



ABOUT THE TRANSLATION

My aim in the translation is to provide a readable and contemporary version of the text that will enable the reader to perceive the structure of Cicero's thought. For the sake of clarity I have not hesitated to break the longer sentences into shorter units, or occasionally to recast the structure of a sentence entirely, but I have tried to keep clauses in their original order insofar as possible. If the result is less elegant than the original, it cannot be helped; however, I may point out that many passages in the philosophical writings are intended to be simple and conversational in style, and that Cicero himself is often willing to forgo stateliness in order to represent his sources accurately and comprehensibly.

I have tried to be consistent in terminology, particularly for those terms which have a technical import in Hellenistic philosophy. Thus *visus* in the sense of Gr. *phantasia* is always "impression," *motus* in the sense of *kinēsis* always "movement," and so on. It should be observed, however, that Cicero himself does not attempt a one-for-one correspondence in translating philosophical terms. A comparison with Greek treatments of the same issues often finds him alternating between two different Latin words where the Greek authors employ a single standard term. Sometimes this practice helps to disambiguate a Greek word used in two distinct senses. For instance, *hēdonē* is rendered by *voluptas* in Epicurean contexts, where it refers to bodily and mental pleasure together; but by *laetitia*, sometimes paired with *voluptas*, in Stoic passages, where it refers to the emotion of delight. In other instances, a single Greek term may be given multiple renderings for the sake

of emphasis, as in the repeated double or triple renderings of *kathēkei* (“it is appropriate”; see on 3,61) or merely for variety, as when *epithumia* (“desire”) is called alternately *cupiditas* and *libido*. In such cases, I have generally preferred to stay with a single standard term, except where both Latin words occur together.

Less commonly, we may find a single Latin word standing in for more than one Greek term. In a few cases, the reasonable assumption is that Cicero has lost hold of a distinction made by his sources. Thus he may use *opinio* of beliefs held by the wise, where the parallel texts in Greek are scrupulous to avoid *doxa*. Elsewhere, the ambiguity seems to be created by the usual difficulty of finding equivalent terms in the target language. Thus *voluntas* in the nominative is pressed into service for *boulēsis* in 4.12, even though the ablative of that same word had been used extensively in book 3 in the sense of *ep̄h' bēmin* (see comm. 3, IVc (on 3,64–71)). *Hormē* (“impulse”) at 4.11 is rendered, reasonably enough, by *appetitus*, but having done this, Cicero has no good term available to use for *orexis* (“reaching”) in 4.12, and settles for *appetitio*. Here and in similar cases it has seemed best to me to preserve the distinctions made in the Greek, at least in those places where I am satisfied that the language of Cicero’s source must have resembled that used in texts known to us.

A few words and phrases present special difficulties. *Animus* is nearer to “mind” than it is to “soul,” and I have in general insisted on this. The usage of certain Greek authors, however, sometimes precludes rendering their term *psuchē* as “mind,” so that “soul” has occasionally had to be retained in the introduction and commentary. I render *virtus* as “virtue,” standardly but with some reluctance: the English word hardly suggests rugged masculinity, as *virtus* does for Cicero; and in any case, few of us would now use English “virtuous” to describe a person we admire. “Excellence” or “merit” or even “goodness” would perhaps capture the connotations of the Latin term more faithfully. The word *aegritudo* is used in book 3 especially for distress at the death of a loved one, what 3,81 calls “that one type of distress which is the most grievous of all”; in book 4, however, *aegritudo* is used only in its broad generic sense (as at 4.14), distress specifically at bereavement being called *luctus*. For the sake of consistency I have rendered *aegritudo* as “distress” throughout both books, even in a few passages (3,27, 3,61) where a more specific translation such as “grief” would have been well suited to the immediate context.

Cicero’s phrase *perturbatio animi*, which I regularly render “emotion,” is literally “a disturbance of mind,” and the force of the metaphor is never entirely absent: Cicero can exploit it, as he does, for instance, in 3,18 and 4,54.

But *perturbatio animi* is also his standard rendering for Gr. *patbos*, naming the class to which fear, desire, grief, and anger belong, and is as close to a standard usage as was in existence in Republican Latin (see further on 3.7). To adopt a stronger rendering in English, such as “passion” or “disturbance,” would imply, wrongly I think, that the Hellenistic schools were interested only in especially powerful versions of emotions and not in emotions generally. I have, however, added “disturb” or “disturbance” to “emotion” in a few places where the verbal notion comes into play in the argument. Another difficult phrase is the one here translated “happy life.” Cicero uses the words *beata vita* as his equivalent for *eudaimonia*, in philosophical Greek a specialized term for that ideal human life which is completely satisfactory on both a subjective and a long-term objective evaluation. This is not, I think, what most English speakers mean by “happiness.” I have tried through the notes, and once through a rather studious translation (“that life which is properly called happy”) to remove any possible confusion between “happiness” in this sense and the emotion of delight.

One other point of interest is the way Cicero deploys language of gender. By scrupulously rendering *homo* as “person” or “human” and insofar as possible employing gender-neutral default pronouns, I have sought to bring out the deliberate emphasis with which Cicero employs “man” and “manly” (*vir*; *virilis*) and, conversely, the opprobrium which attaches to “womanish” (*muliebris*; examples at 3.13, 3.70, 3.72). Another less obvious sexual innuendo can be heard in *fractus*, idiomatic Latin for “effeminate” (cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 115.2, *On the Happy Life* 13.4, Persius 1.18) and so rendered here. All these are standard usages in the public discourse of the period; see L’Hoir 1992, Richlin 1996. It does not follow that Cicero was or could be unconcerned about the viewpoint of potential female readers. We do well to remember that the first reader of *On Ends* was the inquisitive Caerellia (*Att.* 13.21a.2).

