Introduction

HARRY M. MAKLER AND LAWRENCE S. GRAHAM

Social science research on Portugal is only just beginning to emerge in both North America and Europe. As a subject of systematic study, the country has been the most neglected of Western European countries. Its relatively isolated position in one corner of Iberia, until recently its South Atlantic and African rather than northern European orientation, the lack of Portuguese-language competence among Western scholars, and a tendency for concentration on Spain rather than Portugal, even among those interested in Iberian studies, have all contributed to our lack of knowledge. Indeed, the very fact that its 1974 revolution took so many by surprise attests to this paucity. Even in Portugal itself there were few studies analyzing the country's contemporary social, economic, and political structures before the 1970s.

Portuguese social scientists and historians, unlike their counterparts in other European countries, were virtually unknown abroad. Undoubtedly, the humanistic emphasis of university education and strict censorship during the Salazar regime restricted the type of work produced, and contributed to the fact that Portugal was invisible to much of the outside world. The aging dictatorship of António Salazar weathered the *Santa Maria* hijacking in 1961, and even revolutionary activities in its overseas territories were largely overlooked by both the Western press and Western scholars.

During the early 1960s a protracted colonial war broke out in Portugal's African territories. Goa and two other Portuguese enclaves were seized by India. Unrest was echoed on the Continent in manifestations, student strikes, and massive emigration of young men seeking jobs in northern Europe and evading obligatory military service. These problems quietly simmered along for over a decade and might have gone on longer had Salazar not had an accident which soon incapacitated him and quickly eroded his rule.

The overseas problems of the 1960s continued and they were exacerbated during the 1970s as the economy became rapidly internationalized. Movement toward European economic integration

was accomplished by foreign investments in Portuguese industry, which rose from 1.5 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 1970. By 1973 the world-wide recession and increases in petroleum and basic commodity prices, plus the relaxation of price controls, dovetailed to produce a 35 percent inflation rate, one of the highest in Western Europe. Remittances from Portuguese workers overseas and tourism (which annually comprised 30% of the country's foreign currency earnings) were reduced to a trickle. The wars in Africa had become a prolonged and arduous series of sporadic military engagements which left ten thousand dead, wounded another twenty thousand, and annually absorbed half of the country's budget, stunting the growth of education, social welfare, and other domestic institutions. Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, tried to appease everyone—the left, right, and center. Despite his attempts at accommodation, there was increasing dissension within the governing class. General António de Spínola's book highlighted this dissension, until then internalized within the regime, by focusing public attention on the fact that the African wars could not be won and arguing that a new mode of relations with the "overseas provinces" had to be considered.¹

Briefly put, under Caetano, the political system constructed by Salazar ceased to respond to the demands placed upon it; Portuguese politics had entered a stalemate. The regime faced so many national and international problems of seemingly equal magnitude that it could not decisively resolve any one. Nor did it appear to want to. One sensed that the Caetano government, unlike its predecessor, was transitory, almost as if it was awaiting a new "Golden Age." In the mass media, controlled such as it was, news commentators continuously debated whether it was better for Portugal to align itself with Africa, Europe, or Latin America. This indecisiveness was mirrored throughout the regime, as contributors to this volume will demonstrate.

But even now, over four years after the military coup, Portugal still is unsettled; its people are uneasy, restless, and apparently waiting for something, but they know not what. One senses that they have been disillusioned, that they have forgotten the Revolution, and indeed well they might as fifty years of authoritarian rule were followed by eighteen months of anarchy, and now, despite the restoration of the state and democracy, the country is threatened by economic collapse. As this volume goes to press, inflation is around 27 percent, unemployment exceeds 10 percent, half the food

is being imported, and there is a balance of payments deficit of nearly one billion dollars, which is almost certain to increase as the country attempts to borrow two billion dollars abroad. While there are signs of recovery, these are slow and uneven. The gross domestic product rose 4 percent in 1976 after a 3.6 percent drop in 1975. Fluctuations in industrial production have been similar. The only bright spots—a factor predicted by the team of economists contributing to this volume—are increasing tourism and emigrant remittances, but these have not yet offset the other deficits. Politically, various factions are undermining governmental policies designed to curb inflation and rebuild the economy. The Communists blame the Socialist government for promoting “a capitalist recovery” at the expense of workers whose wages have been frozen at the very time that prices are rising and deregulation of private enterprises is occurring. Industrialists are critical of the government’s credit policies and import restrictions as higher production costs, increasing competition, and inflation become more burdensome and European economic integration a reality. After a half century of authoritarian rule many are fearful that those in command will attempt to return to the past, resorting to unpopular measures and stifling the new experiments in representative government, free press, and political expression.

The Origins of New Scholarship on Portugal

It was within this context that a small group of scholars within and outside Portugal began to conduct in-depth research on the country’s recent history, social structure, politics, and economics. Before the 1974 coup, such Portuguese scholars as António de Oliveira Marques (history), Hermínio Martins (sociology), and Manuel de Lucena (political science) conducted their labors largely outside the country, while others—for example, Francisco Pereira de Moura (economics), José Cutileiro (anthropology), and Adérito Sedas Nunes (sociology)—worked quietly at home.² Even though other names could be mentioned as examples of the new scholarship which was emerging within Portugal during these years, the essential point to establish is that it was largely individualistic, isolated, meagerly supported, and faced with tremendous difficulties in the context of a regime which looked askance at the social sciences and the questions they raised.

The first North American social scientists to conduct systematic studies of contemporary Portuguese society were Joyce F. Riegelhaupt (anthropology) and Harry M. Makler (sociology). Although unknown to each other, both were doctoral candidates at Columbia University and both began their research in the early 1960s. In 1960, Riegelhaupt, with a fellowship from the National Institute of Mental Health and under the sponsorship of Charles Wagley, undertook a study of peasant family life, economics, and politics in a small *salóio* village near Lisbon. In 1964, Makler, with a Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation fellowship and under the guidance of Juan J. Linz, began his study of the role of Portugal's industrialists and their enterprises in the socioeconomic development of the country.

It was not until the late 1960s, however, that informal contacts began to be developed among social scientists in the United States who were interested in Portugal. In August 1966, at an international colloquium on Luso-Brazilian studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Riegelhaupt commented on a paper by Makler based on his industrial elite research.³ Another commentator was Douglas L. Wheeler, a historian at the University of New Hampshire who had conducted research on nineteenth-century Angola in the early 1960s under a Fulbright scholarship. The fourth person to become a part of the group was Philippe C. Schmitter (political science), whose research on Portugal began soon after he participated in a panel organized by Linz at the Seventh World Congress of Sociology in Varna, Bulgaria, in August 1970. At that meeting Schmitter presented a paper on interest representation in Brazil between 1930 and 1965.⁴

In May 1971, Makler and Schmitter met at the University of Chicago where they began their collaboration on a paper dealing with the integration of Portugal's industrialists into the European Economic Community.⁵ Schmitter had just been awarded a grant to enable him to visit Portugal for the first time to conduct research on interest politics in the Salazar-Caetano regime and authoritarianism. Schmitter's interest in Portugal originated from his studies of corporatism and authoritarian rule in Argentina and Brazil.⁶

On the basis of his 1971 summer field research, Schmitter prepared his first paper on Portuguese corporatism, interest representation, and policy formulation.⁷ He returned to the United States at the end of that summer enthusiastic about the possibilities of future social science research and cross-disciplinary collaboration. In a memorandum dated October 21, 1971, Schmitter took the ini-

tiative and formalized the sentiments that others in this group had been discussing: a collaborative volume on Portugal from a multidisciplinary perspective, the creation of a southern European longitudinal data bank, and a near-future conference on contemporary Portugal and its problems. This memorandum was directed to Linz, Makler, Riegelhaupt, Hermínio Martins, Lawrence Graham, and Stanley Payne.

Like Schmitter, Hermínio Martins was also interested in Portuguese politics and society. While teaching political science at the University of Essex in England he produced some of the first essays in English on Portuguese fascism and political movements during the twentieth century.⁸ He and Schmitter first met in England during the summer of 1971.

In the early 1970s interest in authoritarianism and corporatism led two other political scientists, Howard Wiarda and Lawrence Graham of the Universities of Massachusetts and Texas, respectively, to begin work on Portuguese politics and its evolution. Like Schmitter, both had previously conducted research in Latin America. Wiarda first traveled to Portugal to begin his studies of Portuguese politics in November 1972, with an SSRC grant to study corporatist theory and its manifestations in Salazar's *Estado Novo*.⁹ In May 1971, Graham went to Portugal under grants from the Calouste Gulbenkian and Earhart foundations and spent eight months conducting research on the country's public bureaucracy. The following year, as a consequence of a continuation of research funding by these two sources, he extended his study to Angola and Mozambique, where he interviewed colonial officials.¹⁰ Early in the summer of 1975 he returned to Portugal to study the role of the military in the Revolution, on which he reports in this volume (Chapter 7).

The memorandum also made its way to Stanley G. Payne, a noted historian of Iberia. In 1971, Payne, who has contributed much to our knowledge of modern Spanish history and fascism, began to turn his attention to Portugal. In June 1971, at a workshop he organized at the University of Wisconsin to encourage historical and social science research on modern Spain under the sponsorship of the Council of European Studies, Payne also encouraged the participation of Portuguese specialists. He discussed with Makler and Schmitter his interest in conducting a study of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Portuguese politics. Two years later Payne firmly established himself as a scholar of Portuguese history with the publication of his two-volume work on Spain and Portugal.¹¹ Moreover,

he was instrumental, together with Linz, in organizing the first meeting of what soon was to become the International Conference Group on Modern Portugal (ICGMP).

THE FIRST CONFERENCE ON MODERN PORTUGAL

During the fall and winter of 1971 plans were made for a small meeting of North American social scientists who had studied or had expressed interest in studying modern Portugal. In early June 1972, with a small grant from the Council for European Studies, Payne organized and hosted an administrative meeting at the University of Wisconsin to plan a larger conference on contemporary Portugal for the following year. Among those in attendance were Linz, Makler, Riegelhaupt, Schmitter, Wheeler, Stuart Schwartz, and Thomas C. Bruneau. Bruneau, a political scientist who had also done his first work in Latin America, had met Schmitter at Berkeley, where they were both graduate students.¹² Stuart Schwartz, a historian of Brazil, had known Makler and Riegelhaupt at Columbia University and then went on to study Brazil's seventeenth-century judicial system, which involved extensive research on Portugal in its archives.

Riegelhaupt and Wheeler volunteered to organize the first conference and to act as co-chairpersons for the newly emerging group. Later that fall (1972), they submitted a proposal to fund the conference to the Council of European Studies and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. Soon afterward, with grants in hand, the newly formed Conference Group scheduled its first "Workshop on Modern Portugal, 1820–1973" for October 10–14, 1973, at the University of New Hampshire's New England Conference Center.

The main objective of the conference—as well as of the two others that followed—was to encourage research on Portugal's recent history, its politics and government, its (then) colonial system, its class structure, and its economic processes. In this regard an effort was made to combine in-depth discussion with the presentation of research results by a larger group of scholars. Included were those who had already studied the country extensively, as well as newer scholars (both graduate students and professors) who were just beginning their work on Portugal.

To encourage multidisciplinary and cross-national collaboration, the organizers solicited papers from a variety of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. With Wheeler in Portugal in 1972 conducting

research, it was possible to arrange the participation of a number of eminent Portuguese social scientists and historians.

This first meeting, chaired by Juan Linz and Stanley G. Payne, was rather broad in scope, as reflected in the organization of the sessions, the disciplines, and the affiliations of the participants (see Appendix).

A number of papers from the conference were subsequently published by their authors in various scholarly journals. Others appear in this volume.¹³ In nearly all cases the papers were substantially revised in the light of the coup that occurred seven months after our meeting. While our papers and discussions at the Durham meeting tended to reveal contradictions, dysfunctions, and weaknesses in Portuguese institutions, there were no hints of radical political changes. Even the most informed among us, including outspoken Portuguese intellectuals (and later political leaders), seemed resigned that the regime was firmly entrenched as its economy was relatively sound, its opposition groups were hopelessly divided in terms of both purpose and strategy, and its colonial wars in its overseas territories were stalemated.

In retrospect, a major weakness in the first program was the neglect of the military. Imagine if we had known that at the very time of our conference clandestine meetings of military officers were planning the regime's overthrow!

The most heated discussions took place in the session on Portuguese corporatism. They were largely theoretical and had more to do with the reality of academic political science than with the reality of Portugal. Two contributors to this volume, Howard Wiarda and Philippe Schmitter, had studied the same topic but had arrived at contradictory conclusions. Wiarda reported that corporatism was an "authentic" structural response, deeply rooted in Portuguese political culture, and under Caetano's guidance a meaningful element in Portuguese political life. Schmitter, in contrast, saw corporatism as having little to do with political culture (except as a *post factum* ideological justification) and as the product of deliberate public policy coercively applied. He later wrote that "its [corporatism's] structure and performance were [and long had been] an elaborate fraud and that, far from being dynamic, it was moribund; and, in fact, that its primary importance lay in what it did not do and prevented from happening rather than in what it did do."

While few of the "seasoned" scholars had any immediate plans to return to Portugal—in fact, in the corridors one often heard dis-

cussions of research prospects in Latin America—there were some “budding scholars.” One was Caroline Bieler (now Brettell), a young Canadian anthropologist who was about to begin doctoral research on Portuguese migration patterns in Europe.

The coup of April 25, 1974, caught all of us completely by surprise. Bruneau, who was continuing his research on the Church and State in Portugal, was the only member of the Conference Group who happened to be “right on site” during the coup. Gradually, the members of the ICGMP returned to Portugal to assess firsthand the Revolution’s impact, to “reaffirm old contacts,” and to gauge the receptivity toward foreigners, especially American researchers. Overnight Portugal attracted numerous social scientists and historians who suddenly developed an interest in Portuguese politics.¹⁴

THE SECOND CONFERENCE ON MODERN PORTUGAL

By the fall of 1974 there were proposals for another meeting of ICGMP. It was hoped that the meeting could be held in Portugal, which would serve to clarify the causes and consequences of the Revolution and to provide opportunities to discuss collaborative research with Portuguese social scientists.

Since the political situation in Portugal remained unsettled, it proved difficult to arrange a conference there, and a small meeting was organized by Juan Linz at Yale University on March 28 and 29, 1975, with the support of Yale’s Council of West European Studies. The primary purpose of this conference was to plan a cross-disciplinary study of Portugal’s social structure and electorate in order to provide a sound basis for future studies and to learn about the population of a country which had been tabulated but rarely, if ever, systematically studied. There was some reluctance by the group to the idea of a large collaborative survey; the participants perceived that the Portuguese would suspect, if not outrightly resist, any social or political research conducted by a North American team. This feeling was acquired during brief visits to Portugal made by many during the summer immediately following the Revolution. Nevertheless, individual research efforts continued.¹⁵ Riegelhaupt, for example, had begun to investigate agrarian reform, Schmitter delved into new political movements, Graham undertook new research on the military, and Wiarda returned to investigate the effects of the Revolution on corporative structure. New scholars also emerged.

Jack Hammond, a sociologist interested in voting behavior, set out to conduct a pre-electoral survey on which he reports in this volume (Chapter 8). Rhona Fields, a social psychologist, studied the political attitudes of the new military leaders; and Eusebio Mujal began his doctoral research on the Communist parties in Spain and Portugal.

THE THIRD CONFERENCE ON MODERN PORTUGAL

A year after its revolution Portugal was still very much in the news. There were counter coups, hints of CIA involvement, Socialist and Communist Party struggles, independence movements in the now-independent African colonies, and a series of economic and fiscal crises of sufficient magnitude to disturb the Western European countries and their alliances. Those who had had an opportunity to study postrevolutionary Portugal were ready to test their theories about the origins and implications of the Revolution with their colleagues. As Portuguese specialists they were also in a position to offer to the North American academic community some cogent explanations for the collapse of the Salazar-Caetano regime, perhaps in atonement for an event which none of them had foreseen. Therefore, early in the fall of 1975, efforts by David Raby (a historian of modern Mexico who wanted to study the *Estado Novo* epoch in Portugal) and Harry Makler to organize a meeting at the University of Toronto were enthusiastically received by the ICGMP members. With the support of the Canada Council, the Interuniversity Centre for European Studies in Montreal, and the University of Toronto, a meeting was held in Toronto, April 16–17, 1976. Unlike the previous conferences, the Toronto meeting specifically focused on the political, social, and economic aspects of the MFA revolution.¹⁶ Specialists who had studied the breakdown of the Salazar-Caetano regime, the rise of the MFA, and the impact of the African wars were invited to participate. Nevertheless, the interdisciplinary and international character of the group was maintained and was reflected in the conference program (Appendix).

At an administrative meeting held immediately following the conference it was decided that a number of the ICGMP papers and research reports were of such quality that they merited publication. Moreover, a book on Portugal seemed timely. Not only had public interest been aroused, but it also was sustained and was still seeking explanation two years after the Revolution. Upon the request of the group, Graham and Makler agreed to collect, edit, and see to the

publication of papers which could best contribute to the understanding of Portugal's changing social, economic, and political structure and the demise of its authoritarian regime.

The Papers Selected and the Rationale for Their Inclusion

The eleven essays selected for publication in this volume come from a pool of thirty-five highly divergent examples of recent scholarship on Portugal. At the outset the editors requested and received from those central to the Conference Group permission to decide which would be the most appropriate for inclusion in a single volume. By 1976 this store of conference papers consisted of both published and unpublished materials.

The essays appearing here are those which in our judgment fit together most effectively in providing an overview of contemporary Portugal. As a general principle we first considered previously unpublished material of quality. Only later did we review work that had already been published by the Conference Group. At our request, Wiarda consented to write a new paper for the book, synthesizing his earlier work on Portugal and reappraising his ideas on corporatism in light of the Revolution. In Lucena's case we found that the paper he had prepared for the Toronto Conference, once it was translated from the French, was not appropriate from the standpoint of the general reader unless one were in a position to read his larger two-volume dissertation, prepared originally for a state doctorate in France. With the author's assistance we returned to the original dissertation of over a thousand pages, abridged, and translated a section from the first part of volume one which complemented the other papers we had in hand. This selection makes available for the first time material on Portuguese and Italian fascism that hitherto has been inaccessible to the English-language reader. As a comparative study of two distinct but related regimes, it sheds new light on both Salazar's Portugal and Mussolini's Italy. Lastly, in order to provide proper balance to the book, we requested and obtained permission from J. Silva Lopes (governor of the Bank of Portugal) and Richard Eckaus to include excerpts from what has become a much debated and highly controversial report on the Portuguese economy, an OECD-Bank of Portugal study amply commented on in the Portuguese press but hitherto of limited availability to the informed public within and outside Portugal. One wonders whether Portugal's continuing economic and political difficulties

would have been averted had the recommendations of Eckaus been adopted. As of the summer of 1977 an MIT group was still in Portugal, continuing its studies and making policy recommendations to the government. We have also included in this volume a paper by Mario Murteira. In 1975 Murteira was minister of planning and economic coordination in the fourth and fifth provisional governments. It was during this time that nationalizations and state interventions in industry peaked. Murteira's paper represents the views of the intellectual Marxists, a group which strongly opposed the OECD-Bank of Portugal report.

SCHMITTER

The volume begins with a paper on the social, economic, and political bases of Portugal's authoritarian regime under Salazar (1932–1968) and Caetano (1968–1974). In keeping with other studies of authoritarian or fascist rule, its author, Philippe Schmitter, examines the social origins and career patterns of what he calls the "founding" political elite, that is, members of the National Assembly and the Corporative Chamber during the early years of the *Estado Novo* (1934–1942). He shows that Portugal's political elite was in many respects quite similar to political elites in other authoritarian regimes in that it was composed mainly of civil servants, technicians, and university professors who were self-made men of middle-class socioeconomic origin. These findings parallel and coincide with a number of those recorded by Makler (Chapter 4) in his discussion of the industrial elite.

Through examining economic and political imperatives Schmitter seeks to explain why authoritarian rule emerged in Portugal. He highlights a series of economic and fiscal crises, beginning with numerous bank failures in 1924–25, which not only led to the state's intervention, regulation, and absorption of surplus capital, but also enabled Salazar to set Portugal on course toward a "delayed-dependent" mode of economic production. In citing political causes, Schmitter notes the loss of hegemony by the dominant political class, the continuing political instability (e.g., cabinet changes, terrorist activities, strikes), and the abundance of competing ideologies. Finally, he looks at the various strategies used by Salazar to implant and consolidate his rule. In economic terms these entailed new and austere fiscal policies, centralization of authority, protective tariffs, agricultural subsidies, wage and price controls, and regulation of competition. Politically, Salazar consolidated

power by abolishing political parties, replacing all class associations with corporative organizations, co-opting notables and experts into high office, and imposing strict censorship on the mass media in order to ensure ideological uniformity. The outstanding characteristics of the Salazar-Caetano regime were its success in demobilizing and imposing social control over its citizenry and its slow, non-aggressive political and economic expansion, which dulled innovation and initiative and comprised all who shared and participated in its policies.

LUCENA

Numerous facets of Portugal's authoritarian rule raised by Schmitter are historically and comparatively addressed by other authors in the volume. Chapter 2 contains an analysis of the structural underpinnings and consequences of the corporative system imposed by Salazar. Manuel de Lucena leads off his discussion by defining Salazarism as "a form of fascism without a fascist movement" and then traces its evolution in Portugal. In order to distinguish between Salazarism and corporatism Lucena chooses a comparative approach. He first outlines the emergence of fascism in Italy under Mussolini and then describes the Portuguese case. The origins, style of leadership, foreign influence, and relations with the state are vividly compared. In a section entitled "Worship of the Leader" Lucena's characterizations of Salazar and Mussolini supply new insight into the nature and persistence of authoritarian rule in each of the countries.

After re-creating an image of what authoritarian Portugal was like, Lucena describes the forces which led to its breakdown. He first acquaints us with the country's economic system: its original restructuring before the war, the impact of World War II, and the stresses imposed later by prolonged colonial warfare and integration into the postwar capitalist world. These transformations gave rise to a number of contradictions. The stimulation given to exports and domestic production by the war and the regime's association with the Allies during its final stages weakened the initial definition Salazar had given to Portuguese nationalism and to his regime. As American capital invaded Europe and many of the European states moved toward economic integration, it became necessary to abandon the original meaning given to corporatism because of its ties with fascism. But in seeking to link Portugal more closely with Europe and yet maintain a colonial empire, a new problem confronted the regime: independence movements in its overseas Asian and African territories. In order to pay for the colonial wars

without weakening economic growth, the regime actively solicited foreign investment. By the mid 1960s, however, foreign capital, coupled with large remittances from Portuguese workers and tourism earnings, overloaded the system. Inflation began to mount as supply could not meet demand, salaries rose, and social and geographical mobility increased. The country was in motion and contact with the outside world accelerated, despite Salazar's endeavors to the contrary. Foreign economic relations, wars in its overseas territories, and the movement of millions to Europe and Africa, back and forth, resulted in a fluid, questioning population, one which the regime found more and more difficult to order and contain.

By 1970 authoritarian rule, now under Marcello Caetano—writes Lucena—was intermittent. Attempts were made to "liberalize" political life, censorship was less rigorous, some demonstrations and strikes were tolerated, lively debates occurred, and the state gave the industrial bourgeoisie free reign. Caetano's new course was limited in its progress, says Lucena, by factors which it unleashed. One senses that the regime gave away too much too quickly, according to its own abilities, and when it wanted to re-establish its hegemony it no longer knew to what extent it could, nor where, nor when. Portugal had been relatively isolated, but it was no longer possible to maintain this isolation. "Neither the rhythm nor the customs of Salazar could be adapted to these changes. . . . Salazarism had passed," but, states Lucena, "it remains to be known whether Salazarism was exhausted in its entirety or, on the contrary, whether it could hold to principles which could be realized in another way."

In the conclusion to his essay Lucena raises questions which observers continue to ask about postrevolutionary Portugal: What structural changes have occurred and which have not? How do we know that a regime or state is the same? Is fascism dead in Portugal? To answer these he ponders the relation between fascism and corporatism in a broader sense. He weighs the existence of corporatist movements within more modern contexts, hypothesizing, for example, that modern capitalism, with its requisites of large bureaucratic enterprises, planning, worker participation, and avoidance of social confrontations, is inclined toward corporatism, especially in Europe.

WIARDA

The questions asked by Lucena are directly related to Howard Wiarda's evaluation of corporatism (in Chapter 3) and lead him to examine in more detail some of the same topics raised by Lucena

by looking at Portuguese political experience both before and after the New State.

Wiarda begins his essay by tracing the origins of corporatism in Portugal and stressing the complementarity between Portuguese civil society, governance, juridical codes, and Catholic-Thomistic emphasis on hierarchy and organicism. He argues that corporatism in the Portuguese context refers to a distinct set of attributes specific to that country's history, political culture, and development process: "... a value system based upon widespread acceptance of hierarchy, elitism, organicism, and authority. . . . functional representation with authority vested in the crown or central state apparatus and with the various corporate units . . . incorporated into a single, organic whole for purposes of integral national development. . . . a social order based similarly on patron-client interdependence . . . a predominantly Catholic society and political culture based upon Thomistic principles. . . . a mercantilist economic system. . . . a political system based on patrimonialism, authority, and hierarchy, with a centralized, vertical, pyramidal structure of power and decision making."

Because corporatism has become so imbedded in Portuguese social, economic, and political structures, Wiarda posits that it remains a "major persistent tradition even today." He therefore questions whether the new regime and new ideologies can "transcend or overcome" certain historic divisions, or whether they will become merely another layer of institutions and personalities imposed over the "already existing" and "perhaps dominant" corporatist model. Here Wiarda coincides with Lucena in his concern with the persistence and re-emergence of corporatist patterns in "new clothing," or what Lucena labels "neocorporatism."

It is in his discussion of the institutionalization of corporatism in Portugal that Wiarda differs with both Lucena and Schmitter. Rather than equate corporatism with authoritarianism, as a particular form of interest representation, he contrasts Salazar's initial corporative restructuring of Portuguese society with his later practices. Wiarda notes that by the mid-1930s corporatism was no longer a system of "free associability and social justice" but was rapidly becoming a means by which the state could repress, control, and contain social groups at the expense of others. For Wiarda, corporatism under Salazar was biased in that it favored employer over employee by applying and enforcing corporative decrees selectively. Various corporative organizations, such as commissions, *juntas*, institutes, and *grêmios*, were used by the state to regulate the econ-

omy and its participants. Wiarda describes the attempts by the state to subordinate industry and the industrial bourgeoisie, a topic which Makler more fully explores in his paper (Chapter 4).

While Wiarda sees no necessary relationship between corporatism and authoritarianism, and hence sees the developments of the early thirties in a far more positive light than either Schmitter or Lucena, he converges with them in his evaluation of the regime by the time of World War II. He hypothesizes that a form of state capitalism linking together government and the major economic interests emerged and soon supplanted corporative structures. "With the end of the war and the general discrediting of all such 'fascistic' schemes, the corporative system was still further shunted aside, circumvented, and ignored." While there was a brief revival in the 1950s—largely owed to economic prosperity and the regime's conviction that it had accomplished economic and political stability—corporatism was already in decline.

Wiarda describes the increasing power of the working class and trade unions with the approach of the 1970s, owing to the reluctance, if not the inability, of the Caetano regime to resolve crises. Not only did the regime vacillate, but it was also inconsistent and Janus-like. In the belief that he could contain the labor movement and its increasing power, Caetano permitted the formation of *Intersindical*, a labor organization which soon represented twenty of the largest unions and upward of 150,000 workers. In a sense this was the "deathblow" to the corporatist system. By the time the regime attempted to outlaw the organization and purge the corporative *sindicatos*, *Intersindical* already had moved underground where it was infiltrated by the Portuguese Communist Party. And, when the government moved to undercut the labor movement and *Intersindical* by bypassing the *sindicatos* and promising wage increases directly to those concerned, it only succeeded in further de-legitimizing corporative structures and its own credibility.

In the final part of his essay Wiarda discusses the dismantling of Salazar's corporative system, but unlike Lucena he also suspects its rebirth and continuity. Indeed, he notes, while within a year "virtually the entire corporative state had been dismantled or re-structured," in actuality many corporate agencies (*grêmios*, *sindicatos*, *casas do povo*, *casas dos pescadores*) remained in existence, either being renamed or undergoing alterations in their top leadership. The new regime resurrected a new set of corporative institutions in an attempt to promote class collaboration under the hegemony of the state. That is, old systems of social, economic, and

political controls were again being employed to maintain order and regulate change. Contrary to some interpretations which view corporatism as rigid and static, Wiarda sees it as malleable and evolutionary, arguing that it differed under Salazar, Caetano, and post-revolutionary governments. For Wiarda corporatism is transitional and will remain very much a part of Portuguese society regardless of its social, economic, and political changes.

MAKLER

Harry Makler's essay (Chapter 4) appropriately follows the essays by Schmitter, Lucena, and Wiarda. By thoroughly examining the impact of the authoritarian regime via the corporative system on the industrial elite, Makler not only corroborates some of the hypotheses on corporatism raised in the preceding essays but also shows its implications for Portugal's class structure and economic development.

By examining the career patterns of a large and representative sample of industrialists heading larger enterprises (50 or more employees) in 1965, during the Salazar era, Makler was able to distinguish two main groups: (a) industrialist corporative leaders who tended to be younger, propertied, upper class in origin, and affiliated with the traditional sector; and (b) industrialist national leaders who were older, university-trained engineers, nonpropertied executives of larger enterprises affiliated with dynamic sectors of the economy. It was through members of this latter group that the interlocking between government and the economy occurred and it was this group that considered the corporative system and its agencies effective. In contrast, the industrialist corporative leaders were compartmentalized by the very system they represented and were the most critical of the corporative system, even the regime itself at times. One reason for this group's compartmentalization, according to Makler, was that the regime considered them "too deeply imbedded in the rural past"; as such they did not correspond to its projection of "national interests." Whatever the motive, it was through corporative institutions that the regime was able to maintain traditional class structure and to control social mobility. On the basis of these findings Makler concludes that two forms of corporatism characterized the Salazar-Caetano regime: state corporatism for the propertied, more traditional elite sector and societal corporatism for the more dynamic and powerful ones. Here, Makler's findings modify Wiarda's hypothesis pertaining to the dynamic na-

ture of corporatism. Wiarda notes that the corporatism of Caetano was quite different from that of Salazar and that it changed and evolved depending on societal conditions and development; Makler suggests its variability even under Salazar's rule.

RIEGELHAUPT

Whereas Makler examines in depth one of the elite groups most active in Salazar's Portugal, Joyce Riegelhaupt (Chapter 5) looks at the regime from below, through the eyes of the peasantry. Her essay on peasant political relations during the Salazar regime thereby both coincides with and complements its predecessors in this volume. While the chapters by Schmitter, Lucena, and Wiarda adopt a macrohistorical approach, with the nation serving as the main unit of analysis, Riegelhaupt takes a microapproach, asking the question: how did peasants at the village level view the regime? If Makler's analysis suggests the way in which elite groups within the regime were marginalized by the process of increasing state power, Riegelhaupt's study shows exactly how the process permeated the lower echelons of Portuguese society and why its effects were so devastating.

Riegelhaupt argues that, in general, only through a thorough understanding of a regime's structure at the grass-roots level can one explain the various forms of peasant political participation. She then provides social data showing how the country was politically organized into a series of hierarchically arranged geographical units (*freguesias*) which the central government (the state) controlled by appointing local officials (e.g., mayors, justices of the peace). Corresponding to this political structure were other public entities (e.g., *casas do povo*, or "houses of the people") whose function was to organize the economic systems of rural areas in order "to harmoniously integrate the owner and worker for the common good and avoid dangers of economic development and social change." Ideally the two systems should have encompassed and penetrated all geographical and social units, but, in actuality, there was one political authority: "*o governo*" (the government), which the peasants always tried to avoid or bypass.

By comparing two villages—one in the central part of the country and the other in the south—Riegelhaupt captures vividly how politics operated at the local level, how the peasantry responded, and the impact this "administered society" had on their traditions, their character, and their relations. Under the New State the courts, laws,

police, county clerks, and even neighboring parishes were considered by peasants as belonging to *êles* ("them"), and any transactions with "them" usually resulted in conflict, economic penalties, or moral damage. The peasantry became reluctant even to press for "public goals," as they lacked both the channels and the will to communicate their needs. In this way the Estado Novo encouraged and created apathy. By promoting apathy and demobilization, the regime privatized rural life and forced patronage upon the rural population. But, as Riegelhaupt sees it, in the process of doing so, patronage, although a traditional pattern of social relations between superiors and subordinates, ceased to constitute a viable response to uncertainty in a corporatist authoritarian state where reciprocity had been destroyed and no longer had meaning. Of the two villages studied, one responded to these circumstances by closing in on itself while the inhabitants of the other begged favors. The peasantry that Riegelhaupt studied thus was subjected to the same enforced marginalization characteristic of Makler's traditional industrial elite, but unlike them it had neither the economic or the political resources to relate to the broader society.

WHEELER AND GRAHAM

Spanning the chasm separating prerevolutionary Portugal, with its politics of limited participation and induced mass apathy, from the new political order that has taken form since April 25, 1974, is the military institution. The military provides the crucial link in moving from the hierarchically structured and closed politics of the Salazar-Caetano era into a more open and competitive political system. Accordingly, two papers dealing with the military in politics have been selected from the Third Conference—those by Wheeler (Chapter 6) and Graham (Chapter 7). While the former shows adeptly the significant role played by the military in Portuguese politics both before and during the New State, the latter focuses on the internal dynamics of the officer corps and interrelations among military officers in politics and the civilian political leadership during a two-year period, extending from the initial coup in 1974 to the establishment of a presidential system based on electoral pluralities in 1976.

The merit of the Wheeler paper is the broad overview it provides of civil-military relations from the end of the First Republic in 1926 to the overthrow of the New State in 1974. It is significant to note here that military involvement in politics and factionalism within

the armed forces is not a recent pattern; rather, it is one of long standing. Wheeler calls attention to the role of the military in ending the Constitutional Monarchy and setting up the First Republic in 1910, in later plotting and executing its overthrow, and in first cooperating with Salazar and later working to bring an end to the regime he established. One of the most valuable parts of Wheeler's paper is the light it sheds on the evolution of civil-military relations during the *Estado Novo*: from an independent role at the outset, which continued through the 1930s, to the erosion of the armed forces' autonomy after World War II and their complete subjugation to Salazar's authority during the 1950s. The upshot of this linking of the military establishment to the New State, in a fashion not dissimilar to the co-optation of the political elite and the industrial elite (described by Schmitter and Makler), was that by the time Portugal had become involved in its colonial wars many military officers felt that the armed forces had become thoroughly discredited by their close identification with the regime.

Wheeler ends his discussion of civil-military relations by comparing and contrasting military intervention in politics in the 1926 coup (which led to the establishment of the New State) and in the 1974 coup (which led to its overthrow). The similarity lies in how, in both coups, the intervention originated in unresolved internal professional military complaints and soon escalated into political stances affecting power relationships throughout the whole regime. While the ideological contents of the two movements differ greatly, the coups are quite similar in the internal military factionalism which they brought to the surface and their inability to structure a new viable national government once they had destroyed the previous regime.

Graham's paper picks up where Wheeler's leaves off, with an eye toward examining in depth exactly what transpired during the critical period of transition between the ending of the old regime and the establishment of a new one. The military grievances which served as the catalyst for destroying the Caetano regime, the factionalism and struggle for power among various groups in the armed forces, and the interaction among military and civilian leaders as they all competed for control of the decision-making centers of Portuguese government are laid out in summary fashion.

Because this is both an extremely important moment in the evolution of modern Portugal and a difficult period to assess, one of this chapter's major objectives is to set out with clarity the rapidly shifting patterns in civil-military relations, until an effective, new

dominant civilian-military relations coalition could emerge—the Soares-Eanes government. Read against the background provided by Wheeler on civil-military relations before 1974, this paper offers insight into the specifics behind the decision of a major segment of the officer corps to intervene in politics to end colonial warfare overseas and authoritarian rule on the mainland. It also examines the impact on the armed forces of the attempt to democratize internal military structures and to sever ties with the old regime. In the process of change, the struggle for power among various military factions and the politicization of the armed forces as a whole had the effect of nearly wrecking the viability and the integrity of the military institution as an autonomous force in Portuguese politics. Yet these were the very goals that the original movement set out to reassert in reaction to the military's implication in the declining authority and legitimacy of the New State.

HAMMOND AND BRETTELL

In the same way that Wheeler's and Graham's chapters complement each other, John Hammond's analysis (Chapter 8) of the correlation between 1975 electoral behavior and socioeconomic cleavages and Caroline Brettell's subsequent chapter (9) on rural and small-town attitudes toward politics in northern Portugal need to be read consecutively. Much of the confusion outside Portugal in assessing the import of the events of 1974, 1975, and 1976 stems from the failure to separate and distinguish two very different processes of change: the political struggle at the top to fill the power vacuum left in a highly centralized state by the collapse of the Caetano regime, and the upheaval from below which represented for the first time the entrance of the urban and rural masses into Portuguese politics. Neither movement—the struggle to establish viable new political leadership and the spontaneous entrance of the masses into the mainstream of Portuguese national life—can be separated entirely. The instability at the top was a direct consequence of this new mass equation in national politics, and the exuberance and popular upsurge of large-group sentiments fed upon and were stimulated by the debate over who should rule and the struggle for power among new military and civilian political personalities.

Before analyzing postcoup Portuguese political behavior (voting and militancy), Hammond describes the class structure, institutions, and events during the *Estado Novo* period which structured politics in both rural and urban areas. The peasantry, for example,

was influenced by the Church, affected by emigration, uneconomical land holdings, and demobilization policies of the corporative state. He hypothesizes that religion, strong in Portugal's north and nearly absent in its south, produced different patterns of political behavior which have persisted despite the Revolution.

His analysis of Portugal after 1974 proceeds first along regional (north-south) and urbanization (rural-urban) lines, showing that the parties of the right (PPD and CDS) fared better in the elections in the north, especially in rural areas, while the parties of the left (the Communists [the PCP] and their affiliate, the MDP) received more support in the south, again in rural areas. The party of the center, the Socialists (PS), was more affected by urbanization: its vote was greater in urban than in rural areas, especially in the south. Hammond then compares different occupational groups within these contexts and includes some explanations to account for the patterns. He argues that poverty (as measured by average monthly family expenses) and emigration mainly accounted for the high conservative vote in the north. "Emigration," he states, "can similarly be taken as a measure of prosperity, since poverty is a principal motive for emigration."

Brettell's chapter provides further explanations for the conservative vote in the north. In her accounting for the high abstention and nonmilitancy of rural proprietors in terms of ties to the land and escape through emigration, we are again reminded of Riegelhaupt's politically isolated peasantry.

However, before turning our attention to the northern vote and Brettell's paper, it is important to seek to understand first the strong support for the Socialist Party (PS) in Portugal's urban middle class and among tertiary-sector employees. We signal these groups because together they are rapidly becoming the largest and politically (at least potentially) the most powerful faction in postrevolutionary Portugal. Threatened by growing inflation, housing shortages, un- and underemployment, there is a real possibility they will split into different segments supporting left and right political parties. Insight into this dimension of Portuguese politics is also to be found in Hammond's paper.

From his analysis of voting, Hammond weighs the militancy of the population in 1975. He relates various political incidents following April 25, and argues that Portugal's high degree of militancy—for example, *golpismo* by the military and relentless demands by the citizenry—is "a consequence of the lack of stable representative structures through which demands could be channeled." Here we

are reminded of the relative political inexperience of most Portuguese owed to the demobilization strategies of the Salazar-Caetano regime. Hammond sees a reversal after 1974: overmobilization, so much so that it is undermining agrarian reform. In urban areas, too, the long-range impact of working-class militancy, owing to the Communist Party's ambivalent role in labor struggles, remains problematical. Still, regardless of the PCP's inability to control excessive worker demands and contain strikes, it received their overwhelming support in the 1975 election in the rural south and in heavily industrialized *concelhos* south of the Tejo River. But in the north, communism was opposed because it symbolized loss of land and opposition to religion, and was "the same enemy the regime had been warning them about for so long."

By focusing on the Revolution and social change through the eyes of inhabitants of a northern rural town, Caroline Brettell is able to describe in far greater detail the forces which have tempered the Revolution. Based on conversations extending over four months with villagers in northern Portugal and emigrant workers in Paris, Brettell provides a first-hand account of the north's conservative reaction when faced with revolutionary change. Much as Hammond, she begins by painting the context and structural factors which she judges influence political behavior. "International, rather than intra-national," emigration, she writes, has served to reduce "the tendency to class solidification and the development of class consciousness." So too, she continues, do different land-tenure systems. The northern minifundia system creates "minute scales of difference among rural peoples" and encourages competition rather than class conflict, while in the south because of different land-tenure systems "there has always been more revolutionary potential." We are also shown how the Church influenced the people from the pulpit, via television, and in local classrooms, encouraging a prowork, diligence, self-improvement, and acquisitive ethic.

Communism was seen as the antithesis to these values. It was the cause of "*muita liberdade*" (too much freedom), disciplinary problems, and juvenile delinquency. Brettell reports how, in the village she studied, after a brief experiment with the new liberties, the priest was given carte blanche to institute a "new regime" of order and discipline. She sensitizes us to the feelings of the peasantry and their fear of change by incorporating their attitudes into her essay.

Equally important is the insight Brettell gives us into the emi-

grants' attitudes. They are neither necessarily indifferent nor apathetic in their feelings toward their homeland. They have simply opted to seek their livelihood elsewhere, rather than attempt to change the system through collective action. Thus, the predilection for individualistic, rather than collective, action among the northern peasantry, through leaving the country or remaining and accepting the "system" as it is, has long served to and continues to reinforce conservative political orientations rather than promote revolutionary ones.

THE MIT GROUP AND MURTEIRA

The last two chapters in this volume—those by economists—dovetail with Brettell's discussion. Whereas she cites the conservative impact of the northern peasantry as a moderating force in the Revolution, Dornbusch, Eckaus, and Taylor (Chapter 10) and Murteira (Chapter 11) all show how emigrant remittances as a totality markedly alleviated Portugal's deficits in the late 1960s and early 1970s and how their virtual disappearance after 1974 undercut the ability of the new governments to take a more active role in the economy. Brettell presents data from the village level in the north which seek to explain how massive emigration, continued emigrant ties with one's community of origin, and regular remittances to family members remaining in the village and looking after one's interests served to retain the vitality of a traditional, conservative set of political attitudes. These chapters relate the micro to the macro setting.

The abbreviated OECD (Office for Economic Cooperation and Development) report by Rudiger Dornbusch, Richard Eckaus, and Lance Taylor, a team of American economists, adopts an optimistic and conservative view. This report, sponsored by the OECD at the request of the Bank of Portugal in late 1975, focuses on a number of "health" measures (e.g., GNP, balance of payments, consumption/investment patterns) and suggests some internal economic policies based on their projections. Although it is recognized that the economics of Portugal will remain in a state of flux for some years to come, the Dornbusch, Eckaus, and Taylor report offers a comprehensive profile of the Portuguese economy immediately prior to and after the 1974 revolution. Murteira's perspective is more focused and skeptical, perhaps because as a Portuguese economist he was closer to the situation and as planning minister (in the Fourth Provisional Government) he was overwhelmed and

hampered by existing complexities. For Murteira the foreign or exogenous factor was the force which precipitated the collapse of a genuinely revolutionary alternative for building a new Portugal.

One of the most useful and permanent contributions of the Dornbusch, Eckaus, and Taylor document is the concrete data it supplies on the status of the economy in 1975. The authors compare "national income accounts" for the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors over a three-year period (1973–1976). They note that—while postrevolutionary income redistribution resulted in an 82 percent personal consumption increase in 1974, an increase which continued into 1975—fixed capital investment was sharply declining and exports and imports were stagnating due mainly to a lag in manufacturing. The report also presents in tabular form concrete information on wages and price levels. For example, in Table 10-5 one can see marked growth in industrial employee income. Prices also increased but, according to the authors, not as much as wages. This probably accounts for the spurt in domestic consumption, particularly in durable items. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that prices and wages were already climbing prior to the Revolution. Elsewhere in the report the authors indicate that in 1975 the government "wisely supported personal consumption by *not* following 'balanced budget'" policies and that over the short run such action served to offset the loss of emigrant remittances, the impact on the domestic economy of depression in Western Europe, and the drastic reduction in exports to its former colonies.

In the second part of the report, supply constraints are evaluated. Again we are instructed that the situation was not as bleak as many made it out to be. Labor unrest, management problems, and productivity declines were exaggerated by the mass media and the political parties. Where productivity declined, it was partially attributable to the lack of demand and the inability of management to discharge employees. According to the team, labor militancy was actually "no more difficult than in most other Western European countries" throughout this period of change.

After diagnosing the postrevolutionary difficulties of the economy, Dornbusch, Eckaus, and Taylor devote the remaining part of their report to Portugal's economic future. Although acknowledging that Portugal's economic posture will be strongly influenced by the way in which the country is able to recover and reorient its international trade, the team postulates that the country's economic health "will depend crucially on *internal* events," for example, the

outcome of farm production as affected by agricultural reorganization policies and climatic factors, and overall government domestic policies to stimulate economic development. By and large, based mainly on monetary indicators, the authors are optimistic about Portugal's growth rate, provided that effective domestic policies are employed by the state to stimulate national investment and reduce unemployment.

In the absence of strong export market recovery, they prescribe controls on wages and consumption, principally to be offset by increases in government deficit spending. But in making these recommendations the team recognizes that important political, social, and economic judgments must first be made. For example, regarding price controls, they argue that the application of rent controls to curb inflation could discourage private investment in real estate, especially among small entrepreneurs, and force the state into housing. Indeed, since the Revolution, there has been considerable state participation in this area in response to the influx of thousands of refugees from Portugal's former African colonies. They also advocate the decentralization of financial institutions to maximize credit allocation to coincide with recent changes in ownership and property structure at the very time that the state, for political reasons, has centralized and nationalized financial institutions. Also problematical in terms of national investment is the "cultural" response. Portugal, they remind us, "has traditionally been a country in which the government has not run a deficit," a country which had strong gold reserves and, as others in this volume have noted, a country with a sound but not speculative or flamboyant economy, at least until Caetano. Because of these factors and undoubtedly due to their exposure to other beliefs that the Portuguese have held regarding their economy, at least implicit in the authors' discussion is a concern about the willingness and the readiness of the state to adopt new economic policies. Throughout their report, however, there are tones of guarded optimism, which contrast with Murteira's generally pessimistic view that the economic crisis facing Portugal has no easy solution.

Just as Brettell sees an external-internal linkage in the political conservatism of small-town and rural northern Portugal, Mário Murteira argues—from a national rather than local level—that Portugal's political crisis and its coup d'état were and will continue to be largely dependent on exogenous factors. Says Murteira, "The economic dimension of the social process has to be understood in

terms of a global interaction of different factors, some of them external or exogenous to Portuguese society." In support of his hypothesis, Murteira briefly considers the economic structure of Portugal since 1950, the changes surrounding the revolutionary period, and the contradictions presented by dependency relations; he then weighs the country's future.

In the early 1960s, undoubtedly in response to the African wars, Salazar adopted a more liberal policy toward foreign investment as he attempted to move simultaneously toward European economic integration and political and economic integration within the colonial empire.¹⁷ As a result agricultural production stagnated; according to Murteira, this in turn caused a marked increase in food imports and massive rural emigration. Emigrant remittances together with receipts from tourism, foreign currency surpluses from the colonies, and a net increase in foreign investments enabled Portugal to equilibrate its balance of payments in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, by the end of 1973, Murteira observes, the country had accumulated "gold and foreign currency equivalent to almost two years of imports."

What weakened the regime were the protracted colonial wars "and the total incapacity of the Caetano regime to find a political solution." By asserting this, Murteira attributes the breakdown of authoritarian rule to political failures and indecisiveness, not to overall economic weaknesses. This assertion by Murteira undercuts the popularized version of the 1974 coup, which sees the old regime as an outmoded, "moth-eaten" dictatorship collapsing under its own weight, and provides economic data supporting Graham's initial premise: that the *caetanato* was not a weak state and that to understand the rapid collapse of the old order one must move first toward an appreciation of internal military affairs and military attitudes concerning the regime.

While noting (and welcoming) the postrevolutionary movement against the major centers of private economic power, the land reform, and the destruction of the old economic order, Murteira is concerned with whether or not these "qualitative changes" are definitive in light of growing unemployment (swelled by refugees from Africa), inflation, and a huge trade deficit. In fact, in his final argument Murteira adopts the view that the changes initiated in 1974 and 1975 were not and could not be permanent without an organized mass movement seizing control of the state. Reluctantly, he sees Portugal condemned to a subordinate place in Europe and, as

the weakest nation, he predicts its political and economic domination by external forces.

Conclusions

The economic overview and recommendations in Chapters 10 and 11 provide a fitting note on which to end this volume, for it is in this assessment of the short-term prospects for Portugal that the reader is equipped with an economic foundation for evaluating and understanding the alternatives open to the government of Mário Soares and any that will follow. The outcome of the 1974 coup has been such that for the present Portugal, a small dependent nation, must seek a solution to its economic, political, and social problems in an international setting where its choices have been limited by the force of events in the capitalist world. It is in recognition of this dependency and vulnerability to external factors that the pessimism of Murteira and the optimism of the MIT group meet.

This is also an appropriate point at which to conclude our collective endeavors to offer a substantive basis from which others can better understand the dynamics and dilemmas of modern Portugal and arrive at their own conclusions regarding the country's future. The first five essays—those by Schmitter, Lucena, Wiarda, Makler, and Riegelhaupt—dwell mainly on the social and economic origins of the New State and the nature of authoritarianism and corporatism during the Salazar-Caetano era. The last five—Graham's, Hammond's, Brettell's, the OECD report, and Murteira's—turn to the revolutionary and postrevolutionary period, with Wheeler's (Chapter 6) providing a link between the two eras.

The Murteira essay thus brings to an end our perusal of contemporary Portugal from the vantage point of the social sciences. Along the way the reader will encounter in these chapters analysis of the foundations of the authoritarian regime which ruled Portugal for nearly half a century, two revolutions, various social strata and classes, and the socioeconomic processes which have engendered such significant change within Portugal. In the epilogue Stanley Payne reassesses the import of these papers as a collective endeavor and signals research topics for the future which will require the attention of anyone seeking to deepen further our understanding of Portuguese society in the midst of transition.

Notes

1. António de Spínola, *Portugal e o Futuro* (Lisbon: Arcádia, 1974).
2. Much of this domestic scholarship was either restricted in circulation or remained largely unknown within Portugal until after the coup. Illustrative writings would be A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal*, vol. 2: *From Empire to Corporate State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) (first published in English); Hermínio Martins, "Portugal," in *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status, and Power*, ed. Margaret S. Archer and Salvador Giner (New York: St. Martins Press, 1971); Francisco Pereira de Moura, *Por Onde Vai a Economia Portuguesa?* (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1969; 4th ed., 1974); José Cutileiro, *A Portuguese Rural Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Adérito Sedas Nunes, *Sociologia e Ideologia do Desenvolvimento* (Lisbon: Moraes Editores, 1968).
3. This paper was published along with other conference papers two years later. See Harry M. Makler, "A Case Study of the Portuguese Business Elite, 1964–1966," in *Portugal and Brazil in Transition*, ed. Raymond S. Sayers (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1968).
4. A revised version of the doctoral dissertation on which this paper was based has since appeared, with the title *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971).
5. The title of this paper is "European Economic Integration and the Portuguese Industrial Elite."
6. This paper was presented at the Yale Conference on Authoritarian Brazil and was subsequently published in Alfred Stepan (ed.), *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
7. This paper was later presented at the First Conference on Modern Portugal and was eventually published as *Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal*, Sage Professional Papers in Contemporary Political Sociology, vol. 1, 06-011 (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1975). Schmitter followed this paper with a broader interpretation of corporatism in its cross-national setting. See "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in *The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World*, ed. Fredrick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974).
8. See, in particular, Martins' article in Archer and Giner (eds.), *Contemporary Europe*; also "Opposition in Portugal," *Government and Opposition* 4, no. 2 (1969): 260–263.
9. This research, which was also reported on at the First Conference on Modern Portugal, was later published as "The Portuguese Corporative System: Basic Structures and Current Functions" in *Iberian Studies* 2, no. 2 (Autumn 1973): 73–80. After the coup he updated that article with a two-page addendum: "Portuguese Corporatism Revisited," *Iberian Studies* 3, no. 2 (Autumn 1974). These articles were preceded by "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics* 25 (January 1973): 206–235. The two approaches—the general and the specific—were combined in "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New

Variations" in Pike and Stritch (eds.), *The New Corporatism*. His larger study of Portugal was published as *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976).

10. The results of that research were published as *Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order*, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, vol. 5, 01-053 (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1975). A related theoretical essay appeared in Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974).

11. Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Spain and Portugal*, 2 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973). Among his other publications on Spain, of note are his *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967) and *The Spanish Revolution* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970).

12. The work on the Church and State in Portugal and Brazil by Thomas C. Bruneau, an active participant in all three conferences, warrants special mention. The paper he presented at the Third Conference was published as "Church and State in Portugal: Crises of Cross and Sword," *Journal of Church and State* 18, no. 3 (Autumn 1976): 463-490.

13. Consult the previous references to the published work of Schmitter, Wiarda, Graham, and Bruneau. The Makler paper has been reprinted here because it is linked with Riegelhaupt's work (Chapter 5), with research subsequently completed by Schmitter (Chapter 1), and with the views of Lucena (Chapter 2).

14. The most notable of these is Kenneth Maxwell, who has preferred to publish his research separately. Of note are his two articles in the *New York Review of Books*: "The Hidden Revolution in Portugal" (April 17, 1975, pp. 29-35) and "Portugal under Pressure" (May 29, 1975, pp. 20-30). See also "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 2 (January 1976): 250-270.

15. Schmitter published a revised version of this paper later: "Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal," *Armed Forces and Society* 2, no. 1 (November 1975): 5-33. Fields' paper and a subsequent one delivered at the Toronto Conference have been incorporated into her book, *The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).

16. The MFA stands for the Movimento das Forças Armadas, the Armed Forces Movement—the military alliance which organized the coup and dominated events throughout 1974 and 1975.

17. Francisco Pereira de Moura in a paper presented at the 1973 ICGMP meeting (6 months prior to the Revolution) also noted that soon after Caetano came to power the internationalization of the Portuguese economy occurred as a strategy designed "to overcome the reduction of the domestic market and the problems generated by the rapid technological development and resistance of the powerful importers" ("The Development of the Portuguese Economy, 1945-1973," manuscript, October 1973, p. 10).

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