D. S. MEREZHKOVSKII VERSUS THE *VEKHI* AUTHORS

Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal

Dmitrii Sergeevich Merezhkovskii (1865–1941) was a seminal thinker. In the 1890s, he popularized Nietzsche's thought and reawakened Russians' interest in antiquity and in the classics of world literature, and his lecture "O prichinakh upadka i o novykh techeniiax v sovremennoi russkoi literature" ("On the Causes of the Decline and on the New Trends in Russian Literature," 1892, published 1893) became the manifesto of Russian symbolism.¹ In the early twentieth century, he pioneered the study of Fedor Dostoevskii, Nikolai Gogol', and Lev Tolstoi as religious writers and co-founded the Religious-Philosophical Society of St. Petersburg (1901–03, 1906–17), which helped inspire a religious revival. The members were called "God-seekers" even though most of them were already believers, because they were seeking a new interpretation of Christianity. During and after the revolution of 1905, he advocated a religious revolution. Throughout, he opposed materialism, rationalism, utilitarianism, and positivism. He promoted his ideas in articles, book-length essays, and historical novels, and at meetings of the Religious-Philosophical Society. Newspapers reported on Merezhkovskii's attack on *Vekhi* and on his polemics with Petr Struve, a prominent Constitutional Democrat and a contributor to *Vekhi*.² Merezhkovskii's attack on *Vekhi* was part of a larger polemic with Struve and certain other *Vekhi* authors on such issues as the state, economic development, and rule by law.

A radical by temperament and by conviction, Merezhkovskii perpetuated the anarchistic, utopian strain of Russian cultural history, without the atheism. His apocalypticism mingled with other apocalyptic scenarios circulating in Russia since 1900.

This article will describe Merezhkovskii's attack on *Vekhi*, as well as responses to his attack, and analyze the larger polemics of which it was part. His attack merits detailed attention because it was one of the "landmark" responses to *Vekhi*, prompting in itself further responses. It also provides a particularly rich picture of the complex and contested cultural, religious, and political landscape in which *Vekhi*—and the polemics around it—were created. Moreover, Merezhkovskii's starting point and certain aspects of his intellectual genealogy share much with those of most, if not all, of the *Vekhi* contributors, to which can be added their common participation in initiatives such as the Religious-Philosophical Society. So, first, a few words on Merezhkovskii's views before 1908, the year his polemics with Struve began.

MEREZHKOVSKII'S VIEWS BEFORE 1908

In the 1892 lecture mentioned above, Merezhkovskii decried the intelligentsia's emphasis on political and social issues to the exclusion of metaphysical questions, aesthetic criteria, and the "inner man" (the soul or the psyche). Here, therefore, and as noted above, he starts from a position not at all dissimilar to that of *Vekhi*. He accused the intelligentsia of curbing self-expression and stifling imagination and creativity, insisted that religious faith is a basic human need, and predicted that symbolism would lead to new religious truths and, eventually, to a new culture characterized by beauty, creativity, and freedom.

Merezhkovskii's version of symbolism was a surrogate religion, a religion of art, but it did not assuage his fear of death. So around 1896, he concluded that there are two eternal truths, paganism (enjoyment of life) and Christianity (personal immortality), that must be reconciled. In 1899, he "turned to Christ." In 1900, he declared that "historical Christianity" (the Christianity preached in the churches) was obsolete because the Second Coming was imminent. Jesus Christ Himself would grant humankind a Third Revelation (a Third Testament) that would solve all problems and reconcile all polarities, including paganism and Christianity, flesh and spirit, and East and West. From then on, Merezhkovskii cast all problems in terms of an eschatological dualism that only divine intervention

could resolve. Very few intellectuals believed in a forthcoming Third Revelation, but his idea that Christianity had to be reinterpreted was widely accepted.

In November 1901, Merezhkovskii, Zinaida Gippius (his wife), and Dmitrii Filosofov (also known together as “the Merezhkovskiis”), obtained the government’s permission to organize the Religious-Philosophical Meetings of St. Petersburg as a “mission to the intelligentsia.” The meetings featured reports by clergymen or lay intellectuals, followed by discussion, on such issues as the Orthodox Church’s excommunication of Tolstoi, Christian attitudes to sex, and whether new Christian dogma is needed and if so, who has the power to create it. The lay intellectuals were mostly symbolist poets and anti-positivist philosophers. The minutes of the meetings were published in *Novyi put’* (*The New Way*, 1903–04), a review founded by the Merezhkovskiis for that purpose.

The government closed down the Religious-Philosophical Meetings in April 1903, charging that they provided a “forum for heresy.” Merezhkovskii was so outraged that he declared that autocracy is from the anti-Christ. Up to that point, he had eschewed political and social questions. The meetings resumed as the Religious-Philosophical Society after the Revolution of 1905 and continued until 1917. The Moscow Religious-Philosophical Society (1906–1917) was modeled on the St. Petersburg one. Several *Vekhi* authors were members of the Moscow Society.

In view of all this, one would expect Merezhkovskii to hail *Vekhi*, but he did not. He lambasted it, because he had come to the following conclusions: first, that the revolution of 1905 had religious significance: it was the beginning of the Apocalypse, the prelude to the establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth; second, that the atheistic intelligentsia was the carrier of the Christian principle of freedom, it was practicing “Christianity without Christ”; third, that Jesus was a revolutionary and Christianity and revolution are two aspects of the same phenomenon, with Christianity being “revolution in the divine category” and revolution “religion in the human category”; and fourth, that autocracy, Orthodoxy, and *meshchanstvo* (philistinism) were faces of The Beast, but since autocracy was dead and Orthodoxy was dying, *meshchanstvo* was the most dangerous face.³ Implicitly, *meshchanstvo* included such bourgeois values as moderation,

compromise, practicality, material well-being, personal responsibility, and self-discipline, some of the very qualities promoted by the *Vekhi* authors.

Merezhkovskii urged Russians to turn the political revolution into a “religious revolution” that would culminate in a society in which Jesus Christ is the only ruler; love is the only law; and the “truths” of anarchism and socialism (personal freedom and community, respectively) have been reconciled. Merezhkovskii’s “religious revolution” featured the destruction of the state, the death of the Orthodox Church, and its rebirth as a revolutionary body, an ally of the intelligentsia in a fight for freedom. Politically, he was closest to the anarchistic Social Revolutionaries (SRs), even meeting with some of them in October 1905. In January 1906, fearful of publishing their book *Le Tsar et la Révolution* in Russia, the Merezhkovskii left for Paris; they returned to St. Petersburg in July 1908. By then, a “second wave” of symbolists—Aleksandr Blok, Andrei Belyi, and Viacheslav Ivanov—had emerged, but Merezhkovskii was still influential.

His “religious revolution” entailed a new set of eschatological dualisms. In the essay “Prorok russkoi revoliutsii (k iubileiu Dostoevskogo)” (“Dostoevskii, Prophet of the Russian Revolution,” 1906), he counterposed earth and heaven and interpreted the revolution of 1905 as a revolt of the earth against the otherworldliness of “historical Christianity.” In an essay titled “Revoliutsiia i religiia” (“Revolution and Religion,” 1907), he treated the Roman papacy and the Russian tsardom (*tsarstvo*) as negative dualisms that originated in the same idea, theocracy, but proceeded along opposite paths. In the west, the Roman papacy became a state. In the East, the state absorbed the church. “In both cases there occurred the identical abolition of the Church, the kingdom of love and freedom, the kingdom of God, by the state, the kingdom of enmity and violence, the kingdom of godlessness.”⁴ According to Merezhkovskii, autocracy reflects, in external political form, an internal religious need, the need of the human soul for Divine oneness, monotheism: one tsar on earth, one God in heaven. That is why the overthrow of the Russian autocracy has “deep religious significance” (189).

The bulk of “Revolution and Religion” was devoted to the interplay of the two phenomena in Russia from the time of the Old Believers (the first dissidents, in his view) to Nikolai Novikov, Petr Chaadaev, Gogol’, Vladimir

Solov'ev, Tolstoi, Dostoevskii, and the Russian decadents (symbolists in the 1890s); the latter were the "first self-generated mystics in Russian educated society outside any church tradition" (214). In the last section, he proclaimed that "The end of Orthodoxy is the end of Autocracy and vice versa.... There is no Orthodoxy without the Roman Caesar just as there is no Catholicism without the Roman archpriest." By the "end of Orthodoxy" he meant the triumph of the "new religious consciousness," that is, the triumph of his interpretation of Christianity: "Only the lie of Orthodoxy [Autocracy] is rejected" (218–19). When the revolutionary and religious movements fuse, Russia will emerge from the "Orthodox Church and the Autocratic Tsardom into the universal church of the One Archpriest and the universal Tsardom of the one Tsar—Christ" (221).

Clearly, Merezhkovskii and the *Vekhi* authors were on different wavelengths. Merezhkovskii favored extreme solutions, opposed politics and law per se, rejected nationalism,⁵ and expected a miraculous break with the old order. As Marshall Shatz and Judith Zimmerman point out, his attack on *Vekhi* "was an attack on the contributors' recognition, in various ways, of Russia's need for a solid structured, autonomous set of political and social institutions.... Hence *Signposts* criticized the intelligentsia for its negative attitudes toward the main elements of this structure: the state, the rule of law, national consciousness, historical tradition, etc. Hence also, the book's rejection of revolution in favor of gradualism, political education, and respect for historical continuity."⁶

MEREZHKOVSKII'S ATTACK ON *VEKHI*

Merezhkovskii titled his attack on *Vekhi*, made in April 1909, "Sem' smirennnykh" ("Seven Humble Men").⁷ He starts out by saying that it is difficult to tell the truth to those one is close to, and he was close to some of the *Vekhi* authors. Nevertheless, he has decided to speak out because the matter is so important. He also writes that in judging the *Vekhi* authors, he is judging his former self ("In beating them, I beat myself"), but that his *mea culpa* should not be taken as an attempt to "sugarcoat" the pill; its bitterness may be the saving medicine (71). There is thus a complex and polemical combination of self-knowledge and superior sagacity, and of

turning the rhetorical weaponry of *Vekhi* back on itself, in Merezhkovskii's attack.

"Seven Humble Men" consists of a series of bullet-like summaries of the articles followed by longer attacks on those by Sergei Bulgakov, Mikhail Gershenzon, and Struve. Merezhkovskii pounced on words or phrases that struck him as particularly outrageous, in some instances magnifying them to the point of distortion and/or pushing them to an extreme conclusion. That said, he raised important questions and deployed his extensive knowledge of Russian and European history and literature in his attack.

Merezhkovskii began his onslaught with a reference to Raskol'nikov's dream (in Dostoevskii's novel *Prestuplenie i nakazanie* [*Crime and Punishment*, 1866,]) in which a little mare yoked to a huge wagon is beaten to death for not heeding the owner's commands. The wagon, Merezhkovskii explained, is Russia; the little mare is the Russian intelligentsia, and the *Vekhi* authors beat her with words. Nikolai Berdiaev accuses the intelligentsia of "populist obscurantism"; Semen Frank, of "sectarian fanaticism"; Bulgakov, of "social hysteria"; Bogdan Kistiakovskii, of "lack of legal consciousness"; and Struve, of "bottomless frivolity." Gershenzon calls the intelligentsia a "frightened herd," an "assembly of the sick." Aleksandr Izgoev indicts it for "onanism, the sexual life of a seventeen-year-old" (72).

"Suddenly the little horse kicks: the intelligentsia affirms that it has the all-purifying fire—liberation" (72), but the beating continues. Gershenzon reviles the intelligentsia as a "monster that looks like a human being." Bulgakov condemns it for "heroic sanctimoniousness" and "self-deification" and calls it a "legion of demons." Frank accuses the intelligentsia of a "Hottentot morality"⁸ and "hooliganistic violence"; Izgoev charges it with "murder, plunder, thievery, of all kinds of debauchery and provocation."

"But the little mare doesn't die." With her last strength, she tries to pull the wagon. Still, the beating goes on. Gershenzon urges the intelligentsia to bless the state authorities (*vlast'*) that with bayonets and prisons still protect us from the people's wrath (72). Merezhkovskii found this (infamous) statement particularly outrageous, and repeated it (80).

"Suddenly there is a miraculous transformation." Like the little boy in Raskol'nikov's dream, Bulgakov embraces the dead mare. The Russian

intelligentsia becomes the beautiful Shulamite seeking her beloved (in the *Song of Songs*). This is an allusion to Bulgakov's statement that the intelligentsia, having refused Christ, unconsciously yearns for Him. "He stands and knocks at that heart, that proud, recalcitrant intelligentsia heart.... Will His knock someday be heard?" "Seven humble men," Merezhkovskii continued sardonically, seven colors of the rainbow that merge into one whiteness, into a "common cause" (49).

Turning to Gershenzon's "Preface," Merezhkovskii noted that the words "faith" and "religious" are in quotation marks for good reason. The *Vekhi* authors have different faiths. Berdiaev and Bulgakov are Orthodox Christians. Struve, if he is a Christian at all, is not Orthodox. Gershenzon, Frank, and Izgoev are believers, but not Christians. Kistiakovskii's religion is unknown. Actually, Struve was Orthodox. Gershenzon, Frank, and Izgoev were Jewish, but Gershenzon has been called a "Jewish Slavophile" and Frank converted to Christianity in 1912.

Gershenzon also said that despite "seeming contradictions," i.e., on the "religious" nature of the intelligentsia, the contributors have a common platform, namely that the "inner life of the individual is the only creative force in human society." Merezhkovskii vehemently objected to this statement, not because he disputed the importance of the "inner life of the individual," but because, in his view, affirming that the individual is the *only* creative force in human society "means that there is no Christianity," because "Christianity affirms that the creative force of the person (*lichnost'*) is not the only one, that the religious limit of the person is union, *sobornost'*, sociality, the church as the body of Christ, a new divine-human I, only in which can the fullness of every separate human being be realized" (74). *Sobornost'*, the social ideal of the Slavophiles, Solov'ev, and many others, connotes an organic community whose members retain their individuality. The erudite Merezhkovskii knew that *sobornost'* had an explicitly Christian origin, the Church as the body of Christ.

There is no personal salvation outside the social, Merezhkovskii continued. "'Then all will be one, as You Father in me and I in You, and so they will be one in Us.' The Church is founded on this principle; annihilate it and you annihilate her. If the religious force of the person is the only one, then there is no religious force in society, no church, no Christianity,

no Christ. This is not a 'seeming contradiction' or a small matter, but a bottomless abyss into which everything disappears."

Finding holes in the *Vekhi* authors' "common platform," Merezhkovskii compared them to seven doctors seeking a life-saving medicine. Berdiaev prescribes "religious philosophy"; Frank, "religious humanism"; Bulgakov, "Christian asceticism"; Struve, "a mystique of the state"; Izgoev, "love for life"; Kistiakovskii, an "authentic legal consciousness"; and Gershenzon, "making the monster into a human being." They seek the truth (*pravda*), but truth is not love and a rainbow is not a bridge (over the abyss).

Indeed, their "common platform" is only a common hatred, Merezhkovskii charged. In so doing, he turns a key aspect of the *Vekhi* critique against *Vekhi* itself and uses Bulgakov to expand on his theme. The basic idea of the symposium, the hidden axis around which everything turns, is encapsulated in Bulgakov's words: "The concept of revolution is negative; it has no independent content, but is characterized only by destructiveness. Therefore the pathos of revolution is hatred and destructiveness." Bulgakov did not say this in *Vekhi*. What he did say is that the Russian revolution developed enormous destructive energy, like a great earthquake, but that its constructive forces were much weaker. Still, Merezhkovskii had a point. It was their opposition to revolution that united the *Vekhi* authors.

Bulgakov's conclusion is implicit but obvious, Merezhkovskii contended. If revolution is destruction, hatred, and negation, then reaction, the restoration of what has been destroyed, is creation; the extinction of hatred is love and the negation of a negation is an affirmation. Finally, if revolution is anti-religion, then reaction is religion and perhaps the reverse, religion is reaction, a conclusion already reached by the enemies of religion (75–76). This is an example of Merezhkovskii's practice of taking a statement to an extreme conclusion, thereby misrepresenting the author's views. Here is another example: "Following Bulgakov's conclusion, we proceed from a 'terrible judgment' on the Russian intelligentsia, the Russian revolution, to a 'terrible judgment' on all European culture," which was forged in the crucible of revolution. Here, he exaggerates Bulgakov's anti-Europeanism. But Merezhkovskii was right when he observed that Christian ascetics esteemed by Bulgakov as the possessors of Christ's truth (*istina*) regarded all European culture as anti-Christian and that St.

Seraphim of Sarov condemned the entire Enlightenment as the work of the anti-Christ.

Merezhkovskii then posited two conceptions of world history. One affirms endlessness, perpetual development, the inviolable law of causality. For this conception, free will, the indispensable premise of religion, is a metaphysical and teleological superstition. The other conception affirms an *end*, a *break*, overcoming the external law of causality by inner freedom, by the intrusion of the transcendental order into the empirical, which seems to be a *miracle* but is really the fulfillment of another law, a higher law incommensurate with the empirical. Every development is a preparation, a maturation, the beginning of a break, the beginning of the end. The freedom of the Son is not the destruction but the fulfillment of the law of the Father. The first conception is scientific, *evolutionary*; the second is religious, *revolutionary*. In the last analysis, and only in the last analysis, they are not opposed. Every break is a limit, the end of development, a *goal* in the teleological order. Every development is a preparation, a maturation, the beginning of a break, the “beginning of the end,” a cause in the determinist order. In this sense, evolution and revolution are two sides, the immanent and the transcendental, of the universal historical dynamic (76).

The apocalypse was given to us as a primarily Christian understanding of world history, Merezhkovskii continued, “catastrophic, revolutionary, bounded, and cut short.” Lightning, thunder, fire, and earthquakes, are vessels of the anger of the Lord. Battles, uprisings, national defeats (presumably he had the Russo-Japanese War in mind), horses knee-deep in blood, corpses of kings devoured by birds of prey, all these signify the fall of the Great Babylon, the greatest of all revolutions, the final storm. Compared to this, all previous revolutions are pallid summer lightning. Babylon, the Kingdom of the Beast, is indeed destroyed, but the Kingdom of God is created. “The rapture [*vostorg*] of destruction is the rapture of the creator; the rage of hatred is the rage of love.” But Bulgakov sees only negation, only hatred and destruction, while to Struve the apocalypse is only an anecdote (Merezhkovskii here exaggerates by trivialization Struve’s opposition to the apocalyptic mind-set). Summarizing this aspect of his critique of *Vekhi*, Merezhkovskii stated: “To reject the positive religious content *not only in the empirical but in the mystical revolution* means to

reject the apocalypse—the entire Christian eschatology, the entire Christian dynamic of the Coming Christ and consequently, of the Advent of Christ, because the Coming and the Advent are one” (77).

The revolutionary conception of world history was born in Christianity, Merezhkovskii contended. Only among Christian peoples do we find an endless search for the City of God, the unconscious teleology that fires the heart of the Russian people to the present day. We find it in the schismatic sectarians, in the intelligentsia, and in all Russian apostates. (Merezhkovskii’s rejection of “historical Christianity” made him an apostate in his own way.) This unconscious eschatological feeling is what makes the intelligentsia national (*narodnyi*)—at least, more national than the authors of *Vekhi*, who confuse Babylon with Jerusalem. For them the liberation movement ends with the October Manifesto. So, without the name of God, the intelligentsia is—according to Merezhkovskii’s polemical conclusion—closer to God than are the *Vekhi* authors. The intelligentsia “is not yet with Christ but Christ is with them.”⁹ Merezhkovskii never stopped trying to get the intelligentsia to accept Christ. His goal was a Christian intelligentsia.

Turning to Gershenzon’s article, “*Tvorcheskoe samosoznanie*” (“Creative Self-Cognition”), Merezhkovskii objects to the author’s negative view of Peter the Great and of the intelligentsia (Peter’s spiritual descendants, according to both Gershenzon and Merezhkovskii). In “Seven Humble Men,” Merezhkovskii’s view of Peter was uniformly positive.¹⁰ He praised Peter as the first *intelligent*, the first Russian apostate, and the first Russian revolutionary, and pointed out that none other than Aleksandr Pushkin called Peter the greatest revolutionary. He accused Gershenzon of wanting to crush Peter like a fly (an exaggeration) and of demonizing both Peter and the intelligentsia. “To spit on Peter means to spit in Russia’s face” (79).

Unlike the Slavophiles, Merezhkovskii approved of Peter’s reforms, especially his opening of a “window on the West.” He believed that Peter had no choice but to subdue the obscurantist, blindly traditional church. Moreover, by the time Peter abolished the Patriarchate, the Orthodox Church was already dead, morally and spiritually. Merezhkovskii considered Peter’s ability to break with the past in order to make a frenzied leap into the future the most Russian of all Russian traits. Seeing the same trait in the intelligentsia, Merezhkovskii claimed that it would complete Peter’s work by

liberating Russia. "It was not for nothing that the Decembrist Revolt began at the pedestal of the Bronze Horseman" (79). He ignored Gershenzon's charge that the intelligentsia stifled individuality, self-knowledge, and personal development, charges Merezhkovskii himself had made in his 1892 lecture and for years after that.

As for Struve's article, "Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia" ("The Intelligentsia and Revolution"), Merezhkovskii lambasts Struve's depiction of the intelligentsia and his apotheosis of the state. He accuses Struve of attempting to flee to pre-Petrine Russia and the year 1612, when the Muscovites drove out the Poles in a battle with anti-state "thievery." Although Struve did not name the present-day Hermogens, Minins, and Pozharskii, it is clear that he considered the intelligentsia the "thieves." Struve considers anti-religion and anti-state positions to be two sides of the same apostasy. In this, and only in this, according to Struve, is the key to understanding the revolution. To Merezhkovskii, the "key" is the intelligentsia's religiousness, which Struve dismissed as a "legend."

To Hermogen, Minin, and Pozharskii, the mystique of the state lay in the idea of autocracy, Merezhkovskii continued. But where is the mystique in constitutional monarchy? In imperialism? In the Third Duma or Stolypin's ministry as objects of faith? Struve is grasping at straws. Although Merezhkovskii objected to Struve's mystique of the state, he believed that the people do need a mystique. The idea of Autocracy, however, is a mystical temptation. "Perhaps the chief sin of the intelligentsia, the chief difference between the Russian intelligentsia and the people, is that the intelligentsia not only failed to overcome this tempting mystique, but did not even feel it" (80). The people still do, Merezhkovskii asserted. In fact, he himself had succumbed to it. In his study of Tolstoi and Dostoevskii (1900–01), he had called the autocrat the visual symbol of God on earth. But then he realized that every autocrat is a pretender who attempts to take God's place. Previous revolutions have resulted in the victory of yet another pretender (or despot), like Cromwell, Robespierre, and Napoleon. He wanted the Russian religious revolution to end the cycle of revolution and despotism altogether.

Merezhkovskii also addressed Bulgakov's views on autocracy. He quoted Bulgakov's statement that "in the soul of the Russian people there

has always been a battle between the precepts of Fr. Sergius and those of the Zaporozhian Sech, of Razin and Pugachev.” “But Bulgakov knows and we know” that Father Sergius posited an unbreakable tie between Orthodoxy and autocracy. The intelligentsia broke, or tried to break, that tie—Merezhkovskii was here referring to the religiousness he discerned in the intelligentsia, not to their views on the Orthodox Church. He objected to Bulgakov’s description of the intelligentsia as a “legion of demons” and his desire to expel them from Russia. Like Fr. Sergius, “Bulgakov sees the salvation of Russia in her only national idea, in her universal historical calling of *messianism*.” The “national idea,” Bulgakov says, “is based first of all on *messianism*, into which national feeling naturally flows. That is how Dostoevskii, the Slavophiles, and Vladimir Solov’ev understood [it]” (81). This is yet another example of a certain shared heritage and ideas, in the context of radical ideological difference, for Merezhkovskii was a Slavophile and messianist too, in his own way. He believed that Russians were the first universal people (an idea he took from Dostoevskii), that the apocalypse would begin in Russia, and that the Russian spirit would save the world.

“Bulgakov knows and we know,” Merezhkovskii continued (conflating Slavophilism and the state ideology of Nicholas I), that Slavophile messianism consisted of three links tightly soldered together: Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. Bulgakov wants to exclude autocracy, but what then, he asked, will connect Orthodoxy and nationality? What will be the embodiment and dynamic of the Orthodox Church outside historical power? These are good questions, followed by a hypothetical answer. “If the soul of Russia is Orthodoxy, then the body is autocracy” (81). “There is no soul without a body and no body without a soul. There is no Roman Catholicism without the Pope, the head of the Church. There is no Eastern Christianity without Caesar, also the head of the Church, not only in historical experience but according to messianic revelation” (81). In other words, Orthodoxy is the soul of autocracy and autocracy is the body of Orthodoxy.

Merezhkovskii repeated this idea in an article titled “K soblaznu malykh sikh” (“On the Temptation of the Little Ones”).¹¹ The subject of the article was an open letter by Berdiaev to Metropolitan Antonii, in

response to the latter's open letter welcoming *Vekhi* and condemning the "new religious consciousness" as a "dangerous heresy." To Merezhkovskii's dismay, Berdiaev agreed. By the time Merezhkovskii returned to St. Petersburg, Berdiaev had returned to the Orthodox Church and was denouncing the "new religious consciousness" as a heresy. In the open letter, Berdiaev called the Orthodox Church his "spiritual mother" and accepted the state as necessary for sinful humanity (whereas at one point during the revolution of 1905 he had advocated Christian anarchism).¹² Berdiaev also said that even though "we overcame temptation" (the "new religious consciousness") he realized that "for many of our brothers, overcoming temptation is terribly difficult." Of course, Merezhkovskii did not consider the "new religious consciousness" a mere temptation. Most objectionable to him, however, was Berdiaev's distinction between the empirical, human church, which can err, and the mystical, divine Church, which preserves eternal truth (*istina*). Merezhkovskii believed that the divine and the human cannot be separated; because Jesus Christ, the Godman, was both. He accused Berdiaev of confusing Christ and anti-Christ and urged him to overcome that temptation (as Merezhkovskii himself had done): "When I began the trilogy *Christ and Antichrist*, it seemed to me that two truths existed—Christianity, the truth of heaven, and paganism, the truth of the earth—and that the absolute religious truth lay in the future union of these two truths. But as I was finishing it, I already knew that the union of Christ and Antichrist was a blasphemous lie: I knew that both truths—of heaven and earth—had already been united in Jesus Christ."¹³

Time and again, Merezhkovskii insisted that empirical objections to the idea of absolute monarchy (*edinovlastie*) have no force, because the issue is not transitory forms of a single power, but its eternal limits, not that which is, but that which may or must be. So, "just as abuse of papal power does not invalidate the idea of the papacy, the abuse of tsarist power does not invalidate the idea of the kingdom (*tsarstvo*)."¹⁴ Even Dostoevskii asserted that "under autocracy such freedoms were possible that republicans never even day dream about." And in Solov'ev's theocracy, the tsar is the indispensable member of the triad of tsar, prophet, and priest. Merezhkovskii objected to Dostoevskii's idealization of autocracy

and to the tsar's central place in Solov'ev's theocracy. In Merezhkovskii's version of theocracy, Jesus is the only ruler.

Merezhkovskii predicted that constitutional monarchy would fail because the people did not understand the principle of shared power. They would ask, "Is the Tsar the Lord's anointed or is he not?" Seeking to regain their lost sense of cosmic unity, they would turn to a new and terrible form of Caesaropapism. He turned out to be right: Stalin became the autocrat and the new god.

"Our contemporary slavophiles are groping in the dark," Merezhkovskii concluded, but they would not find Russia's "national face." This is an allusion to an article by Struve, in which he accused the intelligentsia of an "anemic" and "colorless" cosmopolitanism.¹⁴ Merezhkovskii objected to aspects of slavophilism but, as noted above, was himself a Slavophile, and a messianist, in his own way.

Merezhkovskii contended that *Vekhi* demonstrated the opposite of what it set out to prove. It proved instead that Russian liberation has hidden religious meaning and that "liberation will be religious and religion will be liberation" (83). He concluded his attack on *Vekhi* with a battle-cry that echoes—and outdoes—the rhetorical flourishes with which seven of the eight *Vekhi* essays end: "The Lord lives, our souls live. Long live the Russian intelligentsia and Russian freedom" (83). It is indicative of the complexity and diversity of currents around *Vekhi* that Vasilii Rozanov (1856–1919), another leading member of the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Society, faulted Merezhkovskii's attack on *Vekhi* and praised the *Vekhi* authors for battling their past, i.e., the passionate Marxist and positivist convictions they had once held. For Rozanov, the symposium shows that the intelligentsia lives, and not only lives but has a great future ahead of it, a limitless road. The *Vekhi* authors did not "kill the intelligentsia" (a reference to the slain mare), they killed themselves and were resurrected; they were buried and revived. "How can a specialist in Christian affairs [like Merezhkovskii] fail to understand this?"¹⁵

At the beginning of this section, I noted that Merezhkovskii pounced on words and phrases he considered particularly outrageous. Reading his attack on *Vekhi* and his articles against Struve, one would not know that he agreed with them on matters of personal freedom and the importance of the

inner life, and that he shared their desire to create a new religious culture and a new Russian person—a new Russian person with different qualities, of course: Merezhkovskii's ideal person would be daring, courageous, and willing to break with the past and make a frenzied leap into the future.

A LARGER POLEMIC I. MEREZHKOVSKII VS. STRUVE

Merezhkovskii and Struve had been at loggerheads since early 1908, when Struve published an article titled “Velikaia Rossiia” (“Great Russia”).¹⁶ Their dispute centered on the question of the state, and of the state and culture. Taking his title from Stolypin's speech to the Second Duma, Struve explained that, “to us,” “Great Russia” means a new Russian statehood (*gosudarstvennost'*) “that relies on the historical past of our country and its living cultural traditions, but is at the same time creative, and like all creativity, is revolutionary in the best sense of the word.” He wanted the state to institute a “revolution from above” that would raise the cultural and economic level of the people, release their creative energies, respect personal freedom, emancipate the Jews, and grant autonomy to the Poles. Economic progress and patriotism would overcome ethnic differences and dampen revolutionary fervor. Apropos of foreign policy, one of Struve's goals was Russian domination (both economic and cultural) of the Black Sea basin and the Near East.

To accomplish all of this, the Russian state must be strong; its strength must be based, at least in part, on economic development, and the state must pursue a “politics of power.” Power is not a rational but a religious principle. Every vital state, for example Great Britain, always has been and always will be imperialistic. The idea of an eternal peace is utopian. “Nietzsche talked about the coldness of the state.”¹⁷ On the contrary, its rays warm all aspects of national life.”¹⁸

Struve considered the state a mystical entity, a living organism, a collective person. Citizens are comparable to the cells of a body and are motivated (partly) by will. Loyalty to the state is above reason, an expression of an innate human striving, religious in nature, to transcend the limited sphere of personal existence. The sacrifices people willingly make in war cannot be explained by reason alone. Struve praised Otto von Bismarck for

solving the Prussian political crisis of the 1860s by “taking possession” of the “national idea” and unifying Germany. Presumably Struve had in mind the impasse between the tsar and the first two Dumas. Bismarck created a powerful state without degrading the people or destroying the law, by organically combining historical traditions with new and democratic state institutions. Struve also praised Oliver Cromwell, calling him the most important creator of English state power, because he instilled self-discipline in the people, labor discipline in particular—a quality, he said, that Russians lack.

Merezhkovskii denied each point.¹⁹ “Great Russia” is a terrible artificial being, like Hobbes’s Leviathan; “living Russia will stifle in its dead embrace.” Struve’s patriotism is another word for barbarism. Nation is a beast to nation. In war, one beast falls on another and bites off chunks of meat, he said, giving the Franco-Prussian war as an example. Bismarck is a “beast in capital letters.” But man is not a beast; he tries to rise above animal existence.

Struve’s “politics of power” reminded Merezhkovskii of “laughing lions,” “blond beasts,” and other items from the Nietzschean inventory that Merezhkovskii claimed to have jettisoned. He also claimed that Struve is a utopian. Turning reaction into a revolution from above requires as much of a miracle as turning stones into bread, or a serpent into a fish. Man must strive toward religious truth. The state is not a religious conception: it is godless, inherently unprincipled, and hostile to human personality. Though Struve advocates equal rights for Jews and autonomy for the Poles, if *raison d’état* so required he would persecute them.²⁰ Merezhkovskii may have been right. Struve advocated equal rights for Jews, but he also defended the Russian people’s right to its “attractions and repulsions,” especially since among certain sectors of the Russian people “the force of repulsion from Jewry is very great.”²¹ A few years later, Struve resigned from the presidency of the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Society because he thought it devoted too much attention to the Beilis Case (1911–13). Mendel Beilis, a Jew, was accused of ritual murder, on charges trumped up by the government in order to divert popular anger from itself to the Jews. Merezhkovskii was one of Beilis’s most vociferous defenders. Rozanov’s expulsion from the Religious-

Philosophical Society because of a series of articles in which he claimed not only that Beilis was guilty, but that ritual murder is a Jewish tradition, was largely his doing.

Merezhkovskii also disputed Struve's contention that the state is a creator of culture. Culture can flourish without a powerful state, he argued, giving ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, the disunited Germany of Goethe and Schiller, and the Jews as examples. Goethe and Schiller would be impossible in Bismarck's Germany. Macedonia and Prussia lowered the cultural level of Athens and Weimar. The Jews, "the most anarchistic of all peoples," gave the world Christianity. He did not mention the Ten Commandments, presumably because he rejected law per se. To Merezhkovskii, freedom was the absence of law.

He also pointed out that Struve ignored the combination of apocalypse and revolution in Cromwell's "prophet soldiers" as well in the American Puritans from whom the French Revolution borrowed the idea of the rights of man. Struve is a "zoological patriot" and a "maximalist" whose real religion is the state.

Struve replied that Merezhkovskii's views were "the last gasp of slavophilism" and, at the same time, "the last anchor of the Russian revolution." By making the state his enemy, Merezhkovskii has "turned the police psychology inside out" and entered into the blind alley of pure destructiveness. Macedonian culture was the universal form of Hellenism; Christianity was as much a product of Hellenism as of the Hebrews, and the greatness of Bismarck is a historical fact. Bismarck was not a miracle worker (an allusion to Merezhkovskii's belief in miracles), but with brilliant daring and power he managed to turn reaction into a revolution from above. Bismarck's Germany gave us Wagner and Nietzsche. Cromwell is greater than Stenka Razin, Carlyle is greater than Bakunin, and the dangers of chaos and anarchy are the greatest of all. Merezhkovskii should realize that religious communities like Calvin's Geneva are the greatest threats to personal freedom. Both he and Struve deployed their knowledge of European history on behalf of their arguments.

Struve also contended that apocalypticism does not solve real problems, and that Merezhkovskii's apocalypticism is a materialization

of the Kingdom of God. Jesus said that “The Kingdom of God is Within You.” True mystics regard religion as a purely spiritual force.²² In a previous essay, Struve had given Tolstoi as an example of a purely spiritual Christianity. Merezhkovskii replied that Tolstoi was an anarchist and as such an opponent of “Great Russia” in any form.

Filosofov (the third of the “Merezhkovskiis”) entered the fray with an article titled “Spor vokrug ‘Vekh’” (“The Dispute about *Vekhi*,” 1909). One of his main points is that the supra-personal Leviathan state that Struve advocated in “Great Russia” contradicted the liberal individualism he had advocated in an earlier article, “Religiia i sotsializm” (“Religion and Socialism,” 1909).²³

Merezhkovskii and Struve disagreed on other issues as well. Struve opposed dogmatism in religion and politics; Merezhkovskii sought new Christian dogma. His article “Bor’ba za dogmat” (“Struggle for Dogma,” 1908)²⁴ was a response to Struve’s essay “Intelligentsiia i narodnoe khoziaistvo” (“The Intelligentsia and the National Economy,” 1908),²⁵ in which Struve advocated a new religious attitude to the economy in order to increase production and sanction the creation of wealth. In this context, Struve mentioned Max Weber’s book on the Protestant ethic. Merezhkovskii accused Struve of a dogmatism of his own in the form of reliance on economic processes.

To Merezhkovskii, dogma was the building block of a religious-social cosmos and the point of departure of a religious society: “Without dogma, cosmos becomes chaos.” The content of dogma is non-rational, outside reason. “Dogma is a crystal of revelation.” “Every dogma is a revelation. Every revelation will be a dogma.” Christian revelation is revolutionary. Christ rejected Jewish law and the iron yoke of Greco-Roman slavery in favor of freedom, he argued, and freedom is the testament of the first Christians.²⁶ Merezhkovskii should have known that Jesus did not reject Jewish law: that was Paul’s doing. Jesus said, “Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy but to fulfill. For verily, I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled” (Matthew 5:17–18). Merezhkovskii interpreted Jesus’s statement to mean that there would be no law in the Kingdom of God on Earth. Dogma is dynamic, Merezhkovskii continued. It can become obsolete or turn into sterile dogmatism. For

example, the living dogma of the great (French) revolution—liberty, equality, fraternity—turned into “dead dogmatism, the basis of bourgeois-capitalist slavery.” Accusing the clergy of “dogmatic scholasticism,” Merezhkovskii desired a new revelation of eternal truth to be resolved in dogma, and proclaimed that “in the final analysis, the issue is which dogma will save Russia.” He considered adogmatism a negative conception that cannot combat nihilism. “True dogma is not a burden, but wings.” “The struggle for a saving truth is a struggle for dogma.” “Dogma in religious consciousness is a ray of light; in religious activity, it is a sword.”²⁷

Merezhkovskii and Struve called each other utopians. Merezhkovskii was indeed a utopian, but he raised important questions about the viability of a constitutional monarchy and the moral ambiguities of Struve’s “politics of power.” He was correct in challenging as utopian Struve’s contention that reaction could be turned into a revolution from above.

A LARGER POLEMIC II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RULE BY LAW

Berdiaev, Frank, and Bulgakov advocated economic development, not to enhance state power but to abolish poverty by creating wealth—material and spiritual—and increasing production. In his contribution to *Vekhi*, Berdiaev wrote that “in the thought and feelings of the Russian intelligentsia, the claims of distribution and equalization always outweighed the claims of production and creation” (2). In 1906, he had advocated a “neutral socialism” (as opposed to what he called “socialism as religion”), which would guarantee everyone the necessities of life. Frank asserted in his *Vekhi* essay that it was time “we advanced from distribution and the struggle for it to cultural creation and the production of wealth.” However, he maintained, in order to produce wealth, one must love it, and “*the Russian intelligentsia does not love wealth.*” Indeed, it hates and fears it. “In [the intelligentsia’s] soul, love of the poor turns into love of poverty” (148). And, in the same critical spirit, Frank argues that the intelligentsia “values only distribution, not production or accumulation, only equality in the enjoyment of goods and not their actual abundance” (150). Frank considered wealth a metaphysical concept that includes culture. He disapproved of the American ideal of mass prosperity, because he considered it overly materialistic. Like many

educated Europeans, he regarded Americans as uncultured; he once called the United States “Genghis Khan with a telegraph.”

Bulgakov viewed the struggle with poverty as a moral obligation, partly because he had experienced poverty personally and had witnessed its destructive moral effects. In March 1909, he presented a lecture, “Narodnoe khoziaistvo i religioznaia lichnost” (“The National Economy and the Religious Person”), in which he advocated the formation of an Orthodox work ethic that emphasized personal responsibility, self-discipline, and hard work subsumed in an Orthodox metaphysics.²⁸ His purpose was to combat Marxist materialism, on the one hand, and the apostolic communism preached by the Christian Brotherhood of Struggle on the other. His ideal was a modern industrialized Christian society and a Christian economy based on love of neighbor and the mystical unity of all humankind, a society in which the material necessities of life were available to all.

Merezhkovskii certainly favored cultural creation, but he objected to emphasizing economic development, first because it was a secular goal, and second because the *Vekhi* authors who advocated it had been Marxists. Merezhkovskii probably viewed their desire to increase production as a residue of Marxist materialism. And since he assumed that the Apocalypse was imminent, he could also assume that there would be no poverty in the City of God on Earth.

Merezhkovskii did not respond specifically to Kistiakovskii’s defense of law, even though he agreed with Kistiakovskii on personal freedom and the inviolability of the person. This was not just because Merezhkovskii opposed law per se, but also because he believed that these goals could be accomplished by love. Fond of contrasting “the eternal freedom of love” with the “eternal slavery of law,” he regarded law itself as violence and as a snare of the devil, who makes law appear necessary by endowing it with the semblance of reason.²⁹ People obey the law not out of conviction but because they fear punishment. A vehement opponent of capital punishment, he claimed that the difference between legal force, which holds violence in reserve, and actual violence is only a matter of degree; both are sinful. Autocracy and murder are merely the most extreme forms of force. Once people realize that force is evil, the state will collapse. Deprived of the

means to enforce its will, it cannot exist. “No violence, no law; no law, no state.”³⁰ Religious revolution is not violence; it is the refusal to use violence. After the Third Revelation, love will become an active force; people will find the strength to “live in love,” which they now lack. Love is Christ’s commandment; it is a terrible commandment because it is so difficult, but to deny love is to deny God. The power of love, not force and violence, must prevail. Only when voluntary acceptance of Christ’s law (love) replaces legal force will people be free.³¹

One would think that by refusing to accept violence, Merezhkovskii was advocating passive resistance (like Tolstoi), but he waffled on the use of terror. To him the crucial question—whether love for a higher ideal makes it “necessary to kill or impossible to kill”—was still unresolved. The solution of the religious issue of the use of force requires a miracle.³² He said this in a review of *Kon’ blednyi* (*Pale Horse*), a novel written by the SR terrorist Boris Savinkov, a personal friend. Moreover, in a final minor twist on the question of law, despite his rejection of it Merezhkovskii used the law when it suited his purpose. For example, when the government confiscated the manuscript of his play *Smert’ Pavla I* (*The Death of Paul I*, 1908), Merezhkovskii sued the government under the relaxed censorship laws of 1906 and won. The manuscript was returned to him. Similarly, when the government confiscated the manuscript for his novel *Aleksandr I i Dekabristy* (*Alexander I and the Decembrists*, 1913) he sued the government and got his manuscript back.

CONCLUSION

Merezhkovskii’s attack on *Vekhi*, and his quarrel with Struve and certain other *Vekhi* authors, stemmed from profound religious and political disagreements. Appalled by the violence and chaos of revolution, they advocated a constitutional monarchy, rule by law, personal responsibility, and finding realistic solutions to Russia’s problems. Merezhkovskii opposed the state and law per se, expected divine intervention, and was willing to accept violence and chaos as part of the apocalyptic transition to the Kingdom of God on Earth. What the *Vekhi* authors considered virtues, Merezhkovskii considered *meshchanstvo*. Put differently, Merezhkovskii

was a maximalist; the *Vekhi* authors were moderates, though not all of them remained moderates. Their disagreements show that the intellectual battles of the time were not just between secularists and believers, but among believers as well.

NOTES

- 1 D. S. Merezhkovskii, "O prichinakh upadka i o novykh techeniiax v sovremennoi russkoi literature," *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (henceforth PSS), vol. 18 (Moscow, 1914), 175–275.
- 2 See, for example, V. V. Rozanov, "Merezhkovskii protiv 'Vekh,'" *Novoe Vremia*, 27 April 1909, A. Liubash, "Duel' Merezhkovskogo i Struve," *Slovo*, 23 April 1909, and S. L. Frank "Merezhkovskii o 'Vekhakh,'" *Slovo*, 28 April 1909.
- 3 D. S. Merezhkovskii, *Griadushchii kham*, PSS, vol. 14, 5–39: 8–11.
- 4 D. S. Merezhkovskii, "Revoliutsiia i religiia," in *Ne mir, no mekh*, PSS, vol. 13, 36–97. English translation in *A Revolution of the Spirit: Crisis of Value in Russia 1890–1924*, ed. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak (Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 1990), 189–221. Citations are from the English translation. It will henceforth be cited parenthetically.
- 5 On 26 October 1914, Merezhkovskii gave a lecture titled "O religioznoi lzhi natsionalizma" ("The Religious Lie of Nationalism").
- 6 Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman, eds. and trans., *Vekhi/Landmarks: A Collection of Essays about the Russian Intelligentsia* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), xxi. Citations from *Vekhi* are in this translation, and are henceforth cited parenthetically.
- 7 The speech "Sem' smirennnykh" was delivered to the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Society on 21 April 1909, published in *Rech'*, 26 April 1909, and included in *Boľnaia Rossiia*, PSS, vol. 15, 71–83. It will henceforth be cited parenthetically.
- 8 The phrase stems from a reporter's account of a Hottentot's definition of good and evil: "good" is when the Hottentot steals someone's property; "evil" is when someone steals his property.
- 9 Merezhkovskii, *Griadushchii kham*, 34.
- 10 It was not always so. In his historical novel *Khristos i Antikhrisť: Petr i Aleksis* (*Christ and Anti-Christ: Peter and Alexis*, 1904) Merezhkovskii depicted Peter's flaws as well as his virtues. In "Revolution and Religion," he faulted Peter for ignoring the "free

- spirit of the West,” taking “its form without its content, its light without its fire, its flesh without its spirit” (193).
- 11 D. S. Merezhkovskii, “K soblazu malykh sikh,” in *Bol’naia Rossiia*, 84–91. Metropolitan Antonii’s letter was published in *Slovo*, 10 May 1909. Berdiaev’s letter was published in *Moskovskii ezhenedel’nik*, 15 August 1909.
 - 12 Berdiaev’s views on this and other subjects changed during the revolution of 1905.
 - 13 Quoted in C. Harold Bedford, *The Seeker: D. S. Merezhkovskiy* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1975), 91.
 - 14 See P. B. Struve, “Intelligentsiia i natsional’noe litso” (first published in *Slovo*, 10 March 1909), and the follow-up article “Polemicheskie zigzagi i nesvoevremennaia pravda” (first published on 12 March 1909), both in P. B. Struve, *Patriotika* (St. Petersburg, 1911), 370–79. An English translation of the first as “The Intelligentsia and the National Face” can be found in Rosenthal and Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *A Revolution of the Spirit*, 267–70.
 - 15 Rozanov, “Merezhkovskii protiv ‘Vekh,’” 3.
 - 16 P. B. Struve, “Velikaia Rossiia” (first published in *Russkaia mysl’*, January 1908); see also his “Otryvki o gosudarstve” (first published in *Russkaia mysl’*, May 1908): both in Struve, *Patriotika*, 73–96 and 97–103.
 - 17 Zarathustra called the state “the coldest of all cold monsters.”
 - 18 Struve, “Otryvki o gosudarstve,” 99.
 - 19 See D. S. Merezhkovskii, “Krasnaia shapochka” (first published in *Rech’*, 24 February 1908), and “Eshche o ‘Velikoi Rossii” (first published in *Rech’*, 16 March 1908): both in *V tikhom omute*, PSS, vol. 16, 50–56 and 57–65.
 - 20 Struve also debated with Bogdan Kistiakovskii on the Ukrainian question. Kistiakovskii wanted cultural autonomy (but not separation) for minority nationalities and the use of the Ukrainian language in schools. Struve advocated the dominance of Russian culture and the Russian language. For details of this debate, see Susan Heuman, *Kistiakovskiy: The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 133–46. To the best of my knowledge, Merezhkovskii did not discuss the Ukrainian question.
 - 21 Struve, “The Intelligentsia and the National Face,” 267–70.
 - 22 P. B. Struve, “Spor s Merezhkovskim,” in Struve, *Patriotika*, 110–28. First published as two articles in *Rech’* on 28 February 1908 and 8 March 1908.
 - 23 D. V. Filosofov, “Spor vokrug ‘Vekh,’” *Russkoe slovo*, 17 May 1909, 8.
 - 24 D. S. Merezhkovskii, “Bor’ba za dogmat” (first published in *Rech’*, 14 December 1908), in *Bol’naia Rossiia*, 102–09. The topic of the need, or lack of need, for new Christian dogma had been discussed at the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical Meetings in 1904.
 - 25 P. B. Struve, “Intelligentsiia i narodnoe khoziaistvo” (*Slovo*, 16 November 1909; *Russkaia mysl’*, December 1908), in Struve, *Patriotika*, 362–69.

- 26 Merezhkovskii, "Bor'ba za dogmat," 104–05.
- 27 Ibid., 105–09.
- 28 S. N. Bulgakov, "Narodnoe khoziaistvo i religioznaia lichnost'," first published in 1909, reprinted in S. N. Bulgakov, *Dva Grada. Issledovaniia o prirode obshchestvennykh idealov* (Moscow: Tovarishchestvo tipografii A. I. Mamontova, 1911), vol. 1: 178–205. Details in Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, "The Search for a Russian Orthodox Work Ethic," in *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia*, ed. Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 57–74.
- 29 Merezhkovskii, *Ne mir, no mech*, 147 (see also 36–42).
- 30 Merezhkovskii, *Griadushchii kham*, 21–22.
- 31 Merezhkovskii, *Bol'naia Rossiia*, 24, 30.
- 32 D. S. Merezhkovskii, "Kon' blednyi," PSS, vol. 15, 15–31: 23–31.