the very heart of that reimagination. The second year, 1984, came at a different time: in the late seventies, Foucault addressed neoliberal governmentality head-on in his lectures at the Collège de France, which then inspired him to trace a genealogy of the modern desiring subject back through history to the Christian fathers, the Roman period, and the ancient Greek thinkers.

The multivolume history metamorphized, from 1976 to 1984, into a history of the shaping of contemporary desire.¹⁴ It evolved into the project of understanding how we shape ourselves through our own forms of avowal and practices of the self, and simultaneously how we are shaped, through relations of knowledge and power, into the subjects that we are today. Sexuality plays a central role in this: Foucault's critical project is to expose the way that subjectivity is so deeply and profoundly shaped, within a culture and a particular historical setting, that our own firm conceptions of our deepest selves as desiring subjects begin to feel natural, biological, universal.

We are familiar with the broad strokes of the historical analysis: The ancient Greeks (circa the fifth and fourth centuries BCE) understood sexual relations primarily through the framework of *aphrodisia*, a philosophical understanding that focused on the idea of an ethical self-mastery intended to prevent the subject from being consumed by the pleasures of sexual relations (volume 2, *The Use of Pleasures*). The Greek and Roman philosophers of the early Common Era (circa the first two centuries CE), especially the Stoics, conceptualized sexual relations primarily through the *techniques of the self*, such as the examination of conscience, the memorization of rules of austerity, and practices of penitence (volume 3, *The Care of the Self*). The early Christian thinkers deployed the framework of *lust*, *flesh*, and *sin* as a way to curb and regulate sexual relations (volume 4, *Confessions of the Flesh*). Finally, in modernity, we invented new scientific, medical, psychoanalytic, and juridical frameworks to regulate our sexual behaviors and undergird our judgments of morality, a new set of knowledges that produced the very concept of *sexuality* that had not existed before modern times (volume 1, *The Will to Know*).

In its full completion, *The History of Sexuality* reveals how our contemporary understanding of human sexuality is an artifact of

our times and culture, how it shapes us so deeply, and how it differs so profoundly from earlier ways of living, especially in that domain that today we call “sexuality.” The first volume sketched how the modern concept of sexuality gave birth to new ways of governing ourselves, which Foucault described as combining disciplinary and biopolitical forms of power and resulting in the governing of populations through the administration of life. Sexuality is precisely such a crucial space because it is located at the point of juncture of those two governmental technologies—discipline and biopolitics. The fourth and final volume exposes the ambition to integrate the study of the subjective experience of sexuality back within an analysis of knowledge and power, in such a way as to reveal both the resilience and the fragility of our contemporary sexual norms.¹⁵

In this sense, that other—and also newly published—bookend is equally revealing. In the final pages of the now-final fourth volume, *Confessions of the Flesh*, Foucault’s intellectual project of a history of sexuality comes full circle and achieves its long-awaited completion. In those final pages, dedicated to Augustine’s treatment of marital sexual relations, Foucault reveals the heretofore missing link that now binds his ancient history of sexual relations to his critique of contemporary forms of neoliberal governance: Foucault discovers in Augustine’s writings the birth of the modern legal subject and of the juridification of social relations. Like the final piece of a jigsaw puzzle, the appearance of the modern legal subject completes Foucault’s critical project and allows us to fold the entire four-volume series of *The History of Sexuality* back into his critique of contemporary modes of social ordering in the neoliberal age.¹⁶ In the final pages of volume 4, Foucault points to the direction he might have taken had his life not been cut short by a pandemic: to integrate his late work on subjectivity with his earlier theory

of knowledge-power—in effect, to marry the laborious work on subjectivity, knowledge, and power.

Many critics of Foucault complain that the apparent turn at the end of his life to subjectivity, to care of the self, to truth-telling undermines the political force of his philosophy and pushed contemporary critical thought into a complacent apolitical direction. The now-published volume 4 of *The History of Sexuality* should dispel that argument and open the way to integrate those two projects—knowledge-power and subjectivity. That is our challenge today, I would argue: to explore how we have been shaped as subjects in such a way that we implicate ourselves—both willingly and unknowingly—in the social order within which we find ourselves. Only by doing so will we be able to recover philosophical praxis.

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It is against the backdrop of that other bookend from 1984 that we can better discern the contributions of these early lectures. Of greatest importance, I would urge, is to treat the two texts separately, to understand them as different punctual interventions at different political moments—not only different from 1976 and 1984, but different from each other. It is for this reason that the editor of the French edition, Claude-Olivier Doron, in consultation with the general editor, François Ewald, and the members of the editorial committee, has produced two separate erudite course contexts, which provide fine detail concerning the immediate historical contexts for each of the two lecture series.

Foucault warned about “the paradox familiar to prefaces” in his own foreword to Binswanger’s book *Dream and Existence* in 1954. He warned of the temptation to retrace an author’s steps, given how important it is to readers, for their own comprehension, to struggle through that process themselves. But here there

is value in shedding light on the two lecture series, especially for readers of this English translation, brilliantly executed by Graham Burchell, given our deep familiarity with Foucault's later work on sexuality—his formidable *History of Sexuality*, which exerts such a vast influence across the humanities and social sciences today.

The 1964 Lectures on Sexuality

In 1964, at a time of resurgent heterosexual humanism, Foucault studied the unique cultural formation that he provocatively calls “our culture” and identifies as contemporary Western, European, Judeo-Christian culture. “That is to say,” he writes, “a culture marked by patriarchy and monogamy,” what he calls elsewhere “European, scientific, rational, and technical culture,” with its globalizing tendencies.¹⁷ The regulation and prohibitions surrounding sexuality tend to reveal the contours of culture most powerfully, both because sexuality is the space that is most highly normed and because there are no universal truths about sexuality, no central common core of sexuality with mere social rituals or variances at the edges. What is unique about modern Western culture is the way there arises a troubled consciousness of sexuality and, later, a science of sexuality. It is precisely because of this troubled Western consciousness of sexuality that psychoanalysis becomes, at one time, the foundation and queen of the social sciences.¹⁸

The cartography of Foucault's theorizing here is at two levels, and they work together. By cartography, I have in mind how he is thinking about this object of study, how he even poses the question—in his words, the “only question.” As Foucault emphasizes, introducing his 1964 lectures, “the only question that

we have the right to pose in order to begin [our study of sexuality] concerns therefore what sexuality is *in our culture*.”¹⁹

The first level is borders, limits, and transgression. This is the idea of a space outside our culture that defines the culture itself and its traits. What transgression does is to delineate the boundaries of our culture, previously unnoticed. It demarcates the survey lines. It reminds us of what our culture allows and forbids. And it does a better job of doing that than the notion of the law, or the normal, which are too binary.²⁰ In this, Foucault is deeply indebted to Bataille, Blanchot, Genet, and Sade—Sade, especially, for he so early and profoundly shook modern society with his transgressive writings. We only see sexuality there, at that limit, at the extreme of our culture. The tension between sex as pure biology and the cultural construction of sexuality gets pushed to that limit, in modernity: as sexuality plays less of a central role as a religious sacrament, and as it is simplified in law as well—with the Napoleonic civil code—it becomes the topic of constant discussion in its scandalous dimension.

The second level is archaeology: unearthing the epistemological formation that allows modern subjects to know sexuality. Foucault describes how, throughout the history of Western culture until the nineteenth century, there were just two ways of articulating sexuality: love and erotics—the first, the positive side of sexuality; the second, transgression. It was only in the nineteenth century that there emerges, with Sade, Laclos, and other transgressives, a new language that triggers research on deviations and perversions, that gives birth to a “science” of sexuality, and that makes possible the birth of the human sciences.²¹ “If Western culture is the only culture to have made sexuality an object of science, it is no doubt due to this series of historical and social phenomena,” Foucault writes. “In most other cultures, and still in our culture until the beginning of the

nineteenth century, sexuality could not be an object [of science] because it was too caught up in silent practices.”²²

This leads Foucault to a fascinating and long development of Freud’s writings on perversions and infantile sexuality that shows how important Freud, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, and psychoanalysis were to Foucault at the time, for that moment, for those struggles surrounding the renewed humanism of sexuality. The reason is that Freud, according to Foucault, began to normalize perversions, put them in continuity with “normal” sexuality—or, in his words, because Freud’s work “overturns the ethical relationship that made perversion the deviation of sexuality; it makes sexuality a development of the perversions.”²³

Both of these cartographic elements are deeply opposed to the idea of a humanism of sexuality—or what was often referred to, at the time, as an “anthropology of sexuality”²⁴—and to the “science” of sexuality.

At a time when Foucault was excavating the epistemological layers of Western culture from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century in a manuscript published two years later under the title *The Order of Things* (1966),²⁵ he turned his instruction on sexuality at Clermont-Ferrand into an examination of how his own society crafted and masked its extensive regulation of sexual behavior—of ways of living—through a scientific understanding of sexuality based on the study of supposed deviance and perversions; how, thanks to Freud and psychoanalysis, those perversions began to be reintegrated into the domain of sexuality; but how, in the end, no matter how much we might continue to seek the truth about the biological, medical, or ritual nature of sexuality, what characterized and marked a culture—and “his” in particular—was not a truth about the biological essence of sexuality or its social construction, but the constant interplay, tensions, and contradictions between the two. And where things settled.

The 1969 Lectures on "The Discourse of Sexuality"

Foucault faced an entirely different political landscape and different political struggles in 1969 when he delivered his lectures on "The Discourse of Sexuality" at Vincennes. In the wake of the student uprisings, Foucault conceives a new philosophical praxis he calls the analysis of the discourse of sexuality—or more precisely, a "study" of "discourses that are about sexuality as such."²⁶ It is an examination of how sexuality became *the* topic, *the* focus of debate and discussion. Almost as if referencing his earlier work from 1964, Foucault underscores that his analytic method is not simply "What are the effects on a culture of the different ways sexuality is structured?"²⁷ The project now is to explore how sexuality became the focus of discourse, and somewhat recently in Western culture—how it became, in his words, the referential of the discourse: "The way that Sade does not speak of vices and virtues, nor of an imaginary character, but of sexuality."²⁸

This entails a historical analysis of discourse—both how it is transformed and how it transforms—which leads Foucault back to political economy and Marxian categories of labor supply, forces of production, and the need of capitalists for a reserve army of workers. Foucault details a political economic process, beginning with a form of primitive accumulation associated with a demographic collapse and leading ultimately to a demand for labor, and the corresponding emergence of new institutions and principles: a whole set of practical effects that include new juridical conceptions of marriage as contract, new ideas of procreative sex, new fields of knowledge about sexuality.

What is key is that these are all practices—*social practices*—and not simply things going on in our heads. They are not just a matter of our consciousness, nor just a matter of the Freudian

unconscious. They are certainly not a matter of false consciousness, and cannot simply be resolved by a claim to truth. They are the product of social practices that shape the very basis of how we draw lines and form judgments—including those of truth, those that separate science from mere opinion or ideology. In perhaps one of the most important passages from the 1969 lectures, Foucault notes:

Thus, we should demolish with great care the idea that ideology is a sort of great collective representation that is outside of scientific practice [. . .] Ideology is not a matter of consciousness, any more than it is a matter of science; it is a matter of social practice. That is why the ideological struggle cannot be merely a theoretical struggle, at the level of true ideas.²⁹

This entails the study of what is said and practiced surrounding sexuality: an analysis of the texts and practices that place sexuality at their center—a methodological approach that Foucault calls, at this time in 1969, the “archaeology of sexuality.”³⁰ Foucault is excavating how it came about and all the different ways that sexuality was discussed and treated in literature, in biology and medicine, in the sciences, in psychology and psychoanalysis, in law and morality, and in everyday exchange. It is through the regulation and juridical transformation of marriage, for example, that post-Revolutionary French society facilitated the accumulation of manpower: by readjusting the ease with which people could marry in order to promote procreation—in other words, by the interplay of ideas, institutions, and practices.

An “archaeology of sexuality”: In focusing on the discourse of sexuality, Foucault explicitly inscribes his analysis in his archaeological method, but also begins to realize that it may not be fully adequate to analyze discourse, especially in relation to sexuality.

These 1969 lectures may represent one of the first moments in which Foucault realizes that he may need another method, or a methodological turn, this time toward genealogy, to address both knowledge and power together. It is not an accident that we read here the first of a series of critiques of the traditional notion of ideology that will run throughout his genealogical lectures at the Collège de France during the 1970s: Foucault was also lecturing on Nietzsche at Vincennes and formulating his important essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”³¹ His engagement with the notion of ideology at Vincennes clearly points toward his genealogical writings, even if he never utters the word *genealogy* or *dynasty* in these lectures.

In 1969, this is still *experimentation* in an archaeology of sexuality. As Foucault would admit in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, published the same year, he was still not yet “sufficiently advanced in my task” to be sure whether the analysis of discourse could extend beyond the sciences to a phenomenon like sexuality.³² In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France the next year, on December 2, 1970, Foucault identified sexuality as a domain for future investigation. “Later,” he declared at the Collège in *The Order of Discourse*, “we could attempt an investigation of a taboo system in language, that concerning sexuality from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.”³³ Later would be 1976: volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality* and the rejection of the repressive hypothesis.

Times change. The philosophical methods change. Even so, when faced with a similar dimension of humanist resurgence—for instance, in Marcuse’s writings—Foucault returns to the notion of transgression. In 1969, Foucault critiques Marcuse for his embrace of a humanism that naturalizes a specific conception of healthy sexuality—now allowing homosexuality, but excluding sadism.³⁴ Foucault underscores how Marcuse uses nature

to realign acceptable sexuality. In this context, the concept of “transgression” becomes useful once again, as Foucault returns to Sade and the idea of “transgressive utopias.”³⁵

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Times change, indeed. And much as those earlier moments differ from one another—1964 from 1969, from 1976, and from 1984—they differ even more radically, perhaps, from our political times today. The culture wars, in a country like the United States, continue to place sexuality squarely in its bull’s-eye, in ways that could hardly have been imagined back then, and to a degree that is inexcusable—or “intolerable,” as Foucault would have said.³⁶

No less than a month after his inauguration, on February 22, 2017, the president of the United States—yes, the *president* of the United States—thrust himself into the intimate decision of young children across the country as to which bathrooms they should use. The president withdrew protections for transgender students that allowed them to use the sex-designated bathrooms that they felt best corresponded to their gender identity.³⁷ Overruling his own conservative secretary of education, the president turned children’s restroom use into a federal priority, leaving it to states and localities to decide whether transgender individuals could access the bathroom of their gender.

In 2015, the previous administration had clarified the legal rules, through policy guidance, to explain that “transgender students should be treated consistent with their gender identity for purposes of restroom access.”³⁸ That was about the time when the term “transgender” came into the mainstream.³⁹ Colleges were beginning to design “gender-neutral” bathrooms. College student groups were contesting the term “gender-neutral,” preferring the more transgender-positive expression “gender-inclusive.”⁴⁰ Tension, conflict, and litigation ensued over the required use by transgender

students of those gender-neutral bathrooms instead of the bathrooms that most appropriately corresponded to their gender.

Drew Adams, a sixteen-year-old transgender boy who began his junior year at Allen D. Nease High School in Ponte Vedra, Florida, in August 2017, had been living as a boy since 2015 and had been using the boys' restroom since his freshman year without incident, until someone anonymously reported him. He was then required to use the gender-neutral bathroom. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund filed a lawsuit on his behalf in June 2017, arguing that the "discriminatory restroom policy sends a purposeful message that transgender students in the school district are undeserving of the privacy, respect and protections afforded to other students."⁴¹ The case reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta, Georgia, which, in August 2020, ruled that the school must treat transgender students equally in restrooms.

These culture wars would extend far and wide, including to the military. As Foucault noted in 1964, "we now know that sexuality in its mechanisms and meanings is not just confined to sexual practices but extends very much further into behavior apparently very distant from it."⁴² Six months into his presidency, on July 26, 2017, the same U.S. president posted a series of tweets in the early morning hours announcing that "the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military."⁴³ Thus began another campaign to undo the policies of the previous administration, which had, in 2016, lifted the ban against transgender individuals serving in the military.⁴⁴ The following month, August 2017, the president issued a "Presidential Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals," followed in March 2018 by a new memorandum that had the effect of banning transgender individuals from serving under their identified gender. By means of a subsequent

U.S. Department of Defense directive dated April 2019, and extended in September 2020 through another U.S. Department of Defense order, Instruction 1300.28, “Military Service by Transgender Persons and Persons with Gender Dysphoria,” the federal government required that individuals who are transgender and joined the military after April 2019 must serve under whatever sex they were assigned at birth. They may not serve in their preferred gender identity, are not allowed to seek gender-reassignment procedures, must not have transitioned, and must have been deemed by a medical professional to have been “stable” in their biologically assigned sex for more than thirty-six months.

Meanwhile, on other legal fronts, Lambda Legal filed suit on behalf of Sander Saba, a nonbinary transgender New York resident who was seeking an accurate New York driver’s license that reflected their nonbinary gender identity. The lawsuit, *Saba v. Cuomo*, filed in July 2020, “challenges New York State’s discriminatory policy that categorically prohibits nonbinary people from obtaining an accurate driver’s license that reflects their gender identity, instead forcing them to choose either ‘male’ or ‘female.’ Saba, a 25-year-old New York University Law School graduate, is seeking an accurate driver’s license with an ‘X’ marker.”⁴⁵

Times change. The struggles change. At the time of this publication, in 2021, the culture wars revolve importantly around the daily lived experience of transgender individuals in their most personal and intimate choices. If anything, the term *transgender* is almost already out-of-date. Jack Halberstam has coined the term *trans** with an asterisk to connote a more open-ended and ambiguous transformative ethic and politics.⁴⁶ *Trans** and other new terms, like *gender nonconforming*, *gender questioning*, *nonbinary*, and *neutrois* are becoming more current.⁴⁷ And in this context, some advocates and allies, paradoxically, have come to

embrace the scientific diagnosis of “gender dysphoria,” however uncomfortably, to make possible the types of medical surgery necessary to allow transgender persons to live their lives fully. In these struggles, the earlier stages of Foucault’s philosophical praxis become essential.

Listen carefully to Halberstam, one of the leading critical thinkers on transgender matters and the author of *Trans*: A Quick and Quirky Account of Gender Variability*: “Transgender thus became and remains the newest marker of exclusion and pathology to be seamlessly transitioned into a new template for acceptance and tolerance.”⁴⁸ Or to Halberstam again: “As lesbians and gay men earned recognition and protection from the state, transgender people often came to occupy the newly vacated classifications of disorder and dysfunction.”⁴⁹ Or listen to Paul Preciado, another leading thinker and the author of *Countersexual Manifesto*: “In this negative sexology, transgression is produced by denying the very grammar that produces sexual signification.”⁵⁰ Or to Preciado in *Testo Junkie*: “What if desire, excitement, sexuality, seduction, and the pleasure of the multitude were all the mainsprings of the creation of value added to the contemporary economy?”⁵¹

Notice the terms: exclusion, pathology, acceptance, tolerance, disorder, dysfunction, transgression, surplus value. They are in direct conversation with these lectures of Foucault. Our battles today may be different, but sexuality remains, constantly, at the core of our subjectivity and subject creation. It is precisely for this reason that these early Foucault lectures are of such importance: to help us engage in renewed philosophical praxis for these new and unique times and struggles.

Claiming that a sexual identity or practice is natural, or for that matter a medical disorder, is one of the central ways power functions, and something to resist. In these early Foucault

lectures, one can hear the argument that sexuality as identity and scientific knowledge should be replaced by sex as practice and invention. The point is not necessarily to “denaturalize,” or for that matter to “naturalize,” styles or practices of sexuality, but rather to spotlight how the interplay—one could even say, the dialectic—between what we consider to be natural and what we consider to be socially ritualized is itself the feature that tells us most about our culture and the battles we need to fight. Foucault acknowledged that a claim to nature may be strategically effective at times—for instance, in the context of human rights; but in the end, any strategic deployment is just that—a tactic in struggles of power. There is no point weighing in on the truth of nature or social ritual because there is little to gain in crystalizing social formations in these changing times. But this is, of course, an ongoing conversation—one that can be heard, loudly, still today. It can be heard clearly, I think, when a contemporary like Halberstam writes: “If ‘queer’ in the 1990s and 2000s was the marker of a politics of sex and gender that exceeded identity and gestured toward a critique of state power and assimilationist goals, we could say the term ‘trans’* marks a politics based on a general instability of identity and oriented toward social transformation, not political accommodation. As the term ‘transgender’ comes to represent the acceptable edge of gender variance, the category of trans* signifies the cost of that level of acceptance.”⁵²

*

With the inauguration of this new book series, *Foucault's Early Lectures and Manuscripts*, the third panel of a triptych is formed. A new window is opened, alongside the nine principal monographs published during his lifetime and the existing set of published interviews and essays—the famous *Dits et Écrits*—and thirteen lecture series at the Collège de France.

A new vista—but some ground clearing as well. The publication of these lectures immediately belies the overly simplistic, psychologized interpretations of Foucault—that he turned to the history of sexuality and the ancient Greeks late in life as a product of his own radical experimentations and homosexuality. Nothing could be further from the truth, as evidenced so clearly in these early lectures. The history of sexuality, as a way to understand and critique modern Western society, had been a lifelong project. To be sure, as always, there were biographical antecedents to his interests, not the least of which were his own formative life experiences as a gay man. But his theoretical interest in sexuality dates back to the earliest times.

These early lectures also belie the overly simplistic periodization of Foucault's interests, as if he experienced an ethical turn late in life. They provide a corrective to decades of misinterpretation of Foucault—to the aestheticization of Foucault and to the distortions, so often politically motivated, of his work. His was always a quest to understand the political influence of culture and history, time and space, on our subjectivity. These early lectures provide the perfect illustration. They are a window into a lifelong philosophical interest in sexuality as a way to understand *our culture today* and how we are shaped as contemporary human subjects—a lifelong project that, as this new series of lectures before the Collège de France will show, trace back to the early 1950s and his earliest writings on Nietzsche, Husserl, existentialism, phenomenology, and sexuality.

This new series, *Foucault's Early Lectures and Manuscripts*, of which the courses on sexuality from 1964 and 1969 represent the first volume, shines a light on the original problematics, the earliest formulations, the first philosophical praxes. The volumes will explore Foucault's struggles with phenomenology, existentialism, and psychology; his encounter, conversation, and

distancing from Nietzsche, as well as Marx; his working of *The Order of Things*; his years in Tunisia. Each volume enriches in innumerable ways the other panels of the triptych and, more generally, the fluorescence of Foucault's thought. I welcome you to this rich trove, little known before.

One word of advice—especially to the wise researcher. It is often thought that the notes at the end of a chapter provide merely citation and reference. But in this volume, so ably annotated by Claude-Olivier Doron, and in the forthcoming volumes, as you will see, the notes are so rich and provide a remarkable bibliography, references, and historical links to many of Foucault's and his contemporaries' related writings. The notes alone are worth the price of admission, in addition to the brilliant course contexts which mine Foucault's unpublished notebooks at the Bibliothèque nationale de France and in the process, provide hidden jewels from those private journals—like, for instance, the list Foucault drew on June 4, 1963, of what he called particularly prophetic cultural formations: “death, decadence, avowal, sexuality, madness.”⁵³

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When I set these two lecture series as one bookend, with the fourth and final volume of *The History of Sexuality* as the other, I am left with amazement at how our self-understanding of our sexuality today, no matter how stable, sticky, and natural feeling, is bound to change radically in the twenty-first century—how our sexuality, in the end, is basically written in sand. Just as with that figure of man Foucault identified in the 1960s, our contemporary understanding of sexuality—our own experience and everything we so firmly believe or know about our sexual selves—will wash away and give rise to entirely new ways of being, thinking, and living social, sexual, and political relationships that are practically unforeseeable today.

These works by Foucault reveal not only the iron-fisted hold and resilience of our current imagination of sexuality, but also the openness of sexuality, its fragility and temporality, and its embeddedness in relations of power. As Foucault noted in opening his Clermont-Ferrand lectures in 1964, “if sexuality is quite stereotypical in some of its manifestations, it is extremely plastic in others, and especially in those joined with behavior in general.”⁵⁴ The plasticity of what is to come is perhaps the most remarkable legacy of this work.

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1. Jack Halberstam, *Trans*: A Quick and Quirky Account of Gender Variability* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 3.

2. *Un homme et une femme*, directed by Claude Lelouch, written by Pierre Uytterhoeven, starring Anouk Aimée and Jean-Louis Trintignant (Paris: Les Films 13, 1966). See *A Man and a Woman*, IMDB, accessed January 3, 2021, <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0061138/>.

3. For sources regarding Foucault’s time at Vincennes, see Stuart Elden, *Foucault: The Birth of Power* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2017), 192n22.

4. Michel Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), in *Sexuality: The 1964 Clermont-Ferrand and 1969 Vincennes Lectures*, ed. Claude-Olivier Doron, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 2021), 176 [21], 161 [13], 161 [17], 190 [27], and 163 [20].

5. Michel Foucault, “The Discourse on Language,” in *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 224. For a more recent translation of

Foucault's inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, see Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse," in *Archives of Infamy: Foucault on State Power in the Lives of Ordinary Citizens*, ed. Nancy Luxon, trans. Thomas Scott-Railton (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 141–73.

6. Michel Foucault, *The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972–1973*, ed. Bernard E. Harcourt, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2015), 113. Special thanks to Daniele Lorenzini.

7. Foucault, *The Punitive Society*, 6; see also 2–5.

8. In this, Gilles Deleuze and François Ewald are entirely right. These are philosophical acts that represent "theoretical revolution[s]," in Deleuze's words, acts in relation to political actuality, as Ewald suggests. See Gilles Deleuze, "Écrivain non: Un nouveau cartographe," *Critique* 343 (December 1975): 1212; François Ewald, "Foucault et l'actualité," in *Au risque de Foucault* (Paris: Éditions du Centre Pompidou, 1997).

9. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," in *Power*, vol. 3 of *The Essential Works of Foucault (1954–1984)*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), 32.

10. Daniel Defert, "Chronologie," in *Œuvres I*, by Michel Foucault (Paris: Gallimard/Pléiade, 2015), xxxix.

11. Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité IV: Les Aveux de la chair* (Paris: Gallimard, 2018).

12. Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité I: La Volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976) (back cover); Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, *An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990) (the list is not included here).

13. Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité II: L'Usage des plaisirs* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984); Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 2, *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990) (I retain the plural "pleasures" in my translation of the title in text to reflect Foucault's ethical and political intervention regarding multiplying pleasures rather than looking inside ourselves for the roots of desire); Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité III: Le Souci de soi* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984); Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 3, *The Care of the Self*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1988).

14. Arnold Davidson, Henri-Paul Fruchaud, and Daniele Lorenzini are now editing, for their book series at Vrin, a volume that will collect Foucault's lectures on sexuality at Berkeley and São Paulo in 1975 ("Discourse and

Repression” and “La généalogie du savoir modern sur la sexualité”) and his seminar at the New York Institute for the Humanities in 1980 (“Sexuality and Solitude”). In that forthcoming volume, one can watch the metamorphosis unfold before one’s eyes.

15. Foucault, *Les Aveux de la chair*; see, generally, Daniele Lorenzini, “The Emergence of Desire,” *Critical Inquiry* 45, no. 2 (Winter 2019): 448–70, <https://doi.org/10.1086/700997>; Stuart Elden, “Review: Foucault’s *Confessions of the Flesh*,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, March 20, 2018, <https://www.theoryculturesociety.org/blog/review-michel-foucault-confessions-of-the-flesh>; Lynne Huffer, *Foucault’s Strange Eros* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020).

16. I develop this thesis in detail in an article titled “Foucault’s Keystone: *Confessions of the Flesh*: How the Fourth and Final Volume of *The History of Sexuality* Completes Foucault’s Critique of Modern Western Societies,” *Foucault Studies* (forthcoming 2021); see also Daniele Lorenzini, “La politique du paradis: Foucault, *Les Aveux de la chair* et la généalogie du néolibéralisme,” in *Après “Les Aveux de la chair”: Généalogie du sujet chez Michel Foucault*, ed. S. Boehringer & L. Laufer (Paris: Epel, 2020), 229–41.

17. Michel Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), in *Sexuality: The 1964 Clermont-Ferrand and 1969 Vincennes Lectures*, ed. Claude-Olivier Doron, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 2021), 5 [5] and 8 [9].

18. Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), 16 [21] and 31 [25]; for a detailed discussion of Foucault’s relation to Freud and psychoanalysis in these lectures, see note 5 to second lecture, 43.

19. Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), 5 [4] (my emphasis, though Foucault himself underlines this in his next sentence).

20. Foucault, *The Punitive Society*, 5–6.

21. Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), 71–72 [70–71].

22. Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), 86 [76].

23. Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), 89 [81]. Foucault focuses especially on child sexuality—a theme that he would later develop in his lectures at the Collège de France on *Psychiatric Power* in 1974, in *Abnormal* in 1975, and in the planned volume originally announced in 1976, of which a manuscript exists on *La Croisade des enfants*. Michel Foucault, *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973–1974*, ed. Jacques Lagrange, trans.

Graham Burchell (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975*, ed. Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2004); on the manuscript, *La croisade des enfants*, see note 1 in Foucault, *Sexuality* (1964), fifth lecture 128–129.

24. Foucault writes: “We can call humanist or anthropological philosophy any ‘reactionary’ philosophy” that, among other things, refuses “to see something other than love and reproduction in sexuality.” Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), 236 [NP/75]. For a detailed discussion of this concept of the anthropology of sexuality, see Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), note 33 to first lecture, 24–25.

25. At the time Foucault delivered these 1964 lectures, he was immersed in thinking and writing *The Order of Things*, which was published in April 1966. He had already finished a first version of the book manuscript by December 1964, and by April 1965, he had rewritten another three-hundred-page-long version of *The Order of Things*. Defert, “Chronologie,” xlix.

26. Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), 148 [5].

27. Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), 147 [4].

28. Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), 148 [6].

29. Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), 180 [26].

30. Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), 215 [47/49].

31. Foucault’s lectures on Nietzsche at Vincennes will be published as part of this series of *Foucault’s Early Lectures and Manuscripts*; for context on Foucault’s essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” see Bernard E. Harcourt, “Five Modalities of Michel Foucault’s Use of Nietzsche’s Writings (1959–1973): Critical, Epistemological, Linguistic, Alethurgic, and Political,” *Theory, Culture, and Society* (forthcoming 2021).

32. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 192; see, generally, 192–94 for a discussion of the archaeology of sexuality.

33. Foucault, “The Discourse on Language,” in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 232; see also 233–34 for a discussion of how Foucault would approach the study of sexuality.

34. Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), 268 [11/98].

35. Foucault, “The Discourse of Sexuality” (1969), 263 [15/90].

36. Foucault specifically placed the inquiries of the Prisons Information Group under the label “intolerable.” See Michel Foucault and Prisons

Information Group, *Intolerable: Writings from Michel Foucault and the Prisons Information Group (1970–1980)*, ed. Kevin Thompson and Perry Zurn, trans. Perry Zurn and Erik Beranek (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2020).

37. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, and U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, *Dear Colleague Letter*, by Sandra Battle and T. E. Wheeler II (Washington, DC: 2017), accessed January 3, 2021, <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3473560/Departments-of-Education-and-Justice-roll-back.pdf>; Jeremy W. Peters, Jo Becker, and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump Rescinds Rules on Bathrooms for Transgender Students,” *New York Times*, February 22, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/devos-sessions-transgender-students-rights.html>.

38. U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, *Letter to Emily T. Prince*, by James A. Ferg-Cadima, accessed January 3, 2021, http://www.bricker.com/documents/misc/transgender_student_restroom_access_1-2015.pdf.

39. Halberstam, *Trans**, 46.

40. See Sophie Rothman, “Restroom Signs Go Gender-Inclusive,” *Columbia Daily Spectator*, August 8, 2014, <https://www.columbiaspectator.com/news/2013/10/01/restroom-signs-go-gender-inclusive/>; Li Cohen, “Federal Court Rules That Transgender Students Must Be Allowed to Use Bathrooms That Match Their Gender,” *CBS News*, August 9, 2020, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/federal-court-rules-that-transgender-students-must-be-allowed-to-use-bathrooms-that-match-their-gender/>; see generally Halberstam, *Trans**, 134.

41. “Victory! Federal Court Rules Florida School Must Treat Transgender Students Equally Including Access to Restrooms,” *Lambda Legal*, accessed January 3, 2021, https://www.lambdalegal.org/news/fl_20200807_victory-florida-trans-students-bathrooms.

42. Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), 4 [2].

43. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow . . .,” Twitter, July 26, 2017, 8:55, <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864>; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “. . . Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and

overwhelming . . .,” Twitter, July 26, 2017, 9:04, <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472>.

44. Matthew Rosenberg, “Transgender People Will Be Allowed to Serve Openly in Military,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/us/transgender-military.html>.

45. Saba v. Cuomo, *Lambda Legal*, accessed January 3, 2021, <https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/saba-v-cuomo>.

46. Halberstam, *Trans**, 4, 50.

47. Halberstam, *Trans**, 10.

48. Halberstam, *Trans**, 46.

49. Halberstam, *Trans**, 47.

50. Paul B. Preciado, *Countersexual Manifesto*, trans. Kevin Gerry Dunn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 71.

51. Paul B. Preciado, *Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era*, trans. Bruce Benderson (New York: Feminist Press, 2013).

52. Halberstam, *Trans**, 50.

53. Cited by Claude-Olivier Doron in his “Course Context” to 1964 Lectures, note 5, 317.

54. Foucault, “Sexuality” (1964), 4 [2–3].