5 Settling Authority

Sichuanese Farmers in Early Twentieth-Century Eastern Tibet

Scott Relyea

Abstract

From 1907 to 1911, some 4000 commoners from Sichuan ventured west. Enticed by promises of large tracts of uncultivated land, they ascended the Tibetan Plateau seeking new lives – and new benefits for a changing Sichuan Province and Qing polity. Their presence was both the result of and a response to intensifying competition for authority within eastern Tibet between the provincial government and Lhasa, and perceived regional pressures from British India and Imperial Russia. Using Kham as a case study, this chapter explores the role such state-supported settlement played in the consolidation of rule within a state's borderlands and the relationship between shifting conceptions of territoriality within a globalizing structure of international law as substantiation for asserting sovereignty.

Keywords: borderlands, colonization, Kham, Qing China, Republican China, sovereignty

民安、國富，必自無曠土無游民始，以是謂中國不可一日緩者。

Bringing peace to the people and enriching the state must begin from having no empty lands and no idle people. This is a goal which attainment China cannot delay for a single day.

– *Zhao Erxun (1909)*¹

¹ Zhao Erxun 543 Roll 70, Record 361 (1909: XT1): QA.

Introduction

For more than two centuries, strict central policy officially prevented or restricted emigration from the Qing polity's core provinces into borderland regions spanning the empire's southwest to its northeast and Taiwan.² Yet by the final decades of Qing rule, these regulations began to ease. This prompted neighbouring provinces to encourage its beleaguered commoners to escape overcrowding and settle these regions, at times even providing material support to ensure both their successful cultivation of new lands and the concomitant expansion of imperial tax rolls – as well as their continued loyalty to Qing rule. By the last third of the nineteenth century, in Mongolia and Manchuria, in Taiwan (before 1895) and in Xinjiang, imperial subsidies supported the journey from *neidi* of many a commoner and his family, providing seeds, tools, even initial tax abatement for reclaiming distant 'wastelands'. Pursuing promises of new opportunities and a fresh start, these settlers by venturing into the empire's borderlands contributed to Qing responses to newly emerging pressures on imperial rule in regions at the edge of its authority which manifest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Much of the literature on Qing era settlement beyond China proper (Perdue 2005, Teng 2004, Millward 1998, Lee 1970, Reardon-Anderson 2005) explores the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when a majority of official 'settlers' were soldiers tasked with defending expanded imperial borders and maintaining stable Qing rule in newly acquired territory, such as Xinjiang. During that era, border defense was focused predominately inward, concerned less with repelling external incursion than co-opting local indigenous rulers and forestalling challenges to Qing rule, all while attempting to achieve self-sufficiency through farming. As the nineteenth century unfolded, intensifying demographic pressures in China proper converged with the view that commoner farmers better supported the goals of self-sufficiency to shift official policy toward borderland settlement, just as the increasing intensity of Russian and Japanese imperialism across Qing territory from Xinjiang to Manchuria added a new dimension to its role in the outward focus of border defense (Lan 1999, Lee 1970). Contributing to

2 The Qing polity's core comprises the eighteen provinces commonly called 'China proper' in historical literature and designated *neidi* ('inner lands') by Qing officials, merchants, and soldiers in contrast to contiguous territory 'beyond the passes', administered by the *Lifanyuan* (Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces). In relation to Kham, those traveling west of Dartsedo were said to *chuguan* ('cross the pass'), i.e. leave *neidi*.

scholarship on the processes and goals of settlement in China's borderlands, this chapter explores the connection between state-sponsored settlement and this new dimension manifest in late Qing and early Republican deployment of international law rhetoric and the concept of sovereignty to counter the territorial ambitions of neighbouring imperialist powers.

By the first years of the twentieth century, settlers ascended the Kham region of eastern Tibet, much of which stood within the western boundary of Sichuan Province. But unlike those of the previous 150 years who ventured only as far as the eastern edges of Kham (Lawson 2017, Dai 2009), these commoners traversed high mountain passes to settle deep in the valleys of Kham. The presence of these later settlers was both the result of and a response to intensifying competition for authority within eastern Kham between the provincial government and Lhasa, and perceived regional pressures from British India and Imperial Russia. At the time, Kham was on the cusp of political and economic change. Since the placement of a stele in a pass through the Ningjing Mountains (Tib. Bumla) in 1727, the region's western half fell under the direct administration of the Ganden Phodrang in Lhasa, its eastern half nominally under the jurisdiction of Sichuan Province (see map 5.1). Rather than integrated into Sichuan's territorial bureaucracy, however, the myriad polities east of the stele were administered indirectly via indigenous, lay rulers invested with *tusi* titles who received corresponding seals from the Qing Emperor. While Sichuan officials focused on exerting temporal authority over the territory and inhabitants of Kham largely through these invested *tusi*, Lhasa projected its spiritual authority on Khampa society via monasteries, both Gelukpa and less so those of other Tibetan Buddhist schools, all of which often held sway over local lay rulers. The resulting bifurcated structure of competing authority persisted in Kham until the turn of the twentieth century.

Before this time, officials in Lhasa and Beijing – as well as in Chengdu – perceived the part of Kham situated east of the stele as little more than a periphery, an intermediate space lying between China proper and 'Tibet proper'. For the latter, the region provided but a conduit, the southern (or officials') road, which tethered Lhasa to the Qing Court via Chengdu; for the former, the region epitomized its toponym as a space 'to be defended or to be made civilized' (Buffetrille, this volume), evinced by Ganden Phodrang actions in eastern Kham both at the end of the seventeenth and in the mid-nineteenth centuries. Yet by the turn of the twentieth century, new regional challenges – both internal and external – converged with the transformative influence of newly globalizing statecraft norms to render continuation of a bifurcated structure of shared, sometimes ambiguous

Map 5.1 Map showing 1727 stele and the main trade road through Kham. Inset: Location of Kham within the Qing Empire

Source: Based on SRTM (NASA) and modern administrative borders extracted from GADM database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 July 2015)

Authors: Rémi Chaix and Scott Relyea

authority untenable (Relyea 2015b). Once peripheral, Kham thus became central to the Qing-Tibetan, and later Sino-Tibetan relationship. Exploring the nature of internal and regional confrontations, both real and imagined, and the ramifications of late Qing policies in a borderland such as Kham is equally central to understanding the structural and conceptual origins of the Chinese state and its relationship with Tibetan regions.

In the decade spanning the Qing Dynasty's last years and the first years of the Republic of China (R.O.C.), from roughly 1904 to 1914, a reorientation in both the constitution of and expectations for the settlement of Kham manifest as a consequence of these regional and global stimuli, serving as the impetus for China's assertion of sovereignty on the Tibetan plateau under international law. Using Kham as a case study, this chapter explores the role state-supported settlement plays in the expansion into and consolidation of rule within a state's borderlands and the relationship between shifting conceptions of the territoriality norm within a globalizing structure of international law and such settlement as substantiation for asserting sovereignty. The following discussion focuses on the constitution, results, and rhetoric surrounding

a multi-faceted endeavour implemented in Kham in the midst of China's tumultuous transition from imperial to state form. This culminates with the subsequent role the endeavour played in negotiations at the Simla Convention (1913-1914), convened by representatives of the British, Tibetan, and Republican Chinese governments to determine the territorial extent of R.O.C. sovereignty on the Tibetan Plateau (McGranahan 2003a; Goldstein 1993, 68-75).

Colonizing Kham, supporting the migration of 'idle' commoners from the overcrowded Sichuan Basin to reclaim vast, presumably 'empty' wastelands, was one component of the endeavour initiated by the first Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner Zhao Erfeng to incorporate the region into Sichuan province. The ramifications of this endeavour demonstrate the transformative influence on conceptions of authority in borderlands between empires and between states wrought by the influence of European-forged statecraft norms expanding across the globe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The indigenization of two such norms – territoriality and sovereignty – by Sichuanese and Tibetan gentry and officials reoriented centuries-old imperial Chinese frontier policy and the conduits through which Lhasa exerted influence in regions of the plateau beyond its administrative reach.

The implicit emphasis of these norms on exerting authority over territory not simply through its rulers, rather more effectively through its inhabitants shifted the goals of settlement within Kham and fostered a new external goal. Rather than despatching soldier-farmers as colonists, Sichuan officials turned to recruiting and supporting non-military commoners whose presence would serve to strengthen exertion of exclusive authority internally.³ This settlement in Kham was then deployed to legitimize first Qing and later Republican government assertion of sovereignty externally – to Lhasa, to regional competitors, and to the global community. This represented the external manifestation of a plan proposed by Sichuan Governor-general Lu Chuanlin in the last years of the nineteenth century to exert 'sufficient control' in Kham – and through it Tibet. Both goals were implicated in Zhao's explicit comparison of his multi-faceted endeavour, of which settlement was its cornerstone, with four diverse models of colonialism – England in Australia, France in Madagascar, the United States in the Philippines, and Japan in Hokkaido.⁴ Zhao's first appeal for settlers circulated three

3 In the next chapter, Mark Frank explores a similar focus on recruiting commoners, now citizens, under a Republican Chinese government which used Xikang Province as a laboratory for a Han Chinese form of agrarian nationalism.

4 'Chuandian bianwu shiyi jun guanjin yao...' (The Importance of Sichuan Yunnan Frontier Matters...) (1907: GX33.6.11). In Wu Fengpei (1984, 48).

years before his older brother and Sichuan Governor-general Zhao Erxun submitted a memorial, from which this chapter's epigraph is drawn, asserting that such settlement would strengthen the Qing state. Commoner settlers from the Sichuan basin, and thus largely Han, served a dual role in Zhao Erfeng's endeavour in Kham, first as loyal subjects, later citizens, reclaiming 'wastelands' and expanding taxable land; and second, as models of 'civilization' supporting the efforts of Zhao and his successors to undermine Lhasa's competing authority by acculturating the region's indigenous inhabitants, the Khampas.

In exploring the manifestation of these new external goals for borderland settlement and the reorientation of its inner constitution, this chapter focuses primarily on the first role. Section one briefly introduces the imperial policy of establishing military agricultural colonies in Kham and other borderlands across the Qing Empire, then surveys a shift beginning in the late nineteenth century toward opening such borderlands to settlement by commoners from *neidi*. At the turn of the century, a new conception of Kham emerging among Sichuan officials and gentry, influenced by the newly globalizing statecraft norms, fostered a parallel shift in the constitution of settlement in Kham toward actively recruiting and supporting commoners. The next section details great expectations and misperceptions underlying these settlement efforts and the concomitant establishment of experimental farms in eastern Kham initiated by Zhao and his predecessors. The final section turns west of the stele to analyse the relationship between the settlement endeavour, territorial authority, and Chinese assertions of sovereignty over Kham from the last year of Qing rule through the first years of the Republic of China.

This turn away from an earlier focus on rulers as conduits of authority over territory to the role of commoners as settlers in early twentieth-century Kham is epitomized by Zhao Erxun's exhortation to fill China's 'empty' lands with once-'idle' people. Built on Lu's proposal to exert 'sufficient control' in the borderland, this shift manifests in the settlement component of Zhao Erfeng's multi-faceted endeavour and its deployment at the Simla Convention as partial substantiation for Republican China's appeal to the international law principle of 'effective occupation' in asserting sovereignty over the entirety of Kham.

Shifting Borderland Settlement

In 1896, conflict erupted between the rulers of two Kham polities, the *chikhyap* (Commissioner) of Nyarong, who had been appointed directly by the Ganden Phodrang, and the King of Chakla, who held the Qing-invested

title *xuanwei shisi* (Pacification Commissioner). The Governor-general of Sichuan at the time, Lu Chuanlin, seized the opportunity to initiate a transformation in the nature of governance in eastern Kham. Lu's first acts were to implement *gaitu guiliu* (bureaucratization), a long-standing imperial frontier policy, in two small polities north of Nyarong, Hor Trehor and Hor Drango, in which governance the *chikhyap* had meddled. Under this policy, indigenous rulers were deposed and replaced by civil officials appointed by the Qing Court, and their polities were incorporated into the *junxian* system of direct imperial administration, the Qing territorial bureaucracy. Lu also established a military agricultural colony (*tuntian*) in the two polities (*Luhuo'er zhi* 2000, 7-8; Coales 1917, 203).⁵ The following year, a succession dispute between two brothers vying to succeed their father, the King of Dergé, in which the *chikhyap* had also meddled, provided a further opportunity for Lu to enforce his vision of Qing authority and stability not only in Kham, but also across the entirety of the Tibetan Plateau.⁶

Following the Nyarong *chikhyap*'s hasty flight to Lhasa in the face of Lu's soldiers in 1896, and the imprisonment of the feuding Dergé brothers in Chengdu in 1897, Lu memorialized the Qing Court for permission to implement *gaitu guiliu* and also establish new military agricultural colonies in both Nyarong and Dergé. At the time, Sichuan gentry perceived that Kham and Tibet together formed a fence protecting the province from external encroachment. Responding to their fears for perceived threat to the stability of the fence from British India and Imperial Russia, Lu's goals for bureaucratization were three-fold. By removing the *chikhyap* and ceasing his persistent meddling in the affairs of neighbouring Kham polities, Lu sought to stabilize Qing temporal authority in eastern Kham as a demonstration of imperial power to an 'obstinate' Dalai Lama, who would then be compelled to accept once again the oversight of the Amban (Qing Imperial Resident) in Lhasa. That acceptance, Lu asserted, would further encourage the Dalai Lama to abandon his apparently deepening relationship with the Russians, perceived as groomed by the Buryat monk Agvan Dorjiev (Kuleshov 1996). Concerned that such provocative actions would instead anger the Dalai Lama, driving him closer to Imperial Russia, the Qing Court rejected Lu's proposals, ordering the *chikhyap* and all deposed *tusi* reinstated.

Though thwarted, and rotated to a new post the following year, Lu continued to advocate bureaucratization and colonization in Kham, compiling

5 The colony, which lasted into the early twentieth century, was known as Luhuo Tun.

6 For background on Lu's efforts in Nyarong and Dergé, see Wang (2009). On the origins of the *chikhyap* in Nyarong, see Tsomu (2014, Chapter 7).

his Nyarong memorials and related writings into a book published in 1900. Its preface reflects the influence of both international law and the two globalizing norms of statecraft. Referring to the regional goals of his proposed actions in Kham, he wrote, 'If we can sufficiently control Tibet, then England will be willing to acknowledge that Tibet is under our control. Under international law, states do not invade each other, thus we can use this to repel Russia'⁷ (Lu 1900, 5). Lu asserted that regional powers would be dissuaded from interfering in Tibet only by demonstration of direct Qing authority in Tibetan territory, and thus over the Dalai Lama, effected by implementation of his proposals. For Lu, establishing 'sufficient control' over the territory of Kham encompassed both the exertion of direct authority through imperial officials rather than *tusi*, and, by establishing colonies, the exertion of authority over the territory also through settlement. Lu's memorials, and later his book, contributed to a gradual shift in conceptions of the Kham borderland among Sichuan officials and gentry from an inert, two-dimensional protective fence, administered only indirectly, to a potentially fertile and productive three-dimensional territory, a storehouse of natural resources of value to Sichuan and the Qing (Relyea 2015a). This paralleled a shift earlier in the nineteenth century in conceptions of the globalizing norm territoriality from a focus solely on boundaries to what happened within those boundaries (Maier 2006, 41-46). This shift was at the core of the definition of 'effective occupation', introduced in Article 35 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), by which European empires legitimized their colonial claims in West Africa, and manifest in R.O.C. justification for its claim to sovereignty over Kham at the Simla Convention.

The likely models for Lu's settlement proposals were five military agricultural colonies established in 1776 in Gyelrong, at the eastern edge of Kham, following Qing victory in the second Jinchuan War. Such military agricultural colonies, ideally self-sufficient garrisons of soldier-farmers, can be traced to the Han dynasty during the second century B.C.E. (Yu 1986) The most common imperially-sponsored and supported form of settlement in borderland regions until the last decades of Qing rule, these colonies were often established in the aftermath of imperial intervention in the affairs of indigenous rulers to either suppress local rebellion or forcefully mediate a succession dispute. They were established both in polities which indigenous rulers had been recently replaced through bureaucratization and in polities

7 On the relationship between sufficient control and Lu's understanding of international law, see Relyea (2017).

where such rulers remained in power, presumably restrained by imperially-invested titles (Gong 1997). Their self-sufficiency depended on opening or reclaiming wastelands, a process generally styled *kaiken*, which encompassed the transformation of 'empty', uninhabited space into cultivable land which harvests would provide food for the entire garrison. Yet soldier-farmers alone were often unable to achieve self-sufficiency. Instead, they relied either on indigenous farms or on fields cultivated by commoner settlers for additional foodstuffs. For example, by the early nineteenth century, in addition to a complement of roughly 2500 soldiers, more than 5000 households of farmers from *neidi* settled near the five Gyelrong colonies. All had received imperial support including initial travel expenses, a house, 30 *mu* of land (roughly 4.5 acres), seed, and farm implements. Their presence proved essential not only to feeding the garrison, but also to maintaining stability across the region and providing a 'civilizing' influence for the indigenous population (Zeng 2016; Xu 1995).

Such settlement by non-military subjects from imperial China's core regions has an equally long history, mostly spontaneous and sometimes initiated with imperial support, both of which continued into the Republican-era as Mark Frank discusses in the next chapter. Of the former, commoners emigrated to escape warfare, natural disasters, or overcrowding in their home districts and to find arable land to cultivate and begin their lives anew, to escape taxation or imperial authority, even to flee from a criminal past. Yet the growing presence of settlers in borderland regions often prompted the institutions of imperial governance to follow, sometimes to protect indigenous inhabitants from the rapaciousness of settlers, but more often to return these immigrants and their newly acquired lands to the imperial tax rolls. Both settlers and imperial Chinese governments alike were also drawn by the discovery of bountiful natural resources in some corners of the borderlands, the latter ultimately extending its authority through bureaucratization. This occurred most successfully during the Ming dynasty in the region which would become Guizhou Province in 1413, and in the southward expansion of Yunnan Province to absorb Sipsongpanna in the early eighteenth century under the Qing dynasty (Herman 2007, Shin 2006, Giersch 2006, Yang 2008).

Sending non-military settlers to the borderlands with imperial support, often to supplement the food production of soldier-farmers in frontier garrisons, as in Gyelrong, also dates to the early Han dynasty. In 169 B.C.E., Chao Cuo proposed a policy loosely known as *yimin shibian*, 'settle people to support the border'. Under this policy, settlers, initially convicts, exiles, and slaves, were despatched to the fringes of imperial territory, provided

with housing and farm implements, and assigned land to reclaim in order to provide sustenance for locally garrisoned soldiers. Chao asserted that the happiness and success of these first settlers would entice the poor commoners of *neidi* to follow them, thereby providing more food for the garrison and further strengthening both stability and imperial authority along its frontiers (Chang 2007, 18–21; Gong 1997, 66). Despatching commoners to open wastelands in support of military agricultural colonies established in the northern and northwestern borderlands of the early Han dynasty was a response to the persistent threat of Xiongnu incursion into imperial territory. Similarly, Lu's proposals for Kham some two millennia later were prompted by concern among Sichuan officials and gentry that Imperial Russia sought to expand its 'Great Game' of territorial conquest with British India onto the Tibetan Plateau. Yet the implications of this later threat were different.

The details of Chao's proposals to strengthen the borderlands through colonization resonate especially in the components of Zhao Erfeng's settlement endeavour, as well as in the content of his appeals to the commoners of Sichuan. Yet by the early twentieth century, regional circumstances had changed. The emergence of powerful, more capable competitors to Qing authority in Central Asia and especially on the Tibetan Plateau converged with the transformative influence of newly globalizing norms of statecraft to structure his actions and contribute to Lu's conception of sufficient control. Together, these stimuli reoriented the constitution and goals of settlement in imperial borderlands such as Kham. Attaining regional acknowledgment of exclusive and unchallenged Qing authority over the borderland necessitated demonstrating the exertion of exclusive authority over its inhabitants in all facets of life within a clearly delimited territory, thus fulfilling the parameters of sovereignty as defined by international law texts introduced to China in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Svarverud 2007). Around the same time, an evolving conception of Kham as a region with plentiful open land and bountiful natural resources seemed to mirror conditions which had stimulated independent emigration of Han commoners into Guizhou and Sipsongpanna, and the subsequent extension of Qing authority through bureaucratization. The geological difference between these regions and Kham notwithstanding – especially the latter's altitude – this apparent parallel may have contributed to Zhao Erfeng's great expectations for a flood of Sichuanese answering his call for settlers.

More than military garrisons, the presence of numerous commoners from *neidi* in the Kham borderland promised to further demonstrate sufficient control and strengthen the exertion of exclusive authority in two ways. First, by colonizing the borderland with loyal imperial subjects, who would serve

as models of that loyalty for the indigenous inhabitants, both the geographic reach and legitimacy of Qing authority would be expanded. Second, these settlers would also serve as models of civilization, reinforcing policies focused on acculturating the Khampas as a means to undermine Lhasa's exertion of competing authority on Kham society via local monasteries. Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour, and especially his emphasis on recruiting commoners rather than establishing the military agricultural colonies initially proposed by Lu, evinces a shift away from exerting authority over the territory and people of the borderland only through rulers or garrisons to a geographically wider conception of authority exerted through the loyalty of all its inhabitants.

Similar efforts to demonstrate expanded territorial authority and forestall potential external encroachment by encouraging borderland settlement manifest in regions across the empire in the last few decades of the nineteenth century, most notably in Taiwan and Manchuria. Officially, migration from the former Ming territory into the Manchu homeland beyond the Willow Palisade had been banned from the earliest years of the Qing dynasty, but periodic imperial ambivalence, settler ingenuity, and Manchu landlords seeking income resulted in a small population of agricultural settlers, both legal and illegal, cultivating lands particularly along the Liao and Yitong Rivers (Reardon-Anderson 2000, 515). Yet as land use across Manchuria remained sparse and the population small, especially in regions abutting the border with Imperial Russia established by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), the latter's eastward expansion in the nineteenth century, itself influenced by globalizing norms, endangered Qing authority over these open spaces. Consequently, in 1860, the ban on Chinese migration was rescinded, allowing an influx of agricultural settlers to bolster the scattered banner garrisons and older settlements in hopes of deterring Russia's looming territorial ambitions (Reardon-Anderson 2000, 516; Hunt 1973, 8-9).

In the empire's southeast, a more immediate territorial threat unfolded in 1874 as Japanese soldiers briefly occupied a corner of southeast Taiwan in retribution for the slaughter of marooned Ryukyuan sailors by a group of aborigines three years earlier. Despite this aggressive act, the real challenge to Qing authority on the island arose in negotiations. Asserting that the 'savage' region of Taiwan's east coast lay beyond Qing jurisdiction, the Qing initially refused to pay reparations to Japan for the sailors' slaughter, both in its immediate aftermath and following the Japanese incursion. Further negotiations compelled the Qing to pay the indemnity and also acknowledge Japanese sovereignty over its once-tributary, the Ryukyu Kingdom, in exchange for recognition of Chinese sovereignty, this time over

the entire island of Taiwan (Stern 1979, Chapter 4; Gordon 2007, Chapters 4-5). The Court and local officials on Taiwan then focused on transforming this assertion of sovereignty into a demonstration of their substantive exertion of authority throughout the island. As in Manchuria before and Kham after, commoners as settlers were central to the effort.

After the Qing seized control of Taiwan in 1683, only males were allowed to emigrate to the island, but immigration surged in 1786 when the island was opened also to family members of these prior immigrants. Finally, in 1860 all restrictions were lifted except the prohibition against settlement east of the 'savage boundary', running roughly along Taiwan's central mountain range⁸ (Chen 1999, 135-136; Roy 2003, 22-24). In a direct response to Japan's earlier challenge to Qing authority east of the boundary, Shen Baozhen initiated a policy of 'Opening the Mountains and Pacifying the Savages' (*kaishan fufan*). This policy paralleled both the shift in conceptions of the Kham borderland prompted by discovery of its presumed natural resource wealth and the dual role of Han settlers in Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour. Government-supported establishment of farming villages in eastern Taiwan was intended both to demonstrate exclusive authority through occupation of the once-disputed region and to provide models of 'civilization' to bolster acculturation of the indigenous community (Teng 2004, 211-215; Chang 2008, 18-21). Emigration and acculturation would thus foster a loyal population as further demonstration of authority.

In both Manchuria and Taiwan, the government enticed the commoners of *neidi* to cross barriers to settle presumably empty, but potentially fertile wastelands ripe for reclamation and conversion to productive agriculture, but these were regions with a history of illicit Han settlement. By contrast, the terrain beyond the Dartsedo barrier had rarely attracted settlers from Sichuan or elsewhere to its east. The plateau was high, the climate inhospitable, and the journey arduous. Demonstrating authority in the context of the globalizing norms was thus more challenging – but as the nineteenth century closed, also more pressing.

'No empty lands'

In Kham, as well as Manchuria and Taiwan, settlement was only one component of the local effort to exert exclusive, unchallenged internal

8 On the origins of the 'savage boundary' and debates regarding its continuation, see Chang (2008).

authority as substantiation for Qing assertion of sovereignty to regional competitors and the global community. In addition to bureaucratization, Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour also encompassed the opening of schools, the expansion of mining to exploit natural resources, the establishment of manufacturing and other industries, the expansion of local and export-oriented commerce, and the integration of the land and its products, animal, vegetable, and mineral, into the territory and economy of Sichuan. Roughly a year after detailing these components for the Qing Court, however, Zhao acknowledged that settlement was the cornerstone of his efforts. 'In my humble opinion', he wrote in 1908, 'to manage the whole of Tibet, it is most appropriate to give priority to colonization (*zhimin*)' (No. 0167 (1908: GX34.5.24) QCBDS, 186-187).

Settling Kham with Han commoners provided crucial support for Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour. While each component contributed to the effort to sever Lhasa's competing, spiritual authority on Kham society, acculturative policies centred on compulsory schooling in Confucianism, nationalism, and a range of 'civilizing' subjects for Khampa children and young adults most directly challenged that authority. In addition to their anticipated numbers, the presence of these commoners in Kham as models of loyalty and 'civilization' was expected to reinforce this acculturation and bolster the effort to transform the Khampas into Qing subjects and later Chinese citizens. To demonstrate exclusive authority in the borderland and thus fulfil the parameters of sovereignty externally, it was essential that both the territory and the people inhabiting that territory were perceived as integral to Sichuan and the Qing as a whole. These new goals for settlement were epitomized by Zhao Erxun's assertion that China's prosperity and stability depended on having 'no empty lands and no idle people'.

By the early twentieth century, vast stretches of level terrain across Kham remained uncultivated. Yet with the region's southern reaches stretched across six mountain ranges and four river valleys, none of the latter below 2000 metres in altitude, and its northern, more level reaches encompassing grasslands towering some 4,000 metres above sea level, how much of this land was suitable for reclamation by potential settlers from the Sichuan Basin? In an initial report from early 1904, Wu Xizhen, the Commissary Official in Bathang, site of the first, limited effort to reclaim wastelands in eastern Kham, identified some 4610 *mu* (roughly 700 acres) of potentially fertile, but uncultivated land at four sites near Bathang town. Several months later, Wu reported another 28,500 *mu* (roughly 4,300 acres) of potential wasteland further afield, at several sites in neighbouring polities. Wu proposed recruiting some 100 settlers from *neidi* to reclaim and cultivate

these lands, but under mild imperial pressure for speedy results instead reassigned more than a quarter of the Bathang garrison's 83 soldiers to full-time agricultural work. By mid-year, 300 *mu* had been reclaimed at three sites near Bathang, and of that only 70 *mu* were under crop, mostly buckwheat⁹ (Mei 1934, 220-223; No. 0010 (1904: GX34.5) QCBDS, 11-14). With much of the best and most fertile land already under Khampa cultivation, the only spaces left for possible reclamation lay further up the slopes of the mountains surrounding the valley, where the soil was rockier and irrigation more difficult.

These first, tentative steps laying the groundwork for the introduction of predominately Han settlers from *neidi* to cultivate crops alongside Khampas in the fertile Bathang Valley were taken only after careful negotiations with both the junior and senior *depa* (governor) of Bathang and the *khenpo* (abbot) of Ba Chöde Monastery. Despite persistent reservations from Khampa monk and layman alike, reclamation proceeded without incident until the arrival in late 1904 of Fengquan, the newly-appointed Assistant Amban to Tibet.¹⁰ After four ambitious – and contentious – months in the valley, an uprising forced him to flee. Roughly a week earlier, Alexander Hosie, the British Consul at Chengdu, had described Fengquan as 'headstrong', writing, '[I]t is evident that his plans must create serious disturbances, unless the Chinese garrisons in east Tibet are strengthened' (FO 228/2571, D1, 13, NA). Those plans included the expansion and acceleration of land reclamation. Soon after his arrival, Fengquan identified another five to six thousand *mu* of Bathang land suitable for immediate reclamation, planning to despatch as many as 300 soldiers to locations across the polity to bring roughly 1,000 *mu* of land under cultivation annually (No. 0025, QCBDS, 38-39). As these wastelands newly designated for reclamation encroached on land controlled by the monastery, threatening its income and the harvests of Khampa farmers, when the effort began in earnest during the first months of 1905, they responded with violence.¹¹ During a negotiated retreat from Bathang, Fengquan was ambushed and slaughtered in a narrow pass called the Parrot's Beak (Yingge zui) on the road to Chengdu just south of town.

9 See also 'Huiyi Batang liangyuan bing zun ban kenwu bing ni zhangcheng ying zhun zhaoban xiang wen' (Discussion of the Batang Commissary's Report on Reclamation, his Proposed Regulations, and Allowing Him to Pursue Them), *Sichuan guanbao* 20 (1904: GX30.8.10): 8a-9b.

10 As Assistant Amban, Fengquan was posted to Chamdo, northwest of the stele, but soon after arriving in Bathang, he memorialized the throne for permission to remain there for at least part of the year. Though ordered to proceed to Chamdo forthwith, he remained in Bathang.

11 It should be noted that other grievances against Fengquan contributed to the rebellion, but his land reclamation effort was perhaps the most visible catalyst.

In the aftermath of Qing reprisals for this 'uprising', Zhao Erfeng assumed the newly created post of Frontier Commissioner, establishing his base in Bathang. Though initially tasked only with reconstituting Qing garrisons across Kham, in early 1907 he advanced an even more ambitious plan than his predecessors for the reclamation of wastelands throughout the Bathang Valley, as well as in other polities across Kham. Like Wu, Zhao sought to entice the commoners of Sichuan to ascend the plateau, but unlike his predecessor, Zhao would neither settle for reassigning his soldiers to the task nor expected this would be necessary. Believing that fertile, unused land was plentiful in Bathang and across eastern Kham, as were 'idle' farmers in the overpopulated Sichuan Basin, he ordered 50,000 blank title deeds printed in Chengdu and shipped to Bathang in anticipation of an avalanche of settlers (He 2001, 43; 'Lubian jin xin' 1906, 1a). In the immediate aftermath of his soldiers' brutal pacification of Qicungou, the Gully of Seven Villages situated some 50 kilometres up the valley from Bathang town, in late 1905, many farmhouses and fields indeed lay abandoned, their Khampa occupants either driven out or slaughtered. But those who survived returned and the fields were again cultivated by Khampas as the region calmed in the wake of Zhao Erfeng's subsequent departure for Chaktreng and later Chengdu with the bulk of his soldiers. This again left only the rocky, unproductive plots initially reclaimed under Wu available for settlement in Qicungou.¹² Nevertheless, Zhao's first appeal for settlers emphasized the plight of the average Sichuan farmer, vast tracts of uncultivated land, and the potential to forge a better life in the higher, greener fields of Kham.

Written in vernacular Chinese (*baihua*), the 1300-character proclamation was posted outside local Yamen and other government buildings in every hamlet, village, and district across Sichuan in the last days of 1906, and published in *Sichuan guanbao* the following month. Zhao Erfeng opened with a sympathetic tone, conveying his awareness of the plight of the average Sichuan farmer. 'Knowing that you Sichuanese are many yet land is limited, and that your lives are difficult, I have taken it upon myself to find some better places for you to cultivate'. He contrasted the hardships in an over-populated Sichuan with the benefits awaiting both married and unmarried settlers in Kham, assuring them that life was more economical than in *neidi*. For those settlers without families, he proclaimed that 'the women of this land [are] numerous and the men few, the women industrious and the men lazy. If you take a local maiden as your wife, she might very

12 No. 0362 (1909: XT1.7.28) QCBDS, 404-405; No. 0356 (1909: XT1.7.18) QCBDS, 398-400; Edgar 1908, 44-45; L/P+S/20/87-2, IOR; MssEur F157/304C, 6, IOR.

well be able to assist in the work, carrying water, cooking food, hoeing the ground, and cutting firewood' ('Qinchai duban chuandian bianwu dachen Zhao zhao ken baihua gaoshi' 1907, 2a-b).

Beyond potential free labour – and companionship – commoners were promised generous material incentives, both assistance for the arduous journey and support once they reached their designated settlements ('Bianwu dachen zisong guanwai kenwu zhanxing zhangcheng' 1910, 7a-8b). They received travelling expenses in the amount of one silver *qian*, the equivalent of one tenth of a *tael*, per day for each adult and half that for each child younger than twelve years of age, and food was provided throughout the journey. On arrival, each settler was provided with cattle and farm implements for ploughing, seeds for planting, and additional daily food rations during at least the first year and until such time that their land produced sufficient harvest both to feed him and any accompanying family members. After three or four years, settlers were expected to begin reimbursing the government for its investment. And once the entirety of the loan had been repaid, each settler would receive one of the 50,000 deeds of ownership guaranteeing the right to farm the land in perpetuity – and the duty to pay land taxes equal to those assessed in *neidi*.¹³

In principle, each settler sent to Kham satisfied stringent requirements, detailed in Zhao Erfeng's first appeal, though in practice it is uncertain how many in fact did. And due to the considerable investment – Zhao had set aside the initial sum of 60,000 *taels* to support the settlements – each settler was required to provide his local magistrate satisfactory assurance that he would not turn back before reaching his final destination. Keenly aware that the success of the endeavour would depend greatly on the quality and ability of the settlers, Zhao sought only those commoners who were strong and healthy, no more than 30 years of age, and smoked no opium. They should also have committed no crimes and belonged to a noble and honest family. Thus, in addition to being capable workers and farmers, expanding tax income for the provincial treasury, these settlers were expected to fulfil dual roles in Kham. As loyal subjects, grateful for the Emperor's – and the Commissioner's – benevolence, each settler and his farm, perhaps unwittingly, provided regional demonstration of the Qing's exclusive territorial authority in the borderland. They also served as excellent models of 'civilization', their

13 Though deeded in perpetuity, the settler's rights ended with farming as the state still owned the land, which he was expressly forbidden from buying or selling. If the settler were either unable to adhere to the terms of the agreement or fell ill without an heir, the land would revert to government ownership.

presence in borderland communities reinforcing the acculturation of the Khampas by both modelling morality and the 'proper' way of life, including the demonstration of 'proper' agriculture.

Zhao Erfeng was surprised to discover that the Khampa farmers knew nothing of fertilizer and continued to use wooden ploughs, which were less efficient than the iron ploughs of *neidi*, implying that the addition of such implements and the knowledge and experience of Sichuan's farmers would render their surprisingly good harvests magnificent ('Qinchai duban chuanbian bianwu dachen Zhao zhao ken baihua gaoshi' 1907, 2a-b). Wu Xizhen, based on his prior experience in Bathang, held a much dimmer view of Khampa farmers, advising, 'We should make distinctions when recruiting. Since the Khampas are foolish and ignorant of agriculture, it is absolutely necessary to recruit men from *neidi*' ('Weiguan Batang liangwu tongzhi Wu Xizhen kaiban kenwu liu tiao qing zhe' 1906, 4b). Though disproved by green Khampa fields carpeting the Bathang Valley, and the fertile lands in other districts, this flawed perception was part of the conceit of Han gentry and central Qing officials toward societies at the fringes of imperial territory – and 'civilization'. Official memorials and opinion pieces published in newspapers from Sichuan and elsewhere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries persistently characterized both Tibetans and Khampas as either 'simple-minded and muddle-headed' (*hunhun'e'e*) or 'ignorant and uncivilized' (*mengmei*). More than the Khampas' presumed poor agricultural skills – or knowledge of fertilizer – it was the inextricable link between rice cultivation and 'civilization' which fostered perceptions of them as incapable farmers, because they did not cultivate 'proper' crops, as further discussed by Mark Frank in his chapter.

In addition to his benevolent desire to elevate the agricultural skills of the Khampas, Zhao Erfeng also understood that future settlers from the Sichuan Basin would not easily adapt to a diet of *tsampa* and yak meat, requiring instead pork, rice, and familiar vegetables. He thus brought agricultural specialists to Kham, two from Japan and several more from Sichuan, to oversee the reclamation of wastelands, assist settlers in irrigation and planting, improve the productivity of Khampa fields and teach them to diversify their crops (He 2001, 43). In 1910, two experimental farms were established, the Batang Farming Test Field (*Batang nongye shiyan chang*) and the Dengke Farmers Test Field (*Dengke nongmin shiyan chang*), the latter situated in Dergé to Bathang's north. Precursors of the experimental fields set up by the Xikang Provincial Bureau of Agricultural Improvement (Frank, this volume), these farms tested the viability of growing vegetables and grains introduced from *neidi* and around the world, including several

varieties of wheat, maize, potatoes, soybeans, rapeseed, beans, and squashes, as well as walnuts, tangerines, and pears.

Both farms also required local headman to send one Khampa from each community to study the cultivation of new crops. They were then expected to disseminate both these new methods and new seeds to their neighbours. Similarly, Zhao reportedly required Khampa farmers to attend lectures on new agricultural methods presented sporadically in primary schools then opening across Kham. Despite Wu's earlier caution regarding indigenous agricultural skill, the Dengke farm also worked in tandem with the Farming Improvement Institute (*Nongshi gailiang suo*) to extend to destitute Khampas the same terms offered to settlers from *neidi*: the loan of farm implements and seeds repayable in full after an initial three- to four-year period of supported cultivation. Pastoral nomads inhabiting the northern plains of Kham were not forgotten in the effort to 'civilize' agriculture as an Animal Husbandry School (*Xumu xuexiao*) was also established in Dengke with eight heads of dairy cows from Holland and 24 dairy goats from Australia joining donkeys and horses from Shaanxi.¹⁴

The observations of two missionaries, however, suggest that these experimental farms were largely a failure.¹⁵ On separate visits to Lithang in 1910, both the American missionary J.H. Edgar and the French diplomat Pierre-Rémi Bons d'Anty observed spinach, lettuce, carrots, turnips, potatoes, and two kinds of cabbage growing within a sheltered experimental nursery similar to the experimental farms further west. All were well fertilized with manure, but 'hopelessly stunted'. In fact, the Chinese official tending the nursery seemed 'astonished' by the suggestion that such crops might not flourish at Lithang's 4000 metres altitude. According to local Chinese, the turnips and lettuce from the nursery, though selling for ten times the normal price, were fit only for pigs. Perhaps also due to its altitude, though lower at roughly 2700 metres, several rice fields in the Bathang Valley observed by Bons d'Anty at first seemed to flourish, but never matured. Rice may have been the most difficult cereal to cultivate in Kham, yet also the most essential to ensure the success of the settlement endeavour. Thus, when Zhao's armies encountered a new region west of the stele standing a mere 2300 metres above sea level with a history of rice cultivation, it became the focus of his third and final appeal for settlers, discussed in the next section.

14 No. 0583 (1910: XT2.4.23) QCBDS, 640-642; No. 0771 (1911: XT3.2.10) QCBDS, 860-861; No. 0786 (1911: XT3.2) QCBDS, 888; He 2001, 43.

15 L/P+S/20/87-2, IOR; FO 228/2573 D13, NA.

Despite acknowledging the suffering of Sichuan's farmers and offering such enticements as virtually free labour and a seemingly easy-going life for the 'idle' men of Sichuan, and a new start for its families, few settlers responded to Zhao Erfeng's first appeal. Between hopeful memorials and possibly over-ambitious reports, reliable figures for early settlers are somewhat difficult to discern. Encompassing the fifteen month period from roughly April 1907 to November 1908, when Zhao posted his second, more impassioned appeal, one document suggests that a mere 141 settlers accompanied by only two dependents registered for their onward journey in Dartsedo. All but four were destined for Bathang; the rest headed for Chaktreng (Jin 1932a, 13-15). In a telegram dated only the 34th year of the Guangxu Emperor's reign, Zhao reported the division of 800 settlers, of which 370 were dependents, into groups of 200, which were then despatched to four settlement sites: Dabpa, Bathang, Hekou, and East Eluo (No. 0258 (1908: GX34) QCBDS, 278). Though larger, this second figure still fell far short of Zhao's expectations. And those who did reach their destinations may not have stayed for long. Bons d'Anty characterized the first settlements as complete failures, writing that 'Chinese colonists, discouraged, sold everything that they could to draw together money and took the road to Sichuan; many fell into deep poverty, begging at the doors of lamaseries and along the main road' (Bons d'Anty. 1908, 279-281). Zhao's second appeal took a different tack from his first, more clearly reflecting the influence of the globalizing norms of statecraft on the settlement endeavor.

Published in *Chengdu Daily* (*Chengdu ribao*) in December 1908, the appeal's rhetoric went beyond extolling the vast potential for settlers in Kham. After once again expressing his empathy for the impoverished commoner toiling in hardship on scarce land in the Sichuan Basin, Zhao Erfeng proclaimed, 'The Heavens have bestowed this colony on the poor of Sichuan and tasked them with its revival' ('Zhu Zang Chuandian Bianwu Dachen xiaoyu baixing guanwai kaiken liyi baihua gaoshi' 1908, 1b). He then tickled their nascent nationalism, challenging Sichuanese to seize their destiny on the plateau as foreigners had done across the globe:

You see, foreigners pay close attention to colonization. Their commoners also follow the same maxim, so, no matter where, they are ready to go. They need only hear of it. Whether they must traverse tens of thousands of *li*, whether they must climb mountains or cross seas, they neither see the distance as too far, nor are they afraid of danger as they strive to open wastelands. [...] You decide if this is worthy of respect or not, that

the foreigner in fearing no hardship can ensure the prosperity of his family and business.

Zhao then assured potential settlers that the ascent to Kham had been rendered considerably less arduous. 'Now the lands beyond the barrier are still Sichuan's lands. You need go little more than 10 stages beyond Dartsedo to find cultivable wastelands. This is far superior to taking your family on a journey of tens of thousands of *li*.' As new settlers would traverse widened and smoothed mountain roads, no longer sleeping in the open, instead resting in a series of newly constructed inns all serving the dishes of *neidi*, the journey was perhaps characterized as almost luxurious in comparison with the hardships endured by colonizing foreigners. As further incentive, Zhao also increased the daily stipend for travel.

In April 1909, the magistrate of Pengzhou, Zai Gengtang, posted a proclamation in honour of 97 residents who responded to this second appeal to ascend the plateau, urging others to follow in their footsteps (Jin 1932b, 15-17). Zai's proclamation echoed the appeal's tenor of nationalistic duty, a sentiment just beginning to capture the imagination of an awakening Chinese nation in the early twentieth century, though perhaps more pronounced among the gentry than the commoners targeted by Zhao Erfeng. Zai compared the settlement of Kham with internal state expansions in Europe and America, casting his residents as pioneers as great as the settlers of the American West or the Russian Far East, venturing into dangerous spaces in service to the nation. Closer to home, he also compared the endeavour with the state-sponsored settlement of the empire's northwest two decades earlier.

Whereas eighteenth-century settlement in Xinjiang had centred on recruiting commoners to join soldiers in together reclaiming wastelands in support of Qing garrisons, renewed settlement in the late nineteenth century comprised part of the Qing effort to forestall Russian territorial encroachment after the region's re-conquest in the 1870s. The arrival of new settlers contributed to demonstrating the exertion of territorial authority over the region and served as prelude to the establishment of Xinjiang Province in 1884. Similarly, rescinding the prohibition on settlement along Taiwan's eastern coast demonstrated the exertion of territorial authority both by occupying previously ignored territory beyond the 'savage boundary' and by forging a loyal population through emigration and acculturation, buttressing the formation of Taiwan Province in 1887. Fostered by this reorientation in the internal constitution of settlement first emerging at the end of the nineteenth century in Taiwan, Xinjiang, as in Manchuria, the establishment of a province further demonstrated the exertion of exclusive authority in the borderland

and substantiated the assertion of sovereignty to regional competitors and the global community.¹⁶ Indeed, further explaining his goals of stabilizing the people and enriching the state in the memorial which opened this chapter, Zhao Erxun continued, 'On discussing the policy of colonization, if we speak of these goals, it is essential to convert Tibet and Mongolia into provinces'.¹⁷ The dual role which once-idle Sichuanese settlers were to fulfil in Kham, reclaiming wasteland and reinforcing the comprehensive endeavour's acculturative challenge to Lhasa's competing, spiritual authority, laid the foundation for both the late Qing proposal to establish Xikang Province and subsequent R.O.C. territorial claims at the Simla Convention.

Coupled with the reference to a competitive nationalism in Zhao Erfeng's second appeal, demonstrating territorial authority through the settlement and cultivation of lands by presumably loyal Qing subjects from *neidi* proved especially important after Zhao's frontier army entered Dzayül in early 1910, a corner of Kham southwest of the 1727 stele. After crossing the 'boundary' ostensibly delimited by the stele in the last days of 1909, his army implemented *gaitu guiliu* in polities throughout western Kham, severing the direct administration of the Ganden Phodrang. Tenuously extending Qing authority to (Kongpo) Gyamda, within 250 kilometres of Lhasa and outside the traditional territory of Kham, this westward expansion was a concern not only to Tibetan officials, but also to the British. Among the newly created districts, Dzayül in particular offered great promise for Zhao's settlement endeavour, featuring prominently in his third appeal, but its proximity to British India also portended potential peril for the then-ambiguous northern boundary of Assam.

Extending Borderland Authority

In August 1910, just five months after his soldiers had glimpsed the vast, fertile fields of Dzayül, Zhao Erfeng circulated his third and final appeal for settlers.¹⁸ Expressing empathy this time not only for the plight of farmers in

16 Conversion into a province, the highest level in the administrative structure of both the Qing Empire and the R.O.C., signified the borderland region's unequivocal incorporation into the Qing territorial bureaucracy.

17 Zhao Erxun 543 Roll 70, Record 361 (1909: XT1), QA. Zhao's reference to Mongolia in addition to Tibet is likely influenced by proposals to carve both regions into several provinces circulating in Beijing at the time.

18 'Bianwu dachen zhao ren kaiken baihua gaoshi' 1910, 1a-2a; FO 228/2571 D19, NA; Liu 1995, 207-208.

Map 5.2 Full extent of Zhao Erfeng's bureaucratization and location of main farming settlements, with indication of Tibetan and Chinese claims at Simla Convention (1913-1914)

Sources: Based on SRTM (NASA) and modern administrative borders extracted from GADM database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 July 2015)

Authors: Rémi Chaix and Scott Relyea

the Sichuan Basin, but even more for those who had answered his previous two calls, he proclaimed the discovery of this new, more promising – and potentially more satisfying – destination. ‘Last year I despatched soldiers especially to seek lands where rice always has been sown. Now a place called Dzayül has been found not more than 10 days’ journey from Bathang. It is a wide plain where rice once had been grown and its climate resembles that of Chengdu’.

With barely a hundred Khampa families reportedly cultivating no more than one one-hundredth of its fertile and well-irrigated lands, stretching for several hundreds of *li*, Dzayül perhaps seemed to fulfil the image of ‘Eden’ painted in his first two appeals – open fields ripe for reclamation. Yet Zhao Erfeng ignored the reality that more than 1000 settlers had discovered on reaching Bathang, Chaktreng, and other initial settlements during the previous three years – that open, cultivable land was scarce. Instead, he placed the blame for their hardships – and flight back to Sichuan – squarely on the absence of rice in their plateau diet. Though this was undoubtedly

a hindrance to the success of the settlement endeavour, more detrimental were conditions such as those observed by Edgar in Chaktreng in 1910. With all fertile corners of the district densely populated by Khampas, the few Sichuan settlers inhabited the crumbling remains of Sampheling Monastery, left to cultivate only the dusty, deserted streets of the surrounding town (L/P+S/20/87-2, IOR). Despite periodic reports of newly identified wasteland for reclamation even in Chaktreng,¹⁹ before Zhao's soldiers crossed the stele, fertile land not under indigenous cultivation, and thus available to settlers, remained scarce.

Standing at an altitude of only 2300 metres, lower and more temperate than the Bathang Valley, Dzayül promised to solve both problems simultaneously. The region encompassed a reported ten million *mu* (more than 1.5 million acres) of open land awaiting settlers, and had a history of small-scale rice cultivation. Diverging from both his own and Wu Xizhen's stronger condemnation of Khampa agricultural skill, perhaps implicitly acknowledging what previous settlers had observed east of the stele, Zhao Erfeng explained that the inhabitants of Dzayül were neither lazy nor incompetent. Rather, preferring tsampa to rice, they cultivated only small crops of the latter, which they sold to Yunnanese merchants and Han residents of Chamdo and elsewhere in Tibet. With only a small, scattered population, Dzayül provided vast potential for Zhao's settlement endeavour, but also required a significant mass of settlers to demonstrate the exertion of authority across its territory, a situation not lost on British observers.

Travel expenses and the three-year term of repayment all remained the same as in previous appeals, as did Zhao's assertion that a settler needed only a little bit of hard work to change his lot in life. In addition, for the first time, those with independent capital were explicitly encouraged to hire men to collect the travel stipend and head to Dzayül essentially as tenants, carving a farm of hundreds or thousands of *mu* from the wastelands on their future landlord's behalf. Undoubtedly also aware of the questionable qualifications of previous settlers, Zhao emphasized one new requirement at the very end of his appeal, that those applying for the opportunity in Kham must be both hardworking and legitimate, experienced farmers. 'If you are evil-doers or idlers who live not by honest labour', he warned, 'I cannot extend this opportunity' ('Bianwu dachen zhao ren kaiken baihua gaoshi' 1910). Encouraged by this third appeal, and accompanying enthusiastic

19 See, for instance, No .0627. 1910 (XT2.6.6). QCBDS, 680-681. In mid-July 1910, the *weiyuan* (expectant official) in Chaktreng reported another 1320 *mu* (nearly 7200 acres) of potentially cultivable wastelands.

reports, most of the perhaps 2000 Sichuanese settlers to ascend the plateau in 1911 took the longer road toward Dzayül and several other, newly discovered destinations immediately west of the stele (He 2001, 43).

It is difficult to determine from available records how many of these settlers headed to Dzayül, how many stayed, or if those who answered this third call indeed possessed the agricultural skills Zhao Erfeng sought. However, a report detailing the plight of a group of settlers who crossed the stele in late 1910 and a report from Dzayül by British Captain F.M. Bailey nearly a year later offer some clues. The settlers had chased their dreams of a better life in a site near Drakyap, north of Dzayül close to the Ningjing Range, only to find a nightmare. 'Believing a preposterous rumour that rice, millet, wheat, and beans all sprout from the ground on their own and a mountain of glutinous rice cakes provides food for the taking', the report explained, 'the foolish people were tricked into hastening toward a place called Baimaguan' (Qing 7-956, SA). Many who embarked on the journey fell ill en route with half never reaching their destination. As with many who answered Zhao's calls, these settlers had abandoned everything on leaving the comfortable surroundings of *neidi*. But this group was lucky. Feeling pity for their foolishness, rather than punishing them on their return to his district, the local magistrate granted each family a small parcel of land to cultivate. On a visit to Dzayül in early 1911, Bailey caught sight of nary a settler, instead encountering a band of some 200 frontier soldiers encamped near a small village, living in huts surrounded by small plots in which they tended several varieties of vegetable and maize (MssEur F157/304C, 6, IOR; Bailey 1945, 116).

From early 1910, the British consul-general in Chengdu, W.H. Wilkinson, had monitored the movement of Zhao's frontier army in the regions west of the stele, largely through missionary reports, relaying his increasingly concerned findings to the British Minister in Beijing. More than the proximity of the frontier soldiers to British Indian territory, it was Zhao's proposed settlement of the region – purportedly welcomed by the local inhabitants – which further heightened Wilkinson's apprehension. In his cover letter accompanying a translation of Zhao Erfeng's third appeal, he wrote of the new target for settlement, 'if [Zhao] does succeed, there will eventually be found, north of Rima, a Chinese agricultural colony that will gradually spread until it impinges on northern Burma and the north-east frontier of Assam' (FO 228/2571 D19, NA). This contributed to a growing concern that the Qing and later R.O.C. governments sought to consolidate Chinese authority throughout the eastern Himalayas, perhaps even intent on infringing on British Indian territory, a situation which seemed to catch British officials

by surprise (Guyot-Réchard 2016, 31-32). Even more problematic was the Indian Office's prior hesitation either to extend direct British authority into the mountainous regions north of Assam or to clearly delimit a boundary with Tibetan regions. Periodic proposals to carve new provinces from the Tibetan plateau advanced during the Qing's last years, and especially an R.O.C. Presidential Order from April 1912 equating the administration of Tibet with the provinces of *neidi*, further attested to the role these initial soldiers and settlers could play in substantiating Chinese assertions of sovereignty.²⁰

When Capt. Noel Williamson, an Assistant Political Officer in Assam, reported seeing Chinese flags in the Mishmi Hills in February 1911, beyond what the British considered Tibetan territory, the government of Assam expressed concern that the Chinese might attempt to stretch their authority even further south, seizing the 'tea gardens north of the Brahmaputra' (Reid 1942, 217). Coupled with Bailey's report of Zhao Erfeng's frontier soldiers in Dzayül, noted above, and his observing 'evident signs of friendliness' toward them among most locals, the government of Assam recommended expanding demonstration of clear British authority into the Mishmi Hills. With neither Delhi nor London taking definitive action, Williamson again headed north in March, without official permission but at the invitation of the leaders of a non-Tibetan group, the Abors, with whom he had been friendly in the past. Venturing closer to Dzayül, further up the Siang Valley than ever before, in order to assess Qing influence, Williamson and his party were murdered by his hosts.²¹ In reprisal, a detachment of British soldiers headed to the region in October to force the Abors to acknowledge British authority and pay an indemnity. A team of surveyors followed, whose first detailed maps of the region would contribute to the later delineation of Assam's border some 60 miles further north than the greatest prior demonstration of effective British authority (Grunfeld 1987, 63; *The Annual Register 1911* 1912, 412-413; Reid 1942, 223-225; and Guyot-Réchard 2016, 40-44; Gunter 1915). With these actions, the British hoped to preclude any potential Chinese encroachment into Assam, whether military or settler, by ending decades of ambiguity in the Mishmi Hills.

20 Issued on 22 April 1912, the Order read in part: 'The Republican government [...] considered Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan as equal in status to the provinces of *neidi* and in the future the governments of each would be under the auspices of the Interior Ministry'. See 'Beijing lai dian' (1912, 2). See also 'Yuan Shikai Zongtong guanyu gonghe zhengfu bu she lifan zhuanbu ling' 2005 and FO 228/2575 D66, NA.

21 For further details of concern for Qing actions in Dzayül among Assam officials and Williamson's fateful trip, see Guyot-Réchard (2016, 36-40).

These British incursions into and near Dzayül worried officials of the Great Han Sichuan Military Government (*Da Han Sichuan jun zhengfu*), established in March 1912 in the aftermath of the Qing dynasty's collapse. It inherited and vigorously defended territorial claims across the entirety of Kham, including Dzayül, bolstered by the presumed success of Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour during the previous years. In response to the prospect of continued British incursions, Huang Xuchang, director of the newly-established Office for Managing the Frontier (*choubianchu*, shortened C.B.C.), proposed despatching soldiers from Bathang to line the southern border of Dzayül with a row of R.O.C. flags (FO 228/2575 D57, NA). Fluttering in the plateau wind, these flags would have served as both a practical and performative demarcation of the territorial extent of China's claim to sovereignty in the region, a manifestation of both bureaucratization and settlement carried out west of the stele. Huang reportedly observed, 'All we have to do is to station a few soldiers, and fly the flag, where foreign troops, however bold, would not venture to press forward' (FO 228/2575 D51, NA).

Although a 'fence' of flags might never have been raised, several Chinese border markers, remnants of the Qing era, still stood in the Mishmi Hills as late as 1914. The first, discovered by the British survey team in a village then known as Menilkrai in early 1912, bore the inscription: 'The southern frontier of Zayul on the borders of the Szechuan Province of the Chinese Empire' (Guyot-Réchard 2016, 45-47). These markers, and the diligence with which the British ensured their removal, were a testament to persistent territorial ambiguities across the contentious Himalayan region and the increasing potential for confrontation, which contributed to the opening of the tri-partite Simla Convention in October 1913. It was during these negotiations that the legacy of Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour in the Kham borderland – and especially the success of settlements – were assessed.

In principle, the reoriented internal goals of settlement, colonizing the borderland with loyal subjects and models of civilization to support the acculturation of the Khampas, had transformed the structure of governance in Kham. These cornerstones of the entire endeavour effectively demonstrated Chinese exertion of exclusive authority within, thus fulfilling the parameters of sovereignty, substantiating its assertion to a regional audience – the Russians, and especially British India. In the latter half of 1911, the perceived success of the comprehensive endeavour prompted Zhao Erfeng and his successor as Frontier Commissioner, Fu Songmu, to propose the establishment of Xikang Province across the entire region ostensibly

bureaucratized by Sichuan's frontier army. Roughly two years later, this perceived success also bolstered appeal to the international law principle of effective occupation in support of the R.O.C. plenipotentiary's assertion of sovereignty over the entirety of Kham at the Simla Convention. However, in the Simla Accord, initialled by all three plenipotentiaries in April 1914, this assertion was rejected. Instead, the British proposed what would be known as the 'McMahon Line', which divided the Kham borderland into an 'inner' Tibet, situated east of the stele wherein Chinese sovereignty was recognized, and an 'outer' Tibet, wherein the R.O.C. possessed only suzerainty (McGranahan 2003b, 44-46).

Despite voluminous historical documents submitted in support of the Tibetan claim to authority over all of Kham as far east as Dartsedo, and the R.O.C.'s submission of but a single document in support of its explicit assertion of effective occupation of the same territory, British officials seemed most persuaded in determining the boundary between 'inner' and 'outer' by the legacy of the 1727 stele – and by Fu Songmu. While imprisoned outside Chengdu in the aftermath of Sichuan Province's declaration of independence from the Qing Empire, Fu (1912) compiled and published *A Record of Province-building in Xikang* (*Xikang jian sheng ji*). For the British, a close reading of Fu's book, as much a work of ethnography and geography as of history and policy, suggested that the territorial reach of Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour was more tenuous than either the Sichuan or R.O.C. governments had asserted. Although indigenous officials had nominally been replaced throughout Kham, and schools and mines had been opened and settlements established in polities immediately west of the stele, including Dzayül, most demonstrable activity occurred to its east (see Map 5.2). The initial draft of the Accord first presented in March was perhaps also a product of British desire to ensure that substantive Chinese action remained east of the stele, thereby preserving Tibet proper as a buffer between British India and the R.O.C., coupled perhaps with concern for a potential increase in Chinese activity in Dzayül. Following more than eight months of negotiation, tri-partite accord became bilateral agreement on 3 July 1914. The McMahon Line reinstituting the limits of Chinese sovereignty on the plateau roughly along the border originally set by the 1727 stele compelled the R.O.C. plenipotentiary ultimately to withhold his signature. (L/P+S/18/B212, IOR; Anonymous. 1940, 101-114, 124-129)

Just days earlier, in a perhaps direct rebuke to the McMahon Line and despite agreeing to a stipulation against converting Tibet into a province, the R.O.C. government officially established the Sichuan Frontier Special Administrative Region (*Chuanbian tebie xingzhengqu*, S.A.R.) (Min 195

juan 9 (16 June 1914), SA).²² Stretching from Luding Bridge east of Dartsedo to Gyamda, designated Taizhao Prefecture (*fu*) in early 1913, the S.A.R.'s territory encompassed the initial proposal for Xikang Province and the greatest extent of bureaucratization carried out by Zhao Erfeng's frontier army. Yet substantiation for both the assertion of effective occupation at the Simla Convention and this subsequent establishment of the Sichuan Frontier S.A.R. was based largely on an exaggerated perception of what Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour had accomplished – widespread settlement and acculturation of the Khampas – ignoring its contraction in the tumultuous early years of the Republic of China. Contrary to the conclusions drawn by British officials from a close reading of his text, the serialization of Fu's 1912 book in the popular Shanghai periodical *Dongfang zazhi* on the eve of the Simla Convention likely generated this perception of the endeavour's lasting success, particularly for readers outside Sichuan (Fu 1912; 'Xikang jiansheng tan' 1913). At the same time, the R.O.C. established three additional Special Administrative Regions in the Mongolian grasslands, a borderland similarly threatened by external imperial encroachment and which had seen an increase in agricultural Chinese settlement since the last decades of Qing rule. Occupying a contiguous stretch of territory corresponding with much of today's Inner Mongolia, the three S.A.R.s, Rehe, Chaha'er, and Suiyuan, were converted into provinces in 1929.²³ Xikang Province, however, would not appear on maps for another decade.

Settlement remained an important method for both managing and claiming the territory of the Kham borderland. In August 1912, Acting Sichuan Military Governor Hu Jingyi proposed treating Kham differently from Tibet, absorbing the former into Sichuan. Among his four reasons for this action was the benefit of colonization, and its contribution to making the region self-sufficient. 'The country is really fertile, a paradise not yet exploited', he wrote with hyperbole echoing the ambitions of late Qing era gentry. 'If we establish county organisation, and settle the land with colonists, in a few years time the land and other taxes will suffice to pay all expenses of administration and of military occupation' (FO 228/2577 D60A, NA). The C.B.C.'s structure also suggests the importance of colonization for Sichuan in Kham. One of its four primary divisions was the Department

22 In 1924, the S.A.R. was renamed the Xikang Special Administrative Region (*Xikang tebie xingzhengqu*). See also Jagou, this volume.

23 'Dong Meng gaisheng zhi chouyi' (1914, 9-10); 'Neimenggu gaisheng zhi jinxing' (1913, 28-29). For a detailed and excellent examination of the origins of Suiyuan and its evolution from special administrative region in 1914 to the province's abolition in 1954, see Justin Tighe (2005).

for Colonization (*zhimin si*), which oversaw both agriculture and education (FO 228/2575 D51, NA). Though available records from the C.B.C.'s brief existence remain scarce, indicative perhaps of other proposals circulating at the time, in the summer of 1913 the Sichuan Branch of the Agricultural Society (*kenzhi xiehui Sichuan zhibu*) advocated sending 10,000 settlers to reclaim new wastelands across Kham on both sides of the stele ('Yimin shi bian' 1913, 1). They never went.

In the months following establishment of the C.B.C. and as several expeditions continued to expand British knowledge of the Mishmi Hills and beyond, re-asserting Sichuan authority politically and militarily, re-establishing peace and stability on Chinese terms across the borderland region re-envisioned as Xikang took precedence over despatching new settler commoners. Explicitly citing increased British presence south of and potentially encroaching on Dzayül, observed during an investigation of Kham in August 1912, C.B.C. Director Huang proposed an action more substantive than a fence of flagpoles. Rather than establishing a separate Xikang Province, he advocated the extension of Sichuan's western border beyond the stele and the incorporation of Dzayül, Chamdo, and polities in between directly into Sichuan's territorial bureaucracy as most effective to both exert and assert demonstrable authority.

A measure of Sichuan authority was reinstated across much of Kham by a Western Expedition (*xi zheng*) led by the first Republican era Frontier Commissioner, Yin Changheng, from autumn 1912 to the end of 1913. Though his soldiers initially reached Gyamda, Tibetan forces pushed them further east to the banks of the Salween (Ngül) River where a stalemate held until 1917. During the course of the Simla Convention, the extent of Yin's control encompassed a smaller region than that claimed by the R.O.C. plenipotentiary and later encircled by the borders of the Sichuan Frontier S.A.R., both based on the greatest territorial extent of bureaucratization implemented by Zhao Erfeng's frontier army. The accomplishments of Yin's new frontier army – and subsequent Frontier Commissioners – reinstating Chinese authority within Kham were never sufficient to substantiate assertions of sovereignty across the entire region. Thus the R.O.C. plenipotentiary explicitly referenced not the contemporaneous actions of Yin's army, rather the accomplishments of Zhao Erfeng's comprehensive endeavour, with settlement as its cornerstone, as substantiation for his appeal to the principle of effective occupation during negotiations at Simla. The new internal constitution of settlement, Zhao's recruitment of commoners, as a crucial component of his comprehensive endeavour, corresponded with the expectations of effective occupation – and thus fulfilled the parameters of sovereignty.

Conclusion

Settling farmers in the borderland was an old imperial policy, most often manifest in the establishment of colonies of soldier-farmers, but the influence of newly globalizing norms of statecraft coupled with new regional challenges to Qing authority in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries transformed the policy's internal constitution and introduced new external goals. As international law evolved in this same era, claiming territory, asserting sovereignty over a borderland region came to require a state's demonstrable exertion of exclusive authority. In addition to state actions within the borderland, whether military or commercial, this authority necessitated a demographic shift, both in the indigenous community and through the introduction of a stable, loyal population transplanted from the state's core region. Conceptions of the territoriality norm marked a shift away from focusing on local rulers as conduits of state authority over vast stretches of their territory to the direct extension of that authority throughout the borderland region through individual settlers, each claiming a parcel of stable, taxable land. Recruiting commoners to reclaim 'wastelands' in these distant borderlands rather than assigning soldiers to the task represented a related reorientation in the internal constitution of settlement which manifest across the Qing Empire in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and especially in Kham in the early twentieth.

This reorientation in turn supported the pursuit of new external goals for settlement fostered by changing regional and global conceptions of statecraft in the early twentieth century. As models of 'civilization' and loyalty to a supportive state, these settlers would simultaneously reinforce internal state efforts to acculturate the indigenous Khampas, thereby further expanding state authority over territory through its inhabitants, both indigenous and emigrant. Their presence was expected to cultivate a borderland population which acceptance of exclusive Qing authority would fulfil the parameters of sovereignty, perhaps even support the eventual establishment of a province, and thereby forestall either British Indian or Russian encroachment on the Tibetan Plateau. Once perceived as a periphery by Qing officials in both Beijing and Chengdu, from the dynasty's last years, the Kham borderland had become central to the establishment of a Chinese state and a crucible for early R.O.C. assertion of territorial sovereignty to the global community. The R.O.C. plenipotentiary's appeal to effective occupation at the Simla Convention represented the intersection of Zhao Erfeng's and his successors' great expectations for the success of settlement, grounded in the shift to recruiting once-'idle', but worthy and able commoners and the resulting exertion of exclusive authority throughout the Kham borderland's once 'empty' lands.

Glossary of Chinese and Tibetan Terms

<i>baihua</i>	白話
<i>Batang nongye shiyan chang</i>	巴塘農業試驗場
Bathang	'Ba' thang (Tib.), Batang 巴塘 (Ch.)
Bumla	'Bum la
Chaha'er	察哈爾
Chao Cuo	晁錯
<i>chikhyap</i>	<i>spyi khyap</i>
<i>choubianchu</i>	籌邊處
<i>Chuanbian tebie xingzhengqu</i>	川邊特別行政區
Da Han Sichuan jun zhengfu	大漢四川軍政府
Dengke nongmin shiyan chang	鄧科農民試驗場
<i>depa</i>	sde pa
<i>Dongfang zazhi</i>	東方雜誌
Drakyap	Brag gyap (Tib.), Zhaya 乍丫 (Ch.)
Fengquan	鳳全
Fu Songmu	傅嵩林
<i>gaitu guiliu</i>	改土歸流
Gyamda	Rgya mda' (Tib.), Jiangda 江達 (Ch.)
Hor Drango	Hor brag mgo (Tib.), Huo'er zhanggu
	霍爾章谷 (Ch.)
Hor Trehor	Hor tre hor (Tib.), Huo'er zhuwo 霍爾 竹窩 (Ch.)
Hu Jingyi	胡京伊
Huang Xuchang	黃煦昌
<i>hunhun'e'e</i>	渾渾噩噩
<i>junxian</i>	郡縣
<i>kaiken</i>	開墾
<i>kaishan fufan</i>	開山撫番
<i>kenzhi xiehui Sichuan zhibu</i>	墾植協會四川支部
<i>khenpo</i>	mkhan po
Lithang	Li thang (Tib.), Litang 理塘 (Ch.)
Lu Chuanlin	鹿傳霖
Luhuo tun	爐霍屯
<i>mengmei</i>	蒙昧
<i>neidi</i>	內地
<i>nongshi gailiang suo</i>	農事改良所
Nyarong	Nyag rong
Yinggezui	鸚哥嘴

Pengzhou	蓬州
<i>qian</i>	錢
Qicungou	七村溝
Rehe	熱河
Shen Baozhen	沈葆楨
Suiyuan	綏遠
Taizhao <i>fu</i>	太昭府
<i>ting</i>	廳
<i>tuntian</i>	屯田
<i>tusi</i>	土司
Wu Xizhen	吳錫珍
<i>xi zheng</i>	西征
<i>Xikang tebie xingzhengqu</i>	西康特別行政區
<i>xuanwei shisi</i>	宣慰使司
<i>xumu xuexiao</i>	畜牧學校
Yin Changheng	尹昌衡
Zai Gengtang	載賡唐
Zhao Erfeng	趙爾豐
Zhao Erxun	趙爾巽
<i>zhimin si</i>	殖民司

References

Archives and Primary Source Collections

IOR	India Office Select Materials, British Library, London
NA	The National Archives, London
QCBDS	<i>Qingmo Chuandian biawu dang'an shiliao</i> [Studies of the Reports of Sichuan and Yunnan Affairs at the End of the Qing Empire]. 1989. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju
QA	The First Historical Archives of China, Beijing
SA	Sichuan Provincial Archives, Chengdu, China

Primary and Secondary Sources

- Anonymous. 1940. *The Boundary Question between China and Tibet: A Valuable Record of the Tripartite Conference between China, Britain, and Tibet held in India, 1913-1914*. Beijing.
- Bailey, Lt.-Col. F. M. 1945. *China--Tibet--Assam: A Journey, 1911*. London: Jonathan Cape.

- 'Beijing lai dian' (Telegram from Beijing). (21 April 1912) *Yanjin Bao* 37 (7 May 1912): 2.
- 'Bianwu dachen zhao ren kaiken baihua gaoshi' (Frontier Commissioner's Notice Seeking Settlers). *Sichuan guanbao* (Sichuan Officials' Gazette) 19 (1910: XT2.7.30): 1a-2a.
- 'Bianwu dachen zisong guanwai kenwu zhanxing zhangcheng' (Temporary Regulations Governing Settlers beyond the Barrier). *Sichuan guanbao* (Sichuan Officials' Gazette) 18 (1910: XT2.7.20): 7a-8b.
- Bons d'Anty, Pierre-Rémi. 1908. 'Les Projets de Réorganisation des Marches Tibétaines'. *Bulletin Mensuel du Comité de L'Asie Française* 8: 279-281.
- Chang, Chun-shu. 2007. *The Rise of the Chinese Empire: Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China, 130 B.C.-A.D. 157*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.
- Chang, Lung-chih. 2008. 'From Quarantine to Colonization: Qing Debates on Territorialization of Aboriginal Taiwan in the Nineteenth Century'. *Taiwan shi yanjiu* (Studies of Taiwan's History) 15(4): 1-30.
- Chen Chiukun. 1999. 'From Landlords to Local Strongmen: The Transformation of Local Elite in Mid-Ch'ing Taiwan, 1780-1862'. In *Taiwan: A New History*, edited by Murray A. Rubinstein, 133-162. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Coales, Oliver R. 2003 (1917). 'Narrative of a Journey from Tachienlu to Ch'amdo and Back via Batang'. In *The History of Tibet*, edited by Alex McKay, Vol. 3: 202-238. New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Dai, Yingcong. 2009. *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- 'Dong Meng gaisheng zhi chouyi' (The Plan to Convert Eastern Mongolia into a Province). (15 January 1914). *Shufeng bao* (The News of Sichuan) 4(4): 9-10.
- Edgar, J.H. 1908. *The Marches of the Mantze*. London: Morgan & Scott, Ltd.
- Fu, Songmu. 1988 (1912). *Xikang jiansheng ji* (Record of Province Building in Xikang). Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe.
- Giersch, Charles Patterson. 2006. *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Goldstein, Melvyn C. 1993. *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- Gong Yin. 1997. 'Gudai bianjiang minzu diqu tunken kaifa gai shuo' (A Brief Introduction to Stationed Troops' Opening up Wasteland for Development in Minority Frontiers in Ancient Times). *Xinan Minzu Xueyuan Xuebao* (Zhexue shejhui kexue ban) (Journal of Southwest Nationalities College [Philosophy & Social Science Edition]) 18(1): 65-72.
- Gordon, Leonard H. D. 2007. *Confrontation Over Taiwan: Nineteenth-Century China and the Powers*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.
- Grunfeld, A. Tom. 1987. *The Making of Modern Tibet*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

- Gunter, C. P. 1915. 'The Mishmi Mission Survey Detachment'. *The Royal Engineers Journal* 21: 1-28.
- Guyot-Réchar, Bérénice. 2016. *Shadow States: India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- He, Yimin. 2001. '20 shiji chunian chuanbian zangqu zhengzhi jingji wenhua gaige shulun' (On the Reformation of Politics, Economics and Culture in Tibetan Region of Western Sichuan at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century). *Xinan minzu xueyuan xuebao – zhaxue shehui kexue ban* (Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities. Philosophy and Social Sciences) 22(6): 39-49.
- Herman, John E. 2007. *Amid the Clouds and Mist: China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- 'Huiyi Batang liangyuan bing zun ban kenwu bing ni zhangcheng ying zhun zhaoban xiang wen' (Discussion of the Batang Commissary's Report on Reclamation, his Proposed Regulations, and Allowing Him to Pursue Them), *Sichuan guanbao* (Sichuan Officials' Gazette) 20 (1904: GX30.8.10): 8a-9b.
- Hunt, Michael H. 1973. *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895-1911*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Jin, Fei. 1932a. 'Luting bingbao ge xian kending chuguan renshu yilan biao' (Table Showing the Number of Settlers from Each County to Cross the Barrier as Reported by Dajianlu Sub-Prefecture). *Bianzheng* (Frontier Affairs) 9: 13-15.
- Jin, Fei. 1932b. 'Pengzhou zhizhou Zai Gengtang chengsong kending chuguan wen' (Pengzhou Magistrate Zai report on sending settlers beyond the barrier). *Bianzheng* (Frontier Affairs) 9: 15-17.
- Kuleshov, Nikolai S. 1992. *Russia's Tibet File: The Unknown Pages in the History of Tibet's Independence*. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.
- Lan, Mei-hua 1999. 'China's "New Administration" in Mongolia'. In *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitanism*, edited by Stephen Ktokin and Bruce A. Ellerman, 39-58. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
- Lawson, Joseph. 2017. *A Frontier Made Lawless: Violence in Upland Southwest China, 1800-1956*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Lee, Robert H.G. 1970. *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Liu, Zanting. 1995. *Minguo Chayu xian tuzhi* (Gazetteer of Republican Chayu [Dzayül]) Chengdu: Bashu shushe.
- Lu, Chuanlin. 1968 (1900). *Chou Zhan shugao* (A Draft Record of the Plan for Zhandui). Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe.
- Luhuo'er difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (Luhuo County Annals Compilation Committee), ed. 2000. *Luhuo'er zhi* (Annals of Luhuo County). Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe

- Maier, Charles S. 2006. 'Transformations of Territoriality 1600-2000'. In *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, edited by Gunilla-Friederike Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, 41-46. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- McGranahan, Carole. 2003a. 'Empire and the Status of Tibet: British, Chinese, and Tibetan Negotiations, 1913-1934'. In *The History of Tibet*, Vol. 3, edited by Alex McKay, 269-274. New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
- McGranahan, Carole. 2003b. 'From Simla to Rongbatsa: The British and the "Modern" Boundaries of Tibet'. *The Tibet Journal* 28(4): 39-60.
- Mei, Xinru. 1934. *Xikang*. Nanjing: Zhengzhong Shuju Yinxing.
- Millward, James A. 1998. *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- 'Neimenggu gaisheng zhi jinxing' (The Process of Converting Inner Mongolia into Provinces). (15 December 1913). *Shufeng bao* (The News of Sichuan) 3(3): 28-29.
- Perdue, Peter. 2005. *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- 'Qinchai duban chuandian bianwu dachen Zhao zhao ken baihua gaoshi' (Notice of Frontier Commissioner Zhao Seeking Settlers). *Sichuan guanbao* (Sichuan Officials' Gazette) 35 (1907: GX32.12.10): 1a-2b.
- Reardon-Anderson, James. 2000. 'Land Use and Society in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia during the Qing Dynasty'. *Environmental History* 5(4): 503-530.
- Reardon-Anderson, James. 2005. *Reluctant Pioneers China's Expansion Northward, 1644-1937*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Reid, Sir Robert. 1983 (1942). *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam from 1883-1941*. Delhi: Eastern Publishing House.
- Relyea, Scott. 2015a. 'Conceiving the "West": Early Twentieth-Century Visions of Kham'. *Twentieth-Century China* 40(3): 181-200.
- Relyea, Scott. 2015b. 'Yokes of Gold and Threads of Silk: Sino-Tibetan Competition for Authority in Early Twentieth-Century Kham'. *Modern Asian Studies* 49(4): 963-1009.
- Relyea, Scott. 2017. 'Indigenizing International Law in Early Twentieth-Century China: Territorial Sovereignty in the Sino-Tibetan Borderland'. *Late Imperial China* 38(2): 1-60.
- Roy, Denny. 2003. *Taiwan: A Political History*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Shin, Leo K. 2006. *The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stern, John Peter. 1979. *The Japanese Interpretation of the 'Law of Nations', 1854-1874*. PhD dissertation, Princeton University.
- Svarverud, Rune. 2007. *International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847-1911*. Boston: Brill.

- Teng, Emma Jinhua. 2004. *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- The Annual Register 1911*. 1912. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.
- Tighe, Justin. 2005. *Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northwestern Territory and Development in Early Twentieth-Century China*. Leiden: Brill.
- Tsomu, Yudru. 2014. *The Rise of Gönpö Namgyel in Kham: The Blind Warrior of Nyarong*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Wang, Xiuyu. 2009. 'Lu Chuanlin's "Great Game" in Nyarong: Moving Frontiers and Power Projection in Qing Tibet, 1865-1897'. *The International History Review* 31(3): 473-498.
- 'Weiguan Batang liangwu tongzhi Wu Xizhen kaiban kenwu liu tiao qing zhe' (Temporary Batang Commissary and Magistrate Wu Xizhen Prepares Six Points for Opening Wastelands). *Sichuan guanbao* (Sichuan Officials' Gazette) 8 (1906: GX32.4.10): 4b.
- Wu, Fengpei, ed. 1984. *Zhao Erfeng Chuanbian zoudu* (Memorials of Zhao Erfeng). Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe.
- 'Xikang jiansheng tan' (Speaking on the Creation of Xikang Province). 1913. *Dongfang zazhi* (Eastern Miscellany) 9(11): 1-6 to 1-16 and *Dongfang zazhi* 9(12):1-5 to 1-10.
- Xu, Huaibao. 1995. 'Qingdai Jinchuan gaitu guiliu' (The Transformation of Jinchuan Domains into Garrisons during the Qing Era). *Shoudu shifan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* (Journal of Capital Normal University [Social Science Edition]) 5: 56-63.
- Yang, Bin. 2008. *Between Winds and Clouds: The Making of Yunnan (Second Century BCE to Twentieth Century CE)*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- 'Yimin shi bian' (Filling the Frontier with Immigrants). (20 August 1913). *Sichuan shiye gongbao* (Sichuan Industrial Magazine) 8: 1.
- Yu Ying-shih. 1986. 'Han Foreign Relations'. In *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 1, edited by Denis Twitchett and John K Fairbank, 377-462. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 'Yuan Shikai Zongtong guanyu gonghe zhengfu bu she lifan zhuanbu ling' (President Yuan Shikai's Order Regarding the Republican Government Not Establishing a Special Bureau of Colonial Affairs). 2005 (22 April 1912). In *Minguo Zangshi shiliao huibian* (A Compilation of Historical Materials on Tibetan Affairs in the Republic of China) Vol. 4, edited by Zhang Yuxin and Zhang Shuangzhi, 14. Beijing Xuewan Press.
- Zeng Xianjiang. 2016. 'Hanren yimin yu qingdai Jinchuan tunqu diyu shehui de zhonggou ji fazhan' (Chinese Immigration and the Reconstruction and Development of Regional Society in the Area of Jinchuan Military Agricultural Colony during the Qing Dynasty) *Xinan minzu daxue xuebao (renwen sheke ban)* [Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities (Humanities and Social Science Edition)] 8: 203-208.

'Zhu Zang Chuandian Bianwu Dachen xiaoyu baixing guanwai kaiken liyi baihua gaoshi' (Frontier Commissioner Notifies Commoners of Benefits of Opening Wastelands beyond the Barrier). *Chengdu ribao* (Chengdu Daily) 287 (1908: GX34.11.13): 1b.

About the Author

SCOTT RELYEA is assistant professor of Asian history at Appalachian State University in North Carolina, U.S.A. A historian of late imperial and modern China, his research centres on state-building and the transition from imperial to state formation in the southwest borderlands of China. He also focuses on the global circulation of concepts of statecraft and international law, particularly as received in eastern and central Asia, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He earned a PhD from the University of Chicago and MA degrees from the School of Oriental and African Studies and the George Washington University.