Chapter 2

Constructing Modern Diasporas

This chapter sets out to provide us with a theoretical context to understand the way in which the diasporic identity is constructed and articulated by the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth. In doing so, my aim is not to reinscribe the ideology of cultural difference by locating the descendants of Turkish migrants as Berlin-Turks in a continuous space between Germany and Turkey. Neither am I attempting to exoticise these youths in their cultural space by pinning their identity on a kind of essence. What I want to do is to demonstrate that the whole question of identity is a matter of politics and process rather than of inheritance. In order to reveal a fuller view of the diasporic consciousness displayed by the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth, I shall explore the nature of ethnicity as an expression of collective identity within the Berlin-Turkish population. Therefore, I will firstly examine how the Berlin-Turkish population has historically employed ethnicity as a survival strategy during the process of negotiation with majority society. Secondly, I will scrutinise the notion of diaspora under the guidance of contemporary scholars who offer various interpretations of the concept. Finally, I will contemplate the cultural identity of the Berlin-Turkish youths in the light of, and in relation to, the notion of diaspora.

The Changing Face of Ethnic Group Political Strategies

Contemporary labour-ethnic minorities in Europe can no longer be simply considered temporary migrant communities who live with the ‘myth of return’ or the passive victims of global capitalism. They have rather become permanent sojourners, active social agents and decision-makers in their destination countries. The strategies and organisations developed by the migrants and their descendants in their coun-
tries of settlement may spring from various material and political sources. These sources are namely the racial and exclusionary immigration policies of the country of settlement, the repressive political regime of their country of origin, their homeland’s relations with other countries, the changing streams in world politics, inter-diaspora-relations and class interests. These factors, which are strengthened by global interconnectedness, have recently become the main determinants of the politics of identity undertaken by ethnic minorities in the West.

As these factors are applied to the Berlin-Turks, it becomes apparent that both internal and external factors have impelled them to construct some ethnic-based political participation strategies and identities. There is enough evidence that Turkish labour migrants in Europe have developed two various political participation strategies depending on the nature of problems they have encountered in time: a migrant strategy and a minority strategy. Both strategies have been principally formed along ethnic lines due to the institutional and political context of Germany since the first recruitment treaty in 1961.

In what follows, after a brief history of recruitment and migratory process in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), I shall examine how these political strategies have been constructed and articulated by the Berlin-Turkish migrants along ethnic lines. Subsequently, I shall introduce the notion of diasporic identity as a form of ethnic consciousness, which is peculiar to the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin.

The Migratory Process

Migration into post war Germany started as labour recruitment to mitigate shortages in specific industries. Between 1955 and 1968, the FRG concluded intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean countries: first Italy (1955), then Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). The German Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit – BA) set up recruitment offices in the countries concerned. Employers seeking workers had to apply to the BA and pay a fee. The BA then selected suitable workers, tested their work skills, gave them medical check-ups and screened police and political records.¹ Migrants were recruited at first for agriculture and construction, later by
all branches of industry, where they generally had low-skilled manual jobs (Castles and Kosack, 1973). Guest-worker programmes were designed to solve immediate labour shortages in Germany by recruiting workers on temporary, short-term residence and work permits (Castles et al., 1984). The Turkish population in the FRG rose from 6,700 in 1961 to 605,000 in 1973 (Table 1).

Table 1: Germany’s Non-German Population and Turkish Minority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Non-German Population</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Turkish Minority</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>686,200</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,600,600</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>249,400</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3,966,200</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>605,000</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3,948,300</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>508,000</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4,240,500</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1,453,700</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4,845,900</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1,612,600</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990a</td>
<td>5,342,500</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1,675,900</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991b</td>
<td>5,882,300</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1,779,600</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6,495,800</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1,854,900</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6,878,100</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1,918,400</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6,990,510</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>1,965,577</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Data from 1961-1990 for the ‘old’ Länder;
b) Data from 1991 for the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Länder.
Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1992, 1994, and 1995

In the early stages of the migration, Turkish migrants were mainly men between the ages of 20 and 39, relatively skilled and educated in comparison to the average working population in Turkey, and from the economically more developed regions of the country (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz, 1986; Martin, 1991). The ratio of rural migrants at this stage was just 17.2 percent. In the second half of the 1960s, recruitment consisted of rural workers (Gökdere, 1978). Berlin was relatively late in recruiting Turkish workers. Since the textile and electronics sectors demanded cheap female labour, it was conversely the women who first migrated to Berlin in 1964.
Turkish workers who migrated to Berlin by 1973 were primarily from the eastern provinces and from economically less-developed regions of Turkey.

As shown in the Table 1, there has been a continual increase in the non-German population through the post-war-period. The exceptions are the figures for 1977, which can be explained because the entry of non-European Community workers was banned in November 1973 by the German government due to the oil crisis, the consequent economic stagnation and political considerations. Since 1973, the composition of the Turkish migrant population has tended to become a more general population migration in the form of family reunification and political asylum rather than mainly labour migration.

The Formation of Ethnic-Based Political Strategies

**Der Spiegel** (14 April 1997), a prominent liberal weekly magazine, denounced the ‘foreigners’ in the country as ‘dangerously alien’ and as the cause of the failure of the ‘multicultural society.’ In the magazine, Turkish youths in Germany were presented as ‘criminals,’ ‘fundamentalists,’ ‘nationalist’ and ‘traumatic.’ A similar trend to the media coverage of the Turks in Germany has also recently been exhibited in the academia. Wilhelm Heitmeyer (1997), who was referred to in the *Der Spiegel* article, has become a polemical name after the publication of his book on the German-Turkish youth, *Verlockender Fundamentalismus* (*Enticing Fundamentalism*). In his book, he concluded that it is the Turks who are not tempted to integrate and to incorporate themselves into the system. His main criterion in declaring the self-isolationist tendency of the Turkish-origin youths was their contentment to live with Islam and Turkishness. What was missing in both works was the underestimation of the structural constraints of Germany, which has remarkably shaped the survival strategies of migrants and their descendants. Such an approach, which does not consider the impact of the institutional structure of the receiving country on immigrant political mobilisation, is quite essentialist and exclusionist.

Why do migrants withdraw from ‘host-society’ political life? Patrick R. Ireland (1994) has drawn our attention to the legal conditions and political institutions of the receiving counties in mapping out the nature of immigrant political mobilisation. He has stated that “certain immigrant communities have withdrawn voluntarily from
host-society political life in the face of institutional indifference and hostility” (1994: 8). Ireland has formulated the ‘institutional channeling theory’ as an alternative to the class and race/ethnicity theories to understand immigrant political strategies. Accordingly, he claims that the reason behind migrant groups’ organising themselves politically along ethnic lines is primarily because ‘host-society’ institutions have nurtured ethnicity through their policies and practices. Similarly, Turkish migrants have hitherto organised themselves politically in Germany along ethnic lines because the institutional context in which they have been has primarily made them to do so.

The primary constituent of the German institutional context to which the immigrants are subject, is the laws of citizenship which frame the legal status of minorities. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), recognises two categories of rights: general and reserved. General rights apply to all individuals in the FRG and include freedom of expression, liberty of person, and freedom of conscience (Art. 2, 3, 4 and 5). Reserved rights are restricted to German citizens, and include the right of peaceable assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of occupation (Art. 8, 9, 11 and 12). The Basic Law does not prescribe how citizenship is recognised or conferred, but the criteria are based first and foremost on ethnic nationality. The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship are defined by the Basic Law Article 116, the preamble to the Basic Law, and the 1913 Imperial and State Citizenship Law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz), and provide that citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child.² Article 116 of the Basic Law reads as follows:

(1) A German within the meaning of this Basic Law, unless otherwise regulated by law, is a person who possesses German citizenship, or who has been received in the territory of the German Reich as of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German stock or as the spouse or descendant of such a person.

(2) Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall be granted citizenship on application.

The Imperial Naturalisation Law of 1913 was designed to make the acquisition of German citizenship difficult for aliens out of fear that
the Reich was being invaded by immigrants from the East, especially Poles and Jews. At the same time, the law sharply reduced the barriers to the repatriation of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from outside the Reich (Brubaker, 1992: 114-119; Klusmeyer, 1993: 84; Marshall, 1992).

The claim to naturalisation has always been difficult for the non-EU ‘foreigners’ in the FRG, and has required repudiation of the citizenship of the country of origin. The non-EU ‘foreigners’ are denied the right to dual citizenship; even the children of migrants born and raised in Germany could not automatically receive the rights of citizenship. The ‘foreigners’ who are willing to renounce their previous citizenship can be naturalised only after they have been living in Germany for at least fifteen years. In contrast, the Volksdeutschen (ethnic Germans defined by the Article 116 of the Basic Law) – primarily Poles and Russians who can improve German ancestry – have a constitutional right to naturalisation.

However, the German government recently established two mechanisms that, for the first time, provide migrants with the right to claim citizenship. According to the new Ausländergesetz (1991) and the Gesetz zur Änderung asylverfahrens-, ausländer- und staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlicher Vorschriften (1993), two groups of Ausländer have been legally entitled to naturalisation (paragraphs 85 and 86 of the Ausländergesetz). Paragraph 85 declares that ‘foreigners’ between the ages of 16 and 23, who have been resident in Germany for more than eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years and who have not been convicted of serious offences, have the right to be naturalised. On the other hand, paragraph 86 introduces that those ‘migrants,’ who have been resident in Germany for at least 15 years and possess a residence permit, have the right to naturalisation. The absence of a conviction of a serious criminal offence and financial independence of the applicant are also primarily crucial for the acquisition of citizenship according to this paragraph. Besides, the new citizenship law, which was put into force since the 1st of January 2000, makes it possible for the children of immigrants to acquire dual citizenship up until the age of 23. The age of 23 is the threshold for the youngsters to decide on either German or Turkish citizenship.

Non-European Union immigrants, or resident aliens, mostly have been given what Marshall (1950) defined as social and civil rights, but not political rights. The immigrants built a very real political presence in Germany where their political participation in the system was not
legally allowed. The legal barriers denying political participation provided a ground for the Turkish immigrants in Germany to organise themselves politically along collective ethnic lines. As a response to the German insistence on the exclusionary ‘Ausländerstatus,’ Turkish migrant communities have tended to develop strong ethnic structures and maintain ethnic boundaries. The lack of political participation and representation in the receiving country made them direct their political activity towards their country of origin. In fact, this home-oriented participation has received encouragement from Turkey that has set up networks of consular services and other official organisations (religious, educational and commercial). Homeland opposition parties and movements have also forged an organisational presence in Germany.

This early form of political participation that was home-oriented has crosscut with the migrant strategy, the framework of which I shall discuss below. In the later stages of the migratory process, the legal position of the immigrants with regard to residence and political rights has remained provisional. They have been given the same rights as Germans in the unions and in workplace co-determination under the law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), but they are still excluded from all other forms of formal participation or personal influence in political decision-making process. This is the stage when the Turkish immigrants have been systematically marginalised by the state. As a response to this ‘ethnic minorisation’ they started forming their own associations along ethnic lines – a point which I shall again explore in the following section.

In addition to the constitutional barriers, the absence of a general immigration policy has also compelled the Turkish immigrants in Germany to isolate themselves in ethnic enclaves from the dominant society. From its inception to the present, the Federal Republic’s official policy has been that “Germany is not a country of immigration.” Lacking a general immigration policy, the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) issued the Ausländergesetz (Foreigners Law) in 1965. This law did not give foreigners a right to residence, merely stating that “a residence permit may be granted, if it does not harm the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.” This term is a key phrase in policies regarding migrants. In the 1960s and early 1970s it was not only the granting of political rights to foreign immigrants, which was certainly not seen as being in the interests of the German Federal Repub-
lic, also the law of 1965 specifically excluded them from other civil rights:

Foreigners enjoy all basic rights; except the basic rights of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, place of work and place of education, and protection from extradition abroad (*Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zur Ausführung des Ausländergesetzes*, § 6).

Thus, the German state established a system of ‘institutional discrimination,’ through which temporary guest workers could be recruited, controlled and sent away, ‘as the interests of capital dictated’ (Castles, 1985: 523). The main concern of the first stage of the *Ausländerpolitik* between 1965 and 1973 was economic considerations. The second stage of the law was shaped by concerns of increasing social problems and political tensions. The early policy was impracticable, not only because of the various international agreements granting rights of family reunification, to which Germany was a party, but also because many firms found that rotation led to problems of labour fluctuation and high training costs (ibid.). Accordingly, in November 1973 the entry of further labour force from non-EC countries was banned, and family reunion permitted. Afterwards, the Federal Labour Office decreed that work permits for migrant workers were not to be renewed if West German workers were thought to be available for the job concerned. This meant that in some cases the migrant workers were forced to leave their jobs and return home.

The third stage of the *Ausländerpolitik* started when the CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union – Christian Democratic Party) came into power in 1983. By the early 1980s the ‘foreigners problem’ had become a major issue in West German politics. While in power, the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – Social Democratic Party) had moved towards increasingly restrictive policies on migrant rights. On the other hand, the CDU was proposing to implement stricter policies for the control of foreigners and encouragement of repatriation. A CDU resolution in the Federal Parliament in 1981 stated: “The role of the Federal Republic of Germany as a national unitary state and as part of a divided nation does not permit the commencement of an irreversible development to a multiethnic state” (Castles, 1985: 528). Consequently, Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s government in coalition with CSU (Christlich Soziale Union – Christian
Social Party) and FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei – Free Democratic Party) radicalised the *Ausländerpolitik*, aiming for the restriction of further immigration and encouragement of repatriation. By ‘integration,’ the conservative government meant that those foreigners who were unable to adapt themselves to the German norms, values and laws were to be deported to allow those remaining to be assimilated. In addition to the so-called ‘integration’ the government restricted the entry of further immigrants, spouses and dependent children of immigrants by applying new quotas. Finally, the government encouraged repatriation with a decree between October 30, 1983 and June 30, 1984 by offering premiums of 10,500 DM plus 1,500 DM per dependent child if they left the country immediately. The government also ‘guaranteed’ the reintegration of repatriating children to the new conditions in Turkey by subsidising some adaptation schools and providing German teachers in these schools.⁸

The alteration of the ethnic strategies amongst the Berlin-Turks has considerably been bounded to the transformation of the *Ausländerpolitik* in Berlin as well as to the ethnically defined citizenship laws. The periodisation of the *Ausländerpolitik* in Berlin is slightly different from the rest of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thomas Schwartz (1992: 121-138) provides an overview of three phases of *Ausländerpolitik* in Berlin. In the first phase (late 1960s and early 1970s), when the wall was constructed, the law was characterised mainly in terms of addressing problems of urban planning. Accordingly, demographic and employment factors became the key concerns of policy makers, and ‘integration’ was considered a structural concern. Later, in the second phase of the *Ausländerpolitik* (1980s), ‘representative politics’ (*Beauftragtenpolitik*) emerged as the central orientation of Berlin government. Berlin was the first Land in the Federal Republic to establish an office of *Ausländerbeauftragte* (Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs). The office was originally envisioned as a liaison between local government and the various ethnic organisations. The last phase is the one, which was introduced by the Red-Green coalition in 1998. This phase, which is in a sense peculiar to Berlin, has been dominated by concepts of anti-racism and multiculturalism – a point to which I shall return shortly. These phases of *Ausländerpolitik* have shaped the form of political participation of those Turkish migrants who lack legal political rights. In the following section, after pointing out the three phases of *Ausländerpolitik*, I will elaborate the main
landmarks of the ethnic strategies developed by Berlin-Turkish communities in relation to the *Ausländerpolitik*.

**Migrant Strategy**

The first generation of migrants, who conceived themselves as temporary, arrived in their country of residence by leaving their families behind a painful experience. The nature of the migration to the West from Turkey is mostly chain migration. This type of migration has played a major role in the incorporation of kin and fellow villagers into the migration stream. Chain migration in Berlin has two aspects. The first aspect is the in-coming spouses and children who joined the process of migration with the family reunification in 1973 and onwards. The second aspect of chain migration is the dense in-coming of migrants from disaster areas in Turkey, in a way that led to high representation of people from the Varto/Erzurum and Gediz/Kütahya areas (earthquakes) as well as Konya and Isparta (floods) (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 93).

Chain migration makes migrants’ family relations or local community relations both in the country of origin and in the country of immigration more vital and instrumental. When the migrants arrive in the receiving country their kin and former neighbours give them shelter, advice and support. Their previous social group status and class, lack of language, the exclusionist incorporation regimes as well as the segregationist housing policies of the receiving countries make them stick together and develop solidarity by means of informal local networks. Their desperate will to return has made them invest at home rather than in Berlin. The migrant strategy is formed in their own local neighbourhood, in which they stick together, isolated from the rest of the society. Most socialising has been carried out with other Turks, preferably *hemsehris* (fellow-villagers, *Landsmannschaften*), in private homes, mosques, public restaurants, and coffee houses (the exclusive domain of men), and on structured occasions such as the large parties frequently held in rented halls to celebrate engagements, weddings and circumcisions (Mandel, 1990: 155). It is the development of social networks, based on kinship or common area of origin and the need for mutual help in the new environment, that made possible the construction of migrant strategy (Castles and Miller, 1993: 25).

The first generation migrants, who were recruited by Germany on
the basis of Gastarbeiter (guest worker) system, have called themselves gurbetçi. The gurbetçi is the one who lives in a state of gurbet. Gurbet is an Arabic word which derives from garaba, to go away, to depart, to be absent, to go to a foreign country, to emigrate, to be away from one’s homeland, to live as a foreigner in a country. It is important to note that gurbet does not necessarily refer to a foreign country; one can perfectly be in gurbet in one’s own country: the state of gurbet covers, for instance, Turkish migrants living in Berlin as well as those living in Istanbul. The gurbetçis feel that their primary identification is with the village where they were born rather than the city. The emergent literature and music genres produced by Turkish artists in Western Europe draw upon a long tradition of exile and gurbet experiences (Çaglar, 1994; Mandel, 1990). The term gurbetçi dominated first generation German-Turks’ discourse. Defining themselves as gurbetçi, Turkish migrants raised the points, which prevented Germany from becoming a homeland for them. A feeling of security, trust, behavioural confidence, certainty, assurance and finding social recognition are the dominant needs that the notion of Heimat fulfils. Germany could not meet these needs of the first generation immigrants. The discourse of gurbetçi in alliance with the ‘will to return,’ in this case, has become an essential survival strategy for the migrants in the process of quest for home.

The Gurbetçis used to mystify the homeland in their arts, literature and musical genres as a place to which they would return some day. It would be misleading to abstract them from their attachments to their traditional past and continuous process of migration in exploring their migrant identity. In their expressive culture they have tended to romanticise the past, and continuously sought the Turkey of the times they left behind in the 60s and 70s. The first generation migrants still keep the same discourse in their daily lives. Most of them are twice-migrants – an experience which they express as ‘gurbetin gurbeti’ (exile of exile). Although such a ‘double migrancy’ discourse is still partly alive for most of the first generation migrants, it is subject to change. It is because, the migrants have started to understand that the ‘will to return’ was nothing but a myth, and that they were treated as strangers in both their country of residence and homeland. In Germany, they have been simply called as Ausländer (foreigner), and in Turkey as Almanci (German like).9

The migrant strategy was constructed sometime during the first
decade of the migration wave in the sixties when the socialisation process of migrants was based on a non-associational community formation, ethnic enclave, *hemsehri* bonding, and a *Gastarbeiter* ideology. In this very early period of migration, the primary concern of migrants was to earn money and return to Turkey. In this stage, Turkish workers were demographically more homogenous, densely accommodated in *Wohnheims* (dormitory-like hotels) and were not very visible in the receiving society. In such conditions they need not form associations to become socialised and politicised. Yet there were some informal Turkish worker associations prior to the family reunification in mid 1970s. They were followed by the growth of religious and politically conservative associations in the 1970s. Until around 1981 it was possible to categorise the majority of Turkish associations within one of the two extreme poles of Turkish society. They were either affiliated with one of the Turkish worker associations attached to a centre-left political party in Turkey, or they were more religiously organised, some aligned with the extreme right parties (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 107). It was in the early 1980s that Turkish migrants started to form ethnic and political associations. It was a time when issues of ‘integration’ were highly discussed in Germany and became present in the *Ausländerpolitik*, and also a time when a new policy of ‘assimilation or return’ was put into force by the government of Helmut Kohl in Germany.

**Minority Strategy**

In 1983 the federal parliament passed a law encouraging *Ausländer* (foreigners) to leave Germany, and paying them to do so. However, since the beginning of the 1980s many German cities, especially Berlin, also established official institutions (*Ausländerbeauftragte*) for working with minorities of foreign origin. In this second stage of *Ausländerpolitik*, integration and/or assimilation became the major concern of the Federal Republic (Schwartz, 1992; Vertovec, 1996a). Since the early 1980s, the government of Helmut Kohl reflected the rising tide of rightist sentiments, putting into practice an *Ausländerpolitik* based on the restriction of all forms of new immigration, and a policy of ‘assimilation or return’ for all the ‘foreigners’ present in the country (Vertovec, 1996a: 384). At this stage of the *Ausländerpolitik*, the orientations of Turkish formal associations reached a turning
point in Berlin. Those ethnic organisations, which were established at this stage, were highly oriented towards Germany. The rise of numerous ethnic associations was not only due to the rightist Ausländerpolitik radicalising between ‘assimilation’ and ‘return,’ but also to the exclusionary laws of national belonging, rise of racist attacks, institutional racism, structural outsiderism, family reunification, growing consciousness of long-term settlement, upward social mobilisation, and to the widespread control of political movements in Turkey after the advent of the military regime in 1980. Accordingly all these aspects enforced the formation of ethnic and political associations amongst the Turkish population in Germany to come to terms with the problems emerging in both the countries of reception and origin.

Despite the existence of a modern welfare state which provides the most basic social services in terms of health, education and social security, Turks found it necessary and opportune to set up their own services to mediate between individuals and German institutions. Turks may have previously accepted German advocates; recently, “they are finding their own voice, their own advocates, and their own understanding of what it means and what should mean to be of Turkish-origin in German society” (Horrocks and Kolinsky, 1996: xx).

The emergence of ethnic communities with their own institutions such as ethnic associations, cultural associations, youth clubs, cafés, agencies, and professions give rise to the birth of a new ethnic-based political strategy, i.e. a minority strategy. The permanent settlement brings about the necessity of a long-live strategy rather than the migrant strategy, in order, not only to maintain culture, but more importantly to cope with disadvantage, to improve life chances against political exclusion and socio-economic marginalisation, and to provide protection from racism (Castles and Miller, 1993: 114).

Depending upon the integration policies of the receiving country, the formation of ethnic minority organisations might spring from various material reasons. Ethnic minorities may be seen as social groups which are the result of both ‘other’-definition and ‘self’-definition. On the one hand, the ethnic minorities are defined by dominant social groups in regard to their perceived phenotypical or cultural characteristics, which lead to the imposition of specific economic, social or legal situations. On the other hand, their members generally share a self-definition or ethnic identity based on ideas of common origins, history, culture, experience and values (ibid.: 28). Thus, the
construction of ethnic minority is highly related to the political structure of the receiving society. As Castles and Miller (ibid.: 26) state,

At one extreme, openness to settlement, granting of citizenship and gradual acceptance of cultural diversity may allow the formation of ethnic communities, which can be seen as part of a multicultural society. At the other extreme, denial of the reality of settlement, refusal of citizenship and rights to settlers, and rejection of cultural diversity may lead to formation of ethnic minorities, whose presence is widely regarded as undesirable and divisive. In the first case, the immigrants and their descendants are seen as an integral part of a society, which is willing to reshape its culture and identity. In the second, immigrants are excluded and marginalised, so that they live on the fringes of a society, which is determined to preserve myths of a static culture and a homogenous identity.

The experience of discrimination and racism in western European countries forced immigrants to constitute their own communities and to define their group boundaries in cultural terms (ibid.: 28). This is the new form of racism “which differs from the vulgar and compromised racism of biological differences” (Ålund, 1994: 63). The ‘new racism’ continues to focus on simplified and reified cultural differences, and it does not claim that different cultures have different values, but that they are different and remain so (Barker, 1981). The ideological pillar of new racism is the holistic understanding of culture, which does not encourage the cultures to mix and construct a bricolage. The rationale behind the holistic notion of culture, which leads to new racism, is that the dominant national identities could become uncertain. The formation of community in response to the racialisation process, in return, reinforces fears of separatism and ethnic enclaves on the part of the majority society, leading to the furtherance of exclusionary practices and racism.

These conditions have set certain parameters for the life of a Turkish minority in Berlin and the socialisation of the following generations. The internal social structure of Turkish population in Berlin presents additional contingencies which contribute to the perception and evaluation of world views and collective, ethnic and national identities (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 91). The prominent advocate of ethnic minority strategy in Berlin is a conservative ethnic association, Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB, Turkish Community of Berlin)
(Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 115; Özcan, 1994: 319). TGB attempts to eradicate the use of the label ‘migrant,’ and to be officially perceived as an ethnic minority in the long run like the Danish ethnic minority in Schleswig-Holstein and the Sorben ethnic minority in southern Brandenburg. Acceptance as a minority implies that the residency, and not nationality, matters. It also implies that cultural diversity is not perceived as a danger but condoned as a social reality (Horrocks and Kolinsky, 1996: xiii).

Their attempt to go beyond the perception of being ‘migrant’ demonstrates the sharp discursive transition they have had after the former migrant strategy. The notion of ‘migrant’ has very negative connotations for the TGB members. Firstly, as Mustafa Çakmakoglu, the former head of TGB, put it, those ‘who betray Turkey’ qualify as migrants. Here, the former category of ‘those who betray Turkey’ is a political categorisation; it contains left wing and Islamic-universalist immigrants. TGB has a Turkish-Islamise ideology, which gives priority to Turkishness. Hence, those who underestimate Turkishness are considered ‘traitors.’ By subtracting themselves from this notion, the members of TGB attempt to differentiate themselves from those ‘traitors.’ Secondly, their refusal of the notion of ‘migrant’ is related to the term’s negative historical connotations within the Turkish context. Migrants (göçmen and/or muhacir) in Turkey are those Balkan-Turks, Afghans and Kurds who migrated to Turkey. These migrants have usually been considered by the Turkish people to be competing for the scarce resources of Turkey with themselves. That is why the TGB members do not want to enjoy such an undesirable label.

Moreover, it is evident that a minority status can provide them with substantial cultural and religious rights such as acquiring bilingual education and gaining financial support from the Federal government for their mosques, schools and other cultural projects. To be perceived as an ethnic minority by the German constitution, the members of the concerned group should be German citizens. For this purpose, TGB tries to convince Turks not to neglect gaining German citizenship. Their minority strategy derives from their practical expectations from such a political category. As Abdul Janmohamed and David Lloyd (1990: 9) remind us, their discourse indicates that

Becoming minor is not a question of essence (as the stereotypes of minorities in dominant ideology would want us to believe) but a question of position: a
subject position that in the final analysis can be defined only in ‘political’ terms that is, in terms of the effects of economic exploitation, political disenfran-
chisement, social manipulation, and ideological domination on the cultural formation of minority subjects and discourses [...].

Minority strategy develops within a binary relation with majority society. In this binary relation, the minority attempts to negate the prior hegemonic negation of itself by the majority society in a way that reaffirms its minor location. The collective nature of all minority discourses derives from the fact that “minority individuals are always treated and forced to experience themselves generically” in many fields of social life such as in the literary and/or political system (ibid.: 10). The literary system in Germany is an excellent example to illustrate the way in which a ‘foreigner,’ say a ‘Turkish’ novelist, expresses his/her feelings and emotions generically as a member of Turkish minority, not as a member of the German literary system. Aras Ören, Yüksel Pazarkaya, Zafer Senocak, Emine Sevgi Özdamar and Zehra Çirak are some of the Turkish-origin literary figures in Germany, writing from the margin. These novelists and poets are considered to belong to the so-called Gastarbeiterliteratur (guestworker literature) or Ausländerliteratur (foreigners’ literature) sphere (Suhr, 1989; Teraoka, 1990). These literary figures are expected to reflect the problems of their own communities, and regarded as the spokespeople of the speechless by the dominant culture.

Most of these Turkish-origin literary figures such as Aras Ören and Zehra Çirak reject the label of ‘Turkish’ novelist/poet, because they “emphasise universal human values rather than cultural, national, or even class differences; [they are] global in scope rather than local in focus and concern; and they attempt to be unifying rather than oppositional” (Teraoka, 1990: 304). As someone coerced into a negative, generic subject-position, the migrant individual is forced to respond by transforming that position into a positive, collective one. In our example it is the Turkish-origin literary figures that are forced to become the spokespeople of a Turkish minority.

The ethnic formation of minorities is not solely a product of ethnic groups’ rational choice to come to terms with the discriminatory and racist polities of the receiving country. It is also evident that ethnic minorities can be formed ‘from above’ by the state itself as a result of the exclusionary political system. Immigrant workers in Germany are,
on the one hand, integrated into the social system, but on the other hand not admitted to the political platform. This is due to the concept of the ‘jus sanguinis’, which is expressed in the Article 116 of the German Basic Law, reserving citizenship to ethnic Germans based on blood. As non-citizens, ‘foreigners’ do not have the right to political rights. They cannot themselves struggle for their interests in the political system and have to find ‘deputising majority speakers’ (Radtke, 1994: 33). When the constitutional restrictions for migrants’ political participation are combined with the contemporary local polities of ‘multiculturalism’ in Berlin, migrants are strongly encouraged into ‘ethnic minorisation’ by the state itself (Rath, 1993). As Radtke (1993: 36) reminds us, it is partly the official discourse of ‘multiculturalism’ that has induced migrant groups in Germany to form homogeneous communities around religious and traditional symbols, not only to protect a cultural identity in an unfriendly and sometimes racist environment, but also to present themselves in the way that the majority wanted to see them.

The construction of ethnic-based political strategies is strictly dependent on the policies implemented by the government of the receiving society. As I have tried to explain, those varying governmental policies concerning the ‘foreign’ immigrants – no matter if they were formed by the conservatives or social democrats – have contributed to the othering and minorisation of Turkish population in the FRG. Aras Ören, Turkish novelist and poet, warns of the dangers inherent in the acceptance of otherness and cultural difference:

[I am afraid that while] the conservatives lock us into our cultural ghetto by preserving the culture we brought with us as it is and by denying that there can be symbiosis or development, […] the progressives try to drive us back into that same ghetto because, filled with enthusiasm, by the originality and exotism of our culture, they champion it so fervently that they are even afraid it might disappear, be absorbed by German culture (Quoted in Suhr, 1989: 102).

The former political participation strategies, which have been developed by the Turkish migrants along ethnic lines, were both based on binary relation between the migrants and the majority society. The first strategy, migrant strategy, was characterised by a ‘will to return.’ It was a response to the early German recruitment politics, which was built on the notion of Gastarbeiter (guestworker). On the other hand,
the minority strategy was a response to the culturalisation and minori-
sation of the Turkish population by the German institutional structur-
ing.\textsuperscript{15}

**Diaspora Strategy**

The first generation immigrants as a set of survival strategies have primarily developed these two ethnic-based political strategies. Conversely, their descendants who were born and raised in Germany have followed different patterns, depending on their class, gender and social status. Those who live in Kotbusser Tor, Kreuzberg, where I conducted my research, having grown up in an ethnic enclave have carried the norms and traditions of their parents in themselves as well as receiving those of the majority society and international society. Additionally, they also employed ethnicity, religion and culture for the construction and articulation of their identities. They have acquired a cultural identity, which springs from parental, dominant and global cultures. This cultural identity can be defined as *diasporic*. Diasporic consciousness refers to individuals’ awareness of a range of decentered, multi-location attachments, of being simultaneously ‘home away from home’ or ‘here and there’ (Vertovec, 1997: 100).

The enhancement of telecommunications and the ease of travel made possible the emergence of alternate cultural forms and multiple identities for the diasporic youth. Above all, these transnational networks helped the descendants of the immigrants to dissolve the ‘inevitable’ binary relation between minority and majority. The following section will be an attempt to expose the main parameters of the modern notion of diaspora by referring to some scholars, and also to demonstrate the two inter-related main approaches on diaspora, as Vertovec (1997) put it: ‘diaspora as a form of consciousness’ and ‘diaspora as a mode of cultural production.’ Thus, it attempts to provide a theoretical ground for the understanding of the diasporic cultural identity of the working-class Turkish male hip-hop youth in Kreuzberg.

**Diaspora Revisited**

Recently, the notion of diaspora has been extensively used by a wide range of scholars aiming to contribute to the definition of transnation-
al migrants. The new trend of diaspora studies defines the diasporas as exemplary communities of the transnational moment. The term ‘diaspora’ is derived from the Greek verb sperio (to sow, to scatter) and the preposition dia (through, apart). For Greeks, the term referred to migration and colonisation, whereas for Jews, Africans, Palestinians and Armenians the same term acquired more unfortunate, brutal and traumatic dispersion through scattering (Cohen, 1997: ix). Yet, the contemporary notion of diaspora is not limited only with Jewish, Greek, Palestinian and Armenian dispersive experiences; rather it describes a larger domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker, exile community and ethnic community (Tölölian, 1991: 5). The primary difference between the old and modern form of diasporas lies in their changing will to go back to the ‘Holy Land,’ or homeland. In this sense, the old diasporas resemble the story of Ulysses while the new ones have been like that of Abraham. After the Trojan War, Ulysses encountered many problems on the way back to Ithaca. Although he had many obstacles during his journey, he was determined to go back home. Conversely, the experience of the modern labour diasporas resembles the Prophet Abraham’s biblical journey. In the first part of the Bible, it is written that Abraham, upon the request of God, had to journey with his people to find a new home in the unknown and he never went back to the place he left behind.

The classification of Robin Cohen is quite influential in mapping out the differences between modern and old diasporas. His historical explanation of diaspora goes back to the Biblical Jewish diaspora, which was based on a forced dispersion experience. He has a clear picture of old and new diasporas, which he separates on the basis of the genesis of global economy. Old diasporas are twofold: a) forced diasporas such as Jewish and Armenian, b) colonising diasporas such as Greek and British. On the other hand, the modern diasporas are threefold: a) trading diasporas like Jewish and Lebanese; b) business diasporas such as British; and c) labour diasporas such as Irish, Indian, Chinese, Sikh and Turkish. The main driving force behind the construction of modern labour diasporas is the global economic needs, which bring about an extensive immigration from periphery to the global and regional centres.

William Safran, in his study of “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homelands and Return,” draws up the general framework of
an ideal type of diaspora. He defines diaspora as ‘expatriate minority communities’
(1) that are dispersed from an original centre to at least two peripheral places;
(2) that maintain a memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland;
(3) that believe they are not fully accepted by their host country;
(4) that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the
time is right;
(5) that are committed to the maintenance and restoration of this
homeland; and
(6) of which the group’s consciousness and solidarity are important-
ly defined by this continuing relationship with the homeland (Saf-

Safran’s ideal type of ‘centred’ diaspora, oriented by continuous cultural connections to a source and by a teleology of ‘return,’ is inap-
clicable to the recent experiences of diaspora like African/American, 
Caribbean/British, South Asian/British, Turkish/German and/or Al-
gerian/French. These histories of displacement fall into a category of what Clifford calls ‘quasi diasporas.’ Similarly, Turkish diaspora (like the South Asian diaspora) “is not so much oriented to roots in a spe-
cific place and a desire for return as around an ability to recreate a cul-
ture in diverse locations. Such a state of diaspora falls outside the strict definition of diaspora” (Clifford, 1994: 306).

Clifford also states that the old version of ‘centred’ diaspora which has been formed around a teleology of return is getting looser because of the global social changes that mainly derive from de-colonisation,
immigration, and globalisation. He avoids the old notion of diaspora to scrutinise and enlighten the modern diasporas because,

The transnational connections linking diasporas need not be articulated prima-
arily through a real or symbolic homeland – at least not to the degree that Safran implies. Decentred, lateral connections may be as important as those formed around a teleology of origin/return. And a shared, ongoing history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance may be as important as the projection of a specific origin (Clifford, 1994: 306; emphasis mine).

Thus, Clifford suggests that some groups can become identified as
more or less diasporic, having only two, or three, or four of the six basic features of Safran’s ideal type of diaspora.

The changing nature of space and time in the age of globalism facilitates the emergence of diasporic consciousness. Globalisation emerging as the rise of communications, transportation, migration, modern diasporas, de-monopolisation of national legal systems, new international division of labour, and global culture, empowers the minorities against the hegemony of nation-state, and breaks up the conventional power relations between majority and minority. The modern “communicative circuitry has enabled dispersed populations to converse, interact and even symbolise significant elements of their social and cultural lives” (Gilroy, 1994: 211). For instance, the Turkish TV programmes are easily received in Europe by the Turkish diaspora. The official TRT International and some other private channels and newspapers spread the official ideology of the Turkish nation-state through the diaspora.

Thus, Turkish official ideology that has recently become more hegemonic and nationalist has a very important role on the construction of Turkish diaspora nationalism at the imaginary level which gives a special emphasis on Turkishness.17 For instance, during the intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces into the Northern Iraq in the winter of 1996 to prevent the logistic settlement of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the region, the Turkish TV channels organised an international campaign to collect money for the Turkish Armed Forces. In Germany, a big amount of money has been collected from the Turkish people. This is evidence of the transnational exploitation of the masses by the nation-state, and of the power of the ideology of nationalism. This change in the homeland’s orientation to the diaspora is a part of the realpolitik because the homeland governments tend to exploit diaspora sentiments for their purposes (Safran, 1991: 93).

These changes in the global network, international politics, and internal politics have played an important role in the making of diaspora consciousness. The diaspora consciousness seems to be supplementing minority strategy by means of these global transformations. As Clifford (1994: 310-311) rightfully states, transnational connections with homeland, other members of diaspora in various geographies, and/or with a world-political force (such as Islam) break the binary relation of minority communities with majority societies as well as
giving added weight to claims against an oppressive national hegemony. Through the agency of these connections, diasporic subjects have the chance to create a home away from the homeland, a home which is surrounded by rhythms, figures and images of the homeland provided by TV, video cassettes, tapes, radio, and by the local network they developed in time.

The diaspora consciousness requires the idea of dwelling here in the country of residence and a connection there in the homeland. The modern diasporas are no longer immigrant communities; they are rather sojourners. Diasporic discourses, as Clifford (1994: 311) states, reflect the sense of being part of an ongoing transnational network that includes the homeland, not as something left behind, but as a place of attachment in a ‘contrapuntal modernity.’ Clifford borrows the term ‘contrapuntal’ from Edward Said who has used the term to characterise one of the positive aspects of conditions of exile:

[…] For an exile, habits of life, expression or activity in the new environment inevitably occurs against the memory of these things in another environment. Thus, both the new and the old environments are vivid, actual, occurring together contrapuntally (quoted in Clifford, ibid.: 329).

Diasporic subject constructs his/her cultural identity in a dialogue between the past and the future, ‘there’ and ‘here,’ local and global, and heritage ad politics. The particular experiences of diaspora bring back the memories of the counterparts of those experiences that were once undertaken in the homeland. Memorising those experiences, on the one hand, reinforces the habits of life; on the other, reminds the diasporic subject the condition of dispersal or diaspora.

The contemporary diaspora discourses are developed on two paramount dimensions: universalism and particularism. The universalist axis refers us to the model of diasporic transnationalism, in the form of ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1990), or ‘process of heterogenesis’ (Guattari, 1989), or ‘third culture’ (Featherstone, 1990) – a point to which I shall shortly return in the following chapters. The universalist dimension, which contains the use of all the aspects of globalism and transnationalism, refers to that the diasporic consciousness constitutes a post-national identity. The members of the post-national diasporic communities can escape the power of the nation-state to inform their sense of collective identity. In this new space it is possible to evade the
politics of polarity and emerge as ‘the others of our selves’ (Bhabha, 1988: 22). This is the cultural space where the quest for knowing and othering the Other becomes irrelevant, and cultures merge together in a way that leads to the construction of syncretic cultural forms.

On the other hand, the particularist axis presents the model of cultural essentialism, or diasporic nationalism. The process of home-seeking, as Clifford offers, might result with the existence of a kind of diaspora nationalism, which is, in itself, critical to the majority nationalism, and an anti-nationalist nationalism (Clifford, 1994: 307). The nature of diaspora nationalism is cultural, which is based on alienation, and celebration of the past and authenticity. For migrants as well as for anybody else, fear of the present leads to mystification of the past (Berger, 1972: 11) in a way that constructs ‘imaginary homelands’ as Salman Rushdie (1991: 9) has pointed out in his work *Imaginary Homelands*:

> It is my present that is foreign, and [...] the past is home, albeit a lost home in a lost city in the mists of lost time [...] [Thus], we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands.

As Clifford rightly states, those migrant and/or minority groups who are alienated by the system, and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West, no longer invent local futures. What is different about them remains tied to traditional pasts (Clifford, 1988: 5). Remaking the past, or recovering the past, serves at least a dual purpose for the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coming to terms with the present without being seen to criticise the existing status quo. The ‘glorious’ past is, here, handled by the diasporic subject as a strategic tool absorbing the destructiveness of the present which is defined with exclusion, structural outsiderism, poverty, racism and institutional discrimination. Secondly, it also helps to recuperate a sense of the self not dependent on criteria handed down by others – the past is what the diasporic subjects can claim as their own (Ganguly, 1992: 40).

Although, the main driving forces behind the construction of diasporic consciousness are compression of time and space in the form of globalisation, and the internal institutional context to which the minority community is subject in the country of settlement, homeland government’s orientation towards the diaspora communities is quite determinant too. The changing nature of the orientation of the Turkish
government to the Turks in West Europe has an influential impact on the construction of a kind of diasporic consciousness within the Turkish communities. The official attempts of the Turkish government to form a Turkish lobby in Germany make the Turkish communities that have various political and ideological standpoints, compete with each other for the claim to be the mere representative of the Turkish minority. These ethnic organisations which are in search for recognition by both the country of residence and homeland, tend to improve their orientation to the homeland, and to work for the political and economic interests of the homeland. Thus, such a transnational political network leads the Turkish minority organisations to play more on the axis of Turkishness as a result of the hegemonic ideology of the Turkish nation-state. Here, it should be stated that, while the official lobbying activities attempt to contribute to the creation of a diasporic consciousness on the one hand, they deepen the ideological cleavages between the extremely heterogeneous Turkish communities on the other. For instance, the competition between Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB, Turkish Community of Berlin) and Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB, Turkish Association of Berlin-Brandenburg) to conduct the lobbying activities, expands the divisions between the groups.

Therefore, the notion of ‘diaspora’ (with lower case ‘d’) should be considered a theoretical concept that meets the contemporary needs of the study of ethnicity and nationalism in a broader transnational level. The term ‘diaspora’ might also be useful as an intermediate concept between the local and the global, transcending the national perspectives which often limit transnational cultural studies (Gillespie, 1996: 6). The term ‘Diaspora’ (with a capital ‘D’) was once a concept referring to the traumatic dispersion of the Jews and the Armenians from their historical homelands throughout many lands. The connotations of the term were usually negative as they were associated with forced displacement, victimisation, alienation, and loss. Now, the term ‘diaspora’ is often used by the scholars as a beneficial term to practically describe any community that is transnational.

Contemplating the modern diasporic situations as the unsurprising feature of globalisation (particularly involving the advance of telecommunications and the ease of travel), Vertovec (1997, 1996b) states that there are three different approaches to the notion of modern diaspora, put forward by contemporary scholars. In sum, the first
standpoint regards diaspora as a *social form* (Boyarin and Boyarin, 1993; Safran, 1991). Diaspora as a social form refers to the transnational communities whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states. The second approach conceives diaspora as a *type of consciousness*, which emerges by means of transnational networks (Clifford, 1994, 1992; Hall, 1994, 1991; Bhabha, 1990; Gilroy, 1993, 1987; Cohen, 1997; Vertovec, 1997, 1996b). This approach departs from W.E.B. Du Bois’ notion of ‘double consciousness,’ and refers to individuals’ awareness of being simultaneously ‘home away from home’ or ‘here and there.’ And the last but not the least, is the understanding, which regards diaspora as a *mode of cultural construction and expression* (Gilroy, 1987, 1993, 1994; Hall, 1994). This approach emphasises the flow of constructed styles and identities among diasporic people. Subsequently, I shall provide a theoretical framework for the exploration of the construction and articulation of the diasporic cultural identity of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin.

**Diasporic Consciousness**

The labour migration into Europe is mainly a post war phenomenon resulting in the permanent settlement of millions of people away from their country of origin. After a few decades these peoples who used to be merely temporary workers, and treated so, have become sojourners, and constructed homes away from their homelands. The centring of ethnic minorities around an axis of origin, ethnicity and religion leads to the construction of a modern diasporic cultural identity which leans on both inheritance and politics. Diasporic cultural identity becomes the major politics of identity for the descendants of migrants who were born and raised in the country of residence. The gap between the institutional-societal treatment of the new generations and their own identification that they exhibit with the presentational or expressive forms of representation in the country of residence brings about the ‘problem of identity.’ The quest for identity for these new generations results with the employment and maintenance of ethnicity and religion as a source of identity. The self-identification of second/third generation Berlin-Turks is predominantly shaped by the symbolic ethnic and religious connotations.

The working-class Turkish hip-hop youngsters construct a form of
diasporic cultural identity by means of global culture which transcend
the boundaries of territorial nation-state. In this way, diaspora is
described as involving the production and reproduction of social and
cultural phenomena on a transnational axis (Vertovec, 1996b; Cliffor,
d 1994; Appadurai, 1990; Hannerz, 1996). The diasporic identity con-
structed by ethnic minority youths has been a ‘valuable component of
the critique of absolutist political sensibilities’ within nation-state
(Gilroy, 1994: 210). As I will explain below, the construction of such a
diasporic cultural identity has connections with the production and
articulation of culture on a transnational level. This is evident in the
production and reproduction of forms which are sometimes called
’syncretic,’ ‘bricolage,’ ‘creolized,’ ‘translated,’ ‘crossover,’ ‘cut’n’
mix,’ ‘hybrid,’ ‘alternate’ or ‘melange.’ Hall’s metaphorical insights
regarding diaspora, ethnicity and identity draw up the framework of
the existing modern diaspora identities:

[…] diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only
be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs
return, even if it means pushing other people into the sea. This is the old, the
imperialising, the hegemonising, form of ethnicity. We have seen the fate of the
people of Palestine at the hands of this backward-looking conception of dias-
pora – and the complicity of the West with it. The diaspora experience as I
intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a
necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives
with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are
those, which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew,
through transformation and difference (Hall, 1994: 235).

Hall explicitly distances himself from the old ‘imperialising,’ ‘back-
ward’ notion of diaspora, and celebrates the modern notion that hosts
hybridity and creolization. The production of such ‘hybrid’ cultural
phenomena and ‘new ethnicities’ is especially to be found among
diasporic youth whose primary socialisation has taken place with the
cross-currents of differing cultural fields (Vertovec, 1996b: 29).

The construction of diasporic cultural identity derives from cul-
tures and histories in negotiation, collision and dialogue. Diasporic
identity is a disaggregated identity, and it disrupts the very categories
of identity because it is not national, not genealogical, not religious,
but all of these in dialectical tension with one another (Boyarin and
Thus, the existence of the diaspora idea invites us to see the formation of cultural bricolage within the boundaries of the contested domains between the local and the global, between binary oppositions, between ‘here’ and ‘there,’ and between past and present. This permanent state of ‘double consciousness’ takes the diasporic subject beyond the modern nation-state and its institutional order.

The main determinants giving a diasporic character to these cultures are, for Clifford (1994: 306), the obstacles, openings, antagonisms, connections that the respective group has experienced, and the transnational links facilitated by globalised communication and transport.

Transnational connections constitute what Clifford calls a ‘multi-local diaspora culture’ amongst the multiple communities of dispersed immigrant population (Clifford, 1994: 304). By the multi-locale diaspora culture, we do not mean a specific geographical boundary, but cultural boundary, which is linked with the homeland culture. Those dispersed people, once separated from homeland by geographical distance and political barriers, increasingly find themselves in ‘border relations’ with the homeland and their fellow diasporic ‘mates’ by means of modern technologies of transportation, communication and labour migration. The means of transportation, telephones, faxes, Internet, TV, radio, tape and videocassettes, and mobile job markets reduce distances and facilitate two-way traffic between diasporic subjects and homeland. Today, it is much easier to live in two worlds than it was two decades ago.

Most sociological studies have broadly described German-Turkish youth in terms of stereotypical notions like ‘identity crisis,’ ‘in-betweenness,’ ‘lost generation,’ ‘split identities’ and ‘disoriented children’ (Abadan-Unat, 1976, 1985; Kagitçibasi, 1987; Mushabe, 1985; Önder, 1996). German-Turkish youth were predominantly problematised in the Turkish scholarship. This is the rationale behind opening adaptation schools for the returnee children in Turkey with the co-operation of Turkish and German governments. This problem-oriented image drawn by many scholars is full of contradictions, and lacks sufficient empirical data. The ‘second generation’ (German: die zweite Generation; Turkish: ikinci kusak), often described in melodramatic terms as ‘caught between two cultures but part of neither,’ constructs its identity in a social field where they successfully negotiate various cultures (Mandel, 1990: 155). German-Turkish youngsters, like the other diasporic youths, tend to form a bricolage of cultures and identities,
while at the same time keeping to their ethnic and cultural ‘roots.’ Thus, diasporic cultural identity should be mapped out within the co-ordinates of global (diaspora) and local (national-regional). These are as Hall comments “cultures of hybridity which have renounced the dream or ambition of rediscovering any kind of ‘lost’ cultural purity, or ethnic absolutism. They are irrevocably translated” (Hall, 1992: 310).

Turkish youth experience a permanent tension between homelessness and home in a way that leads to the construction of more meaningful, complex and multiple identities. Diasporic cultural identity of Turkish youth springs from their constant quest for home. For the modern diasporic subject, home is the place to which they cannot return. It is this perpetual dream of return, but not the act of return, which shapes the modern diasporic cultural identity. Should the condition of multiple identities, which is situated by the diasporic youth, be treated as the indication of their state of ‘in-betweenness’? Or, should it be conceived as representing the ‘third space,’ or ‘third culture’? This is the essential question, which I have tried to answer in my work. In the following chapters, I shall, from time to time, return to this question and elaborate upon the diasporic cultural identity of Turkish hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg.

* * *

To recapitulate, this chapter has portrayed the transmission of the ethnic-based political strategies, which the Berlin-Turks developed since the beginning of the migratory process. These strategies have been outlined as *migrant strategy* and *minority strategy*. The change in the political strategies of the immigrants has been primarily presented as subject to the social, political, and economic relations between receiving society and ethnic minority. Then, it has been stated that, the more the ethnic minorities suffer from racism, exclusion, segregation, and majority nationalism, the more they tend to have associations with the homeland, co-ethnics, or with a world-political force such as Islam. Secondly, it was stated that this change is also a product of the globalisation, which appears as an individual consciousness of the global situation. Thus, the ethnic communities who are dispersed away from homeland acquire the chance to feel strong attachments, at symbolic level, to their homelands and co-ethnics by means of modern technology. Thirdly, it was argued that the homeland government’s
changing orientation to the expatriates has become a very determinant factor in the changing face of the ethnic-based political strategies. Accordingly, it was concluded that they always tend to exploit the immigrants’ sentiments for their own purposes.

It should also be stated that there are no clear-cut boundaries between the strategies outlined above, they are rather overlapping. Diasporic consciousness has been introduced in this chapter as the contemporary form of ethnic consciousness. Diasporic identity is initiated by the expanding networks of communication and transportation. The Berlin-Turks tend to develop more transnational attachments with their homelands. By doing so, they transcend the obligatory binarism between themselves and the German nation-state. They rather prefer being attached to their ‘imaginary homelands.’ As Cohen (1996: 516) has stated, modern diasporic identities are mostly constructed on an imaginary axis:

[D]iasporas can be constituted by acts of the imagination […] In the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or re-created through the mind, through cultural artefacts and through a shared imagination.

In the following chapters, the construction and articulation of the diasporic consciousness of the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth and the formation of this complex diasporic culture will cover a wider space. By doing so, I will demonstrate that the whole question of diasporic identity is a matter of politics and process rather than of essence and inheritance. Accordingly, the following chapter will scrutinise the formation of a diasporic space in a multicultural setting. The delineation of the diasporic space shaped by the Turkish migrants in Kreuzberg will help us understand the nature of the urban landscape housing the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth.

Notes

1 The story of migration from the ‘developing’ countries to the FRG was successfully exhibited by John Berger et al. (1975) in the book, *The Seventh Man*. The photographs in the book taken during the journey from home to Germany can partly express the difficulties, which the immigrants had to experience during the migration. The photos taken during the medical check-ups, for
instance, evidently prove how degrading was the way the selec-
tion of the workers was conducted by the ‘experts’ of the recruit-
ing country.

2 Until 1974, the father determined a child’s nationality, but now
either parent is sufficient.

3 It is common for Turkish applicants to reapply immediately
after their German naturalisation for their temporarily-lost Turk-
ish citizenship. Turkey allows dual citizenship once the military
service of the applicant has been resolved.

4 For further information about the new German citizenship laws
and regulations, see Brandt (1996).

5 For further information on the new citizenship laws and the
related parliamenterian discussions see, Innenausschuß des Deut-
schen Bundestages (1999).

6 This strong ethnic boundary construction is what Rex (1994: 2)
calls ‘differential incorporation.’

7 Fredrik Barth (1969) has defined such withdrawal from the
majority society as ‘isolation.’

8 There are five adaptation schools in Turkey as such: one in Anka-
ra, one in Izmir and three in Istanbul. These secondary and high
schools are subject to the curriculum of the Ministry of National
Education in Turkey. The schools are called Alman Anadolu Lisesi
(German Anatolian Grammar School) where the medium of edu-
cation is German. These schools were formed under the joint
Cultural Treaty signed between Turkish and German governments
in 1984. By this treaty it was agreed that the German government
would contribute to finance the education of the returnee children
and to provide 90 German teachers. In the first year of their arrival
in Turkey, the students are placed in a prep-school where there are
only returnees. Here, they are given intensive courses on Turkish
language and literature, Turkish history, and Turkish geography.
The following year they are placed in mixed classrooms with the
local students. The rationale behind the mixed classroom pro-
gramme is to assimilate them to the Turkish culture and way of life
more easily. For a detailed information about the reintegration of
the returnees, see Abadan-Unat (1988).

9 Almanci literally means German-like which bears witness to a
combination of difference, lack of acceptance, and rejection.

10 For a detailed explanation about the history of Turkish ethnic

11 For a detailed information about the laws of belonging in Germany, see Senders (1996) and Klusmeyer (1992).

12 For a detailed map of these associations, see TBB Türkçe Danisma Yerleri Kilavuzu.

13 Danish and Sorben ethnic groups enjoy minority status in Germany with accompanying language and cultural rights.

14 For further information on ‘Gastarbeiterliteratur,’ see also Horrocks and Kolinsky (1996) and Gürsoy-Tezcan (1992).

15 It should be stated that ethnic strategies developed by Kurds and Alevi have different dynamics and need further inquiry. However, Alevi and their ethnic structuring will be explored in the following chapter.

16 The analogy of Ulysses and Abraham belongs to Emmanuel Levinas (1986: 348; 1987: 91). In explaining the attempt of conventional philosophy to seek the knowledge about the ‘Other,’ Levinas stated that the history of philosophy has been like the story of Ulysses who ‘through all his wanderings only returns to his native island’ (1986: 348). He preferred the story of Abraham to that of Ulysses. Conventional philosophy has always sought to return to familiar ground of ‘being,’ ‘truth’ and ‘the same;’ Levinas’ endeavour was to take it elsewhere. He proposed that philosophy should accept that we do not, can not and should not know the Other, rather than seeking knowledge of it.

17 For a detailed map of Turkish TV channels and the spread of Turkish official ideology, see Aksoy and Robins (1997).