

NOTES

1. Those new to the subject will find in Sedley 1980 a brief review of the fourth-century philosophical scene in Athens, in Long 1986 a useful conceptual overview, and in Inwood and Gerson 1997 a convenient anthology of source materials. More comprehensive resources include especially the texts and commentary in Long and Sedley 1987 and the recent *Cambridge history of Hellenistic philosophy* (Algra et al. 1999).

2. For Cicero's position in the rhetorical works see comm. 4, Ilc (on 4.47–57). Many scattered remarks in the letters bespeak a common-sense commitment to the view that emotions are necessary and/or useful. Two examples especially worth noting in this connection are the consolatory notes to Atticus (*Att.* 12.10 “your grief is human but should be kept very moderate”) and to Brutus (*Ad Brut.* 1.9.2 “to grieve, but moderately, is a matter of expediency for others, but for you a necessity”). A remark in the long advisory epistle to Quintus, written some fifteen years earlier, is equivocal: one should avoid the appearance of sluggishness (*lentitudo*; cf. *Tusc.* 4.43), and yet both Quintus's high station and “perfect wisdom” require that anger be eliminated (*QFr.* 1.1.38).

3. For the political situation see esp. Griffin 1997, 8–14. For the chronology and text of the letters see the standard editions by Bailey, together with the narrative in Bailey 1971, 200–15. The argument that follows works from the assumption that the stand Cicero takes in his circulated philosophical works is often fruitfully interpreted by reference to his political and personal concerns of the moment as understood from the letters. For more sustained recent ventures in this line see Griffin 1995 and 1997, Murphy 1998.

4. *Att.* 12.13.2, 12.15, 12.21.5.

5. *Att.* 12.18.1, 12.23.3, 12.37a, 12.38a.2, 12.41.4, 12.43.2. The proposed dedication would likely have struck contemporary Romans as peculiar; see Bailey 1971, 209–10, and in more detail Bailey 1966, 404–13. Cicero tells Atticus he found the idea in books (*Att.* 12.18.1), meaning perhaps in the treatise of Crantor; compare passage [h] in Appendix A.

6. *Att.* 12.16; cf. 12.38.1. For the *Consolation*, see Appendix A, and compare also *Att.* 12.28.2: “As to my consolatory epistle to myself, I do not regret its success. I lessened my mourning, but grief itself I could not lessen, nor would I have wished to do so.”

7. *Att.* 12.14.3.

8. *Att.* 12.46.1.

9. *Att.* 12.13.2, 12.15.

10. Cicero remarks to Atticus on the severity of its tone; *Att.* 12.14.4, 13.6.3. From what he writes to Brutus the following year (*Ad Brut.* 1.9.1), it appears that Brutus's consolation chided the grieving father for “softness” (i.e., effeminacy) and for being untrue to the advice he himself had often given to others. A surviving letter to Cicero by the jurist Servius Sulpicius Rufus (*Fam.* 4.5) gives a taste of the way one ex-consul could address another on such an occasion. Lofty but by our standards rather chilly in

its formality, it urges Cicero to think less of this small personal loss in comparison with the magnitude of the current political calamities. Cicero's response (*Fam.* 4.6) is heartrending. Others wrote as well: L. Luceius (*Fam.* 5.13, 5.14, 5.15) and Caesar himself (*Att.* 13.20.1), though nothing of Caesar's letter remains. See Hutchinson 1998, 59–77, together with Bailey 1977, 2.415–19.

11. *Att.* 12.20.1.

12. *Att.* 12.38a.1. *Att.* 12.40.2, written two days later, is even more defensive in tone.

13. *Att.* 12.14.3, 12.20.2 (finishing touches to the *Consolation*); 12.44.4 (*Prior Academics*); 12.40.2, 13.26.2 (letter to Caesar); 13.12.3 (*On Ends*); 13.13.1 (*Academics*). Griffin argues convincingly that the *Hortensius*, sometimes assigned to the period after Tullia's death, was in fact composed sometime during the winter of 46–45 and in circulation by March (Griffin 1997, 8). On the revision of the *Academics* see Reid 1885, 28–38, together with Plasberg 1922, i–xv. Evidence dating the composition of the *Tusculans* themselves is less secure. Cicero appears to have had it in the planning stages by May 29, when he requests from Atticus a copy of Dicaearchus's *On the Soul* “for a project I have in mind” (*Att.* 13.32.2), but it is not otherwise mentioned until May of the following year (*Att.* 15.2.4). This might mean that the work was not fully completed until that time; so Ruch 1958, 168–74. But the ordering of Cicero's list in *On Divination* 2.1–4 suggests that at least the bulk of the writing was done in the summer of 45, between the completion of the *Academics* in late June and the beginning of *On the Nature of the Gods* in mid-August (*Att.* 13.38.1, 13.39.2).

14. *Tusc.* 2.9.

15. The personal note is most explicit in 3.76 and 4.63, but can also be heard earlier, in 3.58. Erskine 1997 explains Book 3 as an introspective exercise in self-consolation. There is some validity in this, but for this as for all Cicero's circulated works it is important also to become attuned to the rhetoric of public presentation.

16. The *schola* (Gr. *scholē*) was an oratorical as well as a philosophical format; see *Tusc.* 1.7–8, 2.9, and compare *On Ends* 2.1–3 and 2.17. Douglas 1995 gives a convincing analysis of the evidence, arguing that the term “diatribe” has been improperly applied to the *schola*. For the terminology see further Gucker 1978, 160–62.

17. The example of the *Stoic Paradoxes* shows that one might argue for the thesis, rather than against it; note *pref.* 5 “in disputations thesis-fashion” (*in scholis thetikōs*). Cicero sometimes associates the *schola* with argumentation on both sides: according to *On the Orator* 3.80 and *On Ends* 5.10, this is the manner of Aristotle particularly. But he also speaks in these same passages of a more specialized use of the *scholē* by Arcesilaus and Carneades to argue *against* every thesis. See Long 1995, 52–58, and compare Cicero's report about Carneades' pupil Clitomachus in 3.54. *Tusc.* 5.11 names Carneades as a model for Cicero's own disputations.

18. Brunschwig 1986 discusses the use of the “cradle argument” in Epicureanism and Stoicism, with particular reference to Cicero's *On Ends*. Questions of innatism and experience in Plato and the Hellenistic schools are treated at length in Scott 1995.

19. Cicero was not alone in this endeavor. I argue in comm. 3, IV_A (on 3,52–61) and 3, V_A (on 3,75–79), and in the appendixes, that philosophers of several Hellenistic schools made use of the consolatory tradition in much the same way.

20. Crantor is in fact the principal authority cited here for the “Peripatetic” view; see Appendix A and comm. 3, I_c (on 3,12–13).

21. The evidence for Cicero’s knowledge of various works of Aristotle has recently been reviewed in some detail in Barnes 1997b, 44–59 and Long 1995, 52–58. In what follows, I am primarily concerned with the broad bases of Aristotle’s position as suggested by *On the Soul* 2.2–5 and *NE* 1.13–2.8, rather than with the more specific observations in *Rhet.* 1.10–11 and 2.1–11. Cooper 1988 provides a useful point of entry into the secondary literature, and see the essays collected in Rorty 1996, among which the treatment by Striker (1996b) is especially relevant here.

22. Antiochus of Ascalon was another source; see p. xxiv–xxv below. For Lyco see on 3,78. Staseas was an associate of M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus; he is mentioned in *On the Orator* 1.102–5 for his abilities as a speaker and in *On Ends* 5,8 and 5,75 for his position on value; see Moraux 1973, 217–21.

23. The Stoics are notorious for denying emotions to animals, and Cicero will follow his source in this (4,31). But it should not be forgotten that even those ancient philosophers who assert that animals can be angry or in love see crucial differences between the mental experiences of animals and those of humans. Neither Stoics nor Peripatetics were necessarily interested in non-human minds for their own sake; rather, they argued for or against attributing emotions to animals as suited the understanding of human experience they wished to defend. For a broad-based treatment of the issue, see Sorabji 1993.

24. But Diogenes Laertius attributes the adjective *metriopathēs* directly to Aristotle (5,31). For differences between the Peripatetic view and Aristotle’s own view, see further comm. 4, III_B (on 4,38–47).

25. This is the view of Galen and Plutarch in the second century C.E. and also of the handbook Platonist Alcinous, whose dates are uncertain. But Cicero’s earlier contemporary Posidonius of Rhodes may also have put forward a part-based account. Some of the relevant texts and bibliography for Posidonius’s position may be found in Appendix D.

26. Aristotle, *NE* 7,3, 1147a31–b5, Plato, *Republic* 4.435c–444e, 10.603c–604d. Cicero’s division of the mind at 4,10 is labeled by him “Platonic,” even though it does not proceed in what would appear to us to be Plato’s direction. See further comm. 4, II_A (on 4,10–14), section 1.

27. Origen, *On Principles* 3,1.2–3 (*SVF* 2.988). For this and other texts on Stoic psychology, see Long and Sedley 1987, 1,313–23, to which my own summary account is much indebted.

28. Galen at *PHP* 4,2.20 attributes to Chrysippus an explicit statement of the distinction between the two senses of *logikos*, though for reasons of his own he denies that Chrysippus uses the distinction correctly.

29. See especially D.L. 7.134–39, with Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (*SVF* 1.537) and Long and Sedley 1987, 1.286–89. Cicero was soon to give his own account in book 2 of *On the Nature of the Gods*.

30. Sextus, *AM* 8.275–76 (*SVF* 2.223). See further comm. 3, IIa (on 3.13–21), section 1.

31. Seneca, *On Anger* 2.4.5. The point is connected by Seneca with the (also morally insignificant) “pre-emotion,” on which see comm. 3, Vb (on 3.80–84).

32. See further comm. 3, IIb (on 3.22–27), section 1, on the causal history of emotions; 3, IVc (on 3.64–71) on responsibility; and 4, IIb (on 4.14–22), section 2, on being “carried away.”

33. It is of course perfectly possible for a set of statements to be internally coherent when some or even all statements in the set are false. I take it that the Stoics are ready to insist that within those possible sets which can constitute the belief-set of a human being, the process of sorting and elimination which produces full coherence will always result in a set of true beliefs. The underlying premise is, again, teleological: certain foundational truths will always be present in us, even though in some cases they may be very deeply hidden.

34. Fuller treatments of the role of (cosmic and human) nature, value, and the indifferents include Irwin 1998a, 227–38 and 1998b, Long 1971 (together with Long 1996, 152–55), Annas 1993, 159–79, and Striker 1991.

35. For texts on “selection,” see comm. 4, IIIc (on 4.47–57).

36. The class of affect which Cicero calls “consistencies” and Greek authors *eupatheia* (“well-reasoned affect”). See 4.10–14 with comm. 4, IIa (on 4.10–14), section 2.

37. Reports of Panaetius's views on the subject include Aulus Gellius 12.5 (fr. 111 van Straaten) and Cicero, *On Ends* 4.23. Panaetius was enthusiastic about the Old Academy (*On Ends* 4.79, *Tusc* 1.79), but we have no clear indication what arguments he used to support his attempt at synthesis. See also on 4.4. Evidence for Posidonius's views is presented almost exclusively by Galen, in a polemical work, and analysis of the material has been much disputed. We have some reason to question whether Cicero was familiar with Posidonius's views as reported by Galen; see Appendix D, where the point is argued in detail.

38. See further Dillon 1996, 52–105, Barnes 1989, and Glucker 1978, 98–120.

39. Barnes 1989, 60–62, reviews the evidence for Antiochan views among Cicero's contemporaries. For Brutus's treatise *On Virtue* see on 3.1.

40. *Prior Academics* 2.135.

41. The “feelings” (*pathē*), i.e. pleasure and pain, are listed by Epicurus as one criterion of truth; see further comm. 3, IIIb (on 3.32–35) and Appendix B.

42. On the relation between emotions and false belief, Annas 1992, 189–99, Nussbaum 1994, 102–15.

43. For Epicurean texts on love see on 4.70, together with Lucretius 4.1058–1191, and see Nussbaum 1994, 149–54.

44. *On Ends* 1.25. See further comm. 3, III D (on 3.47–51).
45. For discussion see comm. 3, III A (on 3.28–31) and 3, III B (on 3.32–35) with Appendix B.
46. The point is developed in detail in Long 1995, 50–58. The rhetorical preeminence of the Peripatetics, including Aristotle, is established early in the *Tusculans*; see *Tusc.* 1.7, 2.9.
47. *On Ends* 4.5–6. The two following quotations are from the same passage.
48. For the Lyceum see on 3.7; for Cratippus, on 3.22.
49. The format of the *Stoic Paradoxes* is closely allied to that of the *Tusculans*; see note 17 above, with Lee 1953, xxii–xxiv. For further information on the *Paradoxes* see the annotated edition by Ronnick (1991).

