Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant

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The nature of the relation between logic and psychology is recognized to be an important albeit difficult topic for understanding Kant’s aims and argumentation in his theoretical philosophy, particularly, in the Critique of Pure Reason. The recent commentators who have tried to understand and to defend Kant’s views have warned readers not to confuse our, post-Fregean understanding with Kant’s own understanding of the terms like “logic”, “mind”, “psychology”, and “cognition”. One such view that the commentators have noted is that in Kant’s philosophy logic and psychology are intertwined in a way that is perhaps difficult for us today to fully appreciate or even sympathize with. It is noted, for example, that for Kant the talk about “the rules of logic” is inseparable from the talk about “mental activities” or “cognitive faculties”. In this connection, some have suggested that Kant’s view is more in line with the view of the relation between logic and the mind that is elaborated in the Port-Royal logic.

Even among these commentators, however, there seems to be no consensus on precisely how the relation between logic and psychology is to

1 A shorter version of the paper was presented at the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, April 2011, in San Diego, California.
2 For a discussion of the relation between logic, epistemology, and “faculty psychology” in the early modern period, see Hatfield, Gary: “The Workings of the Intellect: Mind and Psychology”. In: Logic and the Workings of the Mind. Ed. Patricia A. Easton. Atascadero, CA 1997, 21–45. For an interesting paper on the relation between logic and consciousness in Kant, see Kitcher, Patricia: “Kant on Logic and Self-Consciousness” in the same volume, 175–90.
be understood in Kant’s philosophy. For example, even among those who are keenly aware that in Kant’s philosophy logic and psychology cannot neatly be divorced from each other, some have been criticized for over-psychologizing, while others have been criticized for over-logicizing Kant’s account or for offering “anti-psychological” interpretations thereof.4 My aim in this paper is not to focus on, let alone, to resolve this conflict, but to explore a particular theme that falls under the broader topic of the relation between logic and psychology.5

One aspect of this relation is represented by Kant’s famous claim in the Transcendental Deduction sections of the Critique of Pure Reason that consciousness or self-consciousness6 is a condition for the possibility of cognition of an object. This claim has been interpreted in various ways. Among the interpreters,7 however, what has not received much attention,

4 For example, Patricia Kitcher (Kant’s Transcendental Psychology, 94) includes Henry Allison among those who “depsychologize” Kant’s doctrine of apperception. Beatrice Longuenesse (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 6), while crediting Kitcher for providing an analysis of “mental activities”, at the same time criticizes her for not taking into consideration the logical forms of judgment. In his review of Longuenesse’s book, Graham Bird (“Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity.” In: European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1), 1999, 105), on the other hand, says there is “surprisingly little on Kant’s account of the self […]”


6 I follow the view of Karl Ameriks, Patricia Kitcher, and Robert Pippin, among others, that Kant’s notion of apperception does not entail that consciousness requires self-consciousness. As Pippin (“Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind.” In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, 1987, 459–60), notes, Kant’s apperceptive thesis (represented by Kant’s claim at KrV: B 131 that “it must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations”) “does not mean that the fact that I am perceiving rather than imagining is itself directly attended to, but that such an awareness is an inseparable component of what it is consciously to perceive, imagine, remember, etc”. See also Kitcher, Patricia: Kant's Transcendental Psychology, 92–94, and Ameriks, Karl: “Kant and Guyer on Apperception.” In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 15 (2), 1983, 183–84.

7 In this paper, I examine in detail the views of three scholars: Allison, Henry: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 1983 (1st ed.), 2004 (2nd ed.); Freu-
and what I would like to explore in this paper, is the fact that Kant links what he terms the “subjective unity” of consciousness, or the way in which representations are combined merely “empirically”, arbitrarily, and contingently in consciousness, with an indeterminate (as opposed to a determinate) way in which the logical forms of judgment are employed. Although the view that the categories are nothing other than the logical forms of judgment as applied to intuitions has been emphasized and elaborated by many commentators, few have focused on the fact that for Kant the logical forms can be employed determinately or indeterminately. By exploring the theme of the relation between the subjective unity of consciousness and the indeterminate use of the logical forms of judgment, I hope to make clear this one, fascinating aspect of the relation between logic and psychology in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. By doing so, moreover, I hope to help make better sense of some of Kant’s notorious distinctions, such as that between judgments of perception and judgments of experience, subjective and objective unity of consciousness, and empirical and pure apperception, distinctions which are elaborated in the passages in which Kant relates his theory of judgment with his views on consciousness.

The key idea that will emerge from my analysis is that what Kant calls “the subjective unity” of (or “empirical”) consciousness involves that state of mind in which the understanding leaves undetermined, that is, fails to specify, fix, or determine, the manner in which the concepts in a judgment are to relate to one another. Differently put, it is when the logical forms are employed merely indeterminately that a “relation” of representations that is merely “subjectively valid” or what Kant calls in the *Prolegomena* a relation of representations that is valid for “a conscious-
ness in one subject only” (as opposed to “a consciousness in general”) results. Although Kant himself leaves it unexplained why such indeterminacy with regard to the act of judging should result in what he calls the “subjective unity of consciousness”, understanding this key idea will help us find ways to resolve some thorny problems and difficulties that have arisen in interpreting the relevant passages in Kant’s writings.

In the first part of the paper, I explain what Kant means by “the logical use of the understanding”, why this use involves an indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment, and what this employment consists in. In the second part, I explain what role this use of the understanding plays in those passages in the Transcendental Deduction sections in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in which Kant relates judgment with consciousness. In the third part, I show that the act of judging objectively involves the consciousness that a representation is a specific or determinate instance of a more general representation. Thus, I will argue that what Kant calls “the subjective unity of consciousness” refers to that form of consciousness in which the subject is aware of an indeterminate relation of representations, that is to say, a relation in which a representation is *not* a specific or a determinate instance of a more general one.

I. Indeterminacy and the Logical Use of the Understanding

What Kant calls the “act of the understanding” or judging by means of which cognition is attained is governed by rules. These rules determine the ways in which the understanding judges. The “Table of Judgments” in the *Critique of Pure Reason* lists the ways. Kant claims that the Table is taken from “general” or formal logic. For Kant, however, the rules taken from general logic are only the necessary but not sufficient conditions for cognition of an object. For such cognition to be possible, the understanding must judge in accordance with rules that are taken from not merely a general but a “transcendental” logic. The two kinds of logic differ because one is more “general” than the other. In the *Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that general logic is “general” because it abstracts from all content of cognition, that is to say, it is indifferent to the question of whether the object has an empirical or a priori origin. As Kant puts it, general logic “concerns the use of the understanding without regard to the difference of objects”. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, is less general or more specific than general logic because it does “not abstract from all content of cognition”: “it concerns the laws of the understanding and reason, but only insofar as they are related to objects a priori”. This implies that the “act of the understanding” as it operates merely in accordance with the rules of a general logic differs from the act of the understanding as it operates in accordance with the rules of a transcendental logic. But in what precisely does the difference consist?

For Kant, the two kinds of logic provide rules for two different ways in which the logical forms of judgment can be employed. He provides an example to clarify the difference. Take the judgment, “all bodies are divisible”. This judgment has the categorical form, such that its function is “that of the relationship of the subject [“bodies”] to the predicate [“divisibility”].” But when the understanding follows the rules of a mere general logic, or in Kant’s words, “in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding”, it is left “undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate. For one can also say: ‘Something divisible is a body,’” Thus, what Kant calls the “logical use of the understanding” leaves it undetermined which of the two concepts will be given which function. Elsewhere, instead of “the logical use of the understanding” Kant uses the phrase “the formal act of the understanding” to refer to that act of the understanding through which the logical forms are employed indeterminately, that is, in such a way that the subject and the predicate concepts may, in Kant’s words, “interchange their logical functions”. So, for example, the two concepts in the judgment “the stone is hard” may inter-

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13 KrV, A 50 f/B 74 f., A 53/ B77
14 KrV, A 55/B 80, A 57/B 82
15 KrV, B 128 f.
16 KrV, B 128: “der logische Gebrauch des Verstandes”.
17 See also KrV, B 419.
18 “die formale Verstandeshandlung”
19 MAN, AA 04: 475. Translations from MAN are by J. W. Ellington (Indianapolis 1985). See also Prol, AA 04: 301, 304, 311 f.
change their function so that one can also say “something hard is a stone”.20

It is important to note here that although one might be tempted to take the phrase “logical use” or “formal act” to signify that act of the understanding that is merely “formal”, in the sense of “without content”, such an interpretation would be incorrect. Kant makes it clear that “the logical use” or “the formal act” of the understanding is that which is operative even when representations derived from the senses, including empirical concepts, are combined in a consciousness.21 Thus I agree with Longuenesse when she says that “by [‘logical use of the understanding’] Kant meant, not the use of the understanding in logic, but the use of the understanding for empirical knowledge, […]”22 This is confirmed by the example given in the quoted passage, “the stone is hard”, which is an empirical judgment and in which the logical forms are said by Kant to be employed indeterminately. As we shall see, in the Prolegomena, Kant uses the phrase “a logical connection of perceptions”23 to refer to that kind of relation of representations that is merely “subjectively valid”, i.e., “empirical” and “contingent”.

When, on the other hand, the categorical form of judgment is employed in such a way that it is determined which of the two concepts is to function as the subject and which is to function as the predicate, the understanding follows the rules of a transcendental logic, in which the logical form (the relation between the subject and predicate) becomes the category of substance and accident. Thus, when the category is employed, the two concepts in the judgment “bodies are divisible” may not “interchange their logical functions”; as Kant explains, “Through the category of substance, […] if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always

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20 MAN, AA 04: 475.
21 This view appears to agree with Longuenesse’s interpretation, according to which, the logical forms of judgment are “the forms of analysis of what is given in sensibility” (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 11). In fact, she also speaks of “the empirical use of logical functions of judgment” (Ibid., 194, and also 27). However, for Longuenesse, there are different stages at which the logical forms function for different purposes, whereas the account given in the present paper focuses merely on the role of the logical forms in combining concepts into a judgment (or the role they play in the first part [or sections 15 to 20] of the B-Deduction). I discuss Longuenesse’s interpretation below.
22 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 71.
23 Prol AA 04: 298. My emphasis.
be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with all the other categories." 24 Moreover, it is only when the logical forms are employed determinately, that is, as categories, that cognition of an object results; the two concepts in the judgment “the stone is hard”, for example, are connected not merely in thought but also “in the object”: “I represent to myself in the object as determined that the stone in every possible determination of an object, and not of the mere concept, must be thought only as subject and the hardness only as predicate, […]” 25 It follows that when the logical forms are employed merely indeterminately, the concepts are connected only in thought but not “in the object”.

Kant contrasts “the logical use of the understanding” 26, in which the logical forms of judgment are employed indeterminately, with “the transcendental use of the power of judgment” 27, which involves “the sensible condition under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be employed, i.e., the schematism of the pure understanding”. 28 In Reflection 5933 29 Kant also says that “the Schematism shows the condition under which an appearance is determined in respect to a logical function and, therefore, stands under a category”. 30 In other words, it is the provision of the schema (or “the transcendental time-determination”) that makes possible the determinate as opposed to the indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment. 31

For Kant, “the act of the understanding” or judging, as it is considered by transcendental logic, is nothing other than the act of determining, that is to say, of delimiting, restricting, or specifying that which general

24 KrV, B 129. See also KrV, A 245 f.
25 MAN, AA 04: 475.
26 KrV, B 128: “der logische Gebrauch des Verstandes”.
27 KrV, B 167: “der transzendentale Gebrauche der Urteilskraft”.
28 KrV, A 136/B 175
29 Dated 1776 to 1789
31 See also KrV, A 139/B 178 and A 664/B 692. Allison (Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 152) contrasts “the logical use” with “the real use” of the understanding. But, as he admits, Kant mentions this distinction only in the Inaugural Dissertation (MSI AA 2: 394, 386). In the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, however, whereas Kant does use the expression “the logical use”, “he does not use the expression [‘the real use’]” (474, note 46). In fact, in the Critique of Pure Reason the expression with which Kant contrasts “the logical use of the understanding” is “the transcendental use of the power of judgment”.

logic leaves indeterminate, namely, the manner in which the concepts in a judgment are to relate to one another, or more specifically, with regard to the categorical form of judgment, which concept is to function as the subject and which concept as the predicate.

II. Logical Forms and Consciousness in the Transcendental Deduction

Before delving into the passages in which the significance of understanding the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment becomes clear, I would like to clarify the status of the categories that the foregoing interpretation supports. I have argued that the logical forms of judgment can be employed either indeterminately or determinately, and that it is only in the latter case that they are employed as categories. This implies that whether the logical forms will be employed as categories or not depends on what Kant calls “the act of the understanding”, that is to say, the act of judging. This interpretation differs from the received view regarding the categories. According to this view, the categories exist even before the activity of judging is carried out, so that “the categories are just concepts that make the logically distinct forms and components of judgment applicable to our intuitions”, or that “categories are supposed to describe twelve different ways of conceiving of objects that are necessary in order to make the twelve different logical functions of judgment applicable to them”. Such a view is questioned, however, by Beatrice Longuenesse, whose interpretation seems to agree with the one I am supporting. She notes that:

the categories, as full-fledged concepts, [...] are in no way prior to the activity of judging. On the contrary, they result from this activity of generating and combining concepts according to the logical forms of judgment. [...] one should not be misled into supposing that the categories are concepts ready to be ‘applied’ prior to the activity of judgment. Such an interpretation is incompatible with Kant’s consistent opposition to innatism of representations.

32 As we shall see, Kant also explains how the hypothetical form of judgment (‘If \( p \) then \( q \)’) can be employed determinately and indeterminately. Prol, AA 04: 311 f. and KrV, B 233 f.
34 Longuenesse, Beatrice: *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 199.
Although Longuenesse’s interpretation differs from mine in some details (which I note below), both interpretations emphasize the necessity of the activity of judging for the generation of the categories. This idea will be operative in my analysis below of the distinction between subjective and objective unity of consciousness, and the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience.

One of the most intriguing and at the same time controversial views that Kant tries to defend in the Transcendental Deduction sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is that cognition of an object or an objective judgment is impossible without the unity of apperception or of self-consciousness. Since it is in these sections that Kant brings together his theory of judgment and his views on consciousness, it is these sections that I shall focus on in this paper. The sections in question are those in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that lead to the conclusion which Kant himself identified (at B 159) as the goal of “the transcendental deduction of the categories”, that is, section 15 to section 20. These are the sections that many, though not all, commentators (following Dietrich Henrich’s suggestion) refer to as “step one” of the deduction. What I shall focus on in these passages is the role the difference between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judg-

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35 In fact, Longuenesse’s view is complex. She notes that the categories are the logical forms before “synthesis of what is given in sensibility” is carried out, but the logical forms themselves “govern the synthesis” (*Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 12).

36 KrV, B 130–143. I restrict my examination to Kant’s views elaborated in the B-Deduction, for, as I am mainly concerned with the relation between judgment and consciousness, it is in the B-Deduction (but not in the A-Deduction) that Kant makes explicit the mediating role that judgment plays between the categories and the unity of apperception. There are in fact also passages in the A-Deduction that lend support to my interpretation. For example, at A 106–107, even though he does not explicitly mention the act of judging, Kant says that “empirical apperception” (as opposed to “transcendental apperception”) is only “the determination of our state in internal perception … forever variable”. I thank Bryan Hall for pointing this out.

37 Allison (*Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*. New Haven 2004, 176) notes that the incorporation of the account of judgment in section 19 of the B-Deduction “constitutes a major improvement over the A-Deduction, which attempted to relate apperception to the categories and the latter to experience without explicitly referring to judgment”.

ments plays in Kant’s account of the relation between consciousness and the act of judging.

Few recent commentators have discussed this role. This is surprising given that the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment is noted and alluded to by Kant himself throughout the sections that make up the first step of the B-Deduction. In fact, the paragraph that immediately precedes section 15, which is the section that begins the whole of the B-Deduction, is the paragraph that we examined above, namely, the one in which Kant explains the distinction. The significance of this passage, with which Kant prefaces the whole of the B-Deduction, becomes evident once we realize that this explanation is reiterated in section 20, in which the conclusion of the entire first step of the deduction is stated:

That act of the understanding [...] through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (§ 19). Therefore all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the logical functions for judgment, by means of which, namely, it is brought to a consciousness in general. But now the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them (§ 13).

What Kant emphasizes in this passage is that it is through the act of judging that the manifold of representations is brought to “an apperception in general”, and the ways in which this act is carried out are the categories, which are nothing other than the determinate ways in which the logical

39 This paragraph is contained in the section titled “Transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories”, to which Kant apparently forgot to assign a section number. Most editors insert “Section 14” into the text. The paragraph was added in the second edition.

40 KrV, B 128 f.

41 In his text of the Critique (Berlin 1911), Benno Erdmann, following Hans Vaihinger, most likely realizing that Kant says nothing about the logical functions determining the manifold of intuition in §13, emends the text by replacing “§13” with “§10”. But Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge 1997, 727, note 41), perhaps noticing that Kant says nothing of the kind in §10 either, and finding justification for Kant’s reference to §13, defend their decision to leave it as it is in their text. In my view, it seems obvious, and I think the readers will see clearly, that Kant should have referred to §14 (not §13 or §10), since the statement in the passage in section 20 is practically repeated in section 14. But as we know that Kant forgot to assign a section number to this section, it makes sense that Kant could only have referred to “§13”.
forms of judgment are employed. But, as we already know from section 14, the same logical forms can also be employed indeterminately, in which case the manifold of representations will be brought, not to “the pure apperception” but to “the empirical apperception” (B 132). This means that, although in the quoted passage from section 20 all that Kant points out is the fact that the categories are nothing other than the logical forms of judgment as they are employed determinately, as we proceed to examine those sections that precede and lead up to section 20 (namely, sections 15 to 19), it is crucial to keep in mind what he also points out in the quoted passage from section 14, namely, that the same logical forms of judgments, through “the logical use of the understanding”, can be employed indeterminately, and that when they are so employed, the representations are connected only “subjectively” or “empirically”, i.e., not “in the object” (B 142).

The point that there needs to be a determinate use of the logical forms or a “determinate relation” of representations in order for there to be a cognition of an object is emphasized by Kant throughout the B-Deduction sections. To show this, I would now like to run through briefly each of the six sections that make up “step one” of the B-Deduction, namely, sections 15 to 20.

Kant begins the deduction in section 15 by identifying what he calls “combination” as “the action of the understanding”, which, in turn, is equated with “synthesis” (B 130). As we find out later in section 19, this act of combining or unifying, or of synthesis, is nothing other than the act of judgment (B 142). And, as we also find out in sections 19 and 20, this act involves the employment of the logical forms of judgment, which, as Kant has already made clear in section 14, can be employed determinately or indeterminately.

In section 16, this act of synthesis is tied to the unity of apperception or of self-consciousness (B 133–136). In order for a manifold of representations to be a manifold at all, it must be combined in one consciousness. But in order for a subject to be conscious of its own identity, it must (somehow) be aware of its own act of combining the manifold of representations into a unity (hence, “the synthetic unity of apperception”). Thus, the unity of consciousness is impossible apart from the synthesis

42 Or so I shall argue below, following Jürg Freudiger’s suggestion. In the Prolegomena Kant distinguishes between “consciousness in general” and “a consciousness of my state” or “a consciousness in one subject only” (Prol AA 04: 304). Cf. KrV, A 106–107.
of the manifold of representations, and the synthesis of the manifold of representations is impossible apart from the unity of consciousness.

Then, in section 17, Kant argues that the synthetic unity of apperception is required for the representation of objects; for, “an object” is possible only when the manifold of intuitions are unified or synthesized under a concept. But since representations can be unified only if they are combined in one consciousness, the unity of apperception is necessary for the representation of objects. Kant then notes that “cognitions” consist in “the determinate relation of given representations to an object” (B137), or that “a determinate combination of the given manifold” is what gives rise to a “cognition of an object” (B 138). Thus a cognition arises not from a mere combination or relation but from a determinate combination or relation of representations; and when we remember what Kant says in section 14 (namely, that the logical forms of judgment can be employed determinately or indeterminately), representations can also be combined indeterminately, the result of which is explained in the next section.

In section 18, Kant distinguishes between a “combination of representations” that is merely “subjective”, “empirical”, and “contingent”, and a combination of representations that is “necessarily and universally valid”. This distinction is also linked to the distinction between what Kant calls “subjective” and “objective unity of consciousness”, and between “the empirical unity of apperception” and “the objective unity of self-consciousness” (B139–140). Kant notes that the empirical unity of apperception “has merely subjective validity” because its unity “depends on the circumstances, or empirical conditions”; and under such conditions “one person combines the representations […] with one thing, another [person] with something else”, that is to say, they are not combined determinately. Its unity, therefore, is “not […] necessarily and universally valid” (B 140). Thus, from Kant’s claim in section 14 that the categories are nothing other than the determinate ways in which the logical forms are employed, it may be inferred that what Kant calls a merely “subjective” and “empirical” connection of representations can be equated with a connection that is not “a determinate relation of representations to an object”, that is, a merely indeterminate relation of representations.

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44 In this section, Kant also says that “the empirical unity of apperception […] is derived only from the [transcendental unity of apperception], under given conditions in concreto, […]” This claim would seem to challenge my thesis, accord-
In section 19, we learn that the act of synthesis by means of which the manifold of representations is united in one consciousness is nothing other than the act of *judging*. In other words, apart from the activity of judging, no manifold would be unified, and thus no representations would represent anything “for me”, and I could not become conscious of my own identity. A “judgment” is defined as “the way to bring given cognitions to the **objective** unity of apperception” (B 141). As Kant tells us, this means that in a judgment (so conceived) the representations are combined “in accordance with principles of the **objective determination** of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them, […] [my emphasis]” (B142). A judgment, in other words, “is a relation that is **objectively valid**”, which, as Kant emphasizes, is a relation through which “two representations are combined in the object” and not merely in the “subject” (B 142).

And finally in section 20, Kant says that “the act of the understanding” is nothing other than “the logical function of judgments”, and that it is through this act that “the manifold of given representations” is
“brought under an apperception in general” (B143). The categories are nothing other than these logical forms of judgment as they are employed in such a way that intuitions are “determined” with respect to them (B 143). Since the categories are nothing other than the ways in which I perform the act of judging, it follows that every manifold of intuition is subject to the categories.45

Considering the views that are implicit in the arguments of the B-Deduction summarized above, however, a problem arises. Kant appears to be saying that whenever a manifold of representations is unified in one consciousness, there is a relation of representations to an object, or in other words, a cognition of an object. But this cannot be right, since Kant also speaks of a combination of representations that is merely “subjectively valid” and “contingent”. Indeed, as we saw above, Kant makes it clear in sections 16, 18, and 19, that there is a distinction between “pure” and “empirical” apperception, between “subjective” and “objective unity of apperception”, and between a “subjectively” and an “objectively valid” relation of representations respectively. As Allison points out, however, although Kant makes it clear what “a subjective unity” is not, namely, a unity brought about by the act of objective judging, he does not clarify what “a subjective unity” is. This prompts Allison to bring up what he calls “the problem of subjective unity”.46 I will return to this problem in the next part of the paper where I will also propose a solution. There is another problem, however.

The account of judgment given in the B-Deduction, particularly in section 19, seems to contradict the account of judgment given in the Prolegomena. In section 19, as we recall, a judgment, by definition, is a relation that is “objectively valid”. In other words, a relation that is merely subjectively valid cannot be regarded as a judgment at all. In the Prolegomena, however, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of judgment, “a judgment of perception”, which is said to be “subjectively valid” because the representations combined in it hold only “for me” but “not for everyone else”, and “a judgment of experience”, which is said to be “objectively valid” because in it the representations are combined not only “in the subject” but also “in the object” (or they hold not only

45 For a fuller and more detailed exposition, see Allison, Henry: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven 2004, 163–178. I have relied on Allison’s interpretation for many of the points mentioned in the summary.
46 Ibid., 178 f. 
“for me” but also “for everyone else”).\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, Kant says that a judgment of experience is “objectively valid”, while a judgment of perception is merely “subjectively valid” because, he maintains, whereas the categories are involved in a judgment of experience, they are \textit{not} involved in a judgment of perception.\textsuperscript{48} Since the sections in the \textit{Prolegomena} in which the distinction between the two kinds of judgment is elaborated (namely, section 18 to section 21) is supposed to correspond to (and indeed, to represent for Kant a more accessible version of) the transcendental deduction sections in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} (section 15 to section 20), it is natural for the reader to assume that the distinction between the two kinds of judgment introduced in the \textit{Prolegomena} corresponds to the distinction Kant introduces in the \textit{Critique} between “subjective” and “objective unity of apperception”. But this assumption is called into question by the discrepancy that seems to exist between the two accounts. This apparent discrepancy along with Kant’s statement that a judgment of perception does \textit{not} require the categories has led many commentators to question the validity of Kant’s notion of a judgment of perception.\textsuperscript{49}

Most commentators have dealt with this problem by suggesting that Kant abandoned the account that he gives in the \textit{Prolegomena} (1783) in favor of the account that he gives in the B-Deduction sections in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} (1787), which, they argue, he introduced to re-
place the *Prolegomena* account.\(^{50}\) The problem with this suggestion, however, is that it would be plausible only if the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience was never to be found in texts written after 1783. But this is not the case.\(^{51}\) What is more, a number of recent commentators such as Allison and Longuenesse have tried to show that the two accounts do not contradict one another, that the account in the B-Deduction is consistent with that in the *Prolegomena*, and that therefore it was not Kant’s intention to replace the latter account with the former account.

Very few of the commentators, however, have focused on the role the logical forms of judgments play in these works, particularly with respect to the manner in which they are employed in the act of judgment. I shall argue that when Kant’s distinction between determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment is taken into consideration, a possible way to show the consistency between the two accounts of judgment can be found.

My aim is to show that the distinction between these two ways in which the logical forms of judgment can be employed in the act of judging is connected to the distinction between what Kant describes as a relation of representations that is “subjectively valid” and a relation of representations that is “objectively valid”, and between what he calls “subjective” and “objective unity of consciousness” or between “empirical” and “pure apperception”. Moreover, textual evidence exists in the *Prolegomena* that supports the interpretation, according to which, the distinction between a judgment of perception, which is “subjectively valid”, and a judgment of experience, which is “objectively valid”, is meant to be understood in connection to the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment. If this interpretation can be shown to be correct, we draw closer to understanding how the account of judgment in the *Prolegomena* and the account of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be seen to be consistent with one another.

In section 18 of the *Prolegomena*, Kant says that there are two kinds of empirical or synthetic *a posteriori* judgments: judgments of perception and judgments of experience. As we have already seen, Kant says that

\(^{50}\) For example, see Beck, Lewis White: “Did the Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams?”, 50 f., and Kitcher, Patricia: *Transcendental Psychology*, 158–60.

judgments of perception are “subjectively valid”, while judgments of experience are “objectively valid”. In section 20, Kant explains that “a judgment of experience” requires a connection of representations that is based on the “subsumption” of an intuition “under a pure concept of the understanding”: “it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under [a “pure”] concept of the understanding.”\footnote{Prol AA 04: 301.} Kant explains the function of such a concept: it “serves to determine the representation subsumed under it, with respect to judging in general” or it “determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition”.\footnote{Ibid.} In section 21a, Kant says that a pure concept of the understanding “can be nothing else than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in itself with regard to one form of judgment rather than another”; it is “a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgments”.\footnote{Ibid., 304.} In a judgment of experience, therefore, a pure concept of the understanding determines an intuition subsumed under it with regard to one of the logical forms of judgment. In other words, the logical forms of judgment in all judgments of experience are employed determinately, that is to say, so as to refer to an object of intuition.\footnote{See also §39, Ibid., 324.}

A judgment of perception, on the other hand, requires “only the logical connection [der logischen Verknüpfung] of perception in a thinking subject”\footnote{Ibid., 298.}. In section 21a, Kant says again that a judgment of perception requires, not a pure concept of the understanding, but a mere “sensuous intuition and its logical connection [die logische Verknüpfung] in a judgment”\footnote{Ibid., 304.}. Kant does not explain what he means by a “logical connection” here. Various interpretations of this phrase have been proposed. Patricia Kitcher modifies the word “logical” to “[psycho]logical”, so that it reads, “the [psycho]logical connection of perception”.\footnote{Kitcher, Patricia: Kant’s Transcendental Psychology, 159.} This is understandable given that what Kant seems to be referring to in the passage is a connection that is more than merely “logical” (in the sense of “without content”), and yet at the same time merely subjective and empirical. However, the word “logical” may mean something different here. Jürg Freudiger says, “Kant scheint also davon auszugehen, dass wir beliebige Vorstellun-
gen sozusagen mechanisch gemäß der Urteilstafel miteinander verknüpfen können”59. I think this is closer to Kant’s meaning. Henry Allison seems to agree. He says that judgments of perception “do not make use of the categories, though, […] they involve the logical functions”60.

If, however, Freudiger and Allison’s interpretation is correct, that is to say, if all that Kant means to say in using the phrase a “logical connection of perception” in describing the nature of a judgment of perception is that all such judgments involve the logical forms of judgment, then we are faced with a puzzle. Kant’s categories are commonly defined as “the logical forms of judgment as applied to intuitions”.61 Indeed, in some passages Kant himself describes the categories in this way.62 But if this is how we are to understand the nature of the categories and nothing further is said about it, then we are forced to conclude that a judgment of perception, no less than a judgment of experience, involves the categories, since, if a judgment of perception involves the logical forms, then, since such a judgment is synthetic and a posteriori (or empirical), the logical forms involved would have to be applied to intuitions, which is just to say, on the view of the nature of the categories just mentioned, that they are used as categories. But this directly contradicts Kant’s claim that judgments of perception do not require the categories.

Faced with such difficulties, commentators have responded in a number of ways. Allison, for example, suggests that Kant’s real position is that the categories do, in fact, govern judgments of perception as well as judgments of experience. For example, after stating that judgments of perception involve the logical forms of judgment, Allison remarks that “the change from a judgment of perception to a judgment of experience does not involve a change in logical form”63. But, as has just been noted, if Allison is right, then we are forced to conclude that the categories are involved not only in judgments of experience but also in judgments of perception. But why, then, does Kant say in the Prolegomena that judgments of perception do not involve the categories?

In response to this question, Allison suggests that in the Prolegomena Kant neglected to point out the fact that judgments of perception, no less than judgments of experience, are governed by the categories, because of

61 See note 8.
62 For example, KrV, B 128–29, and Prol AA 04: 311, 54.
the different method of presentation used by Kant in the *Prolegomena* (namely, the analytic method) from that used in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (namely, the synthetic method) as well as of their respective goals. The neglect, says Allison, “is attributed to [the *Prolegomena*’s] particular goal and method rather than to any philosophical confusion or doctrinal change on Kant’s part”.64 This is not, however, in my view, entirely convincing, since it fails to explain why, then, Kant apparently goes out of his way in the *Prolegomena* to point out that judgments of perception do not involve the categories, and that they are “subjectively valid” and not “objectively valid” because the representations combined in them are not “subsumed under” the pure concepts of the understanding. If Kant intentionally wanted to shy away from mentioning (for reasons methodological or otherwise) that the categories are also involved in judgments of perception, then he probably would have refrained from stating, as he does so bluntly and more than a few times, that such judgments do not require the categories.

Jürg Freudiger offers another interpretation. He maintains as Allison does that the logical forms of judgment are involved in both judgments of perception and judgments of experience. As was noted above, however, this brings up the difficulty that both kinds of judgments must then be considered as involving the categories, which Kant explicitly denies. As Freudiger explains the difficulty, “Nun droht der Einwand, dass Wahrnehmungsurteile qua urteile auch dann gemäß der Urteilstafel verknüpft werden müssen, wenn sie nicht objektiv sind, und dass sie daher die Kategorien voraussetzen. Widerlegt dies die Möglichkeit der Wahrnehmungsurteile?”66 To solve this difficulty, Freudiger argues that whereas judgments of experience involve the “schematized” categories, judgments of perception involve only the “unschematized” categories. So, according to Freudiger, when Kant says that only a “logical connection of perception” is required for a judgment of perception, or that a pure concept of the understanding is not required for a judgment of perception, Kant means that “das Wahrnehmungsurteil setzt keinen *schematisierten* Ver-

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64 Ibid., 182.
65 Moreover, Kant’s statement that the *Prolegomena* employs the analytic method while the *Critique of Pure Reason* employs the synthetic method, while commonly accepted, has been questioned and even challenged by some commentators. See my “analytische/synthetische Methode”: In *Kant-Lexikon*. Eds. Georg Mohr, Jürgen Stolzenberg, and Marcus Wöllschek. Berlin (forthcoming).
standesbegriff voraus”. 67 In order to support his interpretation, Freudiger argues that there are no fewer than three ways in which the categories can be applied in judging, and that while all three ways are involved in judgments of experience, only two are involved in judgments of perception. The first way is as “Urteil überhaupt”, the second way consists in “die eigentliche Anwendung der schematisierten Kategorie”, and the third way is as the condition of the “Synthesis der Apprehension”, which “Wahrnehmung […] voraussetzt” 68. The third way, according to Freudiger, is elaborated by Kant only in the Analytic of Principles sections in the Critique of Pure Reason. While Freudiger’s interpretation is interesting, his claim that the categories can be applied in three different ways in judging would raise some questions and perhaps even doubts. His view, however, that judgments of perception involve unschematized categories is suggestive (and it also enables him to come up with a solution to the difficulty in question), and I would like to return to it later on.

Beatrice Longuenesse proposes an interpretation that is not dissimilar to Freudiger’s. According to Longuenesse, the logical forms of judgment are operative in both a judgment of experience and a judgment of perception, but because the latter involves what she calls “the empirical use of the logical functions of judgment”, such a judgment does not “entitle us to consider” the representations connected therein as “subsumable under the corresponding categories” 69. Thus, Longuenesse maintains that Kant “distinguishes the logical connection [of perception]” which is involved in a judgment of perception, from “the full-fledged application of the category”, which is involved in a judgment of experience. 70 In fact, Longuenesse proposes an interpretation of Kant’s account of judgment that is similar to the one that I have given above. She notes that, for Kant, not every judgment requires the use or the “application” of the categories, “even when judgments […] apply to objects of a sensible intuition” 71. To illustrate her point, she refers to the paragraph in section 14 of the Critique of Pure Reason (B 128) that I discussed above, the paragraph in which Kant distinguishes between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment. Having quoted the passage, Longuenesse comments, “To be sure, this text is not easy to in-

67 Ibid., 420.
68 Ibid., 421.
69 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 194.
70 Ibid., 177.
71 Ibid., 78.
terpret. But at least it unambiguously shows that the relation of subject and predicate in a judgment does not always express one of substance and accident. The same holds for all other categories. I will develop this point in detail in part III." Longuenesse discusses the passage in the context of defending Kant’s metaphysical deduction of the categories against the criticisms raised against it by such authors as Jonathan Bennett and Paul Guyer. But she discusses the passage mainly in connection to the second part or “step two” of the B-deduction, particularly section 26, as well as the Schematism chapters, and the Analytic of Principles. She thus misses the opportunity to discuss the passage in connection to the first part of the B-deduction, namely, sections 15 to 20, in which Kant explains the role of judgment and how it relates to the unity of consciousness.

Thus, although she does speak of “a ‘merely logical’ standpoint” in addressing Kant’s reference in B 128 to “the merely logical use of the understanding”, the distinction between the two ways of employing the logical forms of judgment is not thematized by Longuenesse. In fact, even though she devotes the whole first chapter of her book to elaborating what Kant calls “the logical use of the understanding” in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), she does not provide as detailed an account of the same term “the logical use of the understanding” as it is used by Kant in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787). So, for example, Longuenesse says that “the logical use of the understanding” in the Inaugural Dissertation signifies that use of the understanding by virtue of which mere “appearances” (apparentia) are turned into “experience” or “phenomena” (phaenomena). Longuenesse then argues that this distinction between mere “appearances” and “experience” corresponds to the distinction that Kant later makes in section 14 of the Critique of Pure Reason between object as “appearance” (or as “the indeterminate object of an empirical intuition”) and object “as an object”, i.e., object as “corresponding to intuition”. Thus, according to Longuenesse, the term “the logical use of the understanding” as it is used by Kant in the Inaugural Dissertation denotes the understanding’s use “in the empirical generalization of our sensible representations” or “the subordination of sensible representations under ‘common concepts’”. What Longuenesse does not emphasize, however, is the fact that in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and in the very section that Longuenesses men-

72 Ibid., 79, n. 13.
73 Ibid., 26
tions, namely, section 14, Kant says, “in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate [my emphasis]” (B 128). In other words, in this passage, Kant defines “the logical use of the understanding” as that use of the understanding in which the logical forms of judgment are employed indeterminately.\(^74\)

In sum, Allison, Freudiger, and Longuenesse all construe (correctly, I believe) Kant’s statement that a judgment of perception requires only “the logical connection of perception” as the claim that the logical forms of judgment are involved in all judgments of perception. What they do not seem to recognize, however, is that the phrase “logical connection” can best be comprehended if it is understood in connection to what Kant calls in section 14 of the *Critique of Pure Reason* “the logical use of the understanding”, which Kant takes to involve the indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment, that is to say, the logical forms of judgment as they are employed in such a way that “it would remain undetermined which of [the] two concepts [in a judgment] will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate”.\(^75\)

This interpretation avoids the difficulty mentioned above. It is true that the logical forms of judgments are involved in both judgments of perception and judgments of experience. On this interpretation, however, this fact does not give rise to the difficulty in question, namely, that the categories would then be involved in both kinds of judgments (which Kant denies) because the way in which the logical forms of judgments are employed in the two kinds of judgment are not the same: in judgments of perception, the logical forms are employed indeterminately (involving a mere “logical connection of perception”), while in a judgment of experience they are employed determinately, i.e., as categories. In other words, in judgments of perception the logical forms of judgment are employed but indeterminately. This also means that what makes a judgment of perception “subjectively valid”, or in other words, what makes “the connection of perception” in such a judgment to be valid only “in a consciousness of my state, without reference to the object”\(^76\).

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\(^74\) See also KrV, A 245 f.
\(^75\) KrV, B 128
\(^76\) See Prol 04: 299 f., and also KrV, B 142.
is the \textit{indeterminate} (as opposed to the determinate) manner in which the logical forms of judgment are employed.

That a judgment of perception involves an indeterminate employment, while a judgment of experience involves a determinate employment of the logical forms of judgment is confirmed in two passages, one in the \textit{Prolegomena} and the other in the second edition of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. In these passages, Kant uses the hypothetical form of judgment as an example, while in the passages we examined above he uses the categorical form of judgment as an example. In his discussion of the concept of cause in section 29 of the \textit{Prolegomena}, Kant writes:

\begin{quote}
We are first given \textit{a priori}, by means of logic, the form of a conditional judgment in general; that is, we have one cognition given as antecedent and another as consequent. But it is possible that in perception we may meet with a rule of relation which runs thus: that a certain appearance is constantly followed by another (though not conversely); and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment and, for instance, to say if the sun shines long enough upon a body it grows warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connection or concept of cause. But I proceed and say that, if this proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be a proposition of experience, it must be seen as necessary and universally valid. Such a proposition would be that the sun by its light is the cause of heat.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

Kant makes it clear in this passage that the logical form of judgment – here, the hypothetical form – is involved in a judgment of perception as well as in a judgment of experience. The way in which it functions in each of the two kinds of judgment, however, is different; in judgments of perception, the hypothetical form is employed so as to make possible a “subjective connection of perceptions,” whereas in judgments of experience, it is employed so as to make this connection “necessary and universally valid.” In the Second Analogy of the Analytic of Principles of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, Kant specifies more precisely in what this difference consists. In the following passage, Kant explains that the hypothetic form of judgment can be employed either indeterminately or determinately:

\begin{quote}
Now connection is not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is here rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This, however, can combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{77} Prol 04: 311 f.
one or the other precedes in time; for time cannot be perceived in itself, nor can what precedes and what follows in objects be as it were empirically determined in relation to it. I am therefore only conscious that my imagination places one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object; or, in other words, through the mere perception the objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding one another remains undetermined [my emphasis]. Now in order for this to be cognized as determined [my emphasis] the relation between the two states must be thought in such a way that it is thereby necessarily determined which of them must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa [my emphasis]. The concept, however, that carries a necessity of synthetic unity with it can only be a pure concept of the understanding, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the relation of cause and effect. […]\(^78\)

In this passage we learn that the hypothetical as well as the categorical form of judgment can be employed in two ways: in a judgment of perception the hypothetical form is employed so as to leave “undetermined” which of the two states is to “precede” and which is to “follow” the other; while in a judgment of experience the hypothetical form is employed so as to determine “which [state] must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa,” or which “state preceded the other in the object” (B 233–34). And this is why a judgment of perception merely “expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject, that is, myself, and that only in my present state of perception”\(^79\). A judgment of experience, on the other hand, in which the hypothetical form is employed determinately, i.e., as the category of cause, expresses this relation objectively or as determined “in the object.”

When the quoted passage from the Critique of Pure Reason is read side by side with the quoted passage from the Prolegomena, it becomes clear that the distinction Kant makes in the latter between “a subjective connection of perceptions” and a connection that is “objectively valid” or “necessarily and universally valid”\(^80\) is meant to be understood in connection with the distinction Kant makes in the former between “indeterminate” and “determinate” employment of the logical forms of judgment. In other words, we now have textual support for the crucial link that we assumed above that Kant makes. For Kant, the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment underlies the distinction between a judgment of perception

\(^78\) KrV, B 233–34.  
\(^79\) Prol 04: 299.  
\(^80\) Prol 04: 312.
and a judgment of experience. But we also know that for Kant a judgment of perception is “subjectively valid” because in such a judgment the connection of representations, as merely “empirical” and “contingent”, is valid for “a consciousness in one subject only”, while a judgment of experience is “objectively valid” because in such a judgment the connection of representations, as “necessary and universal”, is valid for “a consciousness in general”. Thus, from these connections it can now safely be inferred that the distinction between the determinate and indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment is also meant to be understood in connection to the distinction between what Kant refers to as “a connection” of representations that is “subjectively valid” and a connection of representations that is “objectively valid”. Indeed, these distinctions help us to comprehend the distinction between a judgment of perception and a judgment of experience in a way that makes it possible to show the consistency between the account of judgment given in the Prolegomena and the account of judgment given in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason, to which I now turn.

In this section, Kant defines a judgment as “a relation that is objectively valid”. While one might so construe this definition as to rule out any possibility that there could be such a thing as “a judgment of perception”, which, Kant says, is “subjectively valid”, once we take into consideration the distinctions we established above and the fact that these distinctions are elaborated by Kant and play a significant role not only in section 19 but throughout the sections that make up the first part of the B-Deduction (sections 15 to 20), it no longer becomes implausible to hold the two accounts of judgment to be consistent with one another. For example, in section 19, Kant also defines a judgment as “the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception”. But Kant contrasts what he calls here “the objective unity of apperception” with what he calls “a subjective unity of apperception” in section 18. “The subjective unity of apperception”, in turn, corresponds to what Kant calls “the empirical unity of apperception”, which is said to “have only subjective validity”.

81 Prol 04: 304.
82 Prol 04: 300.
83 KrV, B 142
84 KrV, B 141.
85 KrV, B 139.
86 KrV, B 140.
Given all this, and given also that in section 19 Kant provides an example of both a relation of representations that is merely “subjectively valid”—“If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight”—and a relation of representations that is “objectively valid”—“It, the body, is heavy”—and given that these two judgments are strikingly similar to the examples of the two kinds of judgment that Kant gives in the *Prolegomena*—“if the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm” is the example of a judgment of perception, and “the sun warms the stone” is the example of a judgment of experience—the fact that Kant does not actually use the phrase “a judgment of perception” in section 19 may not be as significant as the fact that the kind of relation of representations that such a judgment is said to represent in the *Prolegomena*, namely, a relation that is “subjectively valid”, “empirical”, and “contingent”, is precisely what Kant describes in section 19 of the B-Deduction in order to distinguish it from a relation that is “objectively valid”. Freudiger is, therefore, justified in concluding that, if Kant wants to define a judgment that is “objectively valid” as “nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the *objective unity* ofapperception”, as he does in section 19, then “wir koennten daher in Analogie zum [...] zitierten Satz aus B 141 nun sagen: ein Wahrnehmungsurteil ist nichts anderes als die Art, gegebene Wahrnehmungen zur subjektiven Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen.”

Thus, the fact that Kant did not actually use the term “a judgment of perception” in section 19 to describe the kind of relation involved therein may not be as detrimental to Kant’s account as some commentators have thought.

Now, we have already seen that, according to Freudiger’s interpretation, the difference between the two kinds of judgment that Kant distinguishes in both the *Prolegomena* and the B-Deduction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, namely, between a “subjectively valid” and an “objectively valid” judgment, consists in the fact that whereas the “subjectively valid” judgment (the judgment of perception in the *Prolegomena*) involves *unschematized* categories, the “objectively valid” judgment (the judgment of experience in the *Prolegomena*) involves the *schematized* categories. On Freudiger’s interpretation, then, it is because the unschematized categories are not full-fledged categories that Kant says in the *Prolegomena* that a judgment of perception “does not require a pure concept of the understanding”; in fact, “die Bemerkung, dass das Wahrnehmungsurteil ‘nur

87 KrV, B 141.
subjektiv gültig’ (Prol. 298) sei, ist gleichbedeutend mit: die Wahrnehmungsurteile ‘bedürfen keines reinen Verstandesbegriffs’ (ebd.).” As we have already seen, Kant says that “the sensible condition under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be employed” is the “schematism of the pure understanding.” This seems to confirm Freudiger’s interpretation, according to which, a judgment in which the pure concept of the understanding is not required is a judgment that involves, not the schematized, but the “unschematized” categories.

What Freudiger does not seem to recognize, however, is that, for Kant, the provision of the schema (or “the transcendental time-determination”) makes possible not merely the use of “a pure concept of the understanding” understood in the sense of “schematized categories”, but more specifically, a determinate as opposed to merely indeterminate employment of the logical forms of judgment. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example, Kant says that “the actions of the understanding [i.e., judgments], […] apart from the schemata of sensibility, are undetermined […]” Moreover, in *Reflection 5933*, Kant says, “the Schematism shows the condition under which an appearance is determined in respect to a logical function and, therefore, stands under a category”. Thus, for example, Freudiger notes that there are three ways in which the categories can be involved in a judgment, and that in a judgment of perception only two of the three ways are involved (whereas all three ways are involved in a judgment of experience), namely, their function as “judgment in general” and as “the condition of the synthesis of apprehension”, which is described in the *Analytic of Principles*. The third function, namely, as the schematized categories, is not involved in such judgments.

Apart from the difficulty of comprehending how there could be three ways in which the *categories* can function in judging, what Freudiger leaves out in his account is the fact that the logical forms of judgment, which are involved in all judgments without exception, can be employed either determinately or indeterminately, and that the application of the categories, for Kant, is equivalent to the determinate employment of the logical forms of judgment. As the quoted passages indicate, it is the

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89 Ibid., 422.
90 KrV, A 136/B 175.
91 KrV, A 664/B 692.
92 Dated 1776 to 1789
difference between these two ways of employing the logical forms that Kant is concerned with in his account of the schema, which, he says, alone makes possible a determinate (as opposed to a merely indeterminate) employment of the logical forms.

Beatrice Longuenesse proposes another way to reconcile the account of judgment given in the *Prolegomena* with the account of judgment given in section 19 of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. She argues that whereas in the *Prolegomena* Kant opposes “two types of empirical judgments”, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he opposes “two origins of judgment”\(^94\). Thus, “the *Critique* and the *Prolegomena* obey a different purpose”; she explains:

> In the *Prolegomena*, Kant distinguishes between two types of empirical judgments. In the *Critique*, he shows what the combinations of our perceptions would be in the absence of a function of judging that we could consider as original, what they would be if our judgments merely derived from empirical associations. Then our representations would have no other connection than those derived from subjective associations, and the only adequate formulation for these combinations would be such as ‘if I carry a body, I feel [a pressure of weight].’ No combination would be adequately expressed by ‘it, the body, is heavy’, since no combination would hold ‘whatever the state of the subject’, that is, as a judgment of experience.\(^95\)

In other words, as Longuenesse sees it, in section 19 of the *Critique*, Kant is rejecting “Humean associationism”.\(^96\) In her view, Kant is not explaining in this section the difference between two kinds of empirical judgments, as he does in the *Prolegomena*, but rather, he is arguing that, if the only way in which we could combine sensible representations were through the associative (Humean) act of the imagination, no judgment, in the *Kantian* sense, that is, in the sense of “expressing relation to an object”\(^97\), could ever arise. Instead, all combinations would be “subjectively valid”, resulting in skepticism.\(^98\) In the *Prolegomena*, on the other hand, Kant is distinguishing between two kinds of judgments, both of which involve the logical forms of judgments, and, therefore, both of which express “a relation to an object even if this form is ‘filled’ in an empirical, contingent, and (empirically) subjective manner [in a judgment of percep-

\(^94\) Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 188.
\(^95\) Ibid., 187 f.
\(^96\) Ibid., 186.
\(^97\) Ibid., 185.
\(^98\) Ibid., 187.
tion]”99 On Longuenesse’s view, therefore, Kant’s “judgments of perception” are qualitatively different from Hume’s imaginative association of perceptions, which could never be regarded as “a judgment” in Kant’s sense.

Longuenesse’s interpretation hinges on her claim that, for Kant, “the original”100 or “the normative”101 function of the logical forms of judgment is “to express the relation of representations to an object”.102 This definition, Longuenesse maintains, does not force us to reject Kant’s “judgments of perception” which are “subjectively valid”, because even if such judgments fail to “fulfill [this] function”,103 “our capacity to judge carries within its very forms (the logical forms of judgment, specified according to quantity, quality, relation) the norms that drive us to progress from judgments of perception to judgments of experience”.104 Thus, as “a potential judgment of experience”,105 a judgment of perception does require the logical forms of judgment, though it “adequately fulfills its goal or immanent norm only in judgments of experience”.106

Whether or not such a characterization of the function of judgment was what Kant had in mind when he distinguished between the two kinds of judgment in the Prolegomena, Longuenesse is forced by her interpretation to make a move that I believe is questionable. The examples that Kant gives in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason of both a “subjectively” and an “objectively valid” relation of representations—viz., respectively, “if I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight” and “it, the body, is heavy”107—appear to correspond exactly to the examples that Kant gives in the Prolegomena of a judgment of perception, which is “subjectively valid”, and a judgment experience, which is “objectively valid”—viz., respectively, “when the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm”, and “the sun warms the stone”.108 Given this, the most natural way to construe these examples seems to be to regard them as formulating the same distinction, namely, the distinction between a “subjectively

99 Ibid., 185.
100 Ibid., 187.
101 Ibid., 186.
102 Ibid., 172.
103 Ibid., 173.
104 Ibid., 186.
105 Ibid., 193.
106 Ibid.
107 KrV, B 142.
108 Prol 04: 301n.
valid” and an “objectively valid relation of representations” or judgments. This natural reading, however, would have to be rejected on Longueness-e’s interpretation, since, according to her interpretation, in section 19 of the Critique Kant is using the examples to distinguish between “mere empirical association”, which is _not_ (and can never be) a judgment, and a “judgment”, while in the Prolegomena, he is using the examples to distinguish between two kinds of _judgments_.\(^{109}\) She admits that “it is of course tempting” to construe the examples in the two works as representing the same distinction, “all the more so since Kant specifies that the meaning of the objective form ‘it, the body, is heavy’, is that ‘[the] two representations are linked in the object, whatever the state of the subject’, whereas the formulation of empirical association, ‘if I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight’ is said to hold ‘only in my perception’.”\(^{110}\) But she is forced by her interpretation to resist this “temptation”.

The fact that Longuenesse’s interpretation forces us to reject this natural reading calls into question her interpretation. I believe that an interpretation can be proposed that does not force us into such a conclusion and that does not at the same time commit us to a far-fetched reading of the passages in question. We can sustain the natural reading of the passages if we remember that in both accounts Kant speaks of “the logical use of the understanding” (in the Critique) or “a logical connection of perceptions” (in the Prolegomena), which he contrasts with “the transcendental use of the power of judgment” (in the Critique) or with “a subsumption of perceptions under the pure concepts of the understanding” (in the Prolegomena) in order to elaborate the difference between the two ways in which the logical forms of judgment can be employed, that is, indeterminately and determinately respectively. On this interpretation, the example that Kant gives of a relation of representations that is “subjectively valid” in section 19 of the Critique, viz., “if I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight”, will not have to be construed (as it would have to be on Longuenesse’s interpretation) as a non-judgmental, merely “empirical association” that is unrelated to the example that Kant gives of a judgment of perception in the Prolegomena, viz., “if the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm”, of which Kant says not only that it is “subjectively valid” but also that it is “merely a connection of perceptions within my mental state, without reference to the object”.\(^{111}\) Compare the latter char-

\(^{109}\) Longuenesse, Beatrice: _Kant and the Capacity to Judge_, 187.
\(^{110}\) Ibid.
\(^{111}\) Prol 04: 300.
acterization with the example of an “objectively valid” relation of representations that Kant gives in section 19 of the *Critique* viz., “it, the body, is heavy”, in which, he says, “the two representations are combined in the object, i.e., regardless of any difference in the conditions of the subject, and are not merely found together in perception [...]”¹¹² On this interpretation, we are not forced to deny what seems obvious since both examples, viz., “if I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight” (in the *Critique*) and “if the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm” (in the *Prolegomena*), can be regarded as instances of what Kant calls “subjectively valid” relations of representations that can, moreover, be regarded as judgments insofar as they both involve the logical forms judgment as they are employed indeterminately, that is to say, as they are employed in such a way that the representations are connected, as Kant notes, only in the subject, though not “in the object”.

III. The Subjective Unity of Consciousness

If the foregoing interpretation is correct, we can conclude that what Kant calls “the subjective unity” or “the empirical unity” of consciousness or “empirical apperception” refers to that “unity” which results from the indeterminate way in which representations have been combined, that is, in such a way that the manner in which the concepts are to relate to one another in the judgment has not been fixed or determined in one’s consciousness. In other words, for Kant, the representations’ being combined or unified “subjectively”, “contingently”, and “empirically” is equivalent to their being related to one another in accordance with the merely “logical use of the understanding”, that is, in accordance with an indeterminate employment of the logical forms. Unfortunately, Kant does not make clear precisely how the kind of (self-) awareness that is involved when the representations are combined merely subjectively or “only in the consciousness of my state” differs from the kind of (self-) awareness that is involved when the representations are combined not only in the subject but also “in the object”. For example, Kant, as we saw, argues in the Transcendental Deduction that self-consciousness is required for cognition or objective judgment. Kant seems to be saying that we can be conscious of our activity of combining or be conscious of the ways in which the representations are being combined. But how are we to un-

¹¹² KrV, B 143.
derstand such a claim? Moreover, what is the nature of the state of our consciousness when the representations are unified according to an indeterminate use of the logical forms, i.e., in such a way that “it is undetermined which concept is to function as subject and which concept as predicate”? As we have already seen, Kant does not explain how the “subjective unity” differs from the “objective unity” of consciousness, and, in fact, his account seems to suggest (to our puzzlement) that any unification of representations that is effected in one consciousness is an “objective unity”. It can perhaps be suggested that, for Kant, even a relation of representations brought about by, say, a mere associative (Humean) act of the imagination constitutes a “unity”, since what he calls “the unity of consciousness” or “the unity of apperception”, whether it be objective or subjective, is impossible apart from the combining or synthetic activity that is always carried out in accordance with the logical forms of judgments. But such a suggestion still leaves us with some unanswered questions.

A few recent scholars have dealt with the question of the relation between apperception or self-consciousness and the act of judging in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Patricia Kitcher, for example, does discuss apperception as it relates to judging, but she does not take into consideration the role of the logical forms of judgment and the categories in her discussion. Henry Allison also offers an account of the relation between consciousness and the act of judging, but like Kitcher, he does not bring to bear the role the logical forms and the categories play in this relation. Nonetheless, I would like to examine Allison’s account since it does make reference to the notion of indeterminacy and since, if developed further, it can help bring out another dimension in our comprehension of this relation.

Allison says that Kant’s “conception of knowledge” commits him to two views: one, “that judgment involves a synthesizing, unifying activity, exercised upon the given by the understanding”, and two, “that it involves

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113 Kitcher, Patricia: *Kant’s Transcendental Psychology*, 104–115.
114 Kitcher says, “[Kant] believes that the unity of apperception is brought about by syntheses that are guided by rules associated with the categories. I omit this aspect, because it does not bear on the soundness of the reply to Hume [which is her focus in the chapter] and because I do not believe that the arguments for categorically determined syntheses succeed” (Ibid., 105).
a *consciousness* of this activity*. He suggests that judgment be construed as “the activity of ‘taking as’”. He explains:

> To judge is to take something as a such and such. In the simplest case, an indeterminate something $x$ is taken as an $F$. In more complex cases, $Fx$ is qualified by further “determinations”; for example, $Fx$ is $G$ (this cat is black). [...] in all these cases the mind must not only combine the items (representations or judgments) in a single consciousness, it must also be conscious of what it is doing. [...] unless one is aware of taking $x$ as an $F$ (recognizing it in a concept), one has not in fact taken it as such.

Allison says that this “taking” is “a spontaneous, inherently self-conscious activity of the subject”*. He also characterizes this act of “taking as” as “recognition”, that is, being “aware of taking $x$ as an $F$” in a categorical judgment or “the grasping of reasons as reasons” in reasoning or inference.

Allison’s account is highly suggestive. He specifies what it is that the subject must be conscious of in the act of judging that leads to knowledge and thus explains why Kant says that such judgments must involve self-consciousness. What Allison does not incorporate in his discussion, however, is the role the logical forms of judgment plays in one’s consciousness of the act of judging. This is unfortunate given that Allison himself describes this act of judging, which he equates with the act of “taking as”, as the act of *determining*, that is, in Allison’s words, the act of taking “an indeterminate something” as a such and such*. In another essay, for example, Allison says that “to judge is just to take some intuitively given item or set thereof as a determinate something. [For example,] an indeterminate something $= x$ is taken as an $F$. Apart from or prior to this conceptual determination, there is no content for thought.”

I have shown above that, for Kant, cognition of an object or objective judgment (as opposed to a mere relation of representations that does not refer to an object) requires the determinate employment of the logical forms. In other words, nothing can be grasped as an object unless the logical

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116 Ibid., 95.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
forms are employed in such a way that the merely logical function that orders the representations is fixed or specified in some way. The same point can be made from the perspective of apperception. The possibility of the unity of consciousness or apperception must be construed in terms of the manner in which the logical forms are employed in the act of judging. Kant explains the state of consciousness in human cognition, whether it is merely “subjective” or “objective” (that is, whether the representations are unified for one subject only or for all), in terms of whether or not the subject succeeds, through the activity of judging, in fixing, delimiting, or determining, the content of thought. In other words, for Kant, cognition and thus the objective unity of consciousness is impossible apart from the act of making a particular or specific use of the general forms of thinking that are available to human understanding.

Given all this, Allison’s account seems to give rise to the following problem. According to this account, the act of judging is equivalent to the act of “taking as”, which he construes as the act of determining that which was formerly “an indeterminate something”. Such an account, however, will not be able to distinguish adequately the act of “taking as” that represents a determinate, objective judgment from the act of “taking as” that amounts to a merely indeterminate, subjective judgment. For example, a judgment that results from a mere Humean, associative act of the imagination may take the form of “taking” some item in experience “as a such and such”. But this obviously would not count as an objective judgment. So the problem is that as it stands it seems that Allison’s account of judging as the act of “taking as” cannot explain how an indeterminate, subjective judgment differs from a determinate, objective judgment. In other words, what Allison’s account has to (but cannot) rule out is the possibility that the act of “taking as”, understood as the act of determining, be involved in subjective judgments.

Allison would reply that a Humean association is not a judgment at all, and therefore, is not an instance of the act of “taking as”. But, as we have already seen, for Kant, even a relation of representations that does not refer to an object (including Humean associations as well as various species of what he calls “judgments of perception”) employs the logical forms, though indeterminately and not determinately. In other words, Kant allows for subjective judgments, in which (as we saw) the “unity” of consciousness is said by Kant to be merely “subjective” or “empirical” since, again, the logical forms employed therein are not fixed or determined for cognition of an object. In this connection, Longuenesse points out, I believe correctly, that even those judgments that have the catego-
rical form (‘S is P’) can result from a mere associative act of the imagination:

The ‘subjective unity’ [“of given representations”] emerges from the associative combinations of imagination, which are dependent on the contingent conjunctions of our representations. [...] For example, a judgment such as ‘Bodies are heavy’ may be only the empirical generalization of a customary association between impressions of weight and of carrying a body. If it expresses nothing more than such a generalization, the correlation it expresses is contingent.121

If my analysis is correct, one way in which Allison’s account can be supplemented is to provide an explanation as to how the kind of “taking as” involved in a subjective judgment differs from the kind of “taking as” involved in an objective judgment.

An account that includes such an explanation can be developed if Allison’s account is construed in the context of what I have shown above. For Kant, there could simply be no act of “taking as”, if this act is construed (as it is by Allison) as the act of determining, unless the logical forms are employed determinately. The same point can be made in the following way from the standpoint of apperception: Allison says that the act of “taking as” involves at the same time a consciousness of this activity. But if this activity is understood (as it is by Allison) as one of determining that which was at first indeterminate, then the unity of consciousness involved in such an activity is objective, not subjective; and if so, this activity can take place only when the logical forms are employed determinately. Kant makes it clear that what he calls “determinations” (Bestimmungen) are not mere attributes, but “real predicates” (as opposed to merely “logical predicates”) or representations that refer to an object.122 It is only in the Transcendental Deduction sections in the Critique of Pure Reason that the explanation is given of how such representations are possible at all. I have shown above that in these sections we

121 Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 83. Of course, if this judgment emerges from “the objective unity of given representations”, then it is objectively valid, as Kant notes in section 19 of the Critique of Pure Reason. Another example of an empirical judgment that could be either subjectively valid or objectively valid is the one given in the passage from MAN discussed above: “the stone is hard” (MAN AA 04: 475). Longuenesse discusses another example of such judgments that Kant gives in the Prolegomena, “air is elastic”. See Longuenesse, Beatrice: Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 84.
122 KrV, A 598/B 626
learn that no representation can refer to an object unless the logical forms are employed determinately.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, Allison’s account can be developed further in an attempt to make clear Kant’s view of the relation between judgment and apperception. What the subject must be conscious of in the act of judging, according to Allison, is the act of taking something \(x\) as a such and such. But, since Allison himself describes this act as the act of taking “an indeterminate something” as a such and such, that is to say, as the act of determining, it would be more in line with Kant’s own views if we say that what the subject is conscious of in the act of judging that leads to cognition of an object is that a representation is grasped or understood as a determinate or specific instance of a more general one. Kant often explains the act of judging as involving such a relation of representations, namely, in terms of concepts or representations’ being brought under or “subsumed under” more general or “higher” ones.\(^{123}\) The “highest” or the most general representations or concepts under which everything that humans can cognize must be brought are, of course, the categories, which are nothing but the specific or particular ways in which the logical forms can be employed. In other words, the only objects that can be cognized by human beings are those that can be represented as specific or determinate instances of ultimately what are the most general forms of thinking available to us, namely, the logical forms of judgment.

Here one might object that, on my interpretation, the act of judging would cover only analytic judgments in which the concepts are combined in a genus/species relationship or in the manner of subordination or super-ordination typical in the Aristotelian tradition. It would not (so the objection would go) cover synthetic judgments in which not only concepts but also intuitions (empirical or pure) are combined. In response to this objection, we must recall that in section 20 of the B-Deduction, Kant says that the logical forms of judgment are employed not only in combining concepts but also intuitions: Kant say that in applying “the category of substance, […] if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition [my emphasis] in experience must always be considered as subject, never as mere predicate” (B 129). This means that even when intuitions are combined or “subsumed under” the subject concept, such combination is made possible by the logical forms’ (here, the form ‘S is P’) being employed determinately. In other words, the intuition is able to be brought under the concept of the subject at all be-

\(^{123}\) KrV, A 69/B 94
cause it can be represented as a specific instance of a more general concept (‘body’), which in turn may be “brought under” a still more general concept, and so on, though in the end the most general concept would be the category. This interpretation is supported by a number of passages, such as the following passage in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in which Kant mentions the condition that must be met if objectively valid empirical judgments are to be possible:

[Empirical laws] are only particular determinations of yet higher laws, the highest of which (under which all others stand) come from the understanding itself *a priori*, and [...] must provide the appearances with their lawfulness and by that very means make experience possible.\(^{124}\)

As Michael Friedman comments, “Only such [...] [a] procedure, in which empirical laws are successively determined by synthetic *a priori* principles of the understanding, can explain how a judgment of perception can be converted into a judgment of experience.”\(^{125}\) Every act of judging, then, involves taking something as a determinate or specific representation of a more general one. For Kant, cognition of an object is impossible apart from such an act of determining. So what we must be conscious of in the act of judging that leads to cognition of an object is the act of determining, which should be understood not merely as the act of ascribing properties or “determinations” to “an indeterminate something”, but more fundamentally, as the act of grasping or taking something as a specific instance of a more general representation, which, after all, is (as I have shown) how Kant himself understands “the act of determining”, and thus of the act of judging itself.

But what does it mean to say that the act of judging objectively is equivalent to the act of determining in which I am conscious of the act of grasping something as a specific instance of a more general representation? Wouldn’t this mean that only logicians and philosophers can hope to make objective judgments? To avoid this absurdity, it may be suggested that the awareness need not be explicit. Implicit awareness, recognition in retrospect (“after the fact”), or even awareness as a “second order” act suffices. Thus, what is required is the *capacity* of the subject to be conscious of the act of grasping such a relation.

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124 KrV, A 126
We can now return to what Allison calls "the problem of the subjective unity of consciousness", namely, the problem that while Kant does make clear what "the subjective unity" is not, he does not clarify what "the subjective unity" is. Taking into consideration the conclusions of the analyses carried out above, we can say that "the subjective unity of consciousness" is "subjective" because no object is cognized thereby. It is a "unity" because in relating or unifying representations, the logical forms are still employed (though only indeterminately). It is a "consciousness" in the sense that what I am aware of is an indeterminate relation of representations, that is to say, a relation in which a representation is not a specific or determinate instance of a more general representation.  

126 I would like to thank Erik Anderson, Bryan Hall, and Marco Sgarbi for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.