Wolfgang Danspeckgruber

Self-Determination in Our Time:
Reflections on Perception, Globalization
and Change*

Like a barometer, the institute, the processes and the consequences of self-determination reflect the state of the regional and international system. The “ethnic card” – i.e., mobilizing expectations and instilling discontent and possible upheaval to create instability in a certain community or state – has always been a means to a strategic goal. There was significant manipulation of the theories and notion of self-determination and nationalism prior to World War I; later self-determination was employed in certain instances in the decolonization period; and since 1990 it has regained interest – specifically in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus and Caspian Sea region. Particularly in the years since the Cold War, self-determination has obtained great significance in the international system and contributed to change. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has permitted the striving for independence and new statehood to emerge from the suppression by the leading super powers of the bipolar bloc system. On the other, the events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing Global War on Terrorism, GWOT, initiated by America’s Bush Administration de facto re-ideologized self-determination and conflated those who fight for independence with terrorists. Nevertheless, Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the events in Georgia in 2008 have demonstrated the lingering powerful forces of self-determination aspirations. Furthermore, increasing intra-religious tensions – for instance, between the Shia and Sunni communities – could affect the character and intensity of new dimensions of self-determination problems in the Middle East and beyond.

This paper seeks to offer an analysis of three dimensions of self-determination: its meanings and perceptions today; its historical evolution; and its role within the emerging international system, geopolitics and the forces of globalization.

* The author would like to thank Constance Wilhelm, Jessica Sheehan, Anne-Marie Gardner and Uriel Abulof for inspiration and assistance.

I. Self-Determination: Meanings and Perceptions

Self-determination is the ability of the individual to freely enjoy the values of life, prosperity and status, and hence to define its destiny. Self-determination represents a right of peoples in international law, but it is arguable what this right entails or to whom it should apply¹. It can be found in Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Self-determination is also mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations. However, peoples do not have an enforceable recourse to ensure this right, which, in the reality of the international system, makes self-determination subject to many influences, interpretations and limitations. It can be an instrument or a tool reflecting communal, national, or great power interests; describe an aspiration, an aim, or a process. For some, self-determination represents a dream: the ultimate objective entailing freedom from repression, and even full sovereignty and independence. For others, however, it represents a danger: a menace implying opposition, loss and destruction – and even the potential to “shatter” the state. While self-determination is thought to be a noble ideal, and perhaps represents the pinnacle of modern political ethics, it is also considered to be inherently perilous. In real life, the idea of self-determination has all too often lacked reciprocity. Modern history abounds with attempts of outside parties to determine others’ identities, or to exclusively appropriate the right for themselves, while rejecting the right of the other to the same.

The initial idea behind self-determination was to free peoples from repression and to permit their unhindered pursuit of social, economic and cultural development “to define one’s destiny”. The definition of the “self” whose choice would determine the group’s future political development is especially fraught with difficulties. This problem is most acute in a world slowly moving away from a relatively tidy system of states towards a more uncertain world in which national sovereignty is in the process of transformation and regionalization ascends. The pressures for change come both from above (at the level of regional integration) and from below (at the level of smaller-scale political units, communities, drawing their cohesion from such factors as ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic similarity). There is hence a need to determine which entity can justifiably argue for self-determination. Should this entity be a community, a suppressed people, or a former colony? Must the community be under duress or could the claim to self-determination be the simple will of its members – expressed by a free and fair election – to become independent? What has to be the arrangement with members of

¹ At its most basic, the right of self-determination can be defined as a community’s right to choose its political destiny. This can include choices regarding the exercise of sovereignty and independent external relations (external self-determination) or it can refer to the selection of forms of government (internal self-determination). See “Self-determination” by *Wolfgang Danspeckgruber* and *Anne-Marie Gardner*, *Encyclopedia Princetoniensis – The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination*, www.princeton.edu/lisd.

other communities in the local vicinity? Any such decision also relates to the question of whether the holders of the right to self-determination are a large group, i.e. hold majority, or rather a smaller group in the minority of individual subjects. Self-determination is not merely about the right of the collective “self” to decide what polity (an independent state, self-governance, etc.) suits it best; it is also about the right of the “self” to establish its own identity (religious, ethnic, civic, lingual, etc.). The collective identity and the collective polity are two sides of the same political-ethical coin. Furthermore, the essence of self-determination concerns the “other” as much as it does the “self” as the “self” constructs its identity around not only the *perceived*, but also the *real* existence of the “other”. To define the self, then, the actor(s) or institution(s) representing the other within a particular context must also be understood and respected.

In the current international system, the context within which one identifies the ‘self’ is evolving – hence also affecting the causes and effects of self-determination. Richard Falk sees self-determination as maturing along three paths: those of morality, politics and law². In my opinion, self-determination is being increasingly defined by additional factors: education and information on a global and intensifying scale; the increasing role of women; economic viability; the rise of civil society; the rise of “individual empowerment” or enhanced individualization; and the role of citizen diplomacy³; add to this the increasing role of NGOs and non-state actors in the inter-national system. Lately, there has been much discussion concerning the introduction of “smart power” into political considerations, beyond conceptions like ‘hard’ power and ‘soft’ power⁴. “Smart power” refers to the increasing role of persuasion, diplomacy, religion/faith, culture and values. Below, I discuss in more detail these various aspects of globalization and how they impact the self and self-determination.

Self-Determination Crises

The concept of self-determination is comprised of an internal and an external dimension. The internal dimension stems from democratically-developing domestic politics and the national institutions of a state. This addresses the right of a people or polity to independently choose their institutions of domestic governance. The

² “The incorporation of self-determination into international law has consistently lagged behind advocacy based on aspirations and considerations of justice (the moral debate) and political movements and results (the political experience).” *Richard A. Falk*, in: *Wolfgang Danspeckgruber with Arthur Watts* (eds.), *Self-Determination and Self-Administration – A Sourcebook* (Boulder 1997) 42.

³ Citizen Diplomacy can be defined as negotiating endeavors between representatives of sovereign states conducted not by diplomats but by private citizens. This kind of diplomacy can include also so-called ‘track two’ meetings, i.e. meetings between non-diplomats or non-governmental officials from different states, such as academics, experts, business people, etc.

⁴ *Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform. A Statement by Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye Jr.*, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (April 24, 2008).

external dimension refers to the community's or the state's freedom to exercise sovereign rights, to establish independent external relations, and to join any international (or supranational) organization or alliance. "Crisis" means that there is an imminent threat or serious deterioration to an important value or matter perceived. A self-determination crisis arises when a community either pushes to have more say in its government (i.e., increased participation in the internal dimension) or lays claim to a right to decide its own destiny separate from the remaining population of the existing state (defining the intent of the "self" in the external dimension as being not synonymous with that of the "other") and possibly secession.

Any analysis of (self-determination) crises has to consider the following three dimensions: the *actors*, their *objectives* and the *instruments* available to obtain them. A crisis is further characterized by four principal factors: *time*, *stakes*, and *costs* – all of which depend on the *perception*. The time factor relates to how an actor assesses the time available for decision-making. The more critical the issue, according to the actor's perspective, the higher the stakes involved. One can assume that stakes are high for those who strive for self-determination, since this struggle relates to their core identity and the future of their existence. Arguably, in high-stakes crises, key actors will likely be less concerned about the factors of time and cost, whether human or material. However, costs are important for outside powers, even more so for those who consider a given crisis to be of relatively lower stakes. Time can be of critical importance – especially for democratically-elected governments, as these rely on an election cycle. Thus, they tend to calibrate their actions and foreign policy operations to domestic election timetables and seek palpable foreign policy success in accordance to election cycles. Hence, the cost/time factor can be far more relevant for democracies than for authoritarian regimes or the actors on the ground – who believe time ultimately is on their side – though the stakes for the latter could be much higher than for the former. This sheds light on the situation in the Balkans and on Afghanistan. A rather revealing dictum can be found amongst the Afghans who claim: "The IC [international community] has the watches, but we have the time." Incidentally also the Milosevic regime thought so, in 1998 – but they proved wrong.

In this context, I would like to refer to Robert G. Gilpin's *cost-benefit calculation*⁵. While it is frequently denied that actors involved in self-determination crises act rationally, I do believe that emotional and nationalist-identity objectives stand many times also for an inherent rationality in self-determination crises: namely, that the communal or national interest will overshadow any other calculation: there 'benefits exceed costs'; and stakes are simply too high. One might assume that the cost-benefit calculation is less relevant to those for whom self-determination and the achievement of greater independence is the ultimate objective – hence, it is above and beyond any such cost calculations. Arguably, conventional national interest replaces the rational framework of the cost-benefit analysis in the

⁵ Robert G. Gilpin Jr., *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge 1984).

case of self-determination crises. This supports the argument that crises linked to self-determination claims are unique. They also can continue over a very long time and involve high stakes for both the community in question, and also the defending central authorities. In view of the critical importance for both sides, pat situations may occur and/or costs be ignored, leading in some cases to drawn-out “frozen” conflicts, as in the “5Ks” plus Cyprus and Israel/Palestine⁶.

II. The Historical Evolution of Self-Determination: A Brief Synopsis

Since the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era, self-determination has become one of the most central and explosive issues in international politics. Though it was propagated and employed by President Woodrow Wilson to redraw the map of Europe after World War I (WWI) – espoused earlier by Vladimir I. Lenin – the concept of self-determination in reality dates back to the American struggle for independence and the French Revolution. While obviously reflecting the aspirations of communities and nations, self-determination has on several occasions been transformed and utilized as an instrument of great power politics – for instance, in creating a *cordon sanitaire* around France post-Congress of Vienna (1815) by forming independent sovereign nation-states like Belgium and Luxemburg⁷. The unification of Germany and of Italy decades later demonstrated the power of self-determination combined with nationalism to form nation-states at the expense of empires. The 19th century thus saw the formation of several important states in Europe – hence, the emergence of nationalism, which contributed to the explosive power of self-determination, at the detriment of European empires in the early 20th century. Then, the Great War ended empires and changed the world. Self-determination, in conjunction with ideological and revolutionary fervour, became an empire-shattering force (as in the case of Tsarist Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire). In the interwar period, self-determination was employed by Adolf Hitler to regain territory.

At the end of the Second World War (WWII), the notion of self-determination became enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Post-WWII brought about large-scale decolonization; the continuation of the destruction of empires; the availability of weapons of mass destruction; and the ideological bipolar antagonism that later characterized the Cold War. This period’s iron grip on global regions and the two superpowers’ spheres of influence reduced the ability of self-determination movements to achieve success, basically eliminating the possibility of changing external borders – except when ideologically-motivated and in the

⁶ I consider as “the 5Ks”: “K”aucasus, Kaliningrad, Kashmir, Kosovo, Kurdistan.

⁷ G. John Ikenberry, *After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars* (Princeton 2000).

interest of a superpower. The prevailing wisdom held that the relative weight of the two dominating powers – the Soviet Union and the United States – and the systemic balance envisaged would contribute to keeping relative geopolitical stability⁸.

Following the demise of the major colonial empires, the concept's initial impetus within the context of decolonization was largely spent. Although numerous new states emerged in the course of the 20th century, especially after 1945, the international system was largely prejudiced against the possibility of striving for greater independence or sovereignty. The Cold War, with its clearly delineated spheres of influence, contributed to the appearance of an apparently stable and calm international community, without any immediate interest in autonomy, secession, or substantial challenges to sovereignty. This was especially true in Cold War Europe, where the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its follow-up conferences represented a special (originally Soviet) initiative to formalize the post-WWII order and ratify the then existing (inner-German) borders. There was a complacent and erroneous sense among many scholars and policy-makers that self-determination was essentially a question of the past or one primarily related to decolonization. This really was a misreading of the world, which inferred the absence of any urgent self-determination and secessionist movements from the relative calm of the system. It also ignored Südtirol and Catalonia, Ireland, the Basque region, and Cyprus; Biafra, Kashmir, Bangladesh, Tibet, and East Timor, where related disputes have lingered on in various intensity today. Some of these are now called "frozen conflicts" and at their origin, most resulted by decolonization, but they also emanated from a number of related geopolitical adjustments, such as the partition of India. Numerous other self-determination conflicts have continued below the surface and sometimes also under the cover of Cold War proxy wars. In Europe, the moment the Berlin Wall fell, various aspirations for self-determination surfaced, as in the Baltics, in Czechoslovakia, and between Slovakia and Hungary.

Indeed, after the fall of the Wall, the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia became the bloodiest event on the European continent since WWII. To the great surprise of many, forty years after the end of the Second World War, the U.S. Air Force once again bombed targets on the continent, this time in Bosnia. While there were violent conflicts related to self-determination in the Caucasus, interestingly though, all other self-determination related events in post-Cold War Europe took place without major bloodshed or destruction, e.g. the unification of Germany, the "Velvet Revolution" in Prague and the partition of Czechoslovakia, and even the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In East Germany, lives were spared due to the implementation of U.S. sanctions against China following the events of 1989 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing⁹. The sanction policy of U.S. President

⁸ See *John J. Mearsheimer*, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York 2001).

⁹ *Wolfgang Danspeckgruber*, *Emerging Dimensions of European Security Policy* (Boulder 1991).

George H.W. Bush and the corresponding outcry from the international community made clear to the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev that any violent suppression of change in the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe would cause dramatic economic and strategic consequences for the Soviet Union. 1989 therefore, Gorbachev responded with a clear “*nyet*” to Eric Honecker’s request for armed assistance to suppress the popular uprising against his leadership in East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR). Otherwise, we likely would have witnessed significant bloodshed in Honecker’s attempt to squash the civic opposition in the GDR.

Outside Europe, those interested in self-governance sought to advance their objectives after the end of the Cold War. While the rigidity of the Cold War global system had managed to suppress or simply overshadow potential self-determination initiatives, in the early 1990s, struggles emerged or intensified in many different places around the globe from the former Soviet Union – in particular the Black Sea region and the Caucasus – to the Middle East and to Central and South Asia. Since then, self-determination and secessionist movements have been evident in Africa, Central America and in highly industrialized states such as Belgium, Canada, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Each case has its own very specific historical, ethnic, local and regional background and history, though differing in intensity and orientation. This demonstrates the difficulty of creating any one model of general value and of transferring the experiences and adapting lessons of one particular case to others. In an increasingly interdependent and interactive world, characterized by the greater specialization and prosperity of even the smallest units, self-determination gained new meaning and relevance – at least until 2001.

III. Self-Determination and the Emerging International System

In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, one can distinguish two periods concerning the role and impact of self-determination in the international system: The first begins with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War lasting to 2001, while the second period commences with the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The first one includes three defining events: the unification of Germany, the demise of the Soviet Empire, the velvet separation of Czechoslovakia, and the bloody destructive disintegration of Yugoslavia. Incidentally, it also coincides with the most successful regional integration experiment in diplomatic history – the European Union – which entails several important ramifications for self-determination: intensified integration on a nearly continental level in Europe, combined with the formation of the European Economic Community, followed by the EC and the European Union with its Euro-Regions and subsidiarity regulations. This has encouraged communal activities and responsibilities and even

devolution, as in the case of Scotland, and further struggles for self-governance, as in the case of Catalonia. It has contributed to new understandings of community related to authority above and below the state and encouraged individuals to adopt multiple identities. This suggests the possibility of defining multiple ‘selves’ simultaneously, rather than a dichotomous choice between the “self” and the state or the “self” and the “other”. Obviously it all presupposes a certain level of education and mental flexibility and – ideally – the acceptance of ‘multiple identities’.

Globalization at the end of the 20th century also saw major advances in education, the status of women, human rights, information exchange and communication technology. All that has contributed to what I call “individual empowerment”: shaping individualization and increasing the role and influence of individual actions far beyond local, communal, national or regional boundaries. Never before in the history of mankind could an individual man or woman, independent of status, race, color, or age mobilize and influence so much on so global a scale, at any time and any where in the world – provided they are equipped with the appropriate technical devices and internet connection. Also NGOs and non-state actors in conjunction with the internet have become an increasingly important factor in issues and struggles related to self-determination.

These elements, along with the emergence of transnational networks, permit those who are attempting to achieve self-determination to garner more effective support and mobilization abroad, most often thanks to diasporas. On the other hand, these factors encourage all those who are opposed to the self-determination initiative to bring to bear much more radical and far-reaching measures – including cyber operations – to resist and suppress it¹⁰. More than ever before, self-determination claims and crises began to have reach, resonance and impact far beyond their territorial boundaries.

Furthermore, the emphasis upon the obligation to support fundamental human rights and the protection of women and children has become a defining characteristic of our time. Widespread general acceptance of this obligation is derived from increasing education, a greater sense of entitlement, the empowerment of both women and also the younger generation, and various UN initiatives. In 1997, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan introduced the concept of “individual sovereignty”¹¹. In conjunction with the “responsibility to protect” (RtoP/“R2P”) – which is the attempt to develop a normative base for intervention by the inter-

¹⁰ See the cyber operations by Russian experts in Estonia and in the Georgian crisis 2008. *Stephen J. Lukasik, Seymour E. Goodman, David W. Longhurst*, Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against Cyber-Attack, in: Adelphi Paper 359 (2003).

¹¹ “State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights”, see *Kofi A. Annan*, Two concepts of sovereignty, in: *The Economist* (18 September 1999) at <http://www.un.org/News/oss/sg/stories/kaecon.html>.

national community (ideally under UN Security Council mandate). This emphasis on individual rights and sovereignty brought into the limelight the conditions under which outside powers might intervene in self-determination crises¹².

The second period in the post-Cold War era began with the brutal terror attacks of September 11, 2001, against American targets and the *jihad* proclaimed by al Qaeda. The U.S. under President George W. Bush and its allies responded by declaring the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). These events have commenced a new period that has changed the international environment, governmental policies and the role of international organizations, and recalibrated the meanings of state, sovereignty and self-determination. Now suddenly the invocation of self-determination has attracted strong resistance from central authorities, many who tried to combine their fight against liberation movements with their participation in the GWOT¹³. Nevertheless, Sir Michael Howard correctly addressed the incompatibility of declaring “war” on an abstract term like “terrorism”, specifying that this is not a military confrontation between sovereign members of the international community, but a *campaign* for values and policies against terror. Its conduct and extent can thus be easily manipulated and re-interpreted¹⁴.

The post-9/11 international system saw rather abrupt changes in governmental policies towards freedom movements and a fundamental about-turn in the role of the state, i.e. the nation-state came back “with a vengeance” post-9/11 (the ‘pendulum has swung back’), reasserting its central position concerning security, protection, enforcement and border control. This new state of affairs is rather different from the 1990s, when the role of the state and sovereignty seemed to become progressively diminished in favor of a nearly “global village”. Then liberation movements were seen as more worthy to be supported by Western powers, especially the United States. Following the 9/11 terror attacks, one could say that the state and its institutions “fought back” as an actor in the international system by reaffirming its authority, re-enforcing border and national security, and trying to enhance control even over international trade and communications, including the Internet. This increased authority also entailed curtailing the liberties of the citizens, as well as the generally diminished readiness to accept opposition or even dissent. On the other hand, powerful states have begun to project their power upon weaker states, as the institutional fragility of the latter can be seen as a potential menace to international security and the interests of the former. Many view weak and fragile states as a potential wellspring for terror organizations. Consequently, this once again demonstrates that a weaker state is much more susceptible to the demands of greater powers. Radical movements and related international

¹² See Lee Feinstein, *Anne-Marie Slaughter*, A duty to prevent, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004). On intervention, see Gary J. Bass, *Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York 2008).

¹³ Sir Michael Howard, *The Long War*, Speech at IISS Global Strategic Review Conference (Geneva 2006).

¹⁴ Sir Michael Howard, *What’s in a Name? – How to fight terrorism*, in: Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002).

networks could also exploit such weakness. Many argue that liberation movements and their onslaught against central authority contribute to the weakening of states and state institutions. Self-determination and struggles for devolution are much more dangerous if the central authorities appear too weak to resist. Typically, other concerned states could try to confront such threats. Post-9/11, the increasing readiness surfaced to interpret any self-determination movement as radical, even as a mask for terrorist activities, and thus elicit all the ramifications of the GWOT; as for instance, a call for international intervention. Obviously this would depend on the readiness of the international community and neighborhood to assist, which will ultimately be linked to interests in the region, on resources, etc. and whether there are other threats possibly emerging. The greater the security threat or the outside interest in maintaining a stable government, the higher the international readiness to assist and prop up an embattled state and its institutions – hence to resist self-determination and secession claims.

The terror attacks since September 11, 2001 in the U.S., Madrid, London, Istanbul, Indonesia and Moscow have all contributed to heightened threat perceptions and have alarmed citizens and authorities alike by putting emphasis on national and international security initiatives.

These events did increase public readiness to harbour suspicions against anything opposing governmental interests. Intelligence and special operations have thus intensified against suspected terror activists and organizations. While understandable in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks – in response to the hitherto unknown experience of catastrophic terrorism and the worst attack against U.S. territory since Pearl Harbor some sixty years earlier – the belligerent rhetoric of the Bush Administration contributed to an international aura of suspicion and intolerance. New U.S. security and defense mechanisms, subsequently adopted by other NATO members, included dramatically increased border and immigration controls, as well as selective renditions and secret abductions. This brought about an icy international perception towards the US. I would like to emphasize that on the “day after”, September 12, 2001, the entire world empathized with the United States and the victims of the heinous attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and with the heroes over Pennsylvania. Even so, the way in which the GWOT response eventually unfolded (see Guantanamo) did apparently harm international public opinion vis-à-vis the USA and contributed to general intolerance to liberation movements across the globe¹⁵. Richard A. Falk has lamented that the GWOT has reduced the acceptability of dissent or critique of official policies, especially in the United States. In such a climate, it could happen that any critique of governmental policies was easily accused to be unpatriotic or even anti-American in the US¹⁶. Such possible U.S. denunciations have also encouraged many governments elsewhere to use terrorism as a pretext for intensified and

¹⁵ Especially after the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo and at Abu Ghraib became known. See the Pew Research Centre Surveys 2003 onwards.

¹⁶ *Richard A. Falk*, *The Nation* (New York 2003).

oppressive tactics against anyone suspected of instigating liberation movements. The exploitation of the GWOT and related and expected actions have been used by allies not only to silence domestic opposition and to muzzle unwelcome criticism, but also to endear oneself to the Bush Administration, to be seen as a loyal ally as well as in hopes of economic or other rewards. Moreover, allies may have shied away from permitting opposition activities to take place due to the fear that it would be seen as weakness of their state's authority or worse: as anti-Americanism, which could cause a negative relationship with Washington that would be detrimental to commercial and/or strategic relations. It is important to note, however, that after U.S. President Barack Obama took office in 2009, both the United States and the UK government under Prime Minister Gordon Brown have stopped using the term "Global War on Terror".

In the eyes of some, the GWOT has obtained a kind of self-fulfilling dynamic: in its fight against terrorism, some of its actions may actually cause further radicalization and lead to additional terrorism. This in turn demands a more extensive fight against terrorism and more resources. One could hence even discover a certain self-serving automatism, especially if claiming that any potential terrorist threat avails to politicians the opportunity to ask for ever more financial and other resources; which invites an expanded threat evaluation. Very few, if any, politicians would dare to point to the possible mutually reinforcing escalatory spiral¹⁷.

In recent years, non-state actors and the Internet are becoming ever more important elements of self-determination struggles. As the events of 9/11 have proven, non-state actors may seriously challenge even the most powerful actors in global affairs, using antiquated, yet widely available, means (e.g., knives) and civil instruments (airplanes, trains) to commit catastrophic acts of terrorism. This demonstrates the difficulty to stop any determined terrorist ready to commit suicide. Dangerous liaisons between organized crime and terrorists are possible – it is not unavoidable that such links also encompass liberation movements. Non-state actors such as organized crime and criminal transnational networks have demonstrated the ability to cooperate on a global scale, to exploit globalization, and to utilize discontent among suppressed populations and communities for their cause¹⁸. Many of them have used failed or fragile states as their base of operation. Obviously this enhances the chance that liberation movements receive also support from such networks; see for instance in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. In fragile or failed states, central authorities exert little or no control. Large-scale international smuggling and illegal trade with drugs, arms, alcohol and cigarettes, or precious metals and minerals has enhanced the dependence on these networks for financial support. Involvement in large-scale cyber crime schemes could be the next significant source of funding. Rogue governments elsewhere may be involved as well. In a globally interconnected world, it is possible that liberation move-

¹⁷ *Ian Lustick*, *Trapped in the War on Terror* (Philadelphia 2006).

¹⁸ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2001/2002* (London 2002) 5.

ments build upon support from all kinds of sources. Many people originally called freedom fighters have under these new circumstances become labeled terrorists and their respective organizations terrorist organizations/networks – rather than the liberation movements of the past. Nevertheless, it might well be that terror networks see interaction with radical elements of traditional liberation movements. All this has certainly contributed also to the intensification of state security operations and the readiness of key international actors to widen the definition of “terrorist” and intensify the fight against suspect elements. The U.S. Department of State has considerably enlarged its list of suspected terror organizations as a consequence.

Self-determination, Geopolitics and Great Power Politics

Multiple self-determination problems, with potentially disastrous consequences, are looming. Many are either intractable or continue to remain ignored, as in Africa and Latin America. Highly prominent while seemingly irreconcilable self-determination issues include the following: the problems in Belgium between the Flemish and Walloons; Cyprus; South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus; Kashmir; the Caspian Sea area; and the Kurdish issue. Other simmering crises include Indonesia; the Uyghurs and Tibetans in China; and the newly prominent push for more rights for the Azeris and Kurds in Iran or for the Baluchis in Pakistan¹⁹. In addition, one must not forget the most complicated and seemingly unsolvable problem of all: the situation concerning the Palestinians and the future of Jerusalem. In some cases, the communities concerned simply want to end their suffering and perceived suppression by secession and independence. However, in addition to such internal communal motivations, certain outside powers may have an interest in fomenting aspirations for self-determination and secession in order to instill unrest and instability or to cause the transformation of a particular regime or state²⁰. In this way, self-determination and its aspirations become a tool to fulfill the geostrategic objectives of major global actors.

With the advent of the *Responsibility to Protect*, the readiness of the international community to get involved in self-determination crises in order to avoid bloodshed and assist those oppressed – i.e., intervention to protect individuals from flagrant violations of fundamental human rights – increased at the expense of traditional notions of state sovereignty. Global public opinion has contributed to that. Nevertheless, several examples demonstrate that *realpolitik* considerations and national interests of great powers still dominate. For example, compare the international response to Kosovo and Chechnya. Both provinces were situated

¹⁹ Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq: The Way to Go, in: The New York Times Book Review, Volume 54, Number 13 (August 16, 2007); Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran (New York 2006) 60–61.

²⁰ See reports about U.S. \$75 million earmarked for Iranian opposition groups – also to enhance self-determination ideas amongst Kurds and Azeris in Iran. See LISD Report on Iran (2007) www.princeton.edu/lisd.

within the sovereign territory of a state – Yugoslavia and Russia, respectively. In both cases, serious and widescale violations of human rights took place. British Prime Minister Tony Blair raised standards on human rights and a morally acceptable conduct of internal affairs during the Kosovo Crisis of 1998–1999. He found that certain legal and moral-ethical standards warranted NATO's operations against Belgrade. The case of Chechnya, a situation comparable to the Kosovo crisis in terms of sovereignty and conduct by central authorities, has brought about a completely different international reaction: namely, none. Clearly, *realpolitik* considerations – that is, great power interest – drove international actors to inaction in order to remain friendly to President Putin and to Russia. Several dimensions may have played a role, certainly Russia's energy resources and wealth of other raw materials, its nuclear arsenal, and its position as a veto-wielding permanent member in the UN Security Council. So while the international community took forceful steps, including NATO air operations on European territory, to stop human rights violations in the Balkans, no such actions were undertaken to protect the Chechens. Incidentally, the delivery of the secret ICTY indictments to Yugoslav President Milosevic and his wife, and to Yugoslav Vice President Milutinovic and his wife might have been of critical impact to end the Serbian fighting in Kosovo. In 2008, under the direction of the U.S., Western champions declared Kosovo independent *sui generis* – to that day, however, Kosovo still has not been recognized by all 191 states²¹. While this was a unique case of self-determination that should not set any precedent, the case of Kosovo did just that. Russia was quick to counter with support of its own self-determination *sui generis* in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This emphasizes the role of self-determination in spheres of influence and great power politics²².

These cases demonstrate that the treatment of self-determination claims and self-determination crises by the international community can be fundamentally different depending greatly on how the projected outcome fits great power interests. As discussed above, the George W. Bush Administration brought about a critical change in approaches to self-determination following the 9/11 attacks. Suddenly, all those who strove for self-determination and have been engaged in struggles for liberation became termed “terrorists” by their respective central authorities, largely because these governments hoped for benefits from the United States if they engaged in expected behavior and supported initiatives during the Global War on Terror. Already in the late 1990s, Slobodan Milosevic, then President of Serbia and Montenegro and facing severe domestic challenges, called the Kosovars who were struggling against repression “terrorists” and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a “terrorist organization”²³. Indonesian leaders referred

²¹ *Recognition* is one of the Critical “R”-Words of Self-Determination – such as: *Reconciliation, Reintegration, Regionalization*. See Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Annotated Alphabet for Self-Determination and Crisis-Diplomacy, LISD-Paper (Princeton 2008).

²² See Uriel Abulof, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Two Rights Make a Wrong – Self Determination Revisited, LISD Commentary, www.princeton.edu/lisd (March 2009).

²³ Milosevic, however, was later compared to Saddam Hussein and attracted the wrath of the

to the East Timorese in similar terms. Russian President Putin followed suit around that time, comparing Moscow's operations against Chechen fighters to a war against terrorists. Putin used this language to establish a relationship with the new Bush Administration and to deflect the international outcry about the Russian brutality employed against the Chechens. The actions of these governments show *realpolitik* considerations to be the dominant overriding factor in squelching self-determination movements. The Chinese government has on several occasions acted with force against "what it considers to be the religious extremist, separatist, and terrorist activities of Uighurs – a Turkic-speaking, Muslim ethnic group primarily residing in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region"²⁴. It was easy for Beijing to represent this as being part of its own campaign against terrorism, as it was indeed very much in sync with the Bush Administration's own policy.

Now, in marked difference to earlier times, the United States and many of its allies have altered their previous and frequently unqualified support for particular groups of "freedom fighters" – such as the international support that the KLA enjoyed in their armed operations against Serb suppression²⁵. Then, there still existed – in the words of William C. Wohlforth – a unipolar moment in the international system in which American hegemony was active and effective and at play. In the late 1990s, Washington's policy towards certain regions like Kosovo has been to try to resolve particular issues as soon as possible by supporting self-determination, secession or independence. This strategy might ignore the tremendous signalling power of such an action – i.e., the potential enticement for communities elsewhere who compare themselves with the Kosovars, thus expecting equally favorable treatment by the leading power. The Kurds and peoples in the region from the Black Sea eastward could be other cases in point. Peter Galbraith argued for self-determination and secession as a possible avenue to settle the problem of the Kurds in Iraq²⁶. Superficially appearing to be an innovative solution, such a proposal typically ignores the enormous regional ramifications a possible sovereign Kurdistan independent of Iraq would have. Just imagine the reactions from Turkey and Iran and their intent for *revanchism*. Strategies to fix complex and intricate ethnic problems perhaps can suggest quick and seemingly simple solutions in a particular case; however, these may cause long-term negative and destabilizing ramifications with high costs in the region and could further compli-

international community; he was perceived to be too close to Europe's center to be permitted to 'get away' with his repressive politics (see *Madeleine Albright*, Madame Secretary [New York 2003] 378–407).

²⁴ *Ed Shin*, Islam with Chinese Characteristics: A Case Study of the Uyghurs and the Hui, Research Paper, Program on Religion, Diplomacy, and International Relations, LISD (Princeton University 2009).

²⁵ *Michael W. Doyle*, *Stephen Holmes*, Arm the K.L.A., The New York Times, op-ed. (May 25, 1999).

²⁶ *Peter W. Galbraith*, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (New York 2007).

cate problems elsewhere via copycat ambitions. It is important to try to find a solution that takes into account the local, communal, national and regional dimensions, and manages to contribute to longer-term stability, peace and prosperity. Less is many times more – and the region as a whole has to be considered. Redefining boundaries will hardly accomplish this, since such an action always can lead to *revanchism* and instability for years to come. It is often the case that regional integration and multiple identities can offer an answer²⁷.

It is not clear how soon change can occur with regard to these transformations of the meaning of self-determination; nor is it clear whether and when the United States will again begin to distinguish, and to convince others to distinguish, between liberation and self-determination movements on the one hand and terrorist organizations on the other. Anti-Americanism still abounds in many – especially Muslim – parts of the world. Even since President Obama's election, significant anti-American feelings remain. While American support of a certain group's self-governance causes would have created support and positive reactions from other states as well during the Cold War, this may cause the opposite effect post-2004. Such an observation re-introduces the antagonistic dimensions of the geopolitical power balance, this time combined with major concerns about values and religious-cultural aspects, as well as the rising economic influence of other powers like Brazil, India, China, and a struggling Russia (the BRIC states). The notions of ideologies and cultural-religious beliefs and traditions have found their way back into the international discourse, thus affecting arguments for land, liberty and basic human rights. A community certainly has the option to ignore or counter policy suggestions received from the West because of their Western (Judeo-Christian) origins. There is a propensity to criticize these as "Americanisms" and relate them to supposed interests of American hegemony or Western dominance. (It could be important, however, to examine the base of these perceptions and see how they could be altered.) I assume this is a consequence – although hopefully only of limited duration – of the GWOT, which many have come to perceive as a conflict against the Islamic World primarily condoned by the U.S. and its allies. While the state has an obligation to combat terrorism in order to protect innocent civilians from harm, methods like torture, illegal abductions, or extraordinary renditions seem not only to enhance antagonism, but also cause further radicalization against those who employ such methods. In addition, these methods contradict the very values on which the United States of America and its Constitution have been built. I also believe that information received from interrogations under torture is untrustworthy; moreover, many courts and legal systems constitute such information to be invalid.

Perhaps due to the wavering of global U.S. leadership and the "uncertain" appeal of American power at the beginning of the third millennium, the inter-

²⁷ Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Kosovo's Independence – Limit its potentially devastating effects by offering EU membership to Kosovo and Serbia, LISD Commentary (March 2008) http://www.princeton.edu/lisd/commentary_archive.html.

national balance of power has shifted, such that one could say the world is out of balance: indeed, it is becoming increasingly multi-polar and not necessarily more stable, while seeing new actors and new forms of interaction like the Internet and social networks. Thus, according to the realist perspective, the struggle for power and influence has become more crucial. The international system is perceived by many as being in imbalance, and many actors will look for change in that system, which they believe could be to their advantage. These actors also include non-state actors, which can operate independently from constraints that the state-members of the international system face²⁸. As Gilpin stated: perception, prestige and reputation are the main means with which that great power competition is conducted during peacetime. I would add economic prowess and diplomatic capabilities. The potentially increased frequency in balance of power struggles can also mean that self-determination might be used as a tool for great power politics – for example, to achieve or prevent regime change or regime transformation in certain states in order to serve the great powers' geopolitical interests.

The case of Kosovo's independence, more specifically the debate about its international recognition, demonstrated the significant difference in opinions within the EU and between the U.S., Russia and China. The perceived relative decline of the U.S. and the ascendance of the BRIC states while the U.S. remains the leading military superpower in the international system, plus the resulting multi-polarity of the world are contributing to the process of creating an emerging order that potentially alters the framework and the options for those who strive for self-determination. On the one hand, there is no longer a strong pole or force whose opinion and strength decisively counts (which supports liberation movements and which has the willingness and capability to project its power towards achieving lasting change). On the other hand, this deficiency invites other actors, including non-state actors, to exploit instabilities, imbalances, discontent and potential to their benefit. Such misguided perceptions and evaluations tend to contribute to calamities. Therefore, while those interested in aspiring to self-determination may expect greater support, they may also be more easily caught in a web of geopolitical tensions, contradicting interests, and consequently become the playground of others' interests – from major states and minor powers to corporations, and to transnational (also criminal or terrorist) networks. If the leading powers are not willing to differentiate between legitimate independence movements and criminal or terror activities, and cannot agree on general principles for stability and predictability, or if international organizations are incapable to establish them, then there will be ample potential for crisis and instability in the years to come. The international system will become much more volatile.

²⁸ William C. Wohlforth with Stephen G. Brooks, *World Out of Balance: International Relations Theory and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton 2008).

Self-Determination and Globalization

Technological progress and information disseminated by globalization have caused change. They are combined with increased education and personal mobility. This has also affected and improved the status of women in many places in the world. However, the question arises whether these changes will be gradual or become near-revolutionary. I personally witnessed in Afghanistan that while millions of cell phones are in use, many parts of the country still lack roads, railroads, electricity and running water. One can also find there extensive use of computers and the Internet – via satellite dishes and power generators – in a country that is emerging from nearly thirty years of conflict and ranks among the very poorest in today's world. The use of such sophisticated technology today in an otherwise archaic society certainly represents not a gradual change, but rather a revolutionary transformation, hurdling over generations of expected societal development. It is a generational phenomenon, as it profoundly affects the youth – it is also them who actually promote that rapid development. This jump in communications technology and westernization is however prone to produce backlash²⁹.

Some benefits of increased globalization include the distribution of knowledge, ideas and information. On the negative side, globalization fosters the influence of detrimental ideas in crises allowing escalation, which obviously affects those striving for self-determination. In economic terms, globalization reduces the costs of interaction; it transfers know-how and labor; it connects markets; it promotes economies of scale through the international division of labor and through specialization; and it permits the involvement of the masses in the international economic system. Globalization also reduces geographical distances; affects the factors of time and costs; offers new products, flavours, experiences, or simply a wider variety of goods and services for the consumer as well as a wider range of activities and operations for the supplier. However, many challenges also stem from this more open and interconnected market. Globalization changes perceptions (in terms of a “global village”, virtual world, the interpersonal “imminence” of real-time, and constant connection) via the possibility to communicate instantaneously, interactively and globally at any time under any climatic conditions. It also has ramifications for education and information, health, the environment and socio-economic development, and thus for values, customs, religious beliefs and even national identity. National identity can become both challenged and strengthened by globalization. Identity can be enhanced by the adaptation and incorporation of elements of other cultures into traditional national identities³⁰. Nevertheless, communities clearly can be defensive and closed against foreign influence. In its ideal form, successful and universal globalization may render self-

²⁹ It is seen by many (particularly the Taliban) as a revolutionary unsettling of traditional values; hence this jump produces tensions and may well produce a backlash. This was the reason behind the many attacks on the Cell phone transmitter towers 2008/09. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that Kabul was quite advanced in the 1970s.

³⁰ See *Anthony Appiah*, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (Norton 2006).

determination unnecessary or at least disconnect it from its state-shattering character, since each and any one community would be able to be a member of that global village. This will emphasize another meaning of self-determination: to define one's destiny.

Globalization can and will have many meanings for self-determination: it can be a state of affairs or a condition within which struggles occur; it can rapidly inflame or defuse the situation by its reciprocal effects among countries or among actors of different countries; and it can empower diasporas, enhance their influence, and provide linkages via trans-border flows of people, capital, goods, services, information and ideas. Technological progress – information technology and real-time interactive communications – not only can generate support for those trying to achieve self-determination, but also may serve as an instrument to fight it. It invites suppression by the central authorities. Even for reticent individuals who oppose the challenge to their values, technological advances can offer welcome tools to achieve their ends. Alas, technology has also greatly advanced and distributed the know-how and information about highly capable weapon systems³¹. Remotely piloted vehicles, RPV, drones, URV, and robotic weapons have entered the battlefield and have overcome hitherto unthinkable distances – such as the conduct of operations in Western South Asia from a military base in Florida. Arguably, they can assist outside involvement in any developing (self-determination) crisis from afar and renders interference in crises on behalf of any party much easier. Local politics and grievances thus become even more global. This technological leap for some great powers, however, also accentuates the distinction between the “haves” and the “have nots”.

Technological progress and globalization have obviously also augmented the capabilities of diasporas to influence local self-determination struggles from far away. Through the shrinking of distances, heightened information and increased public involvement, domestic policy has often become pitted against foreign policy interests. The Internet has played and will play an ever more intensive and critically important role. On the one hand, it serves to mobilize international public opinion and to enhance outside awareness and support. The use of the Internet also highlights the generational dimension in self-determination crises, since the younger generation works, uses and is affected by the Internet. On the other, it can be used as a new means to attack state authorities and institutions, websites, etc. – for example, through cyber warfare – or to address citizens and local communities. Cyber technology and related security operations add an entirely new dimension. Obviously much of today's information travels, is accessed and supplied via the internet. On the other hand, much critical information, for security,

³¹ It was known that during the Bosnian wars ca 1994 Karadjic et al. tried to acquire a nuclear device for decisive strike. Today there is great concern about possible bacteriological or chemical weapons used by terror organizations and the possible manufacturing of “dirty weapons”. It is in the realm of the thinkable that in future self-determination conflicts these systems could be deployed and even used.

economy, health, administration is stored in electronic devices – hence they are becoming important: both to have, maintain, and defend them, or to harm and destroy them in case of crisis. The cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Estonia stand out and also Georgia/South Ossetia has become a warning example. In each of these cases, the Internet was employed both as an instrument to mobilize international public opinion, create attention, and hopefully assistance; while it also served as a medium for attack; foreign authorities or also non-state actors (e.g., foreign operators as in the case of Georgia) carry out attacks against websites and computer systems – even against state institutions like ministries and financial authorities – in the respective target state or community³². Related social websites like Facebook and Twitter have been occasionally forced to shut down in such crises due to cyber attacks.

On a more general level, the key effects of globalization can be discerned in seven central themes. I call them the “Seven G’s” of globalization: *God, Gold, Gender, Generation, Governance, Google and Geography*:

“**God**” – Through world religions and so called hybrid religions, religious information is increasingly being circulated in new and different ways. Strict types of religious organizations have been and are being formed; their activities, teachings and experiences are more turbulent and get more scrutiny than they would have in the past, as religions have exchange with and challenge each other in this era of globalization. Modern communications technology permits religious leaders to reach everyone, all the time, everywhere and in an interconnected setting.

This theme also encompasses the issue of values that are dear and critical to the historic, current and future life of a community. The perception of the security of one’s culture is currently being challenged in an unprecedented way: there is a widespread fear of Americanization – much of what was seen in the past as Westernization. Today, other cultures are disenchanted with the idea of uniformity in the style of Starbucks, Big Macs, Coca Cola, Levi’s, Nike, etc. and in the prevalence of Judeo-Christian thinking and interpretations. It appears that identities have been or are being changed, albeit perhaps more in certain religions than in others. This struggle between values has created a dichotomy that has come to reinforce national – and, in some cases, religious – identity. This may be especially true with Islam, where religious belief is part of every aspect of life, as opposed to new “soft” religions in the U.S. and Asia. The problem of intra-religious tensions – for instance, between the Shia and Sunni communities – could affect the character and intensity of new dimensions of self-determination problems in the Middle East and beyond. It is surprising how such intra-religious antagonisms can fully overshadow the traditional competition between the three monotheist religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. But already the very bloody and destructive battles between Catholics and Protestants during reformation and counter-reformation offered proof for the intransigence of such fratricide wars. Ob-

³² Lawrence Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, in: Adelphi Paper 318 (1998).

viously, self-determination crises where such inter-religious dimensions do play a role are highly prone to escalate and also draw in engaged outside powers. It is upon the regional and international community to undertake anything in anticipatory fashion to lower the crisis potential.

“Gold” – Commerce is certainly a main beneficiary of globalization, not only through market access, cheaper products and profit, but also through exploitation of cheaper production sites. However, the latter can bring about unemployment and economic insecurity in certain areas. Greed is a prevalent and negative aspect of globalization. Money and resources affect self-determination movements from their inception to the final execution of secession and independence. Corporations can be key actors in international relations, and corporations can have key interests in self-determination issues.

“Gender” – As globalization has largely encouraged the active participation of women in the public sphere, it can serve as an “equalizer” of the sexes and has increased international attention on women rights. It offers more unbiased information and challenges sexist misrepresentations, and so can serve the “women’s cause”. Women indeed have become much more involved in politics. The exchange of ideas, information and access to information has certainly assisted their public role, impact and exposure in many societies all over the world. Globalization permits them to interact between cultures and continents, and to build networks. The mother-child relationship has attained a new meaning in our time, not the least with social networks and real, true personal interconnection. Their impact on crises – both their development and management – has proven to be substantial. The role of “mothers” against conflicts, as in Chechnya and in Kosovo, was magnified by the use of the Internet and achieved global prominence.

“Generation” – The youth today are more mobilized, motivated, influenced, informed, interconnected and educated than ever before. They are the ones benefiting most from individual empowerment. For the young ones, that empowerment is key. The youth are often key actors directly involved in conflicts – increasingly also in the armour, and are the first to fight for the future of their community. In many states they now represent up to 65% of the entire population. They are also the first to explore the technological possibilities that allow individuals to partake in global interdependence. Modern youth have grown up with easy access to more sophisticated communications technology and ever more miniaturized instruments that permit them to reach a near global audience. Their life is penetrated by technology – in schools, medicine, the workplace, and new social media. Their influence on communal, national and global politics has never been greater and rises via non-state actors and networks. Obviously, this especially impacts those countries with predominantly young populations and high birth rates.

“Governance” – Governance deals with matters in daily life that are relevant for the community, the sub-state, or the state. They can comprise law and order, security, education and culture, health, fiscal matters, currency and custom. This is all relevant for self-governance. Governance also represents all those aspects from legitimization to leadership, to effective implementation of governing decisions

and administration. In the words of Count de Maistre, “Any people has the government it merits.” Elsewhere, I have argued that maximized self-governance and regional integration can serve as an instrument to avoid secession, independence and classical sovereignty while offering maximal autonomy to the community. In many situations, this could offer an ideal – and cost-effective – situation for a community that looks for greater independence from the central authority and/or other communities within the state territory without establishing full independence. It requires the readiness to accept multiple identities, but it also avoids redrawing boundaries. The national constitution is of critical importance to find a solution based on law and transparency that proves acceptable to all involved. Intensive participation in global integration may actually diminish the appeal of traditional statehood.

“Google” stands for information, communication, the internet as such. The offer of increased citizens’ access to media and information: both to learn and consume, but also to participate and supply; to report their stories to Governance represents also all those aspects from legitimation to leadership, to effective implementation of governing decisions and administration. We have witnessed this in countless crises: What previously went on unreported for weeks suddenly captured headlines once it entered the internet and citizens were able to offer the news and discussions, and submit messages and videos of the violence and upheaval to media sources such as Al Jazeera via YouTube, which is owned by Google. Obviously this raises a key question: the difference between those who can access the internet and use Google, receive information and participate in the exchange, and those who cannot. It heightens the role of non-state actors and focuses on the power and determination of the individual actor.

“Geography” addresses dimensions of distance, topography, and climate; as well as the dictum “we can change everything – except geography”. Globalization (combined with modern technologies) certainly makes them less relevant. Wherever I am: whether in Zermatt, Switzerland or in Zimbabwe, Africa, I can still participate in the globalization process, and if I am equipped with the appropriate technologies, can do so interactive in real-time. These technologies also assist to redress climatic impediments and inclements – however only to a certain degree. Major changes in climate and their effects on sea levels and glaciers, however can provide for new challenges – entire habitations as in coastal or alpine areas, and lines of communications, can be altered.

Summary

Tensions exist in the current international system between three competing concepts: the generally-acknowledged tendency of globalization towards the creation of a global village with integration and real-time interaction which emphatically shrinks geographical distance; augmented individual empowerment; and the

volume of trade in goods and services. Modern technological capabilities, widespread distribution of information, access to the Internet, better education, and increased awareness and protection of human rights have fostered individual empowerment by permitting the individual citizen of any community – as long as she/he has access to the Internet – to communicate with whomever, wherever and whenever, and to be interactive in real-time on a near-global scale. This has also led to the increased mobilization of women and youth – as can be seen in the participation of ever-more actors below the age of 20. Individual empowerment fosters the democratization of local, regional and foreign relations, as it offers the individual or group to exert direct as well as indirect (i.e., via outside interlocutors) influence. Obviously this benefits those non-governmental organizations and non-state actors whose reach and immediate impact is hitherto unrivalled and will continue to increase. Clearly, individual empowerment and the influence of communities can be seen as key elements of contemporary global interdependence. Globalization also fosters the community's search for greater identity and, hence, self-determination. There exists an inherent tension between globalization and communal identity. In many critical parts this will be accentuated by lingering ("frozen") conflicts reflecting self-determination issues.

The role of non-state actors can add another complicating dimension to the relationship between central authority and community. Arguably, these forces are changing also the relevance of sovereignty, and hence the meaning of the state in the 21st century. The role of the state is presently exposed to challenges from below – the community – and from above – the incentive for regionalization. In the global village – beyond state boundaries, mobility, the exchange of information, and trading of goods and services via the Internet – the state seems much less relevant. While the state or the central authority may provide certain services and disaster assurance, non-state actors can take on its tasks and it no longer seems to represent the one and most important objective for a community or the most relevant condition to participate in the world³³.

In our era of globalization, identity and nationalism remain potent factors as well; indeed many societies and communities see the need to resist the intrusion of certain aspects of globalization; we see an increasing desire to defend communal core values and identity against the intrusions "from outside", such as "Western" (or Judeo-Christian) consumer culture, materialism and over-technologization. Anticipatory solutions should permit ways for a community to fulfill its aspirations of greater self-governance without conflict, bloodshed and destruction, while guaranteeing equal rights, justice and prosperity to the others. It seems that the acceptance of multiple identities and security guarantees could contribute to such a solution, while also permitting continued participation in globalization. Whereas the politics of the GWOT have largely subsided, continued defensiveness vis-à-vis self-determination is still prevalent in China, Russia, Turkey and Spain. Such defensive actions can also circumvent and eventually hamper globali-

³³ See *Prince Hans-Adam II*, *The State in the Third Millennium* (Liechtenstein 2009).

zation. They certainly can cause crises. *Plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose* – self-determination obviously continues to maintain much of its appeal for communities as it represents freedom and liberty; while it retains its dangerous image as a possible cause for tensions, conflict and the destruction of states. Anticipatory policies – such as multiple identities, education, regional integration, and transnational cooperation – should assist to reduce the appeal of state-shattering self-determination on the part of the communities, and consequently diminish the concept's threatening image for central authorities. In the macro regions of a more just and prosperous, globalized and integrated world, the state-shattering dimension of self-determination should ideally become ever less relevant.

Selected Bibliography

- Beitz, Charles R.*, Political theory and international relations (Princeton 1999).
- Buchanan, Allen E.*, Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for international law (Oxford, New York 2004).
- Buchheit, Lee C.*, Secession: the legitimacy of self-determination (New Haven, Conn. 1978).
- Calhoun, Craig*, Nationalism and Ethnicity, in: Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1) (1993) 211–239.
- Carol, C. Gould*, Self-Determination beyond Sovereignty: Relating Transnational Democracy to Local Autonomy, in: Journal of Social Philosophy 37 (1) (2006) 44–60.
- Carr, Edward Hallett*, The future of nations; independence or interdependence? (London 1941).
- Cassese, Antonio*, Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal (Cambridge, New York 1995).
- Castellino, Joshua*, International law and self-determination: the interplay of the politics of territorial possession with formulations of post-colonial national identity (The Hague, Boston 2000).
- Clapham, Christopher S.*, Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival (Cambridge, New York 1996).
- Cobban, Alfred*, The nation state and national self-determination (New York 1970).
- Cohen, Lenard J.*, and *Dragovic-Soso, Jasna* (eds.), State collapse in South-Eastern Europe: new perspectives on Yugoslavia's disintegration (West Lafayette, Ind. 2008).
- Connor, Walker*, Democracy and National Self-Determination: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. In Empire & terror: nationalism/postnationalism in the new millennium, ed. by *B. Aretxaga* (Reno 2005).
- Conti, Erika*, The Referendum For Self-Determination: Is It Still A Solution? The Never Ending Dispute Over Western Sahara, in: African Journal of International and Comparative Law 16 (2) (2008) 178–196.
- Coulthard, Glen S.*, Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the "Politics of Recognition" in Canada, in: Cont. Pol. Theory 6 (4) (2007) 437–460.
- Crawford, James*, The creation of states in international law (Oxford, New York 2006).
- Dahbour, Omar*, Illusion of the peoples: a critique of national self-determination (Lanham, Md. 2003).
- Danspeckgruber, Wolfgang*, Self-Governance Plus Regional Integration: A Solution to Self-Determination or Secession Claims in the Emerging International System; Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Boston Aug 28, 2002) http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65628_index.html.

- Danspeckgruber, Wolfgang*, Self-determination, Self-governance, and Security, in: *International Relations* Vol 15, No. 11 (2000).
- Danspeckgruber, Wolfgang*, The self-determination of peoples: community, nation, and state in an interdependent world (Boulder 2002).
- Danspeckgruber, Wolfgang*, Self-determination and self-administration: a sourcebook (Boulder 1997).
- de Beer, F. C.*, Exercise in futility or dawn of Afrikaner self-determination: an exploratory ethno-historical investigation of Orania, in: *Anthropology Southern Africa* 29 (3/4) (2006) 105–114.
- De-Shalit, Avner*, National Self-determination: Political, not Cultural, in: *Political Studies* 44 (5) (1996) 906–920.
- Eastvold, Jonathan C.*, Toward a Unified Theory of Self-Determination, in: *American Political Science Association* (Philadelphia 2003).
- Emerson, Rupert*, From empire to nation; the rise to self-assertion of Asian and African peoples (Cambridge 1960).
- Etzioni, Amitai*, The Evils of Self-Determination, in: *Foreign Policy* (89) (1992) 21–35.
- Freeman, Michael*, The right to self-determination in international politics: six theories in search of a policy, in: *Review of International Studies* 25 (03) (2000) 355–370.
- Grygiel, Jakub*, The Power of Statelessness: The withering appeal of governing, in: *Policy Review* 154 (2009).
- Halperin, Morton H., Scheffer, David and Small, Patricia L.*, Self-determination in the new world order (Washington, D.C. 1992).
- Hannum, Hurst*, Autonomy, sovereignty, and self-determination: the accommodation of conflicting rights (Rev. ed. Philadelphia 1996).
- Hannum, Hurst, and Babbitt, Eileen* (eds.), *Negotiating self-determination* (Lanham 2006).
- Hasani, E.*, *Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and International Stability: The Case of Yugoslavia*. (Vienna 2001) Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management, National Peace Academy.
- Heater, Derek Benjamin*. *National self-determination: Woodrow Wilson and his legacy* (New York 1994).
- Henrard, Kristin, Smis, Stefaan*, Recent Experiences in South Africa and Ethiopia to Accommodate Cultural Diversity: A Regained Interest in the Right of Self-Determination, in: *Journal of African Law* 44 (1) (2000) 17–51.
- Hughes, James*, *Chechnya: from nationalism to jihad* (Philadelphia 2007).
- Kohn, Hans*, The United Nations and National Self-Determination, in: *The Review of Politics* 20 (4) (1958) 526–545.
- Linklater, Andrew*, The transformation of political community: ethical foundations of the Post-Westphalian era (Columbia 1998).
- Lynch, Allen*, Woodrow Wilson and the principle of ‘national self-determination’: a reconsideration, in: *Review of International Studies* 28 (02) (2002) 419–436.
- Macedo, Stephen and Buchanan, Allen E.* (eds.), *Secession and self-determination* (New York 2003).
- Manela, Erez*, *The Wilsonian moment: self-determination and the international origins of anticolonial nationalism* (Oxford, New York 2007).
- May, Stephen, Modood, Tariq and Squires, Judith* (eds.), *Ethnicity, nationalism and minority rights* (Cambridge, New York 2004).
- McWhinney, Edward*, *Self-determination of peoples and plural-ethnic states in contemporary international law: failed states, nation-building and the alternative, federal option* (Leiden, Boston 2007).
- Moore, Margaret*, On National Self-determination, in: *Political Studies* 45 (5) (1997) 900–913.
- Moore, Margaret* (ed.), *National self-determination and secession* (Oxford, New York 1998).

- Moynihan, Daniel P.*, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in international politics* (London 1993).
- Musgrave, Thomas D.*, *Self-determination and national minorities* (New York 1997).
- Neuberger, Benyamin*, National Self-Determination: A Theoretical Discussion, in: *Nationalities Papers* 29 (3) (2001) 391–418.
- Philpott, Daniel*, *Revolutions in sovereignty: how ideas shaped modern international relations* (Princeton, N.J. 2001).
- Rehman, Javaid and Breau, Susan Carolyn*, *Religion, human rights and international law: a critical examination of Islamic state practices* (Leiden, Boston 2007).
- Rosecrance, Richard N.*, and *Stein, Arthur A.*, *No more states?: globalization, national self-determination, and terrorism* (Lanham, Md. 2006).
- Roshwald, Aviel*, *The endurance of nationalism: ancient roots and modern dilemmas* (Cambridge 2006).
- Roudometof, Victor* (ed.), *Collective memory, national identity, and ethnic conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian question* (Westport, Conn. 2002).
- Snyder, Jack L.*, *From voting to violence: democratization and nationalist conflict* (New York 2000).
- Sorensen, Georg*, After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Liberal Values, in: *Security Dialogue* 38 (3) (2007) 357–378.
- Tilly, Charles*, National self-determination as a problem for all of us, in: *Daedalus* 122 (3) (1993) 29–36.
- Weller, M.*, and *Wolff, Stefan*, *Autonomy, self-governance, and conflict resolution: innovative approaches to institutional design in divided societies* (New York 2005).
- Whelan, Anthony*, Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement, in: *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 43 (1) (1994) 99–115.
- Willens, Howard P.*, and *Siemer, Deanne C.*, *National security and self-determination: United States policy in Micronesia (1961–1972)* (Westport, Conn. 2000).
- Woolsey, Theodore S.*, Self-Determination, in: *The American Journal of International Law* 13 (2) (1919) 302–305.