A Linnaeus of Human Nature:  
The Pragmatic Deduction of Unconscious Thought
in Kant’s *Lectures on Anthropology*  

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I. Introduction

Probably the most important feature in Kant’s approach to the issue of obscure representations is his calmness and firmness when he establishes that they are the most numerous, since their field, unlike that of clear representations, is enormous. In fact, it is enough to apply the synthetic unity of apperception—the highest point of understanding—on materials of pragmatic origin, to uncover some regions in this field. Thus, the best procedure is to head from the cognitive operations which we are conscious of towards those which still remain covered with mist. Nothing in the Kantian deduction of the existence of this kind of representations, deduction which starts from their effects, announces an inversion or a dis-

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turbance either in the realm of objectivity or in the arts which discipline and cultivate human sociability. The discovery of the predominance of obscure regions of the mind does not supply an instrument to reveal the most concealed human thoughts either, since it cannot break the resistance which human beings can oppose, in order to keep their thoughts hidden. One could say that, *avant la lettre*, Kant makes the same reproach against the theories about the unconsciousness of the 20th century that he levelled to the naive gentleman De Luc. This gentleman only dared to conclude, after completing a long journey with a philanthropic purpose, that “[a]s regards benevolence the human being is good enough […] provided that no bad propensity to subtle deception dwells in him,” even though he had the essential elements to deliver such a judgment in his own heart, without ever leaving his country. Similarly, those who find in the thoughts which we start without being conscious of them a kind of secret bottom of the mind—as Baumgarten’s *fundus animae*—do not pay enough attention to the fact that only a “certain pragmatic freedom” offers the occasion to identify in a mediated way the regions of the mind.

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3 G. Böhme (2002: 217 ff.) tells a funny anecdote, according to which in 1962 Christian Thomasius conveyed to the Prince curator of Brandenburg the discovery of a new science, Anthropology, where “the things hidden in the heart of other men would be known, even against their will, through everyday conversations”.

4 *MpVT*, AA 08: 271, transl. by G. de Giovanni

5 Baumgarten, *Met.*, § 511.

6 Foucault (2008: 27).
where obscure representations lie. These representations do not remain foreign at all to the study of what man “makes of himself, or can and should make of himself” in spite of the tendency to reduce them to a mere play of sensations, which is only suitable to a physiological analyse. Kant considers that, in the space covered by the arts of human treatment, the alleged object of empirical psychology meets something “unthought”, which has been traditionally concealed by metaphysics, and which, as an “always open dimension, never permanently defined”, accompanies conscience as its reverse.

Thus, just as one can glimpse from the island of truth the wide and stormy ocean of illusion, the darkness of the mind ought to be located, as indistinctly as it could happen, on an ideal map of the mind, which will never find its customized Linnaeus. In order to accomplish this task, the question about the unconscious order of our thought must satisfy first the conditions of every *quaestio domestica*, that is to say, the question ought to be resolved by resorting to the sources which it stems from: the cognitive faculty of understanding. Therefore, obscurity of mind does not forecast a crisis for this faculty, but understanding confirms that this matter is

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8 *Anth., Vor.*, AA 07: 119.
9 The purpose of Foucault (1966: 333–339) to accomplish, beyond the Kantian transcendental analytic and against the modern *cogito*, a transcendental reflection which would give account of “the unthought” which is contented in the epistemic configuration of man, such a purpose, we say, might be well considered as a *repetition* of the research that the Kantian Anthropology carries out. Cf. Foucault (2008: 57), where he focuses the function that *Kunst* performs in order to unfold the anthropological order in Kant. Actually, this order regulates the production of a fictive reality (taste, protocol, courtesy, seduction...) and establishes both its meaning and its means of communication.
10 *KrV*, A 235/B 294 s.
11 The fact that a Linnaeus of the human mind never could arise obeys to the same reason why it is impossible that some day a Newton able to give account about the origin of a blade should be born (*KU*, § 75, AA 05: 400). Whilst the *Critique of Judgment* asserts that the systematic unity of an organism could not be explained by mere mechanical means, the *Lectures on Anthropology* distrust that social intercourse would be tackled in terms of an empirical psychology. Instead of this, the last matter should be submitted rather to a Critique of sociability, that is to say, to a Critique of the semblances that the developed human community produces. M. Horkheimer offers suggestive remarks about the seeds of a “sozialen Schematismus” in Kant; see “Eine Kantische Soziologie”, in: ID., *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. VI, Frankfurt a.M., Fischer, 1991, pp. 191–192.
12 *KrV*, A 476/B 504 s.
a metaphysical and anthropological object of study. After its plunge into this *terra incognita*, logic will see increased its archive of rules, once it identifies the principles and the transcendental instances which are already working, increased in the common experience without the subject’s knowledge. One of the most evident signs of Kantian interest for the unconscious thought can be recognized in the discovery of a transcendental principle, which, even if it does not concern the objectivity of experience, works as a subjective guiding thread for the research and classification of nature. At first glance, such principle seems to be merely tautological and to belong to a general logic. But, actually, we are faced with the wretched entanglement of a transcendental assumption of the faculty of judgment, the roots of which settle so deep in the domain of reason that the inquiry of its legitimacy as a maxim cannot spare a certain obscurity\textsuperscript{13}. Since the condition of possibility of every logical classification has eventually become outshone by the most humble knowledge\textsuperscript{14}, theory vindicates the existence of an original pleasure which is already absent from the factum of logical subsumption. Unlike Aby Warburg’s dictum, the descent of Kant to the “first ground” [*die erste Grundlage*] of the faculty of reason does not confirm that “Der liebe Gott steckt im Detail”, but rather that the mud, the dirt and the hair of Plato’s *Parmenides* have been conveniently ‘detheologized’\textsuperscript{15}. Thus, it is not the promise of a total release from the conditions of possibility of experience, as the light dove of the *KrV*\textsuperscript{16} dreams, what moves Kant to problematise the hidden forces of judgments of which we only know the results. It is rather the “consciousness of ignorance”, which does not block further philosophical inquiries. On the contrary, this consciousness actually initiates them, and begins with the examination of the first sources of our knowledge\textsuperscript{17}.

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\item[14] KU, Einl. § VI, AA 05: 187–188.
\item[16] KrV, Einl., § III, B 8. As the pathological self-observation reveals, accomplishing such a wish would entail to submit the region which holds the “supposed discoveries” made by self-observation (*Anth*, § 4, AA 07: 133) to an influence even more tyrannical that that of the understanding, that is to say, to the control of a consciousness higher than the human one, which allegedly would inspire to some privileged people visions stemming from suprasensory realms (*WDo*, AA 08: 145).
\item[17] KrV, A 758/B 786.
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II. The Dialectic Path to the Obscure Representations: The Pathological Self-observation

The main caution that needs to be applied before displaying the field of obscure representations is to consider the representation “I” as the unique point of departure of every cognitive biography. A different beginning is not allowed, at least to us men, if our purpose is to classify the representations in our mind. Given the tempting Leibnizian proposal to consider consciousness as a threshold too rough to catch the petites perceptions, which however leave their subtle and continuous traces on our mind, the representation “I”, which “raises us infinitely above all other living beings on earth”, definitely expels man from animal realm. Even though the endeavour to pay attention and to turn away

18 PhilEnz., AA 29: 44: “Das erste, was ich bey mir gewahr werde, ist das Bewußtsein. Dies ist kein besonderes Denken, sondern dasjenige worunter ich die übrige Vorstellungen etc. bringen kann, es ist die Bedingung und die Form unter der wir denkende Wesen oder intelligenten sind”.
20 Anth, § 1, AA 07: 27; cf. Fortschr., AA 20: 270: “Wie es möglich sey, daß ich, der ich denke, mir selber ein Gegenstand (der Anschauung) seyn, und so mich von mir selbst unterscheiden könne, ist schlechterdings unmöglich zu erklären, obwohl es ein unbezweifeltes Factum ist; es zeigt aber ein über alle Sinnenauschauung so weit erhabenes Vermögen an, daß es, als der Grund der Möglichkeit eines Verstandes, die gänzliche Absonderung von allem Vieh, dem wir das Vermögen, zu sich selbst Ich zu sagen, | nicht Ursache haben beyzulegen, zur Folge hat”.
21 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 854: “Wenn ein Thier ich sagen könnte, so wäre es mein Camerad”. Regarding the Kantian difference between the procedure
from an idea reflects the freedom of the faculty of thought and the authority which the mind has over itself\textsuperscript{22}, there is no situation more miserable for man than the one caused by the involuntary course of both operations\textsuperscript{23}, where, as the main character of the E. A. Poe’s tale Berenice declares, visions and ghosts stand for appearances\textsuperscript{24}. The reader of the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view is surprised to find the unexpected note which Kant adds to § 7, where he distinguishes between logical and psychological consciousness. This note does not really belong to the subject of this work. Its purpose is rather to prevent the speculative extravagances of the illuminati being detrimental to the operation of the “I think”\textsuperscript{25}. The pretention to compose an inner story with the invol-

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\textsuperscript{22} Anth, § 3, AA 07: 131.
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\textsuperscript{24} Poe, Berenice: “The realities of the world affected me as visions, and as visions only, while the wild ideas of the land of dreams became, in turn, not the material of my every-day existence, but in very deed that existence utterly and solely in itself [...]. This monomania, if I must so term it, consisted in a morbid irritability of those properties of the mind in metaphysical science termed the attentive. It is more than probable that I am not understood; but I fear, indeed, that it is in no manner possible to convey to the mind of the merely general reader, an adequate idea of that nervous intensity of interest with which, in my case, the powers of meditation (not to speak technically) busied and buried themselves, in the contemplation of even the most ordinary objects of the universe”. We owe this reference to Manganaro (1983: 95). See F.-X. Chenet, L’assise de l’ontologie critique, Lille, PUL, 1994, p. 44: “Kant n’enseigne pas seulement que l’objet est donné, mais qu’il ne peut être donné que comme effet d’une affection. Le concept d’affection ne se réduit pas à l’affirmation que la sensation est donnée, qu’elle est inconstruible et qu’elle est a posteriori, il est indispensable à la pensée de la réceptivité comme telle, c’est-à-dire comme passivité”; cf. Lebrun (1982: 208).
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\textsuperscript{25} Anth, § 7, AA 07: 143: “But it was nevertheless necessary to go back so far simply in order to stop the offenses of the speculative mind in regard to this question”. The question concerns the possibility of a priori knowledge.
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untary course of one’s own thoughts and feelings is, according to Kant, the direct path to alleged inspirations received from the sky and, in general, the direct path to a chimerical community with spirits which we really ignore, a community which substitutes for our real community with other human beings, known to us as world. The main illusion entangled with these practices is the discovery of contents which we have actually carried into our inner self. This happens when we do not consider as objects of our observation the very representations which ourselves have summoned, and which we are the legitimate owners of, but rather the acts of representation which allegedly come on their own into the mind, without anybody having appealed to them. The visionary, whose internal journeys only announce to him a subsequent arrival at the coast of Anticyra, chooses Nietzsche’s statement that thought comes when “it” wants, not when “I” want as his motto. However, the visionary receives as a reply the Kantian firm “decision” to make the logical consciousness

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26 Anth, § 2, AA 07: 130. Cf. Longuenesse (2006: 302): “[A]ccording to Kant, one is conscious of oneself in this empirical sense not when one directs one’s “mental gaze” to one’s inner states. But rather when, in directing one’s mental gaze to outside objects, one becomes also aware of the distinction between the temporal determinations of those objects and the temporal determinations of one’s perceptions and experience of them”; cf. KrV, “Refutation of Idealism”, B 275: “even our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitale, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience” and R 3826, AA 17: 304: “Gott erkennt alles, indem er sich selbst erkennt. Der Mensch erkennt sich selbst, indem er andere Dinge erkennt”; see Goldmann (1948).

27 Jenseits von Gut und Böse, § 17. The following passage from Iliad, chant XV, vv. 80–83, might be a Greek counterpoint, closer to Kant’s position than to Nietzsche’s one, regarding the hidden machinery of our thoughts: “Swift as the thought of one whose fancy carries him over vast continents, and he says to himself, ‘Now I will be here, or there’, and he would have all manner of things – even so swiftly did Juno wing her way till she came to high Olympus and went in among the gods who were gathered in the house of Jove” (S. Butler’s translation).

28 We believe that Kant would not reject this “charge”, rather he would plea for its opportunity; see op. cit., § 16: “Mag das Volk glauben, dass Erkennen ein zu Ende-Kennen sei, der Philosoph muss sich sagen: ,wenn ich den Vorgang zerlege, der in dem Satz, “ich denke” ausgedrückt ist, so bekomme ich eine Reihe von verwegenen Behauptungen, deren Begründung schwer, vielleicht unmöglich ist,—zum Beispiel, dass ich es bin, der denkt, dass überhaupt ein Etwas es sein muss, das denkt, dass Denken eine Thätigkeit und Wirkung seitens eines Wesens ist, welches als Ursache gedacht wird, dass es ein “Ich” giebt, endlich, dass es bereits fest steht, was mit Denken zu bezeichnen ist,—dass ich weiss, was Denken ist. Denn wenn ich nicht darüber mich schon bei mir entschieden
a principle that precedes all the experience amassed in the inner sense. This decision establishes “the natural order in the faculty of knowledge,” according to which the spontaneity of imagination is always kept under control by the spontaneity of understanding. The inner sense alone cannot yield any fruitful observation, because it is an uninterrupted flow of representations. Only if we represent to ourselves the inner changes of the soul as representations which belong to one and the same subject, we will gain consciousness of them or, if one prefers, we will not find any appearance within ourselves, within our own self unless the logical consciousness sets up beforehand the “stage” of objectivity against the blackboard of nothingness, as it was called by the Machadian philosopher Abel Martín.

The reason that definitely destroys the expectations of psychology to become a science—whose situation regarding this point is even more needy than that of the chemistry, which at least can become a systematic art—is that mathematics cannot be applied to the appearances of the inner sense, which flow only in the temporal dimension. Indeed, we can separate these appearances only in our mind, but it is not in our hands to keep them in this state long enough to combine them and, finally, to leave them as they were at the beginning. In fact, the observation already “modifies and dissimulates” the state of the observed object, so that we are only allowed to carry out a natural description of the soul, not even an experimental psychological doctrine, which probably, even if Kant does not pronounce a word about it, will be feasible with animals. Actually, there will be an experiment suited to human nature, but one so connected with the exercise of freedom that, as we will see later, it is better to abandon the term “experiment” for that of “rules of game.” Albeit the rep-

hätte, wonach sollte ich abmessen, dass, was eben geschieht, nicht vielleicht “Wollen” oder “Fühlen” sei? Genug, jenes “ich denke” setzt voraus, dass ich meinen augenblicklichen Zustand mit anderen Zuständen, die ich an mir kenne, vergleiche, um so festzusetzen, was es ist: wegen dieser Rückbeziehung auf anderweitiges “Wissen” hat er für mich jedenfalls keine unmittelbare “Gewissheit”.

29 Anth, § 7, AA 07: 143: “So it is advisable and even necessary to begin with observed appearances in oneself, and then to progress above all to the assertion of certain propositions that concern human nature; that is, to inner experience”.
30 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 134.
31 MAN, AA 04: 471.
32 Cohen-Halimi (1994: 324) has highlighted the figure of the “experimental moralist” (expression which is used in a remark of an anonimous annotation to the Essay about the mental illnesses of 1764), which Kant, who breaks up clearly with
representation “I” is the narrow path which leads us to the world we form part of when we are awake, we can turn it into the narrow pass of egoism, an abuse of reason and freedom, which strangle the use of all the higher cognitive faculties. An especial mention deserves the logical trap which leads to the “physical egoism”—a Kantian hapax—, a pathology where the mind refuses the reality of the world and considers itself as the unique object of reflection.

The § 4 of the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, devoted to the observation of ourselves, ends with a note that reminds us that, due to our finitude, we cannot spare the “consistent inconsistence” of the “I” to appear double to us—where this duplicity concerns the manner of representation, not the represented content—that is, as pure apperception of reflection and as empirical apperception of apprehension. The pure apperception is not an object of psychology, but rather the ground of the “whole of logic”, that is, the “formal element of consciousness” [Formliche des Bewußtsein] that “can be clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure”. The important point is that without it we will only find a chaotical amalgam of states in our mind, which remain untied to any representation. Both dimensions of the “I” are neither cooriginal—one displays the stage where the other appears—, nor evolutive phases that a look at childhood could ever distinguish. Since the empir-
ical consciousness is always necessarily “changing” \([\text{wandelbar}]\), it cannot provide itself a “fixing and abiding self” \([\text{stehendes oder bleibendes Selbst}]\)\(^{41}\). Therefore, when the subject is conscious of the succession of the apprehensions which integrate the series of inner experiences, that consciousness will be the sign that he always represents “himself as one and the same subject in the different states”\(^{42}\), to the extent that he rarely notices it. There are two manners of misinterpreting the function of transcendental consciousness in Kant. One of them declares that the empirical consciousness causes a \textit{doubt} about our own phaenomenal existence. In fact, this is a malicious twist of Kantian terms, because nothing in his description of the manner we represent us to ourselves could equal the following statement: “it only \textit{seems} to me \((\text{mihi videri})\) that I have certain ideas and sensations, indeed it only seems that I exist at all”\(^{43}\). Instead of spreading a doubt which the factual feature of our finitude could easily vanish, it would be better to refuse every intuitive approach, that is, without mediation of time—“which is not a concept of understanding”\(^{44}\)—to the content of the “I think”. For example, when we execute a basic calculation\(^{45}\) the logical consciousness leads the entire process, and, even if we can allude to that highest point of our judgments with expressions as little subjective as “I or he or it (the thing) which thinks”\(^{46}\), we do not gain ac-

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41 \textit{KrV}, A 107.
42 \textit{Anth}, § 4, AA 07: 134.
43 \textit{Anth}, § 7, AA 07: 142.
44 \textit{Anth, Ibid} See F. Desideri (2005: 531): “[P]erché vi sia coscienza della propria esistenza come determinata temporalmente, il tempo va pensato nella sua articolazione con lo spazio. Solo alla luce di questa articolazione strutturale, di questo coappartenersi di tempo e spazio, diviene infatti possibile affermare “Io esisto” con il valore di una proposizione empirica ovvero di un giudizio di esperienza”.
45 \textit{KrV}, A 103.
46 \textit{KrV}, B 404. We consider suggestive the next hermeneutical proposal of Longuenesse (2006: 304): “I” in Kant’s “I think” is not a selfreferring expression in the modern sense of theories of reference. Rather, it is a term, or a thought, playing a role in our activity of binding representations in a way that makes them both, and inseparably, related to objects “in the weighty sense” ascribed to the agent that is accountable for the act of binding, whoever or whatever that agent might be. Considered in this way, if we want to find a modern descendent to Kant’s “formal” or “logical” I, perhaps it could be found more in the direction—horribile dictu?—of Freud’s ego as opposed to id (both of which, rather than refer-
cess to that consciousness in the same manner we face any other object. If we insist to move us forward onto the logical consciousness in such a manner, having renounced to recognize its real identity, that is, the identity of a transcendental function, we could only—Kant tinges—“revolve in a perpetual circle” [in einem beständigen Cirkel herumdrehen]47. The other misleading understanding of the transcendental consciousness finds in the pure apperception a kind of “universal mind”, not provided with personality48, which does not concern us as empirical subjects. But, although we deal with a logical function and not with the empirical quality of a person, it should not be neglected that each subject knows that he—and not a foreign understanding, even a higher understanding—affects himself when he observes himself 49. This fact entails a great risk, because, even if everyone is able to think for himself, he may do it in an obscure manner, in such a way that he can accomplish an outstanding discovery without being conscious of the principle which has guided his thought. Moreover, it is noteworthy that those who never think for themselves “have the sharpness to discover everything”50, so that they believe they already know beforehand all the things which other people could convey to them. This last kind of man, not the first one, would ruin every inquiry, as well as the exercise of philosophy itself.

49 J.-L. Marion (1997: 349) has replied to this kind of lecture of the transcendental apperception in Kant; see the analysis of H. Heimsoeth (1971), which is more concentrated on the practical use of reason, about the averroist echo which is allegedly sent out from the Kantian “I think”; cf. also P. Merlan (1969) and S. C. Tornay (1943). See T. de Aquino, In 1 ad Corinthios, 15, 19, lect. 2, n° 924: “Anima autem cum sit pars corporis hominis, non est totus homo, et anima mea non est ego”.
50 This is the reproach that Kant directs against the academic reception of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, see Prol, § 3, AA 04: 270. Regarding the legitimate phenomenon of employing a method in science without actually being conscious of it see KrV, A 834/B 862: “Niemand versucht es, eine Wissenschaft zu Stande zu bringen, ohne daß ihm eine Idee zum Grunde liege. Allein in der Ausarbeitung derselben entspricht das Schema, ja sogar die Definition, die er gleich zu Anfange von seiner Wissenschaft giebt, sehr selten seiner Idee; denn diese liegt wie ein Keim in der Vernunft, in welchem alle Theile noch sehr eingewickelt und kaum der mikroskopischen Beobachtung kennbar verborgen liegen”.

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Far away from the Kantian warning for preserving the mental health, “illuminists” as Madame de Bourignon, Pascal or Haller\(^{51}\) share the tendency to “eavesdrop [belauschen] on oneself” through thoughts which were caught in a, so to speak, virgin state, since they expect that these thoughts appear “unbidden”\(^{52}\), that is, before they become acts of consciousness. Therefore, “the principles of thought do not lead the way (as they should), but rather follow behind”\(^{53}\). This would not be possible were not the imagination, instead of the understanding, the faculty that leads the observation to a pathology associated with “melancholia” [Grillenkrankheit], which grants more soundness to fantasy than to reality\(^{54}\). However, an intense discipline is required to shape this realm of shadows. Actually, everyone is able to notice how the understanding determines the inner sense while producing the effect called attention:

Ich sehe nicht, wie man so viel Schwierigkeit darin finden könne, daß der innere Sinn von uns selbst afficirt werde. Jeder Actus der Aufmerksamkeit kann uns ein Beispiel davon geben. Der Verstand bestimmt darin jederzeit den inneren Sinn der Verbindung, die er denkt, gemäß zur inneren Anschauung, die dem Mannigfaltigen in der Synthesis des Verstandes correspontirt. Wie sehr das Gemüth gemeiniglich hiedurch afficirt werde, wird ein jeder in sich wahrnehmen können\(^{55}\).

The disturbance derived from the prolongation of this state is to be ascribed, to a large extent, to a subreption, stemmed from the will, consisting in conferring a position in space to the soul, so that the soul comes into contradiction with its main function, which Thomas of Aquinas calls transcendentia and Aristotle formulates as the capacity to be, in some man-

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51 N. Pirillo (2003: 393–394) has collected some annotations from the Lectures on Anthropology where Kant praises Montaigne’s self-observation, which takes place im singulari and only regards the empirical I. Kant seems to discover in this method a powerful medicine against the inner illumination which all the authors of diaries allege.

52 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 133.

53 Anth, § 4, AA 07: 134.


55 KrV, § 24, B 156–157. In the Fortschritte (AA 20: 270) Kant stresses the fact that every act of attention affects the inner sense and that, if it goes on for a large time, it could become bothering [beschwerlich]. “Attentio prolongata faticat”, we read in a reflexion of the 60° (AA 15: 59).
ner, all the things. The pre-critical text *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* establishes that an endeavouring meditation, an anxious or happy state are occasions which make possible to downplay the demand of an accurate place for the “organ of the soul”, because sometimes one thinks it lays on the brain, and some other times on the heart or on the diaphragm. This fluctuation shows that mind, by suffering the semblance that thoughts factually lie in one of those organs, shakes a different organ each time. Kant holds responsible for such subreption the physiological theory of the *ideae materiales*, which was of wide use among the supporters of the Cartesian metaphysics:

Die Ursache, die da macht, daß man die nachdenkende Seele vornehmlich im Gehirne zu empfinden glaubt, ist vielleicht diese. Alles Nachsinnen erfordert die Vermittlung der Zeichen für die zu erweckende Ideen, um in deren Begleitung und Unterstützung diesen den erforderlichen Grad Klarheit zu geben. Die Zeichen unserer Vorstellungen aber sind vornehmlich solche, die entweder durchs Gehör oder das Gesicht empfangen sind, welche beide Sinne durch die Eindrücke im Gehirne bewegt werden, indem ihre Organen auch diesem Theile am nächsten liegen. Wenn nun die Erweckung dieser Zeichen, welche Cartesius *ideae materiales* nennt, eigentlich eine Reizung der Nerven zu einer ähnlichen Bewegung mit derjenigen ist, welche die Empfindung ehemal hervorbrachte, so wird das Gewebe des Gehirns im Nachdenken vornehmlich genöthigt werden mit vormaligen Eindrücken harmonisch zu beben und dadurch ermüdet werden.

Kant does not support this explanation, but he acknowledges that at least it does not mixture the reasons of the physiologist with those of the met-

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56 TG, AA 02: 325 and V-MP-K2/Heinze, AA 28: 756–757. Euler rejected all the essays to place human soul in the space in *Letters to a German Princess*, XII, Charpentier, 1843, pp. 235–236: “mon âme n’existe pas dans un certain lieu, mais elle agit dans un certain lieu”.

57 TG, AA 02: 324; cf. *op. cit.*: 345. For the Kantian attribution of the *ideae materiales* to Descartes we refer to the erudite footnote that G. Chamayou (2007: 250–251) prepared for his edition of the French translation of the Epilogue to the “On the soul’s organ”. The footnote collects interesting remarks about this elusive Kantian term from scholars as J. Ferrari and R. Brandt. The last one points out that the *ideae materiales* appear, as far as we could check, in different passages (§§ 23, 33, 35 and 42) of the Latin but not of the french edition of the *Passiones animae*. Descartes refers in the *Treatise of Man* to “the ideas that take form on the surface” of the pineal gland (AT XI, 184). Max Dessoir (1924: 226) says that during the XVIII Century the formation of figures which are claimed to be the effect of movements produced in the brain was an extended method used among doctors and metaphysicians in order to find the place which thought occupies.
aphysicist. The alleged organic traces, which ideas leave behind, repeat, as a kind of pathological reverse of our receptivity, the manner in which the worldly things affect us, so that, whereas in the case of ideas, the guidelines of the thought movement “meet in the brain,”58 producing futile ghosts—velut aegri somnia, vanae finguntur species—, in the case of things, the same guidelines meet outside the brain, conveying us the existence of an external world.

Nonetheless, if one hopes to inquire what thinking actually means, it is necessary to dispense with the Cartesian support of the organic traces which the thought is supposed to leave on the brain. Inner experience confirms that the only non pathological approach to the soul [Seele] stems from its activity and force—virtus—, that is, from the use of the cognitive faculties, whose effects we perceive in the mind [Gemüth]:

[T]he soul is an object of the inner sense and, therefore, it does not occupy any place. But, if I ascribe a place to it, I make of it an object of external sense and I turn it into matter. For this reason, its presence in the body cannot be determined localiter, but virtualiter, deriving from the influence that it has over the body59.

As we read in Kant’s Epilogue to the text About the Organ of Soul of the anatomist Sömmering, “although most people believe to feel the thought in the brain, however it is only a mistake of subreption”60, because they confuse the judgment about the cause which could have produced this sensation with the sensation of the real locality of the cause. The presence virtualiter of the soul requires accomplishing a hermeneutics of its effects,

58 TG, AA 02: 345.
59 V-MP/Mron, AA 29: 909 and V-MS/Vigil, AA 29: 1028–1030. It is advisable to read the introductory study of G. Chamayou (2007: 16–19) to the french edition of Kant’s writings about the link between body and soul, because it offers a profitable outcome about the Kantian critique of those projects which intend to locate the human soul. Cf. V-VP/Dohna, AA 28: 680: “anima, könnte man Seele, das Subjekt der Empfindung, animus, Gemüth das Subjekt der Gedanken, und spiritus Geist—als Subject der Spontaneitaet—nennen”. Cf. Lucretius, De rerum naturae, III, vv. 136–161, where is called anima the vital principle scattered through the body and animus the faculty to think and desire, placed into the breast.
60 Aus Sömmering: Über das Organ der Seele, AA 12: 32–35. Regarding the reach that this short writing has on the Kantian position about the opening of the mind to the world, we refer to the paper of J. González Fisac, “El mundo como ámbito intencional: vida y virtualidad. La (di)solución hermenéutico-metafísica del problema de la comunidad alma-cuerpo en Kant”, Proceedings of the VIII Philosophical Anthropology International Congress, Madrid, UNED (in print).
which will dissolve any claim to the assignment of a place in space to it. This last remark is important to a large extent for the Kantian analyse of unconscious thought\textsuperscript{61}. Once abandoned the criterion of the anatomist, we will search the soul assessing the interest\textsuperscript{62} of our forces or faculties, so that mind [\textit{Gemüth}], that is, “the faculty that combines the given representations and produces the empirical consciousness”\textsuperscript{63}, will supersede the place of soul [\textit{Seele}]. This remark is of great importance for the “localization” of the obscure representations in the mind, because they also need the virtual presence of the transcendental consciousness or apperception, in absence of which the representations neither would be object of thought, nor would become something for us. In the \textit{virtualiter} presence of the soul is to be found the Kantian formulation of the classical Aristotelian sentence, which claims that “the soul is, in a certain manner, all things”, so that “where the body is, there is also the soul”\textsuperscript{64}. According to this statement, every meditation which has been made according to the Cartesian proposal to speculate “back and forth over the traces of impressions remaining in the brain”\textsuperscript{65} is destined to turn into a theoretical helplessness, since this procedure reduces us to mere spectators of the operations that nature executes on us. But as essential as the act that makes us an intelligence is the existence of some material to determine:

The proposition ‘I think’ or ‘I exist thinking’ is not a mere logical function [...] and cannot take place without the inner sense\textsuperscript{66}.

\textsuperscript{61} Starobinski has analysed the link between body and soul, indissoluble while we are alive (1981: 273) and his conclusions are to a large extent valid for Kant’s reflection on the unconscious: “Cessant d’avoir pour source exclusive la vie du corps, l’inconscient échappe à la compétence exclusive d’une approche médicale et relève d’une herméneutique”.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{KpV}, AA 05: 119, where the principle which contains the condition which enhances the exercise of a faculty is called “interest”.

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Aus Sömmering…}, AA 12: 32, footnote; cf. the valuable comment of Krüger (1967: 43 ff.) about the distinction of \textit{Seele} and \textit{Gemüth} and its meaning for the Kantian question concerning the human nature.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{V-MP-K2/Heinze}, AA XXVIII: 757.

\textsuperscript{65} Anth, Pref., AA 07: 119. The letter address to Marcus Herz to the end of 1773 expresses Kant’s distrust towards a physiological approach, as the one of Plattner, to the origin of our thoughts, see Br, AA 10: 145–146.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{KrV}, B 429 s. In a letter to Tiefrunk of 5th April 1798 (\textit{Br}, AA 12: 241), Kant admits to be puzzled by the Fichtean idea of the subject, since a mere form of thought without any matter [\textit{Stoff}] to determine would produce astonishment in the reader, who has not “anything in front of him to apply it to”; see observations about the letter and its bearing for understanding the Logic of Kant in Capozzi (2002: 141). Cf. \textit{Opus postumum} (AA 21: 76).
Far from its application, the highest act of the faculty of understanding is an “undetermined empirical intuition”, an “undetermined perception” and “something real”\textsuperscript{67}, which still does not produce any experience. We will say, then, as a provisional conclusion that the healthiest state for a cognitive faculty depends on its use, so that we will lack psychological consciousness if we do not refer it to the logical consciousness\textsuperscript{68}. This is equivalent to claim that the most harmful thing to the mind is getting obsessed by self-observation. It should not be a surprise that the first progress a doctor has to make with a hypochondriac patient is to succeed in leading him to forget himself\textsuperscript{69}. Turning to oneself and becoming the object of the own thoughts must be practised from time to time \textit{Zwischenräume}, but it must be carefully prevented that this endeavour becomes a habitual propensity, because it would exhaust the faculty of thought\textsuperscript{70}. The vital force gets stronger with the observation of external objects, whereas it weakens itself when the subject dives into the fearful images that he produces in his own mind. For this reason, it is better not to think about anything, to empty oneself of thoughts, instead of fixing the attention on oneself following that physical egoism discussed appropriately in the “Lectures on Anthropology”. The tree of life may be green and golden, but we have no other option left than to observe it through the unbiased and grey lens of theory\textsuperscript{71}. And, since we speak about our life, theory first of all must withdraw the privileged approach which we allege to have over it, in order to clear what makes our life a \textit{common} life, which takes place in the community with others. To fill this theoretical \textit{locus vacans} a pragmatic \textit{episteme} rises, which offers to the blind alley of speculation about oneself an exit called \textit{game}, that is, a pluralist stage, which we will return to in the third epigraph. Proceeding in this way, Kant indeed follows a remark which Descartes conveyed to Princess Elisabeth in a famous letter of 1643, where the French philoso-

\begin{verbatim}
70 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 862–863.
71 Goethe, Faust, part I, vv. 2038–2039. The following passage of Log, AA 09: 33, displays in an excellent manner the priority of the trascendental apperception to every empirical act of representation. Actually this order is condition of possibility of our experience: “Eigentlich ist das Bewußtsein eine Vorstellung, daß eine andre Vorstellung in mir ist”; cf. T. de Aquino, STh, I, qu. 14, a. 1, sol.
\end{verbatim}
pher referred to common social intercourses as the best means to comprehend the union between body and soul\textsuperscript{72}. Before that, we will look into Kant’s disapproval towards the psychological discovery of obscure representations which the German followers of Leibnizian metaphysics had made.

III. The Only Possible Argument for the Deduction of Unconsciousness: The Transcendental Consciousness as Thread to Discover the Obscure Operations of the Mind

The majority of the research dedicated to inquire about the emergence of the unconscious in occidental philosophy usually considers the Leibnizian theory of the \textit{petites perceptions}\textsuperscript{73} as the first appearance of this matter\textsuperscript{74}. Leibniz leads the consciousness to submerge in a dream which will yield a positive result, if only the consciousness renounces to interpose its spontaneity in the reception of the qualitative variety of the world. This exhortation fits to the comparison of the mind with a marble stone with subtle veins, not totally compact, on which different events have left their trace. The cause of our subtle and ephemeral contact with those particles of the universe is our incapacity to comprehend with distinctness the infinity, as


74 I agree with La Rocca (2007: 63–64) in pointing out the disregard that has suffered the Kantian reflection about this subject. Several of his writings, but specially \textit{L’intelletto oscuro. Coscienza e autocoscienza in Kant} (2007), have been crucial for laying out my own text.
God\textsuperscript{75} is able to do. So we gain a clear idea only after gathering enough quantity of them. The Leibnizian monad lies on the antipodes of the Lockian conception of the mind\textsuperscript{76}, which refuses diametrically the existence of a latent activity in it, composed by microscopical perceptions, since there cannot be any shadowy side within the consciousness.

The thought of the Baroque revitalized the gigantomachia of being and not being thanks to a classification of human representations. In a text dated in 1684 Leibniz propounds a division of the representations in four levels—obscure and clear; confusing and distinct; adequate or inadequate and symbolic or intuitive—, so that human understanding will only reach the cognitive summit of intuition in the case of primitive notions, extremely simple. According to the precedent scheme an obscure notion is, unlike what it happens with clear knowledge, insufficient to know the represented thing—\textit{quae non sufficit ad rem representa
tam agnosendam}—, opposed to the feature of clear knowledge:

An obscure notion is one that is not sufficient for recognizing the thing that it represents. Example: I once saw a certain flower but whenever I remember it I cannot bring it to mind well enough to recognize it, distinguishing it from other nearby flowers, when I see it again. Another kind of example: I have obscure notions when I think about some term for which there is no settled definition—such as Aristotle’s \textit{entelechy}, or his notion of cause when offered as something that is common to material, formal, efficient and final causes. And a proposition is obscure if it contains an obscure notion as an ingredient. Accordingly, knowledge is \textit{clear} if it gives me the means for recognizing the thing that is represented. Clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. It is confused when I cannot list, one by one, the marks that enable me to differentiate the represented thing from other things, even though the thing has such marks into which its notion can be resolved. And so we recognize colours, smells, tastes, and other particular objects of the senses clearly enough to be able to distinguish them from one another, but only through the simple testimony of the senses, not by way of marks that we could list\textsuperscript{77}.

\begin{itemize}
\item[76] In \textit{New Essays} Leibniz, with the voice of Teophilus, charges Locke-Philathetes that he has identified, first, the confusion with the obscurity of representations and, second, the idea of something with its image, which can have faults originating in the senses and the imagination (book II, cap. XXIX). For Leibniz, our body is not on a par with our mind. For Locke, the body does not suppose any obstacle for the operations of understanding.
\item[77] Leibniz (1765: 422–423).
\end{itemize}
Chr. Wolff informed Leibniz that the lecture of this text, which is from the Meditatiores de cognitione, veritate et ideis, threw him “an unexpected light about the differences between notions”\(^78\). In the German Logic, loyal to the Leibnizian approach, a notio obscura\(^79\) is a notion whose marks are insufficient to make it known. Wolff mentions different reasons which make clear why some concepts become obscure, that is, a) the vagueness of certain objects, due to the distance which we contemplate them from; b) the difficulty to get to the proprieties of abstract concepts such as cause, end or essence, which would also explain the obscurity of philosophical vocabulary throughout the centuries and c) the distraction with which we perceive an object, which “just as when we pass through a garden and do not pay attention to the noun of an ignored plant that the gardener convey us, because our thoughts are more directed to the lady we intend to visit than the plant”\(^80\). The examples mentioned above concern both the objective insufficiency of representations, which can be caused by the limitation of human cognitive faculties and the consequences of a deficit of attention. Either the thing itself does not let to be perceived with clarity, or we provoke that it is not perceived at all. On the contrary, if we had to spell out to a handicapped person what the red colour, the whistle of wind, the sound of the sea or the bang of waves\(^81\) are, we would meet other kind of thoughts. This time the thoughts would be necessarily confuse in logical terms, because we only could clarify them by leading that person to a place where he could observe the object of these clear but confuse representations\(^82\). Thereby, if his physical faculties allow it, we would offer him a direct experience of those things which we cannot put analytically in front of him. The Leibnizian nomenclature depends strongly upon the sense of sight, which actually guides the classification, so that we “judge, from the constitution of our thoughts, about the

\(^78\) Letter of Wolff to Leibniz, 21th february 1705, in Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Chr. Wolff: 18. In German metaphysics we read, according strictly to the Leibnizian classification, that “the difference of notions is the same that the one of perceptions: they are indeed clear and obscure notions, and the clear ones, distinct or confused” (§ 50) and the German Logic (chap. I, § 9) reproduces the Leibnizian division.


\(^81\) Ibid

\(^82\) op. cit., § 14.
distinctness of vision." For this reason, we use to say that when our thoughts are clear the light comes into our mind. From a cognitive point of view this means, regarding clear representations, an increase of the manifold of marks which are under the control of subject.

If for Leibniz the subject was no conscious of the perceptions which in an imperceptible manner left their trace on the marble surface of the mind as if they were veins, Wolff, as Baumgarten afterwards, declares that we actually have some consciousness of obscure representations in the mind. It is not the representation which is removed from the consciousness, but the object which the representation refers to. We only identify totally obscure perceptions by inference from other perceptions that we observe with some clarity, but it must be admitted that, as we suppose an unconscious thought in them, it seems that we deal with a lack of thought. But obscure concepts “do not leave us without thoughts”, in spite of the mistakes they provoke, due to the fact that such representations entail a wide margin of error for our judgments. The obscurity of the mind entails, then, according to Wolff, a kind of inner mist, which belongs to the remains of our sensory contact with the world that the consciousness did not absorb, what is very fruitful for the field of aesthetical knowledge. So Wolff goes beyond Leibniz by considering a sort of unde-

83 DM, § 200. In § 33 of Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften, Halle, Hemmerde, 1754 (Hildesheim/New York, G. Olms, 1976 reprint) of Meier, whose work serves as textual basis of Kant’s Lectures on Logic, we read that a representation is “clear […] when we are conscious of it, or we know its difference with regard to others”. Obscurity, on the contrary, is defined by the impossibility to reach that state of clearness, absolutely (cognitio absolute obscura) or relatively (cognitio relative obscura) (§ 125); however, “none true knowledge is absolutely obscure”, so that there is nothing which should be considered absolutely obscure in cognitive terms. Every obscure knowledge is obscure only relatively, that is, “the forces of this or that one thinking being are not enough to clarify it” (Ibid). An absolutely obscure knowledge would be a “chimere” (op. cit., § 156), which, although it should not be identified with a complete ignorance (op. cit., § 157), would hidden so much its content to the extent to hamper its clearing with examples.

84 Wolff, DM., §§ 203–204.
88 Wolff, DL, § 10.
terminated objectivity\textsuperscript{90}, defective but positive in its indetermination, as reference of the obscure representations. Baumgarten will link these representations with the *fundus animae*\textsuperscript{91} and the aesthetical *impetus*.

This classification of representations moves from a hypothesis abandoned definitively by Kant, that is, the psychological genesis of consciousness from an original act of distinguishing \(\text{[Unterscheidung]}\), which enables us to split the external things from our inner self. If this act was absent we would not be able to recognize ourselves as subject of our thoughts either. In the Leibnizian-Wolffian school to observe \(\text{[bemerken]}\) a mark \(\text{[Merkmal]}\) that distinguishes something from something else is a general act, in contrast with the consciousness of our selves; even more, that psychological operation generates the latter, which amounts to making empirical psychology the key piece to build a rational or logical psychology. It is worth mentioning that the latter will consider all judgments of an analytical kind. To observe \(\text{[bemerken]}\) grants to the consciousness the possibility to notice the difference between what is external and itself, that is, the possibility to direct its attention to its own acts\textsuperscript{92}. It should not surprise Kant’s temporary admission of empirical psychology in the household of metaphysics, according to the scholar use, as a foreigner who receives a provisional asylum, “until it is in a position to set up an establishment of its own in a complete Anthropology, the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature”\textsuperscript{93}. It is a piece too important to be expelled outright from metaphysics, but it should radically modify its approach to the question about the origin of human knowledge, if it intends to deserve something more than a provisional settlement. In fact, the first decision Kant makes in order to abandon the analysis of the obscure carried out by Wolff, Baumgarten and Meier is to abolish the link between mark


\textsuperscript{91} About the relationship between the *Grund der Seele* \(\text{[fundus animae]}\) \((\text{Aesth, § 80})\) with the “notre propre fonds” of Leibniz \((\text{Phil. Schr., vol. V, 46, 373})\) and the German mystic tradition from Eckhart, see La Rocca (2006: 44, n. 79).


\textsuperscript{93} *KrV*, A 848/B 876-A849/B 877.
and consciousness. Rationalist philosophers remained within the boundaries of empirical psychology, which deals with the chaotic and rough matter deposited in the fundus animae. Afterwards, the soul elaborates this matter until achieving the level of clarity and distinctness. Meier, whose Vernunftlehre Kant uses as basic manual in his Lectures on Logic, can be used to consolidate the fixed correspondence between distinction and consciousness, which makes the first the source of the second and ascribes obscurity to those representations lacking this origin. Since “from nothing, nothing comes out” [aus Nichts wird Nichts], the obscure representations will be the origin of the rest.

The Kantian separation, mentioned above, entails two important consequences. First of all, the way rationalism inquired about the origin of the representative force suffers from a fundamental flaw, for this kind of inquiry leaves aside the question of the logical right a representation has, restraining itself to describe the psychological content of that force. The discovery of unconscious marks reveals that the distinction cannot be either the unique or the first cause of objectivity of representations, the “stage” for which has not been ascribed yet to a concrete instance, which could only be transcendental. To display the structure of objectivity is, indeed, the function that transcendental apperception accomplishes, which, far from being a live-experience of our psyche, is the best antidote against every spirit-seer, since it distinguishes the subjective validity of representations from the objective and universal. Thus, the empirical psychology leaves the little and less oxygenated place [Plätzchen] it occupies in the ancient shelves of scholar metaphysics, which are already at the risk of collapsing, to move to the stage [Schauplatz] of the world. This departure will entail a really transfiguration for a discipline which aspires to be a science, whose corollary shall be the discovering of a pragmatic use of

95 Meier, Auszug, § 161.
97 Meier, Vernunftlehre, § 159.
reason. At first, it will be necessary to distinguish between the issue about consciousness and its unity, on the one hand, and the issue regarding sources of representation, on the other, to stop ascribing to sensibility the mistakes stemmed from the obscurity and confusion of representative marks. Understanding, as occurs with imagination, thinks also in the obscurity, although in these circumstances we just obtain consciousness of their effects. So the unconsciousness is no longer a mere default or privation, usual in the data given by the senses, nor the lowest level of the life of the mind. Only overcoming the opposition between obscurity and clarity, corresponding to sensibility and understanding, the field of unconsciousness will be opened in Kant’s thought. It is not enough to distinguish the structure of an analytical judgment from that of a synthetic one to go forward. Thus, the opportunity—the use of rules in concreto—ought to appear in order to recognize the traces that obscure judgments of the mind have left in us. This recognition cannot employ the same means provided by the material ideas of the Cartesianism, but should rather adopt a pragmatic modulation, which will bound the huge field of the obscure in the mind without appealing to a concealed metaphysical order. Actually, the notion of game has finally made the charm of the petites perceptions disappear. If the pure logic tiptoed around the “applied logic”, now the information that the senses, the games of imagination, the laws of memory and the power of habits convey about our concepts and judgments is especially interesting. It should not be forgotten that general logic had not qualms to draw the heuristic principles which guide the thought from the common understanding, be-


100 This term, which entails an objective indetermination and, consequently, a claim of reflection, is really important to elaborate a theory of prudence, at least from the work of B. Gracián. S. Vaquero (2009) is a valuable work regarding the subject, since S. Vaquero connects the project of a “Reason of State neither political nor economical, but of yourself”, announced in The Hero of Gracián with the foucaultian notion of “gouvernementalité”, understood as “rencontre entre les techniques de domination exercées sur les autres et les techniques de soi” (1994: 785). Cf. Jankélévitch (1980: 124 and 126) and the erudite contribution of N. Elias to this subject (1997: 90 s).

101 Satura (1971: 55–64) offers a list, which pretends to be more exhaustive than systematic, of the Kantian examples of obscure representations; cf. Manganaro (1983: 105–109) and Tortolone (1994: 258–263). Kant displays the three first classes of Satura’s division in the R 177, AA 15: 65.

102 KrV, A 52/B 77; cf. Logik Hechsel (Kant, Logik-Vorlesung: 546).
cause a large stock of abstract laws awaited there to be disclosed\textsuperscript{103}. As a matter of fact, without the hunter who senses the trace of the prey the academical logic would have never emerged, as without the land surveyor Geometry would have never appeared.

We must not forget the second consequence mentioned above. It seems paradoxical that the feature of understanding as a faculty would be associated to the disclosure of the field of representations we are not conscious of. But that is what actually occurs. The ground to tear apart judgments the predicate of which lies retreated and concealed [\textit{versteckter Weise}]\textsuperscript{104} in the concept of the subject from those which express what happens in the world is the unique thread to locate logical decisions we made unconsciously. Without the opening to the worldly syntax provided by the structure called synthetic judgment \textit{a priori} it would not be possible to clarify anything from the analytical bottom of obscure representations, whose reality depends on the transcendental apperception, as occurs with any other appearance of the world. Even more, if we do not enter \textit{into the world}, the obscure representations will have serious difficulties to be conveniently identified. As soon as we feel ourselves affected by something, reflection begins to work\textsuperscript{105}, albeit we are not conscious of this activity, which is often hectic. We forget too early that any content we are conscious of is owed to the understanding, to the extent that the best argument against the fear to death is that “the thought \textit{I am not simply cannot exist}”\textsuperscript{106}. The following extract from the \textit{KrV} makes the synthetic unity of apperception the sole possible source for the clarity of representations:

\begin{quote}
Der Gedanke: diese in der Anschauung gegebene Vorstellungen gehören mir insgesamt zu, heißt demnach so viel, als ich vereinige sie in einem Selbstbewußtsein, oder kann sie wenigstens darin vereinigen; und ob er
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{WDO}, AA 08: 133; cf. \textit{KU}, § 20, AA 05: 238: the common understanding or \textit{sensus communis logicus} works with concepts according with “dunkel vorgestellten Principien”, unlike the \textit{aestheticus} works according to principles which are usually overlapped in the common language; \textit{Log}, AA 09: 11; \textit{Anth}, § 6, AA 07: 139–140 and \textit{Prol}, AA 04: 369.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{KrV}, Einl., § IV, B 10; cf. \textit{FM}, AA 20: 322: “Urtheile sind nämlich \textit{analytisch}, wenn ihr Prädicat nur dasjenige klar (\textit{explicite}) vorstellt, was in dem Begriffe des Subjects, obzwar dunkel (\textit{implicite}), gedacht war; z. B. ein jeder Körper ist ausgedehnt”.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{V-MP-LI/Pöltiz}, AA 28: 233–234.
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gleich selbst noch nicht das Bewußtsein der Synthesis der Vorstellungen ist, so setzt er doch die Möglichkeit der letzteren voraus, d.i. nur dadurch, daß ich das Mannigfaltige derselben in einem Bewußtsein begreifen kann, nenne ich dieselbe insgesammt meine Vorstellungen; denn sonst würde ich ein so vielfärbiges, verschiedenes Selbst haben, als ich Vorstellungen habe, deren ich mir bewußt bin [my emphasis].

The empirical unity of apperception cannot generate any experience alone, because it is not able to unify the different representations according to any objectivity. The original synthetic unity of apperception is the transcendental-logical structure entrusted to open the realm of objectivity. For this reason it grants to our judgments of perception a necessary combination that transforms them into judgments of experience. Kant does not deny that the obscure representations prevail in our mind, but what he rather denies is that we could not notice them without submitting them at a given moment to the principles of objectivity, whose highest point is the original synthetic unity of apperception. If obscure representations can be mine, to declare both that they are possible representations and that they could become representations for me will be enough.

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108 Kant’s following remark stresses this default of the empirical consciousness: R 5923, AA 18, 386: “Allein das Bewustseyn der Wahrnehmungen bezieht alle Vorstellung nur auf uns selbst als Modificationen unseres Zustandes; sie sind alsdenn unter sich getrennt, und vornehmlich sind sie nicht Erkenntnisse von irgend einem Dinge und beziehen sich auf kein Obiect. Sie sind also noch nicht Erfahrung, welche zwar empirische Vorstellung, aber zugleich als Erkenntnis der Genstande der Sinne enthalten muß”.

109 *KrV*, § 15, B 130: “[S]o ist alle Verbindung, wir mögen uns ihrer bewußt werden oder nicht, es mag eine Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung oder mancherlei Begriffe, und an der ersteren der sinnlichen oder nichtsinnlichen Anschauung sein, eine Verstandeshandlung, die wir mit der allgemeinen Benennung Synthesis belegen würden, um dadurch zugleich bemerklich zu machen, daß wir uns nichts als im Obiect verbunden vorstellen können, ohne es vorher selbst verbunden zu haben” [my italics].

110 *KrV*, § 16, B 131–132: “Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, welches eben so viel heißt als: die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein” [my italics]. Cf. La Rocca (2007: 106): “La autoconscienza psicologica ha come sua condizione (che aiuta a manifestare) la possibilità di una coscienza intenzionale, la quale—è la scoperta di Kant più decisiva—non è un atto puntuale di relazione di un singolo stato ad un singolo oggetto, ma è originariamente complessa, ossia presuppone la costitu-
perceive this potentiality as a suspicion that obscure representations hang around or that a latent judgment has moved us to perform some action. This is the Kantian correction to the rationalist question about what decides if a representation is something or rather nothing\textsuperscript{111}, which the following excerpt of the KrV shows with eloquence:

> Klarheit ist nicht, wie die Logiker sagen, das Bewußtsein einer Vorstellung; denn ein gewisser Grad des Bewußtseins, der aber zur Erinnerung nicht zur- eicht, muß selbst in manchen dunkelen Vorstellungen anzutreffen sein, weil ohne alles Bewußtsein wir in der Verbindung dunkeler Vorstellungen kei- nen Unterschied machen würden, welches wir doch bei den Merkmalen mancher Begriffe (wie der von Recht und Billigkeit und des Tonkünstlers, wenn er viele Noten im Phantasiren zugleich greift) zu thun vermögen. Son- dern eine Vorstellung ist klar, in der das Bewußtsein zum Bewußtsein des Unterschiedes derselben von andern zureicht. Reicht dieses zwar zur Unter- scheidung, aber nicht zum Bewußtsein des Unterschiedes zu, so müßte die Vorstellung noch dunkel genannt werden. Also giebt es unendlich viele Grade des Bewußtseins bis zum Verschwinden\textsuperscript{112}.

Kant makes the transcendental apperception the necessary threshold for any representation referred to objects, but it is not indispensable to this threshold to be noticed with distinctness, not even with what is usually called clarity. Often the transcendental apperception remains in a floating state, more obscure than clear\textsuperscript{113}, as the normative system of their mother language can be obscure to numerous speakers, but they do not stop to communicate with each other. As what happens to the rest of acts which understanding structurally sustains, we are only rarely conscious of the “blind function of mind” which synthesis is. The task of the under-

\textsuperscript{111} KrV, A 103–104: “Denn dieses eine Bewußtsein ist es, was das Mannigfaltige, nach und nach Angeschaute und dann auch Reproducirte in eine Vorstellung vereinigt. Dieses Bewußtsein kann oft nur schwach sein, so daß wir es nur in der Wirkung, nicht aber in dem Actus selbst, d.i. unmittelbar, mit der Erzeugung der Vorstellung verknüpfen: aber uneracht dieser Unterschiede muß doch immer ein Bewußtsein angetroffen werden, wenn ihm gleich die hervorstechende Klarheit mangelt, und ohne dasselbe sind Begriffe und mit ihnen Erkenntniß von Gegenständen ganz unmöglich” [my italics].


\textsuperscript{113} KrV, A 104, A 106, A 116 and 123.
standing is to bring this synthesis “to concepts” and this task turns it into a specific faculty. If some obscure representations can belong to the interconnected context of experience, it will hold them as the legitimate bottom of it, kept latent in the empirical consciousness. The obscure representations are not effectively submitted to the original synthetic unity of apperception. The proof of that is that we do not remember them nor their acquisition has been registered in the treasury of consciousness. But it would be enough to be virtually submitted to that unity. This is the only shelter that understanding offers the obscure representations. This explains a remark of great importance for the Anthropology of Kant, since, although man could pretend to regard his obscure representations as an animal would do it, that is, without being conscious of them, nevertheless, man is determined to see them—even to recognize that he is not able to clarify them—with the aid of light which self-consciousness delivers, what the animal is not able to do. Thus, the Leibnizian-Wolffian approach to the unconscious thought is turned over. Not to mention the romantic sympathy for the unconscious, for the obscure has already no lessons to give to the transcendental apperception. Rather, it is the unique means to notice the presence of the unconscious in the mind. Therefore, the best explorer of obscure representations would not be the visionary, but one who not only knows enough the conditions of possible experience, but is also a man of world, that is, somebody who knows when to interrupt the periods devoted to speculation to have leisure with other human beings in society. The fact that we are able to give reason of the sequence of steps which guided our unconscious judgments (in case we decide to compose its hypothetical genesis as far as we can), proves that the operations executed in the obscurity of the mind are not mere organic events. One more time, the power to say “I” raises us infinitely above the animal, which certainly distinguishes, but has no consciousness of the distinctions it makes.

114 KrV, § 10, A 78/B 103; cf. op. cit, § 15, B 130.
116 Kant’s Anthropology closes the gap that Hume’s scepticism established between the speculation and the philosophical delire, on the one hand, and the effects of leisure and distraction, on the other; see Treatise of Human Nature, I, IV, vii, SB 269, where that gap appears as methodic condition of the “unique science of man” (op. cit., 273), that is, of the science of human nature.
117 Spitzfindigkeit, AA 02: 59–60. C. Ginzburg finds in this “physical distinction” the intuition claimed by the “indiciary paradigm”, which he proposes to apply.
Alles in der Natur, sowohl in der leblosen als auch in der belebten Welt, geschieht nach Regeln, ob wir gleich diese Regeln nicht immer kennen. […] Auch die Ausübung unserer Kräfte geschieht nach gewissen Regeln, die wir befolgen, zuerst derselben unbewußt, bis wir zu ihrer Erkenntnis allmählich durch Versuche und einen längern Gebrauch unserer Kräfte gelangen, ja uns am Ende dieselben so geläufig machen, daß es uns viele Mühe kostet, sie in abstracto zu denken. So ist z.B. die allgemeine Grammatik die Form einer Sprache überhaupt. Man spricht aber auch, ohne Grammatik zu kennen; und der, welcher, ohne sie zu kennen, spricht, hat wirklich eine Grammatik und spricht nach Regeln, deren er sich aber nicht bewußt ist\textsuperscript{118}.

The general logic is a matter of surface, whose task is to rule the most visible and illuminated zone of our judgments and reasoning. Even a logic attentive to the contents, as transcendental logic, which recognizes the existence of a “blind function of the mind” as synthesis is, does not inquire the reflective activities retreated in the shadowy side of the mind. This task is eminently metaphysical and, to be precise, belongs to the matter Kant considers the heiress of the needy empirical psychology of rationalism, namely, the anthropology as a pragmatic knowledge.

IV. From the \textit{petites perceptions} to the Concept of Game:
The Pragmatic Map of the Representations in the Mind

The appearances bearing on the obscure activity of the cognitive faculties of the mind show also the connection between these faculties. The fact that reason prepares the field to understanding\textsuperscript{119}, by ordering the collection of its concepts in accordance with a systematic unity, remembers—\textit{mutatis mutandis}—what happens to someone who decodes the characters to the field of historiography and which “closely connects man as an animal with others animal species”. Cf. Ginzburg (2000: 193); Mathieu (1994: 82).


\textsuperscript{119} KrV, B 685.
of a text: he suspects to have been performing unconscious calculations. The reader, as well as his understanding, only notices the authentic point of departure afterwards, namely, after having finished reading either a literary text or the experience as an interconnected space of appearances. This is a restraint, regarding the knowledge about the human nature, that Anthropology has to take seriously into account, for when the springs of a mental operation are active, we cannot observe them, whilst when we observe them, they stop working or they radically modify its activity. Just then the crucial question emerges: Have I been conscious of the whole cognitive operations required to do what I have been doing? The question does not undertake an exhaustive inquiry of what kind and how many operations and assumptions were required promptly for the activity of spelling and after for the one of reading. The question is settled when noticing the existence of an “unconscious cognitive” what often occurs in a so ephemeral manner that merely to spell out becomes a really thorny task. A different description of this phenomenon,


121 Anth, Vor., AA 07: 121.

122 The relevance that Kant recognizes to these operations that the mind carries out should be enough to consider its analysis of intellectual obscurity close to the studies of Piaget about the cognitive unconsciousness. See “Inconscient affectif et inconscient cognitif”, in: Id., Problèmes de psychologie génétique, Paris, Denoël, 1972, p. 11: “le sujet […] a conscience des résultats qu’ils obtiennent, mais nullement des mécanismes intimes qui ont transformé sa pensée, les structures de celle-ci demeurent inconscientes en tant que structures. Ce sont ces mécanismes en tant que structures et que fonctionnement que nous appellerons globalement l’inconscient cognitif”. Cassirer (1956: 203–204) has appealed to an analogous argument against the reduction of a linguistic form to a sound matter.

123 Manganaro has highlighted that Kant’ discovery of the existence of obscure representations does not intend a complete illumination of the mind (1983: 105): “[I]l processo Kantiano di Aufklärung, la quale ha tante affinità con la Erklärung di Wolff, non va semplicemente dall’oscuro al chiaro, bensì dal chiaro all’oscuro, ossia da ciò che è dato come un chiaro “indizio” alla ricostruzione del campo dell’oscuro. In questo processo, che è un processo memorativo, più che cognitivo in senso freudiano, l’assoluta completezza del mondo oscuro è postu-
where a faculty overcomes the boundaries of another one for its own sake, is the connection between thinking and knowledge. So that, in opposition to the conditions of possibility of knowledge, the only thing demanded of me to think something is not to contradict myself. Kant asserts that we never stop thinking while we are alive, what does the same as affirming that understanding is not the unique faculty which takes part in knowledge. We cannot try to forecast in the most diligent manner the conclusions that our judgments will finally draw. This is a requirement [Bedürfnis] which urges on our faculty of judgment, whose performances we are not allowed to interrupt in an arbitrary manner. Even more, the whole judging activity assumes that things, natural or not, will let themselves be classified in accordance with the conditions of a logical system. Occasionally, due to a habit, we do not notice this appeal [Geheiß] originally rooted in the faculty of judgment, but without it the complete activity of this faculty would sink. On the other hand, according a particular interpretation of the sumpnoia panta that Leibniz borrowed from the stoics, none of our judgments remains isolated. In fact, each judgment depends on an amazing activity enacted by the faculty of judgment. In this perpetual exercise of anticipation the shadow of the unconscious perceptions of Rationalism should not be noticed, but the influence that the systematic order searched by reason on the works of understanding should. Actually, reason displays like a stage the field of understanding, as emerges from the investigation of the natural purposiveness [N.B. purposiveness is the translation of Zweckmässigkeit according to the Cambridge edition] which confirms the rational tendency to produce transcendent concepts. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the existence of purpo-

124 KrV, B XXVIII.
125 WDO, AA 08: 139.
126 KU, Einl., § VI, AA 05: 87–188.
127 Prol, AA 04: 362 ff. To the extent to say that “auch Erfahrung mittelbar unter der Gesetzgebung der Vernunft stehe” (364), assertion to which could be added that the connection, the most direct, between both orders is generally a regulative sign which remains obscure for the researcher, who only achieve to continue with difficulties. Cf. KrV, A 737/B 765 s., where Kant, regarding the impossibility to use a dogmatic method in philosophy, asserts that our reason is, in a subjective sense, a system, but that, when its use proceeds with concepts, reason
siveness concerns specially the use of a faculty\(^{128}\), so who denies or conceals its existence would ground a peculiar “tyranny of values”, which perhaps would turn the mind as \textit{Gemüth} into the proper object of study of a philosophy of mind. In this sense, sciences as arithmetic and geometry would never have arisen if their founders would have been guided by the stingy question: \textit{what is this for}?\(^{129}\) Nothing great has been done in science without granting a horizon which must be maintained in half-light. On the contrary, regarding the practical use of reason, the half-lighted horizon where passions and their obscure misinterpretation of the practical tenets move generates actually a cancer for the practical reason.

Now I suggest focusing on the rich content that Kant’s lectures on logic and anthropology offer about obscure representations. First, we have to tackle what discipline is incumbent to determine “the reflections that understanding has done in obscurity”\(^{130}\). Metaphysics, and not logic, should be chosen to carry out this task, since, as seen above, if such goal were attempted from a logical point of view, it would be severely hampered. The discovery of the darkness of the mind is so indissolubly associated to the history of this sought-after science\(^{131}\) and, indeed, to the entire philosophy, that cannot leave in the hands of the mathematical calculation the results derived from concepts that have been exhaustively refined. For this reason, the latter makes progress insofar as the analysis of its concepts also progresses. Taking into account that “most part of the activity of understanding occurs in the darkness”\(^{132}\), the scholar of metaphysics cannot get rid of the responsibility of research; as far as possible, the sources where “the hidden springs of what takes place at light”\(^{133}\) lie. Indeed, such a study is no trifle:\(^{134}\)

\footnotesize{should be considered as a “system of research according to unity principles”, which the experience provides the necessarily material with.}

\(^{128}\) \textit{KrV}, A 817/B 845.

\(^{129}\) \textit{Log}, AA 09: 42. The article of Pozzo (2005: 198–202) contains valuable information about the influence of the doctrine of the logical horizon in Kant.

\(^{130}\) \textit{V-Lo/Pölitz}, AA 24: 536.


\(^{132}\) R 177, AA 15: 65; cf. R 2342, AA 16: 324: “Die dunkele wahre Erkenntniss ist das \textit{materiale} zu klahren Wahren Begriffen, \textit{e.g.} des Christen in der Religion”. In a letter adressed to Reinhold, dated on the 20th september 1791, AA 11: 288, Kant declares that the analysis promotes the elaboration of a \textit{Critique of pure reason}, since it allows that “what still appears obscure becomes distinct”.

\(^{133}\) \textit{V-Anth/Fried}, AA 25: 479.

Diese dunklen Gründe zu entwicklen ist das Geschäft des Philosophen, wobei wir oft die Vortrefflichkeit der enfalteten Einrichtung des Menschen bewundern. Die Keime unserer Gedanken liegen nur in uns selbst, und dies ist der wahre Schatz der menschlichen Seele; das, was man bis jetzt entwickelt hat, ist unendlich wenig gegen das, was man noch entwickeln könnte. Alle Metaphysiker, Moralisten, müssen demnach zur Aufklärung der dunklen Vorstellungen in dem Menschen beitragen, weil es darin auf die Begriffe der Menschen ankommt, die sie bei sich haben135.

In this overall context of the research the judgments in advance [vorläufige Urteile]136 deserve a special mention, as pieces of a heuristic logic spread along Kant’s writings. The natural procedure is to notice the presence of this hidden ground of the faculty of judgment once a determined judgment has been given out, in order to reconstruct from it the content and the aim of the one which has fortunately guided the search137. It would help to bear in mind that the logic resulting of the previous attempt must remain always in a sketchy state, as the desire of getting a complete control of the judgments, which take place secretly in the mind, would entail the dispossessment of our finitude, which therefore would ruin the primacy of the game as the most profitable experience to recognize the action of concealed cognitive operations138. In this case, the facticity of the obscure side of the mind would stop to surprise us, as the audience which attends a puppetry spectacle, once it is conscious of the principles of its activity. Likewise, scientists like Linnaeus would neither boast unconsciously of the fact that the manifold of natural beings would let themselves be classified in accordance with a logical system, nor would they make reference to worry and hope as suitable terms for the severe tone

136 La Rocca (2003: 119) is author of a profitable study of this kind of judgments in Kant: “Se Kant avesse sviluppato in modo più compiuto la sua “logica dei giudizi provvisori”, avrebbe delineato un sistema di autoanalisi, in base all’intersoggettività di principio, della rete di anticipazioni che rendono possibile, guidandola, la conoscenza empirica”.
137 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 481.
138 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 502; the satisfaction of this desire would shatter the balance among the faculties of the human mind, see KpV, AA 05: 147–148. Peirce threw other glance about the materials offered by these judgments, which turns the obscure genesis of our judgments in the effective motor of all synthesis a priori. It is not at stake to value that provisional judgments have guided our understanding to achieve an objectively valid judgment, but that “the whole cognitive process is put under the sign of the hypothetic inference” (Eco, 1997: 79).
of the logic necessarily used by scientific research. The fact that applying the sceptical method, regarding metaphysical problems, or that taking part in a game—between scholars or social mates—which only an adult would be able to appraise, is a phenomenon compatible with the purposes of Enlightenment is not a negligible finding associated to the discovery of the obscure representations. If this is true, this topic would interest both metaphysics and Pedagogy, since it brings out a discipline for the use of reason and the exercise of freedom. Indeed, in the game that understanding undertakes with itself in the realm of the obscure representations, where it is not always the leading element, a powerful obstacle must be recognized. This obstacle does not let this faculty get too enthusiastic on account of its spontaneity; a faculty that draws consciousness of itself from an “obscure distinction of Judgment”, no matter how coarse or rough it could be, between the sensible world and the intellectual one. Thus, the reflective operations which cover as a concealed thread the darkness of the mind become a burden for the understanding, when this cognitive faculty is victim of the illusion which would wish to see it free of such faults. They shall be, however, of an odd benefit if employed to draw the critical geography of this faculty. So, the reflection about the judgments in advance may “give rules regarding the way we should judge in advance about an object”, but it should be more careful with the uncontrolled aim to turn all the judgments in advance into determining judgments. If this could be possible, the transcendental logic would stop being a mere canon for the pure understanding, as the general logic is with a formal reach for understanding and reason, in order to become the always yearned organon of philosophy. But “we do not possess


140 KrV, A 424/B 451–452.

141 My lecture of the unconscious in Kant’s writing is deeply indebted to the following study of J.L. Pardo (2004: 49 and 463–488) and the respective notions of game 1 and game 2, of Wittgensteinian origin, that he uses there; cf. R. Ronchi (1996) and A. Cohen (2008a and b).

142 GMS, AA 04: 450–452.

143 Cassirer’s theory of the symbolic forms is considered heir of the Kantian method, even though it does not consider in its real sense the originality of the Kantian thought about the unconscious, dispersed in its work, see specially Die Logik des Symbolbegriffs.

it yet”\textsuperscript{145} and there are more than enough reasons, as it has been said before, to state that the \textit{Critique} never had the purpose of grounding something similar.

Kant seems to have read Wittgenstein when he highlights—in a second context of entries stemmed from the obscure representations—that we will be appraised in society first from our appearance, gestures, clothing, although upright men shall retroactively judge us from our intelligence or character. Likewise, we must acknowledge that we cannot avoid judging a stranger from his face or that a book arouses our interest from its title. Or perhaps can we avoid behaving this way? Kant chooses an intermediate solution, which would gradually lead the judgments in advance to the state of conscious judgments. He also tags that the rhythm we deliver judgments never tallies with the rhythm of the worldly things, that is to say, that our finitude prevents us to react immediately and in a complete right manner to the phenomena we have to face. Maybe this unavoidable upheaval is the framework of human life\textsuperscript{146}. A total right answer seldom occurs and when it happens we notice, no matter how obscure it could be, that an unconscious appraisal guided us unintendedly to success. Otherwise, if we could become those perfect speakers, how would we be conscious of the difference between sensibility and understanding, that notwithstanding we ascribe to a “common, but to us unknown, root”\textsuperscript{147}? So, all the judgments necessarily shelter a history that, first and foremost, is unknown to us. We are only allowed to dream that we can exercise instantaneously the determining faculty of judgment\textsuperscript{148}, because we would be able to do it only if we could dispense with the synthesis of apprehension and, therefore, with the combination between the functions of understanding and the manifold material supplied by sensation. What does not surprise us is the fact that the paragraphs of the \textit{Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view} devoted to the obscure representations and its distinctness or indistinctness are followed by a long reminder about the heterogeneity of sources of representation, that is to say, the basis of the knowledge possible to us. An intui-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{145} V-\textit{Lo/Wiener}, 24: 861; cf. \textit{KrV} A 60/B 85-A 61/B 86 and A 796/B 824.
\item \textsuperscript{147} \textit{KrV}, \textit{Einl.}, § II, A 15.
\item \textsuperscript{148} \textit{PhilEnz}, AA 29: 24–25. Kant’s reluctance to a logical absorption of the set of provisional judgments may give the chance to assess the closeness of his interpretation to the freudian definition of unconsciuosity. The reading of Freud’s work as \textit{Das Unbewusste} (1915) and \textit{Einige Bemerkungen über den Begriff des Unbewussten in der Psychoanalyse} (1912) could clarify this point.
\end{itemize}
Unconscious Thought in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology

tive understanding would abruptly interrupt the game that the obscure representations set in motion in the mind, so that it is well-grounded to assert that judgments in advance are a point of an odd depth in the building of human reason. Indeed, this type of judgments contents an unconscious subtract, which no logic could turn into the state of an abstract rule. In fact, every research “must always first presuppose something here”\(^{149}\) that is to say, it must begin with a hypothesis which was not previously taught and which, in either case, stems from a decision so impossible to prove directly as the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction\(^{150}\). Due to this, this faculty must be considered a natural gift, what explains that the logic of the scientific research sets out a hermeneutical circle which prevents the transcendental logic to become one day a productive organon of knowledge not falling into the dialectic. This fact displays also the defences that a game, generated in the obscurity of the mind, provides to conserve the human health, contrary to that other game, very dangerous and normally neglected, performed by those minds bewitched by their power to cover, it does not matter the topic, all thoughts with the logical form of thinking.

It must be emphasized that the analysis of the obscure representations has a certain argumental homogeneity in the lectures that Kant devoted to Anthropology. If we attempt to display this framework, it would be advisable to take into account that the obscurity of the mind should be considered, first and foremost, a paradox. Indeed, in accordance with the famous objection of J. Locke\(^{151}\) which Leibniz argues against, how could we know if we are in possession of representations without being con-

\(^{149}\) Anth, § 56, AA 07: 223; cf. the phenomenon of the premonition of something future, which covers “judgments arising from obscure concepts of such a causal relation”, AA 07: 187 and the general efficacy of obscure judgments in op. cit., AA 07: 140 and 144. The ‘rest’ which provisional judgments entail, and which is non-objectivatable in logical terms, remembers to what a linguist as K. Bühler, in response to certain anlytical and structuralist excesses, called “experience of meaning” (1934, § 4: 58). Freud’s text Triebe und Triebschicksale (1915) may be the counterpoint of Kantian theory about the natural giveness of the cognitive faculties.

\(^{150}\) It would be of interest to assess the closeness between what we consider here “pragmatic deduction” of the unconscious thought and the validity of the refutation in the Metaphysics of Aristotle as an indirect proof of the truth of a principle.

\(^{151}\) Anth, § 5, AA 07: 135. See Essay, l. II, 1, §§ 15–19. Freud and Breuer suggest the very expression “representative substrate” in order to scape from this objection, see Studien über die Hysterie (1895).
scious of them? Nevertheless, a better beginning than this one could not be found in order to deal with the representations which cover most part of the map of mind\textsuperscript{152}, since the absence of a \textit{directly} consciousness of the obscure representations allows us precisely to be \textit{indirectly} seized in accordance with the influence they have on our conscious life\textsuperscript{153}. Once we accept the possibility of an indirect consciousness of this kind of representations, the Kantian analysis uses a distinction which is not specifically stated, but which powerfully reminds us the one Freud established between the \textit{preconscious} and the \textit{unconscious}\textsuperscript{154}. Next we will focus on both terms. First, the perceptions whose faulty character we are not conscious of, the use of devices which broaden the feature and details of the things we observe and thereby allow us to recognize an unsuspected depth also in the sounds we hear, all these phenomena prove that the most part of the operations of the faculties of mind occur in the obscurity. Anyway, we are enabled to recover those operations, either hypothetically or with the contribution of technical devices.

For the purpose of enlightening this first aspect of the obscure representations Kant delivers various examples, some of them recurrent in the Lectures on Anthropology. The example of the confuse perception of a meadow or of a man we see in the distance is paradigmatic of the manner—which is as progressive as impatient—how we perceive\textsuperscript{155}. In fact,

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{V-Menschenkunde}, AA 25: 868. In \textit{Studien über die Hysterie} Freud and Breuer also use the image of light to underscore the quantitative decompensation between conscious and unconscious life.

\textsuperscript{153} See Tortolone (1994: 258–260).

\textsuperscript{154} It puzzles that a recognized specialist in Kant’s Anthropology as R. Brandt, regarding the treatment of the question in \textit{Anth}, § 5 (1991: 96), supports: “In a nutshell, […] Kant is not interested on a broader specification of the unconsciousness” [my translation]. See Freud, \textit{Einige Bemerkungen…} (1912): “Wir waren gewohnt zu denken, daß jeder latente Gedanke dies infolge seiner Schwäche war, und daß er bewußt wurde, sowie er Kraft erhielt. Wir haben nun die Überzeugung gewonnen, daß es gewisse latente Gedanken gibt, die nicht ins Bewußtsein eindringen, wie stark sie auch sein mögen. Wir wollen daher die latenten Gedanken der ersten Gruppe \textit{vorbewußt} nennen, während wir den Ausdruck \textit{unbewußt} (im eigentlichen Sinne) für die zweite Gruppe reservieren, die wir bei den Neurosen betrachtet haben. Der Ausdruck \textit{unbewußt}, den wir bisher bloß im beschreibenden Sinne benützt haben, erhält jetzt eine erweiterte Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet nicht bloß latente Gedanken im allgemeinen, sondern besonders solche mit einem bestimmten dynamischen Charakter, nämlich diejenigen, die sich trotz ihrer Intensität und Wirksamkeit dem Bewußtsein ferne halten”.

our perception does not wait to utter a judgment about an object which faces it until it has gained a complete vision of such object. And in this judgment reflection will bring forward the complete shape of what has not been clearly seen yet—the place that eyes, nose and mouth, which are still not noticed in detail, have in the whole—, “[drawing the conclusion] that that thing was a man”\textsuperscript{156}. It is not clear if in this perception is still working a rational instance, which would determine the provisionally fittest conceptual scheme for the sensory data which are still meager. However, it would not be difficult to connect this appraisal of the methodological assumptions which inhabit our perception with the observations about the transcendental principle of purposiveness which is contained in the \textit{First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment}. It makes no sense to charge the sensibility with the defaults of the judgments uttered in such circumstances, since the faculty of judgment is the unique responsible for those assessments which will be afterwards thrown away. The obscure perception of what is far-off from us also conveys the power which adjacent representations can have over main representations, albeit the first ones do not provide such a relevant information, in objective terms, as the last ones. We ignore actually why these countervailing representations enthral our attention with such intensity\textsuperscript{157}.

A second group of examples concentrates in the manner how devices as the telescope and the microscope modify our perception, whereas they uncover data, which already existed in it, after enlarging and enhancing the sharpness of the images which are pictured on the retina\textsuperscript{158}. This modification tears up the association that the ancient Greeks established between the Milky Way and the imaginary milk jet of a godness, but, at the

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\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Anth}, § 5, AA 07: 135. Kant’s analysis seems near to the phenomenon of the “request image”, which K. Bühler has studied in his \textit{Sprachtheorie}.

\textsuperscript{157} V-\textit{Anth/Parow}, AA 25: 266 and V-\textit{Menschenkunde}, AA 25: 946: “Es ist merkwürdig, daß wir erst auf willkürliche Weise uniere Einbildungskraft auf einen Gegenstand lenken können, dann verfolgt dieselbe ihr Spiel von selbst, und wir folgen nicht mehr willkürlich, sondern eine innere Kraft der Seele leitet uns, die Bilder nehmen ihren Gang und wir selbst wissen nicht, wie wir darauf kommen”. The remark is as interesting for the dynamics of the \textit{Pathosformel} in A. Warburg as for appreciating the implications of the Kantian heritage of the logic of symbol which was analysed by Cassirer in \textit{Der Begriffsform im mythischen Denken} and in \textit{Zur Logik des Symbolbegriffs} (1959).

same time, they confirm that the white patch was only, *in objective terms*, the obscure representation of a group of stars\(^{159}\). Therefore, the fault needs not to be charged to the sensibility, but rather to the faculty of judgment and its impatient *subjective* tenets. The active cognitive life appears associated to this kind of examples, a life which underlays a musical fantasy which is plaid on the organ, whose freedom in the improvisation moves blindly on without leaving any trace on the conscious of the musician, who “perhaps otherwise with all diligence and care could never hope to bring off so well”\(^{160}\). Unlike the previous examples, the field of artistic creation, which from Baumgarten is a common and productive region where obscure representations show specially their activity, has not, as happens with the natural gift of inquiry, a suitable microscope. Quite on the contrary, the one who listens to a musical piece, starting with the author himself, notices the presence, although the perception could be confused, of a reflective and unconscious depth\(^{161}\), which supports the final result as a kind of structural bottom which the subject suspects, without being able to define it in a more precise manner. A last group of obscure representations, which have their root in metaphysics and moral\(^{162}\), remind the philosopher that he ought to bring them to the clarity, for the purpose of uncovering the hidden forces which move them, as the physician, observing the bodies, discovers the forces of matter. Moreover, it is a duty of the philosopher\(^{163}\) to research, as far as possible, in the obscurity of the mind.

These examples set out a first pattern of the unconscious in Kant, which gathers pre-conscious reflections and latent perceptions that, according to a Leibnizian-Wolffian hypothesis, would be possible no emphasis to be utterly clarified\(^{164}\). Such an achievement would turn our mind in a motive of perpetual admiration, basically because we would become a kind of divinity. It would not be possible to distinguish between


\(^{163}\) *V-Anth/Parow*, AA 25: 250.

the genial and the third rate performances, either between the called “logical tact” and the science, without the high cost of ruin the order among soul [Seele], mind [Gemüt] and spirit [Geist]. Yet this desire stems from a preconceived idea of the unconscious thought, the idea of taking the conscious representation as the only valid criterion, namely, the clear and, if possible, distinct representation, instead of appreciating the heuristic support of the reflection which has worked in the obscurity. It is beyond all doubt that the examples assessed up to now belong more to an Anthropology from a physiological view than to a pragmatic one, since the “play of sensations” they bring about is uncovered only in a passive manner, a play whose consequences concern the private sphere more than the sociability. Kant's writing called Menschenkunde may make easier for us to transit to the authentic use of the obscure representations. This lecture, which is devoted to Anthropology, invites to analyse the case of a cultivated man, whom someone asks for to argue about a topic, which the man believes not to have licence to pronounce a word about. Yet this man is not a reliable source of the contents which his mind conceals. Thereby, Kant asserts that if the guest does not accept the pleas of this man, but on the contrary, the first one continues to encourage the last one to speak, this behaviour would unconsciously set in motion the capacity of reflection of the speaker, as confirms the fact that occasionally it is enough “to begin with a subject and, suddenly after, to be able to narrate this story or that other”. It is worth noticing the presence of the term “occasion” [Veranlassung] in the text, which replaces the magnifying optic glasses mentioned above. Everyone can use a telescope in the loneliness of a lab, yet nothing would give a better performance as the pragmatic publicity and the “refined humanity” of a dinner party [Tischgesellschaft]—“this little dinner party” in order to find, without the risk of falling into the Schwärmerie, the bottom of thoughts which are awaiting to be discovered in the self. In spite of the objection of Locke, the human understanding generally does not know what it actually knows. Therefore, the society, not the private space, must carry

167 See Foucault (2008: 64). See also Anth, § 88, AA 07: 277–278 and the remarks of M. Ruffing about this § (2009: 50 s.).
168 Anth, § 88, AA 07: 278.
out the Socratic role of the midwife. Moreover, in a common meal a companion of table supplies to another “with alternative ideas […] stimulation through new material which he himself had not been able to track down”. The proposal to make of social game, of the laws and conversations of social intercourse the most suitable occasion to ‘unload’, in a healthy and reasonable manner, entire files of information, which we ignore to be in possess of, seems to be the best antidote of the pathologies related to self-observation and, borrowing a term of Michel Foucault, it also seems to be the access to a fruitful “gouvernement de soi et par soi dans son articulation avec les rapports à autrui”. The obscure representations are the intimate realm of the mind, but we will never come to know anything about them without getting out of ourselves and entering into the world, where we shall take part in a common life. This entails a new paradox, which is specially important for the subject at stake. The first paradox that we met was focused on the possibility to have representations without being conscious of them. Now we notice that we must rely on the others in order to extract fragments of our unconscious thought. Precisely this unexpected request of exteriority, which is arisen from the most hidden regions of the mind, leads to the other side of the obscure representations, namely, to the specifically unconscious one. We would argue that its role should be accurately assessed in the light of the artifice, that is to say, beyond the existence of a suit-


170 Anth, § 88, AA 07: 280.

171 Foucault, “Subjectivité et vérité”, 1994: 214. Cf. the helpful article of A. Cohen (2009: 133): “[F]or Kant, from the pragmatic perspective of human action, there is no doubt that we do have access to an experience of freedom and that our rational and moral capacities are empirically exercised rather than happening in some timeless inaccessible world”.

172 Foucault’s following citation has been specially helpful for us, in order to identify the function that unconscious thought has in Kant (2008: 56–57): “Alors que le temps de la Critique assurait l’unité de l’originaire (depuis l’originirement donné jusqu’à la synthèse originaire), se déployant ainsi dans la dimension du Ur… celui de l’Anthropologie reste voué au domaine du Ver…, parce qu’il maintient la dispersion des synthèses et la possibilité toujours renouvelée de les voir s’échapper les unes aux autres. […] Dans la Critique, le temps se faisait transparent à une activité synthétique qui n’était pas elle-même temporelle, puisqu’elle
able occasion to experience the presence of the obscure reflection. This new experience encompasses both the game which we undergo, where our nature is too near to the conditions of finitude, and the one which we voluntary generated in order to protect us from those objects which would put at risk the space of social intercourse.

The connection between the obscure representations and the concept of game is essential to break away from the traditional Leibnizian-Wolffian interpretation. It is necessary to distinguish two modalities of game. On the one hand, game appears as an effect which we cannot control, that is to say, so that we become “a toy of the obscure representations”\textsuperscript{173}, for instance, when our understanding runs into the idea of death and therefore falls into logical absurdities, which only express our fear of the mortal condition. On the other hand, less frequently, we intentionally play with these representations, with the aim of covering some concrete subjects with civilisation. Even if it is not approved to mention them, because they are unpolite, in the social intercourse, it would be possible not to renounce to the pleasure of seeing them flow from one conversation to another under the sheltering veil of irony and metaphor. We will tackle the three examples which appear in the § 5 of the \textit{Anthropology from a pragmatic view} and we will focus on death, prejudices and sex. Regarding the first two ones we behave in a more passive than active manner, since the person who meditates about the place where he prefers to be buried certainly knows that this reflection will not achieve anything. Yet he shall not find a most efficacious issue than this tub-thought\textsuperscript{174} to move the phantom of death away. The concern to secure a good lot or a beautiful view in the cemetery, which affects even the wisest men\textsuperscript{175}, lacks sense, even if this thought undertakes its course without our consent and is reluctant to vanish. We feel, thus, under the control of reflections which we do not consider rational to start with. Likewise, it is socially extended that somebody has pity for a recently dead young man, as marks the eloquent utterance of sorrow “after seeing such young blood buried”\textsuperscript{176}, albeit everybody knows that death is the end of all suffering and that after it there is noth-

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Anth}, § 5, AA 07: 136.
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Anth}, § 14, AA 07: 152.
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{V-Anth/Parow}, AA 25: 250.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{V-Menschenkunde}, AA 25: 870.
ing neither good nor bad for man. In a less radical way, somebody placed in the highest point of a tower and endeavoring to see downwards might be assaulted by the vertigo. In this case obscure representations may make this person totter, although he is well conscious that a rail solid enough protects him, to the extent that the power of these representations could lead him to fall without other cause than autosuggestion\textsuperscript{177}. In such a case, the unconsciousness of these representations generates the belief that we have sensations which actually did not take place.

It is also necessary to investigate the first grounds of the prejudices, before which the understanding seems to be helpless. Kant suggests as paradigmatic a case as the following. The sighs that the bourgeois of the XVIII Century breathed before the inexperience \textit{[Unerfahrenheit]} in the art of pretence \textit{[Kunst zu scheinen]}\textsuperscript{178}, noticed in an adolescent peasant girl, and felt as an ephemeral ray of light in an horizonz which is darkened by the egoism, pay tribute to the fact that experience \textit{[Erfahr- renheit]}\textsuperscript{179}, a pregnant term of Kant’s reflection on pragmatics, is lacking here. Anyway, as Rousseau already acknowledged, man cannot dream with a non political, and consequently a non social, sphere\textsuperscript{180}. The only effective medicine against the nefarious effects of the art of pretence, far from slacking the springs of such an art, will tighten and strengthen them, albeit in an unusual direction. This is a feature of the Kantian Anthropology that Foucault has insistently highlighted, since no other work of Kant confronts more decidedly the animal rationale with his destination, not as a pure rational being or as a member of the visible Church or of an aesthetic community, but properly as an \textit{animal rationabile}\textsuperscript{181}, who ought to take control of his own reason and, furthermore, within a


\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Anth}, § 4, AA 07: 132–133.


\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes}, n. 9: “Quoi donc? Faut-il détruire les sociétés, anéantir le tien et le mien, et retourner vivre dans les forêts avec les ours? Conséquence à la manière de mes adversaires, que j’aime autant prévenir que de leur laisser la honte de la tirer”.

civil community among other men, enhanced by the “bürgerlichen Um-
gang”\textsuperscript{182}. This civilising scope calls for developing a “technique of the self”, which a pragmatic knowledge, basically an “art of prudence”\textsuperscript{183}, must devise. On this basis, I submit that the subject of a pragmatic An-
thropology, like a galilean experiment which would endeavor to calculate
a kind of civilising inertia, stems from the result of listening, not the
noise—the phone—, but more precisely the subtract of logos, which the
city gives out every time it has been voided of politic life. This work prob-
lematizes the sole origin of man which we are enable to discover, an ori-
gin which is necessarily borne on language and appearance, hence, on
rhetoric\textsuperscript{184}. In this context, the habits that dwell in us as a “second na-
ture”\textsuperscript{185}, making thornier self-observation, explain the general validity
that the Russian proverb “clothes make the man”\textsuperscript{186} has in all countries,
even those where the civilizatory process has most intensively progressed.
At the most, we will achieve to expel prejudices \textit{a posteriori}, after having
corrected our judgment in advance. Kant suggests that we should answer
the following question: why do we endure more a man who squanders his
fortune than a miser man in the social intercourse, even if we have actual-
ly nothing objective against the behaviour of the last one? Again, the phi-
losopher ought to search for the origin of this prejudice, which the logi-
cian disregards. According to Kant, the explanation lies on the fact that
human mind draws quickly the conclusion that the miser person depends
on his own properties more than he respects the humanity in himself and
in others\textsuperscript{187}. Such a judgment does not stem from things that the subject
has actually seen, but rather from a “presumptive objectivity”\textsuperscript{188}, which
he holds legitimate enough to be applied to the present case.

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25: 734}.
\textsuperscript{183} Aubenque (1963) is one of the rare scholars which have underscored the pres-
ence, even if through many mediations, of the work of B. Gracián in the Kantian
notion of prudence—private and mundane—; cf. \textit{GMS}, AA 04: 416 and 417,
footnote.
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1223}: “So ist ieder Tropus und iede Figur ein Umweg
inden man eine dunkle Vorstellung plotzlich zur klaren macht und darin besteht
das angenehme derselben”. To define this term in Kant are indispensable the fol-
lowing textes: \textit{KU}, §51, AA 05: 321 and § 53, AA 05: 327. We commend the lec-
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Anth, Vorwort}, AA 07: 121.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Anth, § 5}, AA 07: 137.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 250}.
\textsuperscript{188} Levi-Strauss (1962) and Lebrun (1970: 272).
Regarding the manifold games that we produce employing the obscure representations, the phenomenon which promotes such an inversion of wit is the fact that the civilised man occasionally perceives far too much his relationship with animals. Especially his yearn for sexual satisfaction, together with the habits and the utterances which are too mechanical, show his relationship with animals, which embarrasses him. This runaway of man from himself makes the human faculties work in order to shelter what one really desires both in the conversation and in the social intercourse. Furthermore, society promotes this process, an authentic “art to darken”, which, although sparing us “crude expressions”, keeps them unharmed in our social intercourses, transparent enough to bring out a smile. The smile is a mark of the aesthetic self-restraint and the beginning of a moral self-mastery, based on pretence, through which the homo civilis overcomes the wild and rough man. In fact, Kant acknowledges that the audiovisual archive of such an art shall give the more pleasure the stronger the contrast is. A contrast that one notices between the original obscurity—in ornament, in utterance—and the clarity which finally emerges once the speaker understands what it actually veiled. Here the mind moves in a delicate intermediate zone between the cynicism of those who preach the radical deliverance of the animal features of man, and the purism of those who plea for a complete submission of human drives under the chains of culture and education. Besides the spring to the gentleness, one of the most habitual issues which men use as a protective screen to disguise their relationship with

190 Anth, § 12, AA 07: 149. The “physical coaction”, which stems from the assuetudo provokes disgust when we perceive it in others, because “here one is led instinctively by the rule of habituation, exactly like another (non-human) nature, and so runs the risk of falling into one and the same class with the beast”. Cf. MAM, AA 08: 114, where Kant highlights that human being, in the fourth level of his evolution, conceives “wiewohl nur dunkel” that he is an end of nature, so that nothing on Earth may seize him his title. This enclosed as counterpart the claim, which can also emerge only obscurely in mind, that the same dignity which makes him think he is the owner of nature must be supposed to any other man.

192 V-Menschenkunde, AA 25: 871. In this passage Kant comments an amusing letter from Cicero (Fam., IX 22), where the latin author lists the absurds which the cynical philosophers failed in when they tried to naturalize the organic functions that man shares with other animals.

animals is to borrow a foreign term to cover the one he would prefer not to pronounce in their mother language. The explanation that Kant offers of this behaviour is the following. This decision, unconscious at first glance, forces us, every time we meet the term at stake, to take time in order to translate it in our mind. This translation also takes place when one decodes an enigmatic message. Such a detour brings down the intensity of the aggression that the mind notices in the term, without actually being conscious of this fact, as if we had found the most suitable screen to refract a ray of light as powerful as fearsome. Kant delivers valuable psychological recommendations regarding this point: when one fears something, the most advisable behaviour is not to be reluctant to face it, but rather to face repeatedly with an often exposure to the focus that motivates the distrust, after having chosen the convenient angle of refraction. So, “through obscure representations we endeavour to weaken or to strengthen the power of the impression”, which is normally related to corporal functions or which belongs to the field of sex. This analysis displays the human mind as a complex logical and optical machinery, where understanding and imagination are doomed not only to understand each other, but to do it through a common game. As Kant, who takes the biblical tale of the Genesis as a travel map, interprets the fig leaf as the result of man’s discovery of his rational control over inclinations such as the sexual instinct, the anthropological remark about the attachment that mothers have more to their sons than to their daughters has a probably explanation in the rooted inclination to the other sex, which is a natural disposition of the human being. Therefore, the sexual instinct tallies with the game it provokes in its circular feature: the force of the instinct will soon catch unaware the stakes of the civilisation. The decency that an urban woman exhibits as external appearance finds fulfillment in the tribute that the other sex tributes her and the modesty enlarges the distance between sexes which prevents that both shall reduce each other to a mere mean of enjoyment. Moreover, instead of expelling passion, decency and modesty search to administrate it in an optimal manner. Both practical and empirical phenomena illustrate the “un-di-

194 V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 481.
196 MAM, AA 08: 113. We cannot focus here on the interesting effects that the obscure idea of freedom, or an analogous representation of it, has on the practical philosophie of Reason of Kant. Regarding to this question, we refer to La Rocca (2003: 267–285).
lectized dialectic\textsuperscript{198}, which Foucault remarked in the Kantian \textit{Anthropology}. Yet the most outstanding fact of this case is that the polite language endeavours to find the suitable \textit{formulae} for the contents that society does not approve to be pronounced in public and that the art of pretence\textsuperscript{199} appears as a pragmatic, hence intelligent, use of pleasures. In short, the outstanding point in the human animal is to employ the \textit{logos} to deal with the function that instinct carries out in the other animal species, that is to say, as the voice of God, which the human creature drive away, as a mist, as soon as it begins to behave in accordance with its own tenets.

Finally, the obscurity entails a rhetoric interest, for it works as an epistemological obstacle which, when it is conveniently dosed, the reader, the speaker and the listener shall be thankful, since the obscurity gives them the chance to use their understanding in a ludic manner and, hence, to experience the strength of their faculties\textsuperscript{200}, as they have to fight against the obstacle. Notwithstanding, when this tendency goes to the excess, it is in accordance with the decree of all mystics\textsuperscript{201}, who identify the imperative \textit{skotison!}—opposed to the \textit{sapere aude!}—with an organon of alleged knowledge, since there will be no way to sieve the will under an apparent solemnity, attractive for the neophyts, to hide their own ignorance from the legitimate aim to exercise and tune the faculty of judgment.

\section*{V. Conclusion}

Finally I suggest breaking down the topic of the obscure representations at least into three aspects in order to determine the output that it provides to the \textit{Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view}. First, Kant releases this evasive subject from the monopoly which was demanded by its al-

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[198] Foucault (2008: 39).
\item[199] \textit{Anth}, § 14, AA 07: 152: “In order to save virtue, or at least lead the human being to it, nature has wisely implanted in him the tendency to allow himself willingly to be deceived”.
\item[201] \textit{Anth}, § 5, AA 07: 137.
\end{itemize}}
leged scholars, namely, the visionaries, to the extent that the study of obscure representations could be considered as a supplement for the paralogisms of pure reason which seizes the last framework of empirical psychology. To support this claim, it could be added that the critical lecture of the obscurity of the mind denounces the fact that philosophy, more often than expected, has fallen into the dialectic when regarding this topic. Against this misconception of the unconscious thought, Kant undertakes an anthropological “didactic”, according to the table which the cognitive faculty, the faculty of desire and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure set out, since the obscurity of thought concerns all these faculties\(^\text{202}\)\). Thereby, Kant prevents that the mentioned illuminated gang could allege a privileged experience of the phenomenon. Second, the pragmatic assessment of the referred topic, which stems from the critique of the empirical psychology, analyses the domain that human Erfahrungidentifies in an intuitive manner, therefore transcendental apperception obtain a plea for its rights also over the fragments of the unconscious thoughts which we could be enabled to track down. Moreover, in spite of the astonishment aroused by the discovery of the great amount of our unconscious thoughts, an even more intense and lasting astonishment should be engendered by the principle which the entire logic depends on and which the very understanding consists of, namely, the objective unity of apperception. Transcendental consciousness is the only tenet which is able to avoid the probable shipwreck when we dare to raid the Cocitus Lake of unconscious thought. Yet the submission of the obscure representations to the unity of the logical consciousness reveals also that the game and social techniques provide the occasion for discovering these representations. In fact, the internal logic and the experience of time which those devices entail are essential to the rightful comprehension of human life. Third, an internally consistent pragmatic discours stems from the study of the obscurity of mind, which tackles the human nature from the point of view of the worldly and popular activity of man. It leads us to an order where the problematic nature of man emerges amidst games, conversations, jokes and riddles. The fact that Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view should be considered as a possible and necessary work proves that those arts, with all their glittery bright, have been analysed up to now under the grey glass of the theory. Perhaps there is no other possible achievement when the subject of study is

\(^{202}\) According to Oberhausen (2002: 125), the § 5 of ApH is, in relation to the matter of unconscious representations, only the “summit of the iceberg”.

human nature. The following excerpt of M. Foucault, surely one of the finest scholars which have interpreted the Kantian Anthropology, will allow us to infer what we consider the conclusion of this contribution:

Le Geist ce serait ce fait originaire qui, dans sa version transcendentale, implique que l’infini n’est jamais là, mais toujours dans un essential retrait—et, dans sa version empirique, que l’infini anime pourtant le movement vers la vérité et l’inépuisable succession de ses formes. Le Geist est à la racine de la possibilité lié du savoir. Et, par là-même, indissociablement present et absent des figures de la connaissance : il est ce retrait, cette invisible et “visible réserve” dans l’inaccessible distance de laquelle le connaître prend place et positivité. Son être est de n’être pas là, dessinant, en ceci meme, le lieu de la vérité.

The text refers to the spirit [Geist], the “faculty to exhibit aesthetic Ideas”, which Foucault tracks in the Anthropology in the light of the link between this “principle that vivifies man” and the mind [Gemüt], which in fact consists only in life. But the principle that vivifies the mind is also strongly connected with the aesthetic potency of genius, whose roots lead to the obscure representations which we have to deal with. The fact that the genius and the artistic production belong to the realm of the potency prevents both their exam from a genetical method and their acceptation in the circuit of cultural and artistic progress. It should be admitted that none artist has denied the participation, no matters how minimal it could be, in genius, as the Kantian exam of the musical fantasy shows. Furthermore, the aesthetic attributes that the creative spirit uses to vivify rhetoric and poetical works cannot be exhibited. Nevertheless, this failure of exhibition, both in a direct and indirect manner, traces the existence of imaginary representations that, when they go with a determined concept, supply something like an air or an ambiance where everything makes us remember to reason. The relation of counterpart or pendant between the aesthetic Idea and the Idea of reason is justified by the fact that both refer, although each one in a different manner, to the supersensory ground of the phenomenal world. The distinctiveness of the genius is that it borders this ground with the virtuosity which is necessary for its products not to be decoded some day. The gathering of phenomena at first glance so distant from each other, as the genial artistic creation, the judgments in advance, the wit, the gift of inquiry, the preju-

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204 KU, § 49, AA 05: 313–314.
205 Lebrun (1970: 403 ff.).
dices or the *galateo*, and other ones which could be added to these—then we face an open series\(^{206}\)—pushes us to think that the obscure representations lay out a real archipelago in Kant’s writings, which is impossible to constraint to a single work. *Esprit, genius, bon sens*, are brittle terms, more suitable for the writing of a visionary than for the author of the *Critiques*. Nevertheless, Kant did not dismiss, quite on the contrary, facing all of them, in order to discipline their claims and cut up the wings\(^{207}\) of the predominant perceptive field in mind. It could be submitted that the suspected presence of obscure representations is a kind of balancing pole for the transcendental consciousness, which allows this one to *feel* that something will always remain to be known and to be discovered, that is to say, to be brought to the objective unity of apperception. Furthermore, finite understanding can neither be completely correct nor completely wrong. The default of this feeling should be enough for the one who exists when thinking to become another person\(^{208}\), while assuming maybe Fichte\(ean\) marks. Again, nobody has noticed this with such a great lucidity as M. Foucault, whose remarks about the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*, as brief as weighty, have guided without any doubt the present work:

De la *Critique* à l’*Anthropologie*, il y aurait comme un rapport de finalité obscure et obstinée. Mais il se peut aussi que l’*Anthropologie* ait été modifiée dans ses éléments majeurs à mesure que se développait la tentative critique: l’archéologie du texte, si elle était possible, ne permettrait-elle pas de voir naître un “*homo criticus*”, dont la structure différait pour l’essentiel de l’homme qui l’a précédé? C’est-à-dire que la *Critique*, à son caractère propre de “propédeutique” à la philosophie, ajouterait un rôle constitutive dans la naissance et le devenir de formes concrètes de l’existence humaine. Il y aurait une certaine vérité *critique* de l’homme, fille de la critique des conditions de vérité\(^{209}\).

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\(^{206}\) The sense of the Kantian critique to the rhapsody of Aristotle’s categories must be tinged since there is the same figure of a rhapsody in the pragmatic Anthropology, not only because the methodic difficulties for the research, but also the very dress of the object of study; cf. Foucault (2008: 33: “L’*Anthropologie* se déploie donc selon cette dimension de l’exercice humain qui va de l’ambiguïté du *Spiel* (jeu=jouet) à l’indécision du *Kunst* (art=artifice)").

\(^{207}\) *KU*, § 50, AA 05: 319.

\(^{208}\) Prol, § 46, footnote, AA 04: “[die Vorstellung der Apperception] ist nichts mehr als Gefühl eines Daseins ohne den mindesten Begriff und nur Vorstellung desjenigen, worauf alles Denken in Beziehung (relatione accidentis) steht”.

\(^{209}\) Foucault (2008: 12–13).
However, as we argued specially in the third section, after noticing the existence of the unconsciousness, the obscure balancing pole of the logical consciousness will not be examined within the boundaries of a transcendental doctrin of the faculty of judgment, either using a physiological method, which could only increase the data of an empirical Anthropology. The only path that remains open is, thus, the one which chooses the intercourse [Umgang] as the context of discovering, not of explanation, of the unconscious representations. The main part of what we shall find insofar as we track down the pieces of the layer of prejudices underlying in the mind will not please us. Yet this is not at stake here. As Aristotle would say, no one calls us good or evil taking in account the passions which get us rough, but only after having assessed the habits that actually have grafted onto a morally good character, that is to say, onto a “second nature” for us. Hence, the space of the social game is the best both empirical and pragmatic spectrum of human nature, which the rules of elegance and the norms of taste reflect, once that nature has been necessarily framed to ease its entrance in society. This notwithstanding requires selecting foremost that part of the obscurity of mind that our finitude can endure. And this is a worldly glass that the empirical psychology could never have polished by submitting human representations to a mere logical analysis.

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