THE RISE OF THE PEOPLE AND THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE *VEKHI* AUTHORS*

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... Sem' vrachei sem'iu lekarstvami lechat
bol'nogo.

—Dmitrii S. Merezhkovskii, “Seven Humble
Men,” 1909

Mais lorsqu'on lui pose la question: “Qui sont
les *aristoi* qui doivent nous gouverner?”, le
démocrate se tourne vers le peuple pour lui
laisser la décision.

—Bernard Manin, *Principes du gouvernement
représentatif*, 1996

Some argument is required to justify a discussion of the political philosophy of the *Vekhi* authors. This dimension received relatively little attention during the discussions immediately after the book's publication in 1909, which focused more on the *Vekhi* authors' perception of current affairs and, most of all, on the possible effects of their intervention.¹ It has also remained under-researched in later scholarly literature, which tends to concentrate on the religious philosophy of the authors, their conceptions of

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religion, philosophy, and the intelligentsia, and, not least, on the question of whether, in a Russian tradition of prophecy (*prorochestvo*), they “saw it right.” Finally, the *Vekhi* authors themselves suggested that “[I]n *Vekhi*, as is well known, politics occupies a relatively small place.”² This may be true of politics in the *immediate* sense of parties, policies, and measures, although even there one may disagree: “*Signposts* claimed to stand above politics.... But the book’s moral and cultural critique did in fact mask a predominantly political motive. [...] [T]he real political thrust of the book was an attempt to destroy the informal coalition of the liberals with the left which characterized Kadet [Constitutional Democrat] Party policy.”³

At the time of writing of *Vekhi*, Europe was on the threshold of the age of democracy, and Russia was no exception in this respect: there was strong pressure to change the *politeia*, and some short-lived changes indeed took place after the 1905 revolution. In this situation, the pressure on intellectuals to engage in politics was strong. With the exception of Mikhail Gershenzon, the initiator of the project but an outsider in many respects (notably in his admiration of Tolstoi), all of the *Vekhi* authors were politically active, moving from Leftist positions (legal Marxism, social democracy) to liberal ones, and in some cases, for example that of Aleksandr Izgoev (Lande), remaining close to a non-orthodox Marxism.⁴ With the exception of Izgoev, all had studied or lived in Germany. With the exception of Gershenzon, who later set up the Soviet *Soiuz pisatelei* and was its first president, all of them opposed the Soviet regime. Bogdan Kistiakovskii died in 1920 while a professor at Kiev University, but Petr Struve, after a brief membership in the “white” government of General Wrangel, left Russia after 1920, and Nikolai Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, Semen Frank, and Izgoev were forced to emigrate in 1922 on the “Philosophy Steamer.”⁵ The chart on the next page illustrates their political activism and the gradual shift to liberal and “kadet” positions.⁶

The main reason, I suggest, why the book had the impact that it did have is its attempted intervention in the very foundation of any “politics”: investigating the nature of the political, the relation between truth and power, and the role of the intelligentsia. This article, therefore, seeks to assess the political philosophy of the *Vekhi* authors, which is largely implicit in the seven articles that make up *Vekhi*. While *Vekhi* evidently neither is

	Politically active	Legal marxist	Social democrat	Soiuz osvobozhdeniia	Kadet party	Duma member
Berdiaev	yes	yes	yes	yes	member	
Bulgakov	yes	yes	yes	—	member	1905–07
Frank	yes	yes	yes	—	close	
Gershenzon	no	no	no	no	no	
Izgoev	yes	yes	close	local leader	member	
Kistiakovskii	yes	influenced	close	co-founder	member	
Struve	yes	yes	ally	co-founder	leader	1905–07

nor contains a treatise in political philosophy, a particular political philosophy is, I argue, taking shape on the pages of this famous, polemical, and highly contested symposium, which saw five editions within a year and began a second life in the late 1980s, when republication of this previously forbidden book became possible.⁷

The chapter consists of two parts. The first part focuses on a key issue at stake in *Vekhi*, namely the relation between democratic conditions and the idea of an integral worldview, and I introduce this topic by way of a discussion of the social and political philosophy of a major predecessor of and inspiration for Silver Age thought, Vladimir Solov'ev (1853–1900). The second part offers a systematic analysis of the overall political philosophy of the *Vekhi* authors (without ignoring their differences). To avoid misunderstanding: the expression “political philosophy” denotes not the *Vekhi* authors’ political opinions or stances, but their overall conceptions of politics and the political.

A few preliminary remarks are appropriate. First of all, my objective is to understand, not to evaluate, let alone judge, the *Vekhi* authors. This is not without relevance, since *Vekhi*, whether in spite of or because of its “conciliatory” tendency, strongly invites the taking of a position even today, just as it is difficult to think about the first two decades of twentieth-century Russian history without developing strong opinions and emotions. Rather than concealing these behind the veil of scholarly objectivity, they should be pointed out. My overall intuition with respect to *Vekhi* is that the *Vekhi* authors were essentially fighting the already lost battle of an elite that had

not even begun to play a major role. More generally, there is a prevailing sense of tragedy around *Vekhi*. Nonetheless, this should not stand in the way of sober analysis.

Second, it is important to note that the statement that the *Vekhi* authors were fighting a lost battle can only be made by virtue of the advantage of hindsight. It is difficult to avoid reading *Vekhi*, in the light of later developments, as a prophetic warning against “principled revolutionism” (Frank, 143; cf. Bulgakov, 30), against a peculiar combination of moral absolutism and nihilism, and against the dangers of any “instrumentalization” in politics—that is, against the notorious Jacobin justification of means by ends that would become the hallmark of the later Bolshevik regime.⁸ In fact, however, we encounter here what I suggest one might call the *disadvantage* of hindsight, leading us to project later developments upon earlier events. A clear example of this is present in the review by Rüdiger Safranski of the German edition of *Vekhi*, published by Karl Schlögel in 1990: “Russian intellectuals of European reputation ... used *the calm before the great storm* after the failed revolution of 1905 to urge a radical self-scrutiny of the intelligentsia” (italics mine).⁹ Obviously, to the *Vekhi* authors, the year 1909, in 1909 itself, was not an intermezzo: they were as ignorant of what would take place eight years from then as we are regarding what will take place eight years in our own future, even if they themselves, a decade later in *Iz glubiny* (*Out of the Depths*, 1918), recorded that “Russian educated society for the most part did not heed the warning addressed to it ...,”¹⁰ thus contributing to the hindsight perspective.

Third, the use of words like democracy and aristocracy in this chapter calls for a terminological remark. Generally, I use the classical classification of six forms of *politeia*, three of them “virtuous” and three “corrupt.”¹¹

<i>Virtuous form</i>	<i>Number ruling</i>	<i>Corrupted form</i>
Monarchy	One	Tyranny
Aristocracy	Some	Oligarchy
“Good democracy”	Many	Mob democracy / majority tyranny

Other empirical forms, such as bureaucracy, gerontocracy, technocracy, expertocracy, hierocracy, and kleptocracy, are essentially variants of oligarchy. Corruption is possible in all three forms, but while the contrast between a good monarch and a tyrant is enormous, and an oligarchic elite can yield its place to a virtuous one which is truly oriented towards the common good, in the case of democracy the distance between “good” and “bad” democracy is relatively small. To the extent to which “the people” actually rules, it becomes difficult to find an alternative *demos*; corruption and amelioration can only come from the inside. The double meaning of *demos*, as denoting both the (political) people and the poor mob, is an indication of this. A *polity* with a virtuous *demos* could be qualified as “mass aristocracy,”¹² pointing to a political community that rests upon widespread civic education (*paideia*), an Aristotelian ideal that is strongly present in *Vekhi*.¹³ Even Plato was not anti-democratic per se if *demos* meant a community of the virtuous.¹⁴

Conceptions of an *ideal politeia* contrast with the more realistic ideal of a *mixed polity*,¹⁵ used by Cicero and before him Polybius to describe the Roman republic, and seen by them as a means to compensate for the flaws of *each* of the pure forms, prefiguring the idea of representative democratic government that runs from James Madison to Bernard Manin.¹⁶ Empirically and historically, all regimes are compromises, and they are to a varying degree “corrupt”—they are somewhere on the scale of virtue, and engaged in the ongoing process of generation, corruption, and repair. This, however, is to be distinguished from the increase or decrease in political participation of members of the polity, in response to the actual development of society, as well as from the equalization of this participation, which historically led to universal suffrage on a one-(wo)man-one-vote basis. This increase and decrease of democratic participation is never smooth or uncontested—it tends to be rife with struggle and conflict.¹⁷ *Vekhi* is seen, in this article, against the backdrop of a “rise of the people” with a claim to political participation on the one hand, and a call for virtue and “political quality” on the other.

Finally, I perceive three meanings of the expression “political philosophy.” (i) In the most habitual meaning, political philosophy is a specialized branch of philosophy that focuses on “things political,” that

is, issues of government, justice, deliberation, political rights and liberties, party politics, and so forth. (ii) In a second, more properly philosophical meaning, it is a reflection on the question of why there are “political things” in the first place, and what makes them “political”—my position is that they are “political” insofar as they entail the possibility of “real conflict” (as opposed to mere disagreement or quarrel). This is, as Derrida has aptly labelled it, their *politicité* (politicity).¹⁸ Here we are in the field of ontology, and my position, following Chantal Mouffe’s interpretation of Carl Schmitt, is that *everything* social is always-already “political” in this precise sense. However, it is so to a varying degree, which can approach zero: some things are “politically neutral,” some have been *neutralized*. Such neutralization itself is not neutral, but political; at the same time, they *are*, for all practical purposes, neutral—that is, they have *effectively* been neutralized.¹⁹ That “everything is political” thus neither implies that anything is ever *purely* political nor that everything is *politics*—quite the contrary, it means that nothing is ever purely political *and* that nothing is ever purely a-political or un-political. Everything social has an inevitable political dimension: it is potentially conflictual and essentially contestable. (iii) If the previous is true, a reflexive notion of political philosophy is implied, which claims that political philosophy itself is always-already “political,” and hence it makes sense to approach a book like *Vekhi* as a *politicum* (Gk: *politikon*) in its own right.

THE BIG ISSUE: DEMOCRACY AND INTEGRAL WORLDVIEW

John Rawls has argued that under conditions of political freedom, there is likely to exist a plurality of comprehensive doctrines—that is, religious and non-religious worldviews, each of which offers a more or less elaborate conception of society, politics, the meaning of life, salvation of the soul (or lack thereof), and so forth.²⁰ Each of these “comprehensive doctrines” is a specimen in the category of what Berdiaev labelled “integral world-view” (*tselostnoe mirosozertsanie*), or “organic fusion of truth and goodness, knowledge and faith” (5, 13). One can connect the contrast that Aileen Kelly (thinking of Frank and Struve on the one hand, and Berdiaev and Bulgakov on the other) makes between doctrines that make a “clear distinction bet-

ween religious and political tasks” and others that do not with Rawls’s distinction between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines.²¹ A reasonable comprehensive doctrine recognizes the existence of a plurality of competing comprehensive doctrines and is capable of distinguishing its own comprehensiveness from its participation in an overlapping consensus with other comprehensive doctrines. While disagreeing with Rawls on the notion of reasonableness and sharing the critique of those who argue that it already presupposes a “modern autonomous self,”²² I do agree with his idea of a plurality of comprehensive doctrines: under conditions of freedom, people will articulate their perceptions of the world in the form of contrasting worldviews which serve as each other’s “constitutive outside” (*negierte Bestimmtheit*, one might turn Hegel inside out), and of which there hence have to be at least two.²³

Under conditions of liberty, the elements of this plurality enjoy *prima facie* legitimacy. Consequently, what singles out a democratic polity, given a degree of freedom that allows for their development, is a plurality of integral worldviews, none of which can be a priori disqualified without undermining the very polity in which they exist. In other words, there is a plurality of *legitimate* mutually exclusive integral worldviews, none of which can lay exclusive claim to truth or justice, and which together express and reflect both the richness of human intellectual creativity and the conflicts that exist in the society that they relate to, and which they sustain through their interaction. At the same time, they demonstrate the differentiation and partition of that same society, and deny its organic nature unless this diversity of worldviews is sublated (*aufgehoben*) into a higher unity. Some of these integral worldviews (forms of liberalism and/or pluralism, for example) accommodate the very plurality just indicated, others do not; some appreciate it positively, others reject it or accept it as an inevitable evil.

The key point here is that there is a conflict between, on the one hand, this situation of “real existing plurality,” and, on the other hand, the ideal situation that is part of the vision of the good society of at least some of the *Vekhi* authors. Upon Kelly’s reading, *Vekhi* reflects precisely this conflict in its inner division and in its “two contradictory messages to the intelligentsia.”²⁴ According to Kelly, the four main authors, all “former leading ideologists of

Russian Marxism,” fall into two groups: the “maximalists” and “messianists” Berdiaev and Bulgakov, who stuck to an integral, Orthodox Christian worldview and hence viewed history in teleological terms, and political reality in apocalyptic ones, and the “pragmatics” or “humanists” Frank and Struve (joined by Izgoev and Kistiakovskii), who “were prepared to live with unpredictability as a consequence of openness to ideas (such as concepts of legal order and individual rights as preached and practiced in the West), which could extend the freedom of individuals in the present to determine their own destinies.”²⁵

The way in which thinkers address issues that are part of the “current affairs” of their time is determined, among others, by their philosophical background. Part of the background of the *Vekhi* authors was the massive figure of Vladimir Solov’ev, who represented the kind of thinker that the *Vekhi* authors were trying to be, and who had in his work pointed out a number of basic problems and questions that the *Vekhi* authors were also struggling with. This struggle becomes manifest on the pages of *Vekhi*. Solov’ev had not, in any direct or indirect sense, been the philosophical teacher or mentor of the *Vekhi* authors. As he himself famously asserted, he had not founded a doctrine or school of his own,²⁶ and even those who were philosophically closest to him—Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank—cannot be considered his pupils. At the same time, however, he is mentioned several times in *Vekhi*, by Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Kistiakovskii (the only contributor who is critical of Solov’ev, and who is more generally an exception among the *Vekhi* authors), Gershenzon, and Struve, though not by Izgoev and Frank (who might, however, have referred to him in his analysis of Nietzsche, and who refers to him frequently in other works).²⁷ Apart from the well-known passage in Berdiaev’s text in which he claims that “there seemed every reason to acknowledge Vladimir Solov’ev as our national philosopher and to create a national philosophical tradition around him,” and that “the philosophy of any European country could take pride in a Solov’ev” (12), the most striking statement on the topic can be found in Struve, who claims that, in contradistinction to Mikhailovskii and Chernyshevskii, “Vladimir Solov’ev is not an *intelligent* at all” (121). Solov’ev was, for most *Vekhi* authors, a “role model” at this point, in the sense that they all identified, explicitly, as *intelligenty*, yet wanted to supersede this identity. Finally, and

perhaps most importantly, it was Solov'ev who, in his philosophy of law and his attempts at a political philosophy, which was essentially an anti-political philosophy,²⁸ put key philosophical issues on the agenda. One such key issue concerns the relation between law and politics, and I will discuss this issue with the help of a recent analysis of Solov'ev's legal and moral philosophy by Alexander Haardt. In his commentary, Haardt situates Solov'ev's position in between those of Lev Tolstoi, who denied positive law in the name of Christian morality, and Boris Chicherin, who claimed the moral autonomy of the legal system. Solov'ev defends the position according to which positive law *does* have a moral dimension, which excludes out of hand any kind of legal positivism as well as its logical consequence, namely legal nihilism,²⁹ but also justifies the *legal* relations, guaranteed by the state, between members of a given society.³⁰ In his discussion of Kant, his main interlocutor in matters of moral and legal philosophy, Solov'ev concludes that the moral demand to treat each person always as an end in itself and never merely as a means founds the legal guarantee of personal rights and freedoms: "This right of the person [*pravo litsa*] is from its very nature *unconditional*, while the rights of the community with regard to the person are *conditioned* by the recognition of his individual rights [*lichnoe pravo*]."³¹ However, while these individual rights do include, for Solov'ev, property rights, freedom of religion, and other personal rights, they do not include *political* rights: "While Solov'ev emphasized time and time again the rights that protect citizens against state power, he distanced himself from the rights to participation in political power of the individual, rights which are just as essential for a liberal conception of the state."³² So if, on the one hand, we have good reasons to call Solov'ev a *liberal* at the level of individual rights and freedoms, he is neither a liberal nor a democrat at the level of *political* rights, that is, the right to participation. The shortest way to summarize his position is to say that if those who hold power in society, namely tsar, church, and civil society, act fully in accordance with the principles of Christian universal morality, as they obviously ought to do, in Solov'ev's view, the political participation of those who are ruled becomes superfluous. Given a just society with just rulers, democratic participation of substantial parts of the population can only lead to division and discord. Put differently, in a society fully determined by a Christian conception of

justice, the difference between monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic *politeia* tends to become superfluous. To put it in Rousseauian terms: if the *volonté générale* is Christian in its essence, the *volonté de tous* becomes, if anything, a barrier to true justice.

As such, there is nothing particularly Solov'evian, Russian, Orthodox, or even Christian about this argument.³³ This position was embedded, however, in Solov'ev's case, in his conception of *Christian politics*, a position which, however liberal, rights-oriented and humanistic it may be, is not one that favors democracy.³⁴ The reason for this is the following: Christian politics, like Solov'ev's entire political project, relies on the idea of an *integral worldview* that not only comprises philosophy, religion, and science, but also answers all questions in the field of social and political philosophy.³⁵ By contrast, the acceptance of individual political rights, that is, the acceptance of the principle of legitimate free individuality, not only at the personal and the religious level, as with the adherents of Christian politics, and not only at the economic level, as with the liberals and to an extent Solov'ev, but also at the *political* level, means that *if* a single integral worldview is the shared conviction of the members of a given society, this is an accidental fact in the sense that *it happens to be the case* that people share the same integral worldview or, in Rawlsian terms, comprehensive doctrine. If, by contrast, a modernized church and a Christian intellectual elite manage to establish such an integral worldview at the level of society as a whole, it will not be accidental, but organically related to the very "idea" of that society.

This excursion into the social and political philosophy of Solov'ev serves to show that the *Vekhi* authors were situated between two positions: one which preferred a Christian society on the basis of liberal principles, and another which preferred a free society based on Christian principles. Even if the "net effect" of these two models can, in principle, be the same, their foundation is fundamentally different. Among the *Vekhi* authors, Kistiakovskii came closest to the first position, while Frank was the thinker who most clearly adhered to the second. What they all feared, however, was not simply the power of a mob that hated them, the *intelligenty*—though that fear was reflected in Gershenzon's much-loathed remark that "we must bless this government which alone, with its bayonets and prisons, still protects us from the people's wrath" (64). What they feared more, and with

equally good reason, was that a democratic polity would not *automatically* yield a good or just society, let alone one that would fit the integral worldview that they, in different ways and to a varying extent, were endorsing. There is a general truth about democracy at play here: if a democratic polity is based on a liberal constitution that guarantees the citizens' rights and liberties, political rights included, it can surely yield a society that is considered just by the vast majority of its members, but the unity of such a society will be the contingent a posteriori outcome of law-based practices and procedures, and not part of the a priori make-up of that society as an organic whole: a democratic society, by definition—by virtue of its being democratic—does not necessarily yield a society that is considered just by any its members, except by those who equate democracy and justice.

The big issue, then, for the *Vekhi* authors and their contemporaries, was identical to one of the big issues of political philosophy today, one that divides, for example, “liberals” from “communitarians”: how to accommodate the “democratic impulse,” while retaining the possibility of a “substantive” integral worldview. The position of the *Vekhi* authors at this point was not simply that of an intellectual elite that wanted to take part in political power before they had to give it away to “the people”—their vision was *genuinely* aristocratic. At the same time, their effort to argue for such a perspective on the political reality of Russia after the 1905 revolution and its subsequent failure is itself squarely situated in that political reality. It is from this angle that we must try to assess the political philosophy that is present in *Vekhi*.

VEKHI AS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

If we start with the first, most habitual meaning of political philosophy (meaning [i], as indicated in the Introduction to this article), we ask how the *Vekhi* authors perceived polity and politics. For an assessment of the political philosophy that comes to the fore in *Vekhi*, it is appropriate, to begin with, to distinguish between preferred ends, acceptable means, and envisaged agents. Concerning *ends*, the *Vekhi* authors made their preferences clear. First of all, they wanted *order* in the sense of a society held together reliably and stably by a *politeia*. Secondly, they all desired *freedom*,

at least in the sense of religious and intellectual freedom, which implied a break with the autocratic regime that had existed until 1905. In the third place, I think, they all desired social *justice*: throughout *Vekhi*, one senses genuine protest against the many forms of injustice in Russian society, and against the violation of elementary ethical norms. A fourth candidate, rule of law (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*) or legality (*zakonnost'*, which is rule *by* rather than *of* law), seems to be of less primary relevance to most *Vekhi* authors—at this point, Kistiakovskii comes across as a relative outsider,³⁶ while the others seem to perceive it as a means rather than as an end in itself.

As far as means are concerned, apart from rule of/by law, the *Vekhi* authors are crystal-clear on one point: revolution is to be avoided. Even if, standing in the tradition of legal Marxism, they did not exclude a strictly *political* revolution, they did reject revolution in the sense of a major social transformation.³⁷ Even if in some cases it might be inevitable, it is certainly not preferable, as its force is primarily destructive. Since the main alternative, reform, involving cooperation between the state and some form of representation of society, was not a serious possibility, as Bulgakov, Izgoev, and Kistiakovskii show with their critical assessment of the quality of political parties and Duma representatives, the question is what remains.³⁸ Revolution being rejected, and reform proving unrealistic, the overall answer that emerges from *Vekhi* is (political) education, an echo of the aristocratic ideal of *paideia* that we find in Aristotle, as opposed to mobilization of popular instinct: “The *Vekhi* authors saw one of the most serious accusations directed at the Russian intelligentsia in the fact that, instead of engaging in a systematic political education of the people in a spirit of reasonable compromise, it not only pandered to, but even fully consciously stirred up, the ‘dark,’ ‘destructive’ instincts of the masses.”³⁹

Coming, finally, to agency or political subjectivity, the implicit position of the *Vekhi* authors is that, once cured and revitalized, the intelligentsia still would have to be the main vehicle of social and political change. There is a certain modesty at play here, since the intelligentsia is also held responsible for much of Russia’s malady, but the basic position is that precisely because the intelligentsia has been profoundly wrong, it now really must do good. It is not difficult to see sincere intentions and genuine repentance here. However, at the same time, the “reborn intelligentsia” is again staged as the

leading, if not exclusive, agent. If it does its job properly, there is no real need for the political participation of the people: in *Vekhi*, we find a profound critique of *what* the intelligentsia had been telling the *narod*—not, however, a critique of the fact *that* it was the intelligentsia that had assumed this role. This is not so much an anti-democratic as an a-democratic attitude, fully congruent with the Christian politics of Solov'ev. In Kelly's words—spoken of Berdiaev, but applicable more generally—the *Vekhi* authors showed “a reluctance to face the fact that in concrete situations choices frequently have to be made between equally desirable but conflicting values: democracy and aristocracy, equality and excellence, the demands of the flesh and the spirit.”⁴⁰

The primary agent of change, the intelligentsia, remains particularly vague in *Vekhi*. The *Vekhi* authors were criticized by, for example, Evgenii Trubetskoi, for the “extreme lack of definition of that concept which constitutes the fundamental theme of the reflections of *Vekhi*—the concept of the intelligentsia.”⁴¹ Schlögel, who subscribes to this critique of a lack of definition (*Ungenauigkeit*), forgives the *Vekhi* authors by arguing that the *intelligenty* as a matter of fact *were* unclear as a group.⁴² This may be true, but there is something else at stake as well: the vagueness of this definition is productive in *Vekhi*'s key argument. The *Vekhi* authors were *intelligenty* themselves and they were identified as such by others.⁴³ Therefore they had to be, as Lenin might have put it, “*intelligenty drugogo tipa*” (*intelligenty* of a different kind), namely a kind that would be capable of properly diagnosing the crisis of the intelligentsia to which they themselves belonged, and to point a way out of this crisis. They were able to put themselves in this position by associating themselves with a number of people, such as Dostoevskii and Pushkin, who often were considered *intelligenty* but who, according to most *Vekhi* authors, were only wearing, like Herzen, the mask or the “uniform” of an *intelligent*—or even, like Solov'ev, were “not an *intelligent* at all” (Struve, 121). The *Vekhi* authors were those *intelligenty* who were capable of receiving the cure for the intelligentsia's ills as a whole *from the outside*, from non-*intelligenty* or from those who were merely apparent ones.

Proceeding to the second meaning of political philosophy (ii), namely a philosophy of the political understood as the possibility of conflict, we

can state that the general perception of it by the *Vekhi* authors is negative. Political parties, for example, are explicitly defined as a necessary evil by Bulgakov: “The division into parties, based upon differences of political opinion, social position, and property interest, is a habitual and widespread phenomenon in countries with popular representation and, in a certain sense, is a necessary evil” (46). The fact that they are a *necessary* evil provides them with a certain legitimacy, but the fact remains that they are an *evil*. The persistence of this negative evaluation—which is by no means specifically Orthodox or Russian!—is shown by its presence in one of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s contributions to the 1974 *tamizdat*⁴⁴ publication *Iz-pod glyb* (*From Under the Rubble*), a book that saw *Vekhi* as one of its forerunners: “‘Partiia’ means a part. Every party known to history has always defended the interests of this one *part* against ... the rest of the people. And in the struggle with other parties it disregards justice for its own advantage. [...] In the world today, we doubtfully advance toward a dimly glimpsed goal: can we not, we wonder, rise above the two-party or multi-party parliamentary system? Are there no extra-party or strictly non-party paths of national development?”⁴⁵

This protest against the partition of society, reflected by a multi-party system, is directly related to a predominantly organic conception of society as we find it in the thought of most of the *Vekhi* authors.⁴⁶ It is part of a particular type of worldview, again neither typical of nor limited to Christianity or to Orthodoxy, but widespread among late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century thinkers (and not only in Russia). Struve later moved on to a nationalist position, which is indeed one of the possible vectors of development of the organic conception of society: “Contending that every state is an organism that needs to assert itself among its peers in order to maintain its health, he [Struve] argued that Russia could heal its internal wounds by pursuing an expansionist foreign policy based on a vigorous nationalism.”⁴⁷

Directly related to the idea of society as an *organism* is the predominance in *Vekhi* of the medical metaphor: if a society is a living organism, it can be ill, wounded, cured, killed, operated on, infected, contaminated, and so forth. The intelligentsia is described, by Gershenzon, as “a crowd of sick men quarantined in their own country” (63). When emphasis is

on the spiritual dimension of Russian society, “psychotherapeutic” metaphors pop up with a vocabulary of crisis, healing (*ozdorovlenie*), self-searching, and similar notions. The *Vekhi* authors thus engage in anamnesis and diagnosis before suggesting a cure: “What follows from this diagnosis of the illness? First of all ... it means that the ailment is deep-seated” (Struve, 127). A close reading of *Vekhi* shows that the metaphors of illness, diagnosis, and healing are present in all seven contributions except Kistiakovskii’s.⁴⁸ As Dmitrii Merezhkovskii aptly, and sarcastically, put it: “Seven physicians are treating the patient with seven drugs.”⁴⁹ Treating a patient with seven different medicines obviously has a strong risk of overkill, and this possibility catches the disagreement among the *Vekhi* authors, correctly highlighted by Merezhkovskii. More significant, however, is the political metaphysics at play here: if society is an organism, and one of its main limbs or organs, the intelligentsia, is ill, then it must receive proper treatment from that part of itself that is capable of providing it, namely, its *spiritual* part. This part can receive the remedy from the outside, because it is the *privileged* part of the social body.⁵⁰ Such metaphysics fits badly into a democratic society with matching polity: whatever unity or harmony there is under conditions of democracy is the *contingent* outcome of complex processes, not the manifestation of an underlying substance. This is not to say that the *Vekhi* authors were anti-democratic per se, in the sense of being opposed to elections (as Kadet party and Duma members, they would be performatively contradicting themselves if they were), but to argue that their perception of society, and of their own position in it, was essentially pre-modern and aristocratic.

Closely connected to the organic conception of society is the idea that the “body” of society consists of more or less clearly delineated “organs” and “members” (rather than of citizens or individuals). The two of these on which the *Vekhi* authors focus are, of course, the intelligentsia and the people (*narod*), the latter of which in Russian always has the connotation of “ordinary people,” i.e., *demos* in the sense of the mob or *hoi polloi*. The relation between these two entities is stated and evaluated differently, but the pair itself is constant and goes unquestioned. Arguably, a belief in the central role of this pair

is what the *Vekhi* authors have in common more than anything else, and it appears in all seven contributions (again, less prominently in Kistiakovskii's).⁵¹

Arriving, finally, at the third meaning of “political philosophy” (iii), we should address the *politicity* of *Vekhi*, that is, the fact that the book's very appearance and existence are political. First of all, the book itself, not so much as a physical object but as an event, as something that was there, is a “thing political.” It was a *politicum* in 1909, when it saw five editions within a year and became the object of heated debate. It was a *politicum* during the Soviet period, when it “survived as a negative” in the polemical works of Lenin, in Stalin's *Kratkii kurs istorii KPSS* (*Short Course on the History of the Soviet Union Communist Party*), one of the key ideological texts of the Stalin era, and in the official Soviet renderings of the history of philosophy in Russia, for example in the *History of Philosophy* that appeared in six hefty volumes between 1957 and 1965 (in a chapter entitled “Critique of the Bourgeois-Landowner Idealistic Philosophy and Sociology in Russia in the Epoch of Imperialism” *Vekhi* is discussed as “maliciously attacking [zlobno napadaia na]” Marxism, materialism, and natural science while invoking “the Slavophiles, Iurkevich, Solov'ev and other mystics,” and Lenin's “O ‘Vekhakh’” is repeatedly quoted to disqualify *Vekhi* as “an encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy.”)⁵² And it was a *politicum*, once again, around the end of the Soviet regime, when it was republished in large numbers (the edition used for this article appeared in 75,000 copies),⁵³ and played a key role in the reassessment of the intelligentsia and of the role it claimed it could or should play.⁵⁴

In terms of *what* it did, secondly, *Vekhi*'s nature as a *politicum* comes to the fore in the decisions it takes at the level of theory.⁵⁵ The sustained juxtaposition of intelligentsia and *narod* as not only historical or sociological categories but also as political agents and non-agents respectively is a first case in point. The nascent nationalism of the *Vekhi* authors, in opposition to both proletarian internationalism and the “Christian cosmopolitanism” of Tolstoi, is a second example. It appears in several places, for example at the end of Izgoev's contribution, where he ascribes the political success of the Young Turks to their emphasis on the nation-state and contrasts it with the failure of the Russian intelligentsia (90).⁵⁶ A third example is

the renouncement of revolution as a viable strategy for political change, and the choice for a combination of reform and conciliation, highlighted by Merezhkovskii, among others.⁵⁷ All three examples point to political decisions at the level of theoretical discourse, and they are part of the polemics that *Vekhi* engages in.

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, *Vekhi* is political in its *formal* aspects, that is, in *how* it develops its positions and polemics and thus in how it “engages in politics” itself. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be clarified that this is not a matter of doubting the sincerity of the *Vekhi* authors (as if they were “politicians cloaked as philosophers”), but a matter of highlighting the *inevitable* political nature of their endeavor, and of laying bare the logic of things (a logic which implies that philosophers always *are* “politicians” in the precise sense that they, too, have to deal with “the political” that is present in their text). To start with, the polemics of *Vekhi* are anti-polemical, with their emphasis on “reconciliation” (*smireníe*), a feature noted by many commentators, including Merezhkovskii, whose critical commentary bore the title of “Sem’ smirennnykh” (“Seven Reconciled Men”).⁵⁸ To be anti-polemical, however, is to be polemical in a different way: the original opponents are those who continue the struggle, who *refuse* to reconcile, and a plea for conciliation is a form of self-concealing polemics. In this sense, *no* position or perspective can ever escape the logic of polemics.

Crucially important is the use of one key word of political philosophy, “we”:⁵⁹ a conciliatory word par excellence, it is also, as Frank emphasized elsewhere, oppositional: “... ‘we’ is fundamentally limitless. It is true that, empirically, ‘we’ is always limited: every ‘we’ ... is opposed by ... some ‘you’ and ‘they.’ But, along with this, ‘we’ in another, projected unity can embrace and include all ‘you’ and ‘they’ ...”⁶⁰ This is the case with the “we” formed by the *Vekhi* authors too. Apart from the differences within this “we,” it is also always constitutive of its “other.” A close analysis of the use of “we” (*my*) and its derivatives such as “our” (*nash*) serves to show that while its *meaning* (in the Fregean sense of *Sinn*) remains constant, namely, “this group of which I as locutor am part and in the name of which I speak,” its *reference* (Fregean *Bedeutung*) shifts between *three* positions: sometimes “we” stands for the Russian nation, sometimes “we” stands for the intelligentsia as

a whole, and sometimes, finally, it stands for those *intelligenty* who, unlike the vast majority but including the *Vekhi* authors themselves, perceive the real causes of the crisis and have the proper remedy.

In the three cases mentioned, “we” stands in opposition to, respectively, people other than Russian nationals, non-*intelligenty*, and, most importantly, the “you” that is addressed directly and has the choice between becoming part of a reborn “we” or remaining stubbornly “ill,” thus risking becoming part of “they.” This shifting use of “we” is what enables the *Vekhi* authors to turn their criticism of the intelligentsia into a *samokritika* (self-critique) by the intelligentsia as a whole, in which case they themselves are the agents of this *samokritika*.⁶¹ A cured intelligentsia will be capable of becoming the agent of change of the “big we” of the Russian nation. The shifting reference of “we” thus is the precondition for the *Vekhi* authors to distance themselves from the intelligentsia while remaining part of it, and thus both to “remove themselves from the ranks of the accused,”⁶² and to turn the intelligentsia into, to put it in present-day terms, a self-help group.

In sum, *Vekhi* is political with respect to its very existence—its *that*; with respect to its content—its *what*; and with respect to its form—its *how*.

From this analysis of *Vekhi* as a specimen of political philosophy, three conclusions can be drawn. First of all, it has been demonstrated that the largely implicit political philosophy (distinct from their political stances) of the *Vekhi* authors was aristocratic, not so much in terms of their own social background (which was rather mixed in this respect),⁶³ but in terms of their perception of political agency. This conception is clearly at odds with the *first* model of democracy that I have distinguished, that is the Jacobin model of direct or pure democracy in the tradition of thinkers from Rousseau to Lenin and Schmitt. But it could be made compatible with the *second* model, or representative democracy as a mixed polity with aristocratic elements, if the *Vekhi* authors could have accepted the idea of a plurality of radically different, yet all a priori legitimate, “comprehensive doctrines” and, perhaps more importantly, the intrinsically political nature of things political, including their own endeavor. Their organicist social ontology, however, precluded this: it held no place for conflict, division, and plurality other than as an ailment to be cured or, at best, as a necessary evil.

Connected to this is a second conclusion: the *Vekhi* authors have been qualified as reactionaries and mocked as *renegaty* and *nazadniki* (literally, “backwarders”),⁶⁴ and they have objected to this misqualification.⁶⁵ They were partly right: they did not support autocracy, they did favor constitutional and democratic reform, they were “liberals” in such issues as freedom of religion, opinion, and movement, and they were certainly progressive. Still, their qualification as reactionaries does make sense: their position was not only and explicitly a reaction to the failed revolution of 1905 and to the ensuing crisis of the intelligentsia; it was also, and more profoundly, a reaction against the actual democratization of Russian society. This reaction comes to the fore most clearly in their persistent use of the opposition: *intelligentsia-narod*. One can link this to a conservative position, aiming at the preservation of the worldview monopoly of the intelligentsia, but it is, in fact, reactionary, because this monopoly *already* belonged to the past. Shelokhaev rightly states that, while the *Vekhi* authors accepted the idea of a *political* revolution (and thus could approve of the February revolution of 1917), they were opposed to the idea of a social revolution.⁶⁶ They ignored, however, the social revolution that was already taking place, and to which the February and October revolutions were the *alternative* reactions. In *Vekhi*, we see a partial recognition of this new situation when, for example, Kistiakovskii points to the legitimate existence of a plurality of political parties (99),⁶⁷ or when Gershenzon, in the last section of his contribution, displays an almost visionary awareness of the coming-to-be of a society of individuals who decide for themselves (66–69). Such insights, however, remain relatively rare on the pages of *Vekhi*.

Finally, when Shatz and Zimmerman, in the Introduction to the English edition, state that “contemporary Western political thought and practice can also be illuminated by *Signposts*,” they claim that *Vekhi* shows that “the need for political and social justice” should be placed “within the larger perspective of the need for a creative and productive culture” (xxiv–xxv). Safranski, in reviewing the German edition, adds that *Vekhi* shows “how from the struggle against a political tyranny emerges the *tyranny of the political*.”⁶⁸ Shelokhaev, finally, in the preface to a 1991 post-Soviet edition, states that when the *Vekhi* authors demonstrated the poverty of political culture in Russia, they were overstating their case.⁶⁹ All three

may have a point. The main conclusion from the *Vekhi* case, however, is that it shows that a democratic *politeia*, whatever its details, that matches a democratizing, individualizing, and differentiating society, does not rely on, and no longer *can* rely on, an integral worldview that is monopolized by intellectuals or *intelligenty*. Instead, it relies on the contingent and hence unpredictable dynamic interplay between a plurality of worldviews and a society as it actually exists and develops. The *Vekhi* authors saw this situation approaching and rejected it, and in doing so they demonstrated the conflict between a Platonic-Christian *ideal politeia* on the one hand and the unpredictable plurality of a democratic society under *mixed polity* on the other. This is not an exclusively Russian problem. On the contrary, it was and is also a European and global problem. Karl Schlögel, in the concluding remark of his Introduction, points to an open question rather than to an achieved answer: “To be able to live without *Vekhi*, leaving them behind as signs on a road which at last leads Russia out of the time of catastrophe—that would be ‘New Vekhi.’”⁷⁰ This, again, is not an exclusively Russian issue. At this point, *Vekhi* and the *Vekhi* authors continue to be highly instructive indeed. We see seven intellectuals playing doctor, struggling to keep up the idea of an organic society-cum-polity that has a single integral worldview as its “spiritual foundation,”⁷¹ while the world, Russia included, had already developed beyond that point.⁷²

NOTES

- 1 See V. V. Sapov, ed., *Vekhi: pro et contra. Antologiya* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Russkogo Khristianskogo humanitarnogo instituta, 1998).
- 2 A. S. Izgoev, “Sol' zemli,” in Sapov, *Vekhi: pro et contra*, 485.
- 3 Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman, eds. and trans., *Vekhi/Landmarks: A Collection of Articles about the Russian Intelligentsia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), xvii. Henceforth references to this edition are in parentheses in the text.
- 4 See A. S. Izgoev, “Intelligentsiia i ‘Vekhi,’” in Sapov, *Vekhi: pro et contra*, 505, where he writes: “As far as ‘Marxism’ is concerned, I both was and remain a Marxist. But I never considered myself an orthodox ‘Marxist.’”

- 5 For details on this involuntary trip and on some of the *Vekhi* authors, see Evert van der Zweerde, “La place de la philosophie russe dans l’histoire de la philosophie mondiale,” *Diogenes* 224 (Juillet 2008): 121–23.
- 6 The scheme is based on the biographical information that is contained in the Russian, English, and German editions used for this article (see note 7, below), as well as B. V. Emel’ianov, ed., “*Zheleznyi vek*” *russkoi mysli: pamiati repressirovannykh* (Ekaterinburg: Izdatel’stvo Ural’skogo universiteta, 2004).
- 7 Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, vii; V. Shelokhaev, “Predislovie,” in *Vekhi: sbornik statei*, ed. N. Kazakova (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1991), 5; Karl Schlögel, ed., *Wegzeichen: Zur Krise der russischen Intelligenz* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 1990), 6; Aileen M. Kelly, “Which Signposts?,” in Kelly, *Toward Another Shore: Russian Thinkers Between Necessity and Chance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 155.
- 8 See Julien Freund, *L’essence du politique* (Paris: Sirey, [1965] 1986), 299; Michael Oakeshott, “The Masses in Representative Democracy,” in Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), 377, who distinguishes between parliamentary and popular government, the latter meaning “jacobinism”; cf. also Alain Besançon, *Les origines intellectuelles du léninisme* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1977).
- 9 Rüdiger Safranski, “Tauben Ohren gepredigt; Russische Intellektuelle vor der Oktoberrevolution,” *Die Zeit*, 8 March 1991, 48.
- 10 P. B. Struve, “Predislovie,” *Iz glubiny: sbornik statei o russkoi revoliutsii* (1918), quoted in Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, xix.
- 11 The scheme is essentially based on Plato, *Politikos* 302c–e and Cicero, *De re publica*, I 26–27.
- 12 Far-fetched as this may seem, it is in fact what is currently put forward in, for example, Benjamin Barber’s notion of strong democracy. See Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, [1984] 2003).
- 13 See M. I. Gershenzon, “Creative Self-Consciousness,” in Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, 68.
- 14 See Thom Brooks, “Is Plato’s Political Philosophy Anti-Democratic?,” in *Anti-Democratic Thought*, ed. Erich Kofmel (Exeter, VA: Imprint Academic, 2008), and Leo Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?,” in Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1959] 1988), 36.
- 15 At this point, I propose to distinguish a mixed *polity*, i.e., a mixture of monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements, from mixed *government*, i.e., the balanced configuration of different powers as in the *trias politica*, a notion already present in antiquity (Aristotle, *Politika*, Book IV, xi.1 / 1297b, 37 – 1298a, 3).
- 16 Cicero, *De re publica*, II–29 and II–39, James Madison, “The Federalist No. 10” (1937), in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Charles R. Kesler and Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 2003), 71–79, and Bernard Manin, *Principes du gouvernement représentatif* (Paris: Flammarion, [1995] 1996), 66–67, 198–99.

- 17 Cf. Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000), 3, as well as Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and *Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- 18 Jacques Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié* (Paris: Galilée, 1994), 137; the English translation renders *politicit* as "politicity": J. Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso, 2005), 117.
- 19 See Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, [1929] 1987), esp. "Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen" (79–95); for Mouffe's project "to think with Schmitt against Schmitt" (*The Democratic Paradox*, 2), see Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, [1993] 1997), Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, and Chantal Mouffe, ed., *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt* (London: Verso, 1999).
- 20 John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, [1993] 2005), 3ff., 133ff., and *passim*.
- 21 Kelly, "Which Signposts?," 196.
- 22 See, e.g., Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*.
- 23 The notion of "constitutive outside" is adopted from Henry Staten, *Wittgenstein and Derrida* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 23; cf. also Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political* (London: Routledge, 2005), 15.
- 24 Kelly, "Which Signposts?," 167–68.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 156, 164–66, and 198–99; a clear example of Berdiaev's apocalyptic vision of history is his influential *The End of Our Time* (London: Sheed & Ward, [1933] 1935).
- 26 Cf. V. S. Solov'ev, "O poddelkakh," in *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh* (Moscow: Pravda, 1989), vol. 2, 316, and "Pis'mo k redaktoru V.V. Lesevich," *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii* 1, no. 5 (1890), also in *Sobranie sochinenii* (Brussels: 1966–69), vol. 6, 269–75.
- 27 Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, xxviii, 5, 12 ff., 23, 44, 93, 119, 121.
- 28 See Evert van der Zweerde, "Zlo i politika: ob anti-politicheskoi politicheskoi filosofii Vl. Solov'eva," in *Vladimir Solov'ev i kul'tura serebrianogo veka*, ed. A. A. Takho-Godi and E. A. Takho-Godi (Moscow: Nauka, 2005), and "La place de la philosophie russe."
- 29 See Andrzej Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, [1967] 1992).
- 30 Alexander Haardt, "Personalitt in Recht und Moral: Vl. Solov'evs Begegnung mit Kant," in *Diskurse der Personalitt: die Begriffsgeschichte der "Person" aus deutscher und russischer Perspektive*, ed. Alexander Haardt and Nikolaj Plotnikov (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2008), 171.
- 31 Vladimir Solovyov, *The Justification of the Good: An Essay on Moral Philosophy*, trans. Nathalie A. Duddington (first publication 1918), ed. and annotated Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 229; in Russian, *Opravdanie dobra*, in V. S. Solov'ev, *Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh* (Moscow: Mysl', 1988), vol. 2, 346.

- 32 Haardt, "Vl. Solov'evs Begegnung mit Kant," 181.
- 33 One can construct a similar position departing from Islamic principles, for example.
- 34 See Pauline W. Schrooyen, *Vladimir Solov'ev in the Rising Public Sphere* (Nijmegen: Ipskamp, 2006), 69–89.
- 35 See Evert van der Zweerde, "Vladimir Solovjov: een levend denkwerk," *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 65 (2003), 715–35, for a concise rendering.
- 36 This impression is strongly confirmed by Vanessa Rampton's contribution to this volume.
- 37 Shelokhaev, "Predislovie," 8–9.
- 38 Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, 46, 89, 101–02.
- 39 Shelokhaev, "Predislovie," 15. The translation from the Russian is my own.
- 40 Kelly, "Which Signposts?," 173.
- 41 Evgenii Trubetskoi, "'Vekhi' i ikh kritiki," in Sapov, *Vekhi: pro et contra*, 324.
- 42 Schlögel, *Wegzeichen*, 12–13.
- 43 Ibid., 7, and D. I. Shakhovskoi, "Slepye vozhd'i/vozhd'i slepykh," in Sapov, *Vekhi: pro et contra*, 48.
- 44 *Tamizdat*, consisting of the words "tam" (there) and "izdat" (to publish), refers to publications by Soviet dissident authors in the West; it is a counterpart to the better-known expression of *samizdat*, from "sam" (self) and the same "izdat."
- 45 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "As Breathing and Consciousness Return," in A. Solzhenitsyn et al., *From Under the Rubble* (London: Collins & Harvill Press, 1975), 19. Originally published as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn i dr., *Iz-pod glyb* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1974).
- 46 Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, 13, 33, 48, 63, 88; in all these places, the ideas of an organic whole and organic activity take center stage.
- 47 Kelly, "Which Signposts?," 178.
- 48 Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, 5, 15, 45, 49, 63, 65, 78, 86, 127, 133, 153.
- 49 D. S. Merezhkovskii, "Sem' smirennnykh," in Sapov, *Vekhi: pro et contra*, 103. Originally published in *Rech'*, 26 April [9 May], 1909.
- 50 Note the parallel here, despite all the differences, to the self-perception of the Bolsheviks as the privileged part of the proletariat.
- 51 Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, 2, 7, 21, 43–44, 57, 64, 80, 94–95, 104, 124–125, 140–41.
- 52 M. A. Dynnik et al., eds., *Istoriia filosofii v 6-i tomakh*, vol. 5 (Moscow: izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961), 342.
- 53 Kazakova, *Vekhi*, 464.
- 54 See Jutta Scherrer, *Requiem für den Roten Oktober: Rußlands Intelligenzija im Umbruch 1986–1990* (Leipzig: Universitätsverlag, 1996), 44–51 and 159–65, and my review of it in *Symposium: A Journal of Russian Thought* 2 (1997): 167–69.

- 55 That Louis Althusser was arguably wrong when qualifying philosophy as *class* struggle at the level of theory does not mean that philosophy is not always-already struggle, i.e., that it always, and necessarily, has a polemical side to it.
- 56 In a footnote to the second edition, he even reinforced this point (Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, 90 and note 17); I am grateful to Catherine Evtuhov for drawing my attention to this point.
- 57 Sapov, *Vekhi: pro et contra*, 103.
- 58 See note 49.
- 59 Also discussed by Stuart Finkel in his contribution to this volume.
- 60 S. L. Frank, *The Spiritual Foundations of Society* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1987), 50. Originally published as *Dukhovnye osnovy obshchestva* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1930).
- 61 Cf. Nikolai Berdiaev, “Philosophical Verity and Intelligentsia Truth,” in Shatz and Zimmerman, *Vekhi/Landmarks*, 5; Sergei Bulgakov, “Heroism and Asceticism (Reflections on the Religious Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia)”, *ibid.*, 18.
- 62 Shelokhaev, “Predislovie,” 11.
- 63 The only real aristocrat was Berdiaev; the others had their roots in the academic elite (Struve, Kistiakovskii), clergy (Bulgakov), professional middle class (Frank), and business milieu (Gershenzon). Data about the Jewish family in Odessa that Izgoev grew up in are hard to find.
- 64 Cf. V. Il’in [V. I. Lenin], “O ‘Vekhakh,’” in Sapov, *Vekhi: pro et contra*, 488, and Schlögel, *Wegzeichen*, 12.
- 65 See, e.g., Izgoev, “‘Sol’ zemli,’” in Sapov, *Vekhi: pro et contra*, 485–87.
- 66 Shelokhaev, “Predislovie,” 8–9.
- 67 See Schlögel, *Wegzeichen*, 16.
- 68 Safranski, “Tauben Ohren gepredigt,” 48.
- 69 Shelokhaev, “Predislovie,” 15.
- 70 Schlögel, *Wegzeichen*, 44.
- 71 The expression “spiritual foundation” is taken from Frank’s main work in social philosophy, *Dukhovnye osnovy obshchestva* (see note 60 for details).
- 72 From this perspective, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the regime that it led to, far from being “progressive,” were even more reactionary.