Chapter 5

Revolution in Early Islam:
The Rise of Islam
as a Constitutive Revolution

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We conceive of revolution in terms of its great social and political consequences. In a forthcoming comparative and historical study of revolutions, I contrast to the state-centered revolutions of modern times with another ideal-type of revolution which I call the ‘integrative’ revolution (see the Appendix). This ideal type of revolution – which is an aspect of all revolutions – expresses two simple ideas: revolutions 1) bring to power a previously excluded revolutionary elite, and 2) enlarge the social basis of the political regime. This makes integrative revolutions not just political but also ‘social revolutions.’ Integrative revolution is in turn divided into three subtypes, the two sub-types I derive from Aristotle-Pareto and Ibn Khaldun are so labeled. The ‘constitutive’ type is my own invention, offering the sharpest contrast to the state-centered or ‘Tocquevillian’ type in that it is the typical pattern of radical change in the political order through the enlargement of political community in ‘stateless societies,’ be they of 6th century BCE Greece or 7th century CE Arabia.

In addition to this structural typology, we need to come to terms with the motives and goals of the revolutionaries as historical actors, and here I do what may be politically incorrect from the viewpoint of the theory community by using the term teleology, not in the strict Aristotelian sense but rather as a term denoting the directionality of revolution. Through teleology, I seek to capture the distinctive direction of a revolution, its intended or intentionally prefigured consequences. This ideal-typical characterization of revolutions as historical individuals is intended as a substitute for the putatively general or generic teleology of all revolutions as steps in the forward march of mankind in historical materialism and the popular 20th-century conception of revolution.

The constitutive revolution of Sargon of Akkad had unified the city-temple-states of Mesopotamia on the basis of the idea of universal monarchy. What Cleisthenes similarly achieved in Athens eighteen centuries later by means of democratic political reform, was done by Muhammad in the 7th century of the Common Era as a by-product of a religious revolution: the unification of the tribes of Arabia on the basis of Islam. In this essay I draw on the vast primary and secondary literature on the subject only for details that illuminate (a) the rise
of Islam as a ‘constitutive’ revolution, and (b) its teleology as set off by an apocalyptic vision and given its distinctive direction by a transcendental monotheism.

The pre-conditions of a constitutive revolution: The Arabian tribal society on the periphery of the two empires. Its cultural and religious unity and economic integration

In the 7th century, one can speak of an Arabian religion (*din al’arab*) whose beliefs and rituals were centred on a pantheon of interrelated tribal gods. These gods had their sanctuaries in the territory of a tribe, and were usually shared by allied tribes or those in the vicinity able to visit them. Such sharing of the divinities, and participation in common fairs and festivals around their sanctuaries, made for religio-cultural unity (Chelhod 1955: 123-25). The sacred enclave was called *hijr*, where common rituals of initiation, pilgrimage to and circumambulation of the sanctuary shrine with shaven heads were performed (Retsö 2002: 587, 624). The most important divinities were *Manât*, the goddess of the tribes of *Aws*, *Khazraj* and *Ghassân*, the *Lât*, goddess of the *Thaqif*, and the ‘*Uzzâ*, goddess of Muhammad’s tribe, the *Quraysh*, as well as the *Kinâna*, the *Khuzâ’a* and all of the *Mudar* confederacy. The three goddesses were considered the daughters of the paramount god, *Allâh*. Muhammad’s ancestor, *Qusayy*, had settled the *Quraysh* in the sacred enclave (*haram*) of Mecca just over a century before his birth. The custodianship (*hijâba*) of the House of *Allâh*, the *Ka’ba*, was secured for the *Quraysh*, and made them beneficiary of sacred immunity from attacks by other tribes (Peters 1994: 26, 69). Even though the custodial functions became divided among his descendants through the lines of Hâshim and ‘*Abd al-Dâr, *Qusayy*’s cultic reforms had a lasting effect, making him the “unifier” (*mujamma’*) of the tribal union of the *Quraysh* on behalf of *Allâh* (Dostal 1991: 193-98). Furthermore, *Qusayy*’s descendants succeeded in creating a supra-tribal collective identity by founding or reconstructing a cultic union, the hums. Fabietti (1988: 32) considers this union a response “to the unreliability of a system based on the kinship model,” consisting in the superimposition on the tribal kinship system of a form of solidarity and cohesion based on religion (*din*), and Dostal (1991: 215-16) sees it as a response to the unsuccessful invasion of Mecca by Abraha, the Christian Ethiopian viceroy of Yemen in mid-6th-century CE. Be that as it may, the *Quraysh* linked their claim to be “the people (*ahl*) of *Allah*” to a

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1 The Arabian gods could be identified with those of the ecumenical pantheon of the antiquity. The ‘*Uzzâ*, in particular, was already identified with Aphrodite at Petra in the 1st century CE (Bowersock 2003: 2).
covenant (‘ahd) of their putative ancestor, Abraham, whose image, holding arrows for the ritual of casting arrows in front of the idol Hubal, was only to be erased by Muhammad’s order (Rubin 1990: 104-107).

The fact that the gods and their sanctuaries were usually shared by tribes made for a measure of religious and cultural unification. The religious unity of the Arab tribes of the Hijaz, Western Arabia, was thus periodically reaffirmed by their pilgrimages to the divine sanctuaries around Mecca. These gods offered their worshippers protection (Q. 8: 72), and could intercede on their behalf with the higher god, Allâh (Q. 10: 18; 30: 12) (Watt 1988: 32-33). Invaluable information preserved in the pilgrimage formula of ritual invocation (talbiya) for the pre-Islamic Arab tribes proves that the relationship between the supreme god, Allâh and the gods of the other tribes was conceived as partnership (shirk). Each tribe had its own invocation formula. That of the Nizâr was: “Here I am, O God, here I am; Thou hast no partners except such partners as Thou hast; Thou possessest him and all that is his [i.e., the partner’s]” (Kalbi 1924: 7; Kister 1980: 33, 50-51), while Quraysh’s was cited in the Qur’ân (and became known as ‘the Satanic Verse’): “To the Lat and the ’Uzza, and Manât, the third and the other! Verily they are the high-flying cranes; and their intercession [with Allâh] is to be hoped for” (Kalbi: 19). The idol of the tribe of Khawlân, ’Umyâmus, appears to have been associated with Allâh on a more equal footing, as the Khawlân were dividing their cattle and harvest between the two (Kalbi: 43-44). The Qur’ân characterizes the Arabian form of polytheism as ‘associationism’ (shirk), and its description of the Arabian tribes as “associationists” or believers in divine partnership (mushrikun) is quite precise. They admitted the supreme authority of Allah but associated other tribal deities with him (Kister 1980: 48-49) Associationism was thus the linchpin of the religious unity of the segmented society of politically autonomous Arabian tribes.

The polytheistic cult of idols that persisted beneath the Allâh-dominated associationism was deeply rooted in the social organization of tribal Arabia and cemented it. Not only each tribe, but each clan (batn) within it had its own idol. Lesser idols pertained to the lower echelons of social organization: noblemen of the clans had their own idols, and domestic idols symbolized and cemented the unity of the family (Kalbi 1924; Lecker 1993: 332, 342). This polytheistic tribal idolatry was hedged by a cult of vengeance (thâ’r) with elaborate rituals than fostered clan solidarity (Chelhod 1955: 101-104). Furthermore, their social grounding gave the idols great political significance: in each clan, the idol was associated with its leader and with the clan assembly (majlis) (Lecker 1993: 342).

The religious unification of Arabia was sustained by a modicum of linguistic unity. The tribes of the Hijaz were unified by one of the two lingue franche of the peninsula, the other being the language of the Northern and Central Arabian tribes. During the century preceding the rise of Islam, the organization of the local trade by the Quraysh in the linguistically unified Hijaz had made for considerable economic integration of Western Arabia. Trade fairs had grown in the pro-
tected environs of the divine sanctuaries in Western Arabia, especially those around Mecca in conjunction with pilgrimage rites (Kister 1972: 76-77; Crone 1987: 177-85). The Quraysh became traders under the leadership of Qusayy’s grandson, Hâshim, and played an important role in the growth of the caravan trade in the region. Meccan trade was “a trade conducted overwhelmingly with Arabs and generated by Arab […] needs” (Crone 1987: 149). The Quraysh were thus “the merchants of Arabs,” (Crone 1987: 153) and their trade acted as a force for economic unification of the Hijaz. Furthermore, it had important political implications. The Quraysh created a military force consisting of mercenary Bedouins and Ethiopians (ahâbish) to protect the caravans, which also enhanced its political predominance2 (Fahd 1989). Meccan trade was also based on pacts (ilâf) among the clans of the Quraysh and the Bedouin tribes, not only of mutual help and protection but also the guarding of caravan on a profit-sharing basis (Peters 1994: 58-59, 68-69). The pacts amounted to a “Pax Meccana” in the Hijaz (Kister 1965: 120-21). The situation was, however, rife with tension and conflict. The disparate and heterogeneous coexistence of the commercial ethos of the city of Mecca, and the superimposition of religious unions on kingship ties did not always work smoothly. Rival religious and tribal cleavages could overlap, producing intermittent conflict, as they did between Mecca and Tâ`if (Chelhod 1958: 97, 113). This was inevitable as long as the religio-culturally unified and economically integrated tribal society of Western Arabia remained segmented and without any central or otherwise unified political authority structure.

Foreign political domination of Arabia is an important feature of the historical background of the rise of Islam. Arabia was on the periphery of three completing empires, the Persian, the Byzantine, and let us not forget, the Ethiopian.3 The royal house of Himyar in southern Arabia had converted to Judaism in the 5th century. The Persians had conquered Southern Arabia toward the end of the 6th century, driving out the Ethiopians, and left a Persian colony, known as “the sons” (al-abnâ`) whose predominance had become truly tenuous by the time of the rise of Muhammad. Down to the end of the 6th century, the Persians also dominated much of north-eastern and northern-central Arabia, including Yathrib (the future Medina) through their Lakhmid Arab client state in the Hira (near the future Kufa).4 The Byzantines dominated north-western Arabia through their

2 Some Ethiopian military presence is still found in Mecca during the 2nd Civil War, half a century after Muhammad’s death (Bashear 1997: 99-100).
3 In the earlier centuries, the Ethiopian empire had been dominant in Southern Arabia, but by the seventh century, it plays a subordinate role as an ally of the Byzantines.
4 The Sasanian empire was meanwhile undergoing the most serious crisis of its history. Military defeat by the Byzantines resulted in the deposition of Khosraw II by a praetorian coup in 628. Subsequent militarization of government produced a severe dynastic crisis in the Persian empire. Khosraw’s son, Shiruya, having killed all his
Ghassanid client tribal dynasty, and their influence in the south seems to have been growing through the Ethiopians (Hoyland 2001: 236-42). “And remember when you were few and abased in the land and were fearful that the people (al-nâs) would snatch you away,” so the Qur`ân (8: 26) reminds the Arabs. ‘The people’ was taken by the earliest commentators to refer to the Persians (or the Persians and the Byzantines; Kister 1968: 143-44). The poet Qatâda affirms: “the Arabs were confined between the lions of Persia and Byzantium” (cited by Crone 1987: 249).

Persian authorities or their Lakhmid clients in Hira favoured the Jews of Yathrib for much of the 6th century. The Jewish tribes of Nadir and Qurayza dominated Yathrib (they were said to be its “kings”) as agents of the Persian emperor for whom they collected taxes. When the Nadir and the Qurayza lost this important fiscal function, which was given to an Arab from the Khazraj tribe about the beginning of the last quarter of the 6th century, their economic power declined (Kister 1968: 147; 1979: 330). The political status of the Jews declined more sharply. By the time of the migration of Muhammad in 622, though still considerably richer than the Arabs (Serjeant 1978: 3; Newby 1988: 17), the Jews of Yathrib were either the allies or clients of the Arab tribes of Aws and Khazraj. The Christians of Najran and southern Arabia were under Byzantine domination. It does not seem too unreasonable to conclude from our admittedly scanty evidence that when Muhammad brought the Koran in Arabic, Judaism and the various forms of Christianity were already hopelessly compromised by the strong identification with foreign domination, taxation and warfare” (Newby 1988: 47-48). References in the Qur`ân (Kassis 1983: 274) to itself as the “Arabic Recitation (Qur`ân)” (Q. 20: 113; 42: 7; 43: 3) and an “Arabic judgment” (Q. 13: 37), and to “Arabic tongue” (Q. 16: 103; 26: 195; 46: 12) effectively present Islam as an alternative to foreign religions5 (Watt 1956: 143). Muhammad thus began his prophetic career in Mecca as God’s messenger to the Arabs (Welch 1983: 196), “a people (qaum) to whom no warner came before thee” (Q. 32: 3). “And so We

brothers, died in less than a year, and was succeeded by a minor son. In 630, the year of victory for Islam when Muhammad took Mecca, the commander of the palace guards opened the gates of the capital, Ctesiphon, to a usurper who was in turn killed by the spear of a guardsman shortly afterwards (Morony 1984: 92). Another minor was put on the throne but soon left it vacant for a woman, Khosraw II’s daughter, Bôrân, who failed to revive the glory of divine Sasanian kinship and was assassinated by a general. (Daryae 1999). She was further to take the blame of subsequent historians for the disintegration of the empire: “and with that – she being the ruler of Persia, their dominion weakened and their glory lapsed […]. The word spread throughout the world that the land of Persia did not have a king, and that they were seeking shelter at the gates of a woman” (Dinawari: 111). Severe political crisis in the Sasanian empire left the Persian agents in eastern Arabia and the Persian colonists in the Yemen helplessly vulnerable to their local opponents and eager to court the rising power of Muhammad.

5 The adjective `arabi (Arabic) is aid to occur in the Qur`ân for the first time.
have revealed to thee an Arabic Recitation, that thou mayest warn the Mother of Cities and those who dwell about it […]” (Q. 42: 7).

**Transcendent monotheism and apocalyptic messianism**

The two or three empires for which Arabia was a common periphery were centers of two axial civilizations which were witnessing vigorous growth of universalist religions of transcendence, or ‘world religions’ in Max Weber’s terms: Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Manichaeism crossing the two. The Arabian religion embedded in peninsular kinship and tribal institutions, as depicted above, had in fact not remained immune from ecumenical religious aspirations to transcendence and universalism. Muhammad drew two critical components of Islam from the ecumenical culture of the late antiquity: apocalyptic messianism and transcendent monotheism. Both components are essential for understanding the rise of Islam as a revolution. Apocalyptic messianism supplied the key factor in the causation of the revolutionary break with embedded religion, the second in its long-term teleology or the subsequent evolution of Islam. In other words, the first explains the motivation of his revolution in Arabia, the second its global consequences – the new empire and axial civilization it gave birth to.

In the forthcoming book, I also present apocalyptic messianism as the contribution of the Maccabean revolt to world history, a contribution made not by the winners of the revolution but by the losers who withdrew to the desert to form the Qumran community. Although the Qumran settlement was destroyed by the Roman army of Vespasian, the Messiahism they has sustained in institutionalized form for two centuries survived them and was passed on to Christianity, Rabbinical Judaism and Islam. The broader apocalyptic frame of Messiahism was carried by them and by other sectarian groups through the intertestamental period, and was taken up by the Christians. The Enochic circles effected the other-worldly transposition of political Messiahism in the Similitudes of Enoch (Enoch, 1, 37-71), as did the Christians gradually after the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE. Other apocalyptic notions survived and coalesced with Messiahism, notably that of the prophet of the end of time, which informs the apocalyptic reconstruction of Elijah as the returning prophet. The apocalyptic perspective of the Book of Daniel was especially privileged, as the Maccabean winners of the revolutionary power struggle had appropriated its ideas and effected its inclusion in the Old Testament canon. Centuries later, the apocalyptic world-view found a forceful statement in the early, Meccan, verses of the Koran on the coming of the Hour. These marked the inception of some two decades of revolutionary “absolute poli-
tics” in the remote Arabian periphery of the empires that changed the course of world history.

There can be little doubt that the apocalyptic notions of the Enochic circle were known to the Jews of Arabia in the 7th century, as was the Danielic tradition. The Book of Enoch has survived in Ethiopian. Its notions may well have penetrated Southern Arabia through their domination. It is certain that the Karaite Jews of the 9th century were called Sadducees by their opponents, while considering themselves the Righteous (ṣaddiqin) and the sons of Righteousness (sâdōq), that their missionaries called themselves the wise (maœkilim) in the Danielic tradition, and that they carried the religious tradition of the Essenes in the Islamic era (Erder 1994). It is also more than probable that the Essenes, or unorthodox Jewish sectarians influenced by them, were present in 7th-century Arabia (Erder 1990: 349-50). The religious leaders of these sectarians were evidently not called Rabbis but ahbâr (haberim in Hebrew; Rabin 1957: 123); and incidentally, quite a number of them converted to Islam (Newby 1988: 86). Most apocalyptic notions of early Islam can be traced to Jewish sectarian sources, even though the central messianic idea of the paraclete came from Christianity. There may also have been some Manichaean influence, as we have record of an attempt to introduce it to Arabia through the teaching of Mazdak at the end of the 5th century that left behind a number of “Mazdakites/Manichaeans (zanâdiqa) of Mecca” (Gil 1992: 19-33, 42). The Manicheans, too, had been receptive to the Enochic and Christian apocalyptic lore.

The Enochic idea of the heavenly tablet (Enoch, 1, 90), as the archetype of all revealed books, is crucial in informing the Qur`anic conception of revelation according to which the heavenly archetype and eternal source of all revelation is “the preserved tablet” or “the Mother of Books.” The Koran (19: 57-58; 21: 85-86) mentions Enoch twice as Idris, which is etymologically traceable to the Qumranic dōrçsh ha-Torah (Interpreter of the Law) (Erder 1990; Gill 1992: 34-35), uses the epithet sidîq whose Zadokite connotation is evident, and alludes to

6 As defined in Pizzorno 1994.
7 The eighty-two early Muslim converts who took refuge in Ethiopia during the Meccan persecution may also have brought back some Enochic notions. Furthermore, we find twenty-two Christians from Ethiopia or Najran among other early converts (Life: 146-48, 179-80).
8 Erder (1994: 197, 210-12) goes further and argues that the name ‘qârá‘im (Karaïtes)’ was derived from qeri’è ha-šem associated with “the Sons of Sâdōq” in the Damascus Covenant, which was, incidentally, found among the Geniza documents in Cairo and published as a Zadokîte work in 1910. What Erder calls the Karaïtes “Sadducee dilemma” ceases to be dilemma if we adopt the most obvious interpretation of the evidence – namely that the Karaïtes and the Zadokîtes, both of whom rejected the Oral Law of the Rabbis, are the same group separated by a few centuries. In my forthcoming book, I emphasize the Zadokîte/Sadducee identity of the Qumran leaders.
his heavenly ascension (Q. 19: 57). There are traces of influence of the oldest section of the Book of Enoch, the Book of Watchers, in the Qur`ān (Crone unpublished), and Ezra, another major figure of the Enochic and Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic lore, is mentioned once in the Qur`ān in the diminutive form of ʿUzayr. By the time of the Fourth Ezra and in the subsequent literature, Ezra the scribe had become Ezra the prophet. Ezra was identified with Enoch and appears as the key figure in the mystical speculations of the Jewish communities of Arabia9 (Newby 1988: 60-61). At the beginning of Ezra IV, which circulated not only in Syriac but also in Arabic, Ezra is clearly presented as a Second Moses (Ezra, 4, 14: 1-6); and it is as the messianic “prophet like Moses” that he enters into Islam. The phrase occurs in a poem attributed to Muhammad’s uncle and protector, Abu Tālib: “We have found Muḥammad, a prophet like Moses, described in the oldest books.”10 (Life: 160)

The paraclete is referred to in Q. 61: 6, where Jesus son of Mary gives the children of Israel “good tidings of a messenger who shall come after me and whose name shall be more praised/Ahmad (ismuhu ahmadu).” The Koranic statement is a reasonable paraphrase of the promise of the coming of the paraclete in Jn 16: 13-1411 (Life: 104; Arjomand 1998: 241-42). The paracletic term, ahmad, also occurs in the above-mentioned poem by Abu Tālib.

Daniel is not mentioned in the Koran. This is surprising in view of the evident influence of the Book of Daniel. The reference to Abraham as the friend of God (Dan. 3: 35), which also occurs in the Essene Damascus Covenant, is carried over to the Koran (4: 124). Gabriel and Michael, the two archangels who are introduced to the Hebrew Bible in the Book of Daniel are both mentioned in the Koran. In fact, Gabriel’s role in hierophany and audition (Dan. 10: 4-11.1) becomes central; Gabriel is not only as the angel of revelation but is also seen by the Islamic tradition as Muḥammad’s frequent counselor. Last but not least, the Danielic notion of setting the seal on prophecy (Dan. 9: 24), crucially influenced Muḥammad’s idea of final prophecy.

9 The assertion in the Qur`ān (9: 30) that “the Jews say ʿUzayr is the son of God as the Christians say the Messiah is the son of God” should be understood in this light, especially as we have Ibn Hazm’s gloss that the referent is the Sadducee sect of the Yemen (cited in Erder 1990: 349). An interesting refutation of the divine status of the prophets in the apocalyptic lore is found in an inscription dated 786/170 that asserts that Muḥammad, Jesus and ʿUzayr are just servants of God, like all other creatures (Nevo and Koren 2003: 398).

10 See also Ibn Ishāq: 353; Life: 240.

11 The influence of the Gospel of John may have been reinforced through Manichaeism. Indeed, Biruni’s (1879: 190) statement is a striking presentation of the great Babylonian prophet, Mānī (d. 277) as the forerunner of Muḥammad: “In his gospel […] he says that he is the paraclete announced by the Messiah, and that he is the seal of the prophets (i.e. the last of them).” Be that as it may, the Muslim tradition came to consider Ahmad (“more praised”) a variant of Muḥammad and another name for the Prophet, and identified him with the paraclete.
There can be little doubt that the notion of Seal (*khâtam*) is apocalyptic, as is its Hebrew cognate, *khotam*. The basic tenet of primitive Islam, according to Casanova (1911: 8) was that “the time announced by Daniel and Jesus had come. Muhammad was the last prophet chosen by God to preside, at the end of time, over the universal resurrection and Last Judgement.” His argument for equating the expression “Seal of the Prophets” (*khâtam al-nabiyyin*) with “the prophet/messenger of the end of time” (*nabiyy/rasul âkhir al-zamân*) is persuasive (Casanova 1911: 18, 207-13, 228). It should also be noted that the early traditions consider the seal of prophecy a physical mark of prophecy between Muhammad’s shoulders, variously described as a dark mole or a lump the size of a pigeon’s egg (Life, 80; Ibn Sa’d 1: 106-7, 2: 131-32), or alternatively on his chest. According to one well-known tradition, the finality of Muhammad’s prophecy itself is apocalyptic: “I am Muhammad, and I am the Paraclete (*ahmad*), and I am the resurrector (*hâshir*) – the people are resurrected upon my steps – and I am the final one – there is no prophet after me” (Mas’udi, 3: 7). An earlier variant includes “and the prophet of the *malhama* (tribulations of the end of time)” (Tabari, 9: 156n, 1066). The epithet “Prophet/Messenger of the *malhama*” is even more decisive, and is attested for Muhammad in several other early traditions as well (Ibn Sa’d, 1: 65; Casanova 1911: 49-53). *Malhama*, a loan word from the Hebrew *milhâmâ* (war), is the same as notion as the one we find in the apocalyptic War Rule and other texts from the Qumran (Rabin 1957: 118-19). Let us close with one last apocalyptic tradition which has Muhammad saying: “I was chosen prophet together with the Hour; it almost came ahead of me” (Cited, together with some other similar ones in Arjomand 1998: 246).

In contrast to the apocalyptic beginning of Islam, which is largely ignored, its monotheism is obvious and generally acknowledged. We shall bring it to our analysis of the teleology of Muhammad’s revolution in Arabia. What needs to be emphasized at this point is that the Jewish and Christian communities of Arabia were not the only bearers of monotheism. There was a third group known as the Hanif. Given the scanty references found to the Arab monotheism identified by the Qur’ân as the remnant of the religion of Abraham, the hanif, we can only speculate on their probable role in the transmission of the above-outlined apoca-

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12 The Hebrew cognate *khotam* is the messianic signet-ring of Haggai 2:23, where Yahwe declares to Zerubbabel: “I shall take you […] and make you like a signet-ring; for I have chosen you.” The apocalyptic connotation of the term is made explicit, and is, furthermore, applied to prophecy by Daniel who speaks of the time for setting the seal on prophecy (Dan. 9: 24) and is told by Gabriel to “keep the book sealed until the end of time” (Dan. 12: 1).

13 Rabin (1957: 119) also traces the Qumranic origins of the Islamic apocalyptic terms *hashr*, mentioned above, and *harj* (Hebrew, *heregh* [slaughter]).
lyptic lore to Islam.\textsuperscript{14} We can, however, be certain that the religion of the hanif⁹'s was a form of monotheism associated with the belief in foundation of the Ka’ba by Abraham and the settlement in Mecca of his son Ishmael, with the ritual of hajj, and with the sacrifice of animals consecrated to the Ka’ba (Rubin 1990: 92, 102; Bashear 2004). Their tabliya formula for the ritual of hajj, however, was significantly monotheistic, and unlike those of the other tribes mentioned above, did not identify any partners for God (Rubin 1990: 100; Bashear 2004: 5-6). Muhammad very successful in identify with it and appropriating its core Abrahamic tenet and ritual for Islam. There remained, however, a group of hanifs who refused to convert to Islam, and were led by the monk Abu ʿÂmir, who had fought against the Muslims in the battle of Uhud, as an opposition group to Muhammad in Medina in the last years of the Prophet’s life (Watt 1956: 189-90; Gil 1987, 1992).

\section*{The new revelation and Islam as submission to one universally-acknowledged God}

One day in the month of Ramadhan at the end of the first decade of the 7\textsuperscript{th} century, when in seclusion following the ancient custom of the Quraysh,\textsuperscript{15} Muhammad b. ʿAbdAllâh, a trader with skins about forty years of age, received the call to prophecy. He was shaken until reassured by his wife’s cousin, Zayd b. ʿAmr b. Nufayl, a hanif monotheist, who swore by the God who held his soul that “thou art the prophet of this people” (Life: 105-107). According to another report, Zayd had said: “I expect a prophet from the descendants of Ishmael […] who has the seal of prophethood between his shoulders. His name is Ahmad” (Tabari, 6: 64). The Qur’ân was later to confirm that God sends to the ‘gentiles’ of the ‘unscrip-tured’ (ummiyyun) “a messenger, (one) of themselves, to recite to them His signs […]” (Q. 62: 2; Watt 1988: 53). And Muhammad was indeed “the gentle prophet” (al-nabiyy al-ummi), whom they find written down with them in the Torah and the Gospel […]. Believe then in God, and in his messenger, the gentle prophet […]” (Q. 7: 156, 158).

The attestation of messianic expectations among the Jews of Arabia in Muslim traditions (Life: 197-98, 240; Ibn Sa’d, 1: 103-104) cannot be dismissed as an Islamic version of praeparatio evangelicorum, as it is corroborated by Jewish and Syriac sources (Lewis 1953; Cook & Crone 1977: ch. 1). It is worth noting that one particular tradition, doctored to suggest the Jews of Medina expected it to

\textsuperscript{14} There is some indication that they expected a new prophet (Life: 98), and that one hanif, Umayya b. Abi’l-Salt of Tá’if, claimed to be one (Rubin 1990: 90, 96; 1995: 72-75).

\textsuperscript{15} The custom of tahannuth: seclusion in mount Hirà,’ followed by feeding the poor and ending with the circumambulation of the Ka’ba (Kister 1968).
become “the sacred enclave/place of migration (muhājar) for a prophet from the Quraysh” retains the significant (and inconvenient) phrase “at the end of time (fī ākhir al-zaman)” (Ibn Ishāq: 13-14; Life: 7, translation misleading). Furthermore, it is clear from the Qurʾān that the acceptance of Muhammad messianic claim by the few converts among the “people of the book” was of great psychological importance to his early in his career. Two elements from the Judaean-Christian apocalyptic tradition thus stand out in Muhammad’s earliest messages: he was the gentile prophet sent to the people of Arabia, and he was the prophet of the end of time.

In this Meccan period, as he encountered mounting opposition from his own oligarchic clan of Quraysh, Muhammad was repeatedly told in the Qurʾān to distance himself from them and to seek confirmation from the people to whom the Book or Knowledge has already been given (Rahman 1976: 11-12). In addition to reports of the acceptance of Muhammad as the prophet of the end of time by Jewish converts in his biography (Life: 240-41), the Qurʾān itself contains evidence of the acceptance of Muhammad’s messianic claim in the course of the emotional experience of conversion:

Say to them [i.e., to the recalcitrant Meccans], O Muhammad, ‘Whether you believe in [the Qurʾān] or not, those who have been given the Knowledge before it, when it is recited to them, fall upon their faces in prostration. And they say, ‘Glory be to our Lord! Our Lord’s promise has been fulfilled.’ And they fall upon their faces weeping […] (Q. 17: 107).

There is ample evidence of apocalypticism in the early, Meccan, verses of the Qurʾān which speak of the coming of the Hour as the prelude to Resurrection: “The Hour has drawn near and the moon is split;” (Q. 54: 1) “The Hour is coming, no doubt of it;” (Q. 22: 7; 40: 59[61]) “Haply the Hour is near;” (Q. 33: 63; 42: 17[16]) and “surely the earthquake of the Hour is a mighty thing” (Q. 22: 1).

The apocalyptic Hour is the earthly prelude to eschatology. It is the hour of calamity that precedes Resurrection. The appearance of the Beast (Q. 27: 82) and such cosmic cataclysms as the smoke (dukhân; Q. 44: 10), the rolling up (takhwr; Q. 81) of the sun, the darkening of the stars and the movement of the mountains (Q. 81: 2-4), the splitting (infitār; Q. 82) of the sky, the scattering of the stars and the swarming over of the seas (Q. 82: 2-4) are evidently the signs of the Day of Resurrection “when the tombs are overthrown” (Q. 82: 5). The Qurʾān also

16 A number of mostly obscure catastrophic terms for the occurrence at the Hour are identified by the early commentators with the Day of Resurrection. These include āzīja (the imminent) (Q. 40:18, 53:58), wāqi’a (terror) (Q. 56; 69: 15), rājīfā and rādīfā (quake and second quake) (Q. 79: 6-7), ākhkha (blast) (Q. 80: 34-36), ghāshiya (enveloper) (Q. 88), zilzila and zalzāl (earthquake) (Q. 99; 99: 1) and qāri’a (clatterer) (Q. 69:4, 101; 101:1-3).
speaks (14: 49) of “the day the earth shall be transformed to other than the earth.”
The mountains will be pulverized into dust (Q. 56: 4-6), or become like plucked
tufts of wool (Q. 70: 9). A few signs of social disorder accompany cosmic cata-
lysms: “And when the Blast shall sound, upon the day when a man shall flee
from his brother, his mother, his father, his consort, his sons” (Q. 80: 33-36).

At the Hour, “the Trumpet (sur) shall be blown; that is the Day of the Threat
[…]. And listen thou for the day when the caller shall call from a near place. On
the day they hear the Cry (sayha) in truth, that is the day of coming forth” (Q. 50:
19, 40-41). The Cry is not unprecedented; it is a portent of God’s physical de-
struction of the nations which had disowned their prophets in sacred history (Q.
11: 67, 94). But the final day has no precedent. It is indeed “the day when the
earth is split asunder about them as they hasten forth” (Q. 50: 43). “For the
Trumpet shall be blown, and whosoever is in the heavens and whosoever is in the
earth shall swoon, save whom God wills. Then it shall be blown again, and lo,
they shall stand, beholding. And the earth shall shine with the light of its Lord
[…]” (Q. 39: 69-70). This final transfiguration of the earth is presumably “the
new creation” (Q. 14: 22).

Muhammad also preached the absolute transcendence of Allâh as the One
God who came to sublimate other divinities. Muhammad’s Lord (rabb) in the
earliest verses of the Qur`ân (Watt 1988: 87-88), is identified with the Lord of
All Being/the worlds (rabb al-´âlamin) “who sent Moses as his Messenger (Q. 7:
61, 67, 104; 26: 16). This ecumenical “One God” or “the lord of all,” attested in
Greek funerary inscriptions in Palestine from the 4th, 5th and 6th centuries was
identified, much more frequently in the later verses, with Allâh as the Lord of the
Ka´ba and God of Abraham, Moses and Jesus. It followed that the mission of the
Messenger of the God of universe was also universal:

We have not sent thee, save as a mercy to all being/the worlds (Q. 21: 107).

Say: “O mankind (al-nâs) I am the Messenger of God to You all,17 of Him to whom be-
longs the kingdom of heavens and the earth. There is no god but He. (Q. 7: 158).

Muhammad also assimilated the transcendent, universal god of southern Arabia,
the Rahmân (Merciful One), to Allâh. The Rahmân is attested in late 4th-century
Himyarite inscriptions as the “Lord of heaven and earth,” and in the mid-6th in-
scription recording the expedition of Abraha, the Ethiopian viceroy whose Chris-
tianity is attested in other sources, begins in the name of the Merciful One and
“his Anointed One (messiah), king Arbaha” (cited in Hoyland 2001: 556). The

17 Q. 34: 28 is more emphatic in this respect: “We have sent thee not except to all of
the people (illa kâffatan li’l-nâs).” For a discussion of all these verses, see Welch
49-51).
Rahmân was also known closer to Mecca in the Yamâma in central Arabia, and his angels were believed to be all female (Q. 43: 19). Muhammad appropriated him as an epithet of Allâh or one of his “most beautiful names” (Q. 17: 110) despite the resistance of the Meccans, who professed “unbelief at the mention of the Rahmân.”18 (Q. 21: 36; also Q. 13: 30; Peters 1994: 48, 156-57; Kister 2002: 5-6) With less resistance, some lesser divinities would be transformed to God’s beautiful names, others demoted to the rank of angels (Watt: 1988: 90-91) and a few discarded as mere names (Q. 53: 23). Just as Abraham had submitted, or surrendered himself to the Lord of all Being (Q. 2: 131), those who accepted Muhammad’s new revelation of monotheism and thereby became ‘Muslims’ were sternly required to worship the One God exclusively.

Starting point was the predominant position of Allâh in the associationists’ pantheon, Muhammad considered anyone who rejected partners for God and declared his/her exclusive belonging to Him had submitted to the Lord of all Being (Q. 40: 66) or “undergone Islam (aslama)” (the term ‘islâm’ soon assumed the congruent meaning of submission; Baneth 1971: 188-89). His message of transcendental monotheism thus struck at the heart of associationism (shirk) – the social or embedded religion19 of segmented Arabia whose main beneficiary, his own tribe of Quraysh, began to persecute him and his followers.

Muhammad began to look for a sacred enclave (hjr, muhajar, dâr al-hijra),20 and began making discreet enquiries among visitors to the trade fairs at the divine sanctuaries around Mecca. At that time, after just over a decade of preaching in Mecca, Muhammad had built a small community of the faithful numbering barely over a hundred.

**Mobilization for Holy Struggle (jihâd) and the construction of a new community**

The evident demise of mediated Persian authority in Yathrib had aggravated the endemic violence typical of segmented “stateless societies,” setting its main tribes of Aws and Khazraj in unresolved deadly conflict. What was needed for its resolution was a holy judge-arbiter (hakam), the only native extra-tribal authority known in Arabia and one similar to the judges of the Old Testament. A number

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18 According to one report, a presumably early convert who had changed his name upon conversation to ‘Abd al-Rahmân was asked by a Meccan friend to adopt a different name because “I don’t know al-Rahmân!” (Life: 302).
19 ‘Social,” as conceived by W. Robertson Smith and E. Durkheim, and ‘embedded’ in contrast to world or transcendental religion, as conceived by M. Weber and S.N. Eisenstadt.
20 See Serjeant (1982: 26-27) for the pre-Islamic attestation and meaning of the notion.
of aldermen (naqibs) from Yathrib were in charge of the search for one, and met Muhammad at the trade fair. According to the earliest account of a meeting between Muhammad and the Yathribites in ‘Aqaba by ‘Urwa b. al-Zubair, the aldermen gave Muhammad the following pledge: “We are of you and you are of us, whoever comes to us of your companions, or you yourself if you come to us, we shall defend you (numni’ka) as we would defend ourselves” (Tabari 6: 136; Mèlaméde 1934). They probably also gave him an armed escort of 4 or 5 bodyguards who later migrated with Muhammad (Lecker 2000: 164-65). As the heavenly counterpart to the pledge of the ‘Aqaba, Muhammad received permission to fight (Q. 22: 40-42), whereupon he ordered his companions to migrate from Mecca to the future Medina (Life: 213). The prophet thus chose his sacred enclave, and embarked on the “migration” [to a sacred enclave] (hijra) that was to mark the beginning of the Islamic era. Those who undertook hijra and joined him in the sacred enclave had the special status of Migrant (muhājir). God’s permission to fight was probably first given to the Migrants “who have been expelled from their dwellings without any cause,” (Q. 22: 39) and then to all Muslims “to fight in the way of God” (Q. 2: 244). The coincidence of the two orders is not an accidental event in Muhammad’s biography but was essential to his struggle for this-worldly translation of the apocalyptic vision that began in Medina. This is proven by the striking association between migration (hijra) and the struggle (jihād) “in the path of God” (Q. 8: 71-73; 9: 19-20) in the Qur`ān (Crone 1994: 354-55).

Migrating to the sacred enclave of Allah meant foregoing the protection of the partner-god and thus discarding associationism with monotheism (Watt 1988: 20, 25). This was the condition sine qua non of Islam or submission to God: “To those who believed but did not make the hijra it is not for you (pl. to give ‘protection’ (wilāya) until they do make the hijra” (Q. 8: 72). Muhammad also had to derive his own authority exclusively from God. It is striking the very frequent references to Muhammad as the Messenger of God in the Medinan verses of the Qur’ān (Welch 1983: 43).

Upon his arrival, Muhammad found the inhabitants of Medina “a mixed lot, consisting of the believers united by the mission (da’wa) of the Messenger of God, the polytheists who worshiped idols, and the Jews who were the armored people of the forts and the allies (halifs) of the tribes of Aws and Khazraj, and wished to establish concord among all of them” (Report from Bayhaqi reproduced in Lecker 1995: 31) Muhammad’s emigrants were supporter by the Medinan believers, and organized several raids against the caravans of the Quraysh, typically by a handful of Muslims, to sustain themselves from booty.

Muhammad, the prophet of the end of time, did begin the conquest of Arabia

21 Other – presumably somewhat later – verses promise paradise as a reward (Watt 1956: 4-5).
as the Prophet of the *malhama*; his apocalyptic battle was no other than the battle of Badr in Ramadan of year 2/March 624 when God, according to the *Qurʾān* (3: 123-25), sent down three thousand angels to fight alongside his army.\(^{22}\) Just as God had sent Michael to help in the great apocalyptic battle of the Book of Daniel, the Muslim tradition has Gabriel and Michael each lead a thousand angelic troops to the right and the left of Muhammad (and archangel Isrāfīl is added at the head of another thousand to reach the number given in the *Qurʾān*; Wâqidi, 1: 57-71, 113; Ibn Saʿd, 3: 9), and considers the battle of Badr as “the day of redemption/deliverance (*furqān*)” mentioned in Q. 8: 41 as a parallel to Ex. 14: 13. With the help of the angelic host, Muhammad’s three hundred or so holy warriors, who constituted almost the entire body of male Muslims at the time, defeated an army consisting of three times as many Meccans and their allies. The rich booty was distributed among the 313 or 314 holy warriors, three quarters of whom were Medinan converts\(^{23}\) (Wâqidi, 1: 23; Life: 336).

The battle of Badr also sealed the institutionalization of holy warfare as the distinctive Islamic path of revolutionary struggle for the religion of God (*din Allāh*): “Fight them until there is no more persecution and religion, all of it, is God’s” (Q. 8: 39). In fact, Sura 8 of the *Qurʾān* (*Anfāl*), believed to have been revealed as divine commentary on the battle of Badr (Wâqidi, 1: 131-31), or a section thereof, was often read to the Muslim armies before battle during the Muslim conquests.

Most of the Badr prisoners were ransomed to support the new Muslim community, but two anti-Muhammad pagan intellectuals were executed. The victory was also used by Muhammad to have two Medinan pagan intellectual opponents of Islam executed by their own converted clansmen (to avoid vengeance and payment of blood money)\(^{24}\) (Watt 1956: 178-79). A few months later (625/3), Muhammad besieged the fortification of the Jewish clan of Qaynuqâ’, whose strength is put at three hundred armored men and four hundred men without mail (Life: 363), until they surrendered unconditionally. Their Arab protector from the tribe of Khazraj, ʿAbd Allāh b. Ubayy, who almost passed for a king before Muhammad’s arrival (Life: 279), interceded for them. He reportedly felt confident enough to grab the Prophet by the neck until the latter said: “You can have them!” (Life: 363) The lives of the Jewish clan were spared, but they were expropriated and expelled from the Medina settlement. This alarmed a half-Arab nobleman of the Jewish clan of Nadir, Kaʿb b. al-Ashraf, who went to Mecca to

\(^{22}\) According to ʿAbdallāb b. ʿAbbās, the angels wore white turbans in the battle of Badr and red turbans a few years later at Hunayn (where they helped but without fighting; Life: 303-4).

\(^{23}\) According to Wâqidi, their number was 313, 5 of whom were not present during the distribution of booty.

\(^{24}\) They belonged to the Aws Manât, the majority of whose clans broke their idols and converted to Islam, changing its name to Aws Allāh (Watt 1956: 178-79).
confer with the Quraysh and began composing anti-Muslim satires. Muhammad sanctioned a conspiracy involving Ka’b’s half-brother to assassinate him and absolved the conspirators from the sin of lying. After the assassination of Ka’b b. al-Ashraf, he reportedly added the injunction, “Kill any Jew that falls into you power,” whereupon an Arab wantonly murdered his Jewish ally. The murder of Ka’b b. al-Ashraf “cast terror among the Jews, and there was not a Jew in Medina who did not fear for him life” (Life: 367-69). At this point some Jewish leaders approached Muhammad, and he seized the opportunity to conclude a pact with them that reaffirmed the status of the Jews as members of the unified community of Medina but also obligated them to pay the war tax (Serjeant 1978: 32). The pact, which was kept by ’Ali b. Abi Tâlib (Lecker 1995: 26), formed the nucleus of what modern scholars have referred to as “the constitution of Medina” (CM; Wellhausen 1975; Humphreys 1991: 92-98).

While proselytizing and winning new converts who would accept his prophetic authority on the basis of the new revelation, Muhammad wasted no time consolidating his authority as a judge-arbiter (hakam) according to Arabian customary law, which included legislative authority (Serjeant 1978: 1-2). In doing so, he needed divine succor, and the phrase “obey God and His messenger” appears some forty times in the Qur’ân in Verses that are mostly dated to his first three years in Medina (Watt 1956: 233). In this series of pacts, which were correctly executed, “Muhammad the Prophet (al-nabi)” (CM: A.1) secured recognition of his authority as the judge-arbiter to whom all disputes were to be referred on behalf of Allâh (CM: B.4). One of the later Clauses reiterates the requirement of referring disputes “to Allâh and to Muhammad, the Messenger of Allâh” (CM; F4). The potentially expansive quality of this authority is evident. Those subject to this authority are constituted “a unified community (umma wâhida) set apart from [other] people” (CM: A.2a). The Qur’ân (21: 92) duly sanctioned the new social compact for the believers: “This community of yours is a unified community, and I am your Lord, so worship me.”25 Although the unified community was religiously plural and “a rather loose heterogeneous political entity,” comprising not only the Muslims but also non-Muslim clans. As the Muslims were its soul, “the more the new faith grew, the more the umma overshadowed the clans” (Wellhausen 1975: 131).

Medina was still tribally organized, with each clan “in charge of the management of its affairs,” joint payment of blood-monies and collective responsibility for ransoming its prisoners (CM: A.2c-j). The Migrants of Quraysh were constituted into a clan alongside those of the Aws and the Khazraj. Individuals who would lose the protection of their tribes by joining the united community were

compensated according to the customary blood-money and ransom rates (CM: A.3a); and the Jews joining it were assured parity (CM: A.8). All covenaners with Muhammad (mu`minin)26 were declared to be under the security (dhimma) of God, which the least of them could extend on behalf of all (as any member of a clan could pledge protection on its behalf; CM: A.7) A covenanter was, on the other hand, forbidden to kill another in retaliation for an infidel (among his kinsmen; CM: A.6); and the united community was given collective responsibility for the punishment of crimes against its members and for treason (CM: A.5). The inner part of Medina was declared a sacred (harâm) for the covenaners (CM: F, H; Denny 1977: 45), just as Abraham had reportedly declared Mecca a sacred area (Rubin 1985: 11). A pact of tolerance allowed the Jewish covenaners of the united community to have their religion, as the Muslims had theirs, as long as they paid the war levy (nafaqa) alongside the other covenaners and refrained from treason (CM: E.3-3b, G; Rubin 1985: 12).

This last clause points to the crucial fact that, from the moment of constitution of a new community, Muhammad was also making constitutional provisions for the (revolutionary) struggle in the path of God. That a levy was imposed on the covenaners and their Jewish affiliates for the purpose is a minor aspect of this development. The general peace and security of God eliminated the legitimacy of the use of violence by politically autonomous segments of the Arabian tribal society. The monopoly of the legitimate use of violence was in principle invested in the united community, thereby laying the foundation for a unified structure of authority – a state – devoted to the realization of the final end of the prophetic mission:

The covenanters shall make peace only in unity. No covenanter shall make peace apart from other covenanters in fighting (qitāl) in the path of God – and that only as a just and equitable decision by them. And all raiding parties shall fight with us one after another. And the covenanters shall execute retaliation on behalf of one another with respect to their blood shed in the path of God (CM: A.9-11, my translation).

The Migrants had been aided by the Medinan hosts – the ‘ Helpers’ (ansâr), with whom Muhammad had instituted artificial kinship by a pact of Brotherhood. The Helpers had provided their emigrant ‘ brothers’ with land and palm trees (Life: 231-35).

The next battle, Ḥud, in March 625/3,27 went badly for the Muslims. The Helpers, who bore the brunt of casualties found the support of their Muslim brethren more burdensome. ‘Abd Allâh b. Ubayy openly criticized Muhammad

26 I am following Serjeant’s (1978: 12-15) suggestion that the term ‘mu`minin,’ which later acquired the meaning of the ‘faithful,’ originally meant parties to/beneficiaries of the covenant (amân).

27 I follow the chronology of Jones (1957), which is basically al-Wâqidi’s.
for following the hot-headed youths against his own better judgment and Ibn Ubayy’s advice and thereby bringing disaster to the Medinan Helpers, seventy of whom were killed. The power struggle between ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUbayy and Muḥammad intensified as the tension between his Jewish clients and the Prophet increased. No longer trusting the Jews of Medina, Muḥammad asked his secretary, Zayd b. Thabit to learn Hebrew and the Jewish script in 625/4, which the latter reported did in 17 days of intensive study (Abbott 1967: 247, 257). Some five months after the battle of Uhud Muḥammad decided to expel Ibn Ubayy’s other Jewish allies, the Banu al-Nadir, and sent them an ultimatum. Ibn Ubayy encouraged the Jewish clan to resist, saying to them, according a common in Qur’ān interpretation, “Surely, if you are expelled, we shall go out with you, and if you are attacked in war, we shall help you.” This is immediately denied by the Book: “God testifieth that they are lying” (Q. 59: 11). Following two serious set-backs which cost the lives of nearly 50 missionaries sent by Muḥammad to the nomads, he accused Banu al-Nadir of conspiracy to kill him, and attacked their oasis, destroying their palm trees. The Nadir were one of the two former “kings” or fiscal agents of the Persian empire. They surrendered in August 625/4, on the condition that they would keep their movable property, except for arms, and were deported, some to Syria others to Khaybar. Two of them reportedly “became Muslims in order to retain their property.” The rest packed their belongings on camels and left “with such pomp and splendor as had never been seen in any tribe in their days.” Their land was distributed among the Migrants. The Medinan Helpers were excluded, presumably because they did not need land, except for two who pleaded poverty (Life: 437-38).

The Nadir exiles from the Jewish settlement of Khaybar approached the Meccan pagans in the hope of being restored to Medina, and Muḥammad dispatched a team including a converted son of a Jewish woman of Khaybar to assassinate their leader, Abu Rāfīʿ Sallām b. Abīl-Huqayq, most probably in 626/5 (Watt 1956: 30-31; Newby 1971: 217-20). Meanwhile, Ibn Ubayy persisted in his opposition, and over a year or so later, spread scandalous rumors about Muḥammad’s young wife, ʿĀyisha. Muḥammad summoned a meeting of Ibn Ubayy’s fellow Khazraj tribesmen to strip him from tribal protection from punishment but did not succeed. But soon thereafter, Ibn Ubayy ceased his opposition and Muḥammad himself eventually performed his funeral rites (Watt 1956: 185-87).

As the mobilization for holy struggle continued and the number of holy warriors increased from some 300 in 624 (Badr) to 3000, with thirty-six horsemen in 627, the war levy and booty from raids on the Quraysh caravans became inadequate and there was an evident need for additional fiscal prey (tuʿma) (Kister 1986: 88-89). According to some reports, the other kingly Jewish clan, Banu Qurayza had also first joined Banu al-Nadir in the summer of 625/4 but had come to terms with Muḥammad, concluding a pact of peaceful coexistence (muwādaʿa; Kister 1986: 82-85). Coexistence, however, turned out to be neither easy
nor peaceful, and the Quryaza, the strongest of the Jewish clans of Medina, became Muhammad’s most lucrative fiscal prey in 627/5, immediately after the battle of the Trench. Perhaps as a vestige of their former status as the agents of Persia, the Qurayza possessed a large number of weapons in their storehouses, and lent the Muslims tools to dig a tend around Medina when was besieged by the Quraysh and its allied tribes. However, the Qurayza also established contacts with the Quraysh through instigators from the Nadir exiles. After some inconclusive fighting, the Quraysh and their allied lifted the siege and left in disarray. Muhammad at once laid siege to the fortification of the Qurayza two miles from Medina. The Qurayza surrendered unconditionally after two or three weeks, even though one companion of the Prophet had indicated by a gesture that their lives would not be spared. The number of Muhammad’s holy warriors now exceeded three thousand. He confiscated the 1500 swords and shields, 300 coats of arm and 200 spears from Banu Qurayza for them. Insisting on observance of the legal formality of arbitration by a man from the protecting Arab tribe of Aws, Muhammad Sa’d b. Mu’adh, a man who had previously managed the assassination of Ka’b b. al-Ashraf and was severely wounded during the siege, to decide the judicial murder of the Jewish captives. Some 400 men constituting the entire male population were executed by the Migrants, except for six by their three Medinan Arab confederate clans so as to avoid vengeance and payment of blood mone (Watt 1956: 214-16). The Qurayza women and children, numbering about one thousand, taken captive and sold into slavery. The proceeds went to his new treasury, while Muhammad made grants on their land and palm trees to the Migrants who were to give back the tree given to them by the Medinan Helper (Kister 1986: 90-96). Medina was thus cleared by the Jewish clans and Muhammad became the undisputed ruler of the united community he had set up in it.

Political success did not lessen Muhammad’s sense of living at the end of time and preparing for the Last Judgment. For this reason, he insisted that his mosque be built, in accordance with Gabriel’s instructions, as a “booth like the booth of Moses thy brother,” (Kister 1962: 154) and without a roof. When the palm branches were replaced by bricks as its wall about the time of the battle of the Trench, he refused to add a roof and retained the Mosaic form appropriate for the end of time. Nevertheless, success also sharpened the Prophet’s political pragmatism. After the battle of the Trench, Muhammad married the widowed Muslim daughter his distant cousin Abu Sufiyân, the leader of the pagan Quraysh, who gradually ceased to take part in its military operations, and was conspicuously absent during the negotiations for the treaty of al-Hudaybiyya in March 628/6 between Muhammad and the Quraysh. Some three months later, Muhammad attacked the rich Jewish settlement of Khaybar, rewarding some 1600 Muslims who had pledge their steadfastness in anxious moment before the
truce of Hudaybiyya with booty and land. Despite its disadvantages, notably the undertaking to return Muslim refugees to the Quraysh, the latter did not capitalize (Görke 2000), the truce of Hudaybiyya enabled Muhammad to take part in a pilgrimage and thus paved the way for the taking of Mecca in January 630/8, and to realize his dream of the believers “entering the Holy Mosque in security, God willing, with your heads shaven, not fearing” (Q. 48: 27). The importance of appropriating the hajj for clearing Islam of the suspicion of foreignness and making it firmly Arabian cannot be overemphasized. Muhammad marched into Mecca with some 10,000 armed men (as compared to the 3,000 he could muster three years earlier). Abu Sufiyân visited his camp secretly and arranged for a general amnesty. Within a month of the conquest of Mecca, Muhammad added some two thousand men to his army and defeated a coalition of the old opponents of the Quraysh in Hunayn at the end of the same month. The wholesale conversion of the old Quraysh oligarchy took place rapidly, with the “winning of [their] hearts” with generous distribution of the booty from Hunayn, which caused considerable resentment among old Muslims, especially the Medinan helpers who reportedly got nothing (Life: 594-97). Muhammad was now the most powerful man in Arabia, and its close and distant tribes hastened to send him “delegations’ to join him as confederates (Ibn Sa’d, I, 2: 38-86). In the last months of 630/9, he was able to send an army of 30,000 to Tabuk.

From the viewpoint of the teleology of Muhammad’s revolution, this unification of Arabian was an incidental result of the triumph of the religion of God. Muhammad undertook the breaking of the idols of the Ka’ba himself, beginning with the destruction of Hubal, the red amber statue in human form in whose name Abu Sufiyân had led the pagan Meccans in ’Uhud, their most successful battle against Muhammad, with the cry: “Allâh is greater and more glorious!” He sent ’Ali b. Abi Talib, Mughira b. Shu’ba and Khâlid b. al-Walid to destroy, respectively, the three goddesses, Manât, the Lât and the ‘Uzza. The tribes of Khath’am and Bâhila fiercely defended their idol, Dhu’l-Khalsa, and one hundred of them were killed before the idol was destroyed (Kalbi: 15-17, 25-28, 36). The destruction of the idols meant the liquidation of the social organization of tribal Arabia, and above all, of autonomous tribal political leadership (Lecker 1993: 343). What was left to complete the unfolding of the religious telos of Muhammad’s revolution was the destruction of a handful of rival Arabian monotheistic prophet, the most important and powerful being Musaylima of Yamâma, the prophet of al-Rahmân, the area close to Mecca (around present-day Riad). This was done by his successor, Abu Bakr 632-634 (Kister 2002).

28 The division of booty and fiscal levies imposed on the Khaybar were formally recorded, and served as the legal model for treaties with the Jewish colonies of Fadak, which followed immediately, and with those of Wadi al-Qurâ’ and Taymâ’ later, all of which stipulated payment of regular levies to the Muslim state (Life: 521-23; Watt 1956: 218).
The destruction of the old, segmentary political order was thus complete. The construction of a new political community and government, has barely begun, however. As we shall see, these task, especially the second – namely the construction of a new authority structure and government, remained incomplete at Muhammad’s death. The unfolding of the teleology of the revolution thus continued under his successors.

The unification of Arabia, and the emergence of a composite Muslim polity

The idea of the umma as a community designated for salvation through a prophet is already strongly present in the Meccan verses of the Qur’an (Denny 1977: 44, 52). Such a community, however, could not be constituted in Arabia without a revolution as we have defined the term: it required a radical transformation of the politically segmented tribal society and the structure of authority that held them apart. Although the Meccan converts had been individuals, Medina witnessed the phenomenon of acceptance of Islam by whole clans (Watt 1956: 170-71). The constitutive revolution began with Muhammad’s migration to Medina. Muhammad had taken cognizance of the existing kinship and tribal solidarities and sought to harness them for the propagation of his religious mission. His missionaries to Medina had been sent to the Banu al-Najjâr clan of and Khazraj, clan of his maternal grandmother (Life: 199; Mélamède 1934: 48), and himself resided with them when he migrated, and built his mosque in their quarter (Tabari, 8: xvii, 4-5). But the decade of struggle and warfare in the path of God had set sons against fathers and kinsman against kinsman. The cult of vengeance was transformed into holy warfare. The believers were “each other’s avengers of blood on the war path of God, but tribal law and family sentiment are wholly ignored” (Wolf 1951: 147). Membership in the new community of believers displaced, desacralized and subordinated the old ties of kinship: “Verily, they who have believed and fled their homes and spent their substance for the cause of God, and they who have taken in the Prophet and been helpful to him, shall be near of kin to the other” (Q. 8: 73).

Muhammad’s tribal policy was an aspect of creating a society and polity on a religious foundation around the belief in one God and Muhammad as His messenger. Arabian tribes could put themselves under the protection of God and His messenger without professing Islam. In this way, Muhammad created an inter-tribal security system, a Pax Islamica, around the growing polity in Medina. Pax Islamica had a religious kernel: it was a system based on ‘the security of God and his messenger.’ As he grew stronger, he demanded Islam from prospective allies brought under God’s protection, but continued to make purely political alliances with distant and powerful tribes which came to submit to Pax Islamica on the basis of the Arab norms of tribal alliance (Watt 1956: 144-46). In the year 626/5, he
made a special arrangement with 400 men from the Muzayna tribe, granting them the status of “emigrants” (muhajirun) within their own territories – which meant they would not have to join the jihād, thereby making an exception to coupling of hijra with jihād as a condition of Islam (Madelung 1986: 231-32). The umma was not a suitable term to apply to this confederate polity, and as Watt (1956: 247) points out, it no longer appears in the Qur`ān or the treaties.

The reason was the radical change in the basis of Muhammad’s domination in Arabia. Khālid b. al-Walid and ‘Amr b. ‘Ās, two important tribal leaders of the Quraysh, who were late converts like Abu Sufyān, had already joined Muhammad in Mecca during the summer before the fall of Mecca, and taken part with 3,000 men in the campaign of Mu’ta in September and October of 629/8. Only 700 of the 12,000 men who fought in Hunayn, the decisive battle for unification of Arabia under Muhammad, were Migrants (Watt 1956: 53-59). Although their number had multiplied almost tenfold since the battle of Badr six years earlier, these early Muslims or members of Muhammad’s charismatic religious movement were now a small minority in his armed forces.

Muhammad, however, did not live long enough to settle the constitution of the new polity. Nor did he have the time to lay down the constitution of its government. This contrast sharply with Muhammad’s regulation of warfare, which formed the basis of the Muslim conquests or what we might call “the export of the Islamic revolution” that resulted from the mobilization of the Arab tribes. One curious consequence of this failure is that, by the middle of the 7th century, the Muslim state appears as a huge army accompanied by the most rudimentary civil bureaucracy” (Donner 1993: 312).

Succession to charismatic leadership and the consequences of Muhammad’s constitutive revolution in Arabia

The social background of the first Muslims who comprised the core of Muhammad’s charismatic movement was very different from those of either the Quraysh oligarchs or the tribesmen of Arabia who pledged allegiance to Muhammad in his last years. The first Muslims were individual converts. They included 6 or 7 slaves, 5 women, 4 lowly brothers and one man (Bilāl) freed by Abu Bakr. One of the slaves was of foreign (Ethiopian) tongue and a Christian, and was said to teach Muhammad the Qur`ān by his detractors. Of the 82 who migrated to Ethiopia from Meccan persecution, 5 were freedmen or clients (mawāli), the rest were from Meccan clans and included some of Muhammad’s cousins (Life: 143-48, 179-80; Ibn Sa’d, 3/1: 282-83). The Migrants who fought in the battle of Badr included 11 slaves and freedmen (Watt 1956: 344). Abu Bakr and ‘Umar were merchants who, unlike Muhammad himself and his cousin ‘Ali and his son-in-law ‘Uthmān, did not belong to the tribal elite. The first change in the recruit-
ment pattern was conversion by clan is reported in Medina a little before the Prophet’s migration, when, following their above-mentioned leader, Sa’d B. Mu’adh, “every man and woman among the Banu ‘Adbu’l-Ashhal joined Islam” (Life: 201). Conversion by clans in Medina and among the northern Arabs continued under Muhammad. The second major change came after the conquest of Mecca and the battle of Hunayn, when tribes of southern Arabia and other region pledged allegiance to Muhammad. As the wars immediately following the death of the Prophet demonstrated, quite a few of these tribes did not acknowledge Muhammad’s prophecy and did not convert to Islam, some of them professed Islam but did not want to pay taxes to the nascent Islamic state, and yet others were followers of rival ‘false prophets’ (Kister 2002: 13-26).

With the change in the composition of Muhammad’s polity came a corresponding change in the pattern of motivation. As in any socioreligious movement, Muhammad had always had to overcome the typical dilemma of ‘mixed motivation’ by offering his followers rewards in both this and the other world. According to Ibn Ishâq (Life: 395), this mixture of rewards in both worlds had been reinforced after the disastrous battle of Uhud: “And he who desires the reward of this world We will give him it; and he who desires the reward of the next world We will give him it and We shall reward the thankful” (Q. 3: 145).

Now the mix of motives had to be made considerably this-worldly for the tribesmen who had joined the original holy warriors. Furthermore, the holy warrior/migrants had been maintained on booty from the tribes, but as Pax Islamica expanded, and the confiscation of Jewish settlements was completed, northward expansion was the only remaining outlet for raids and booty (Watt 1956: 145). Here we have the crucial factor behind the export of revolution from Arabia, which also explains why, contrary to a widespread misperception, it was not accompanied by the mass conversion of the conquered populations.

The biggest unsettled questions at the time of the Prophet’s death were those of legitimate rulership and organization of the state. The absence of reference to the form of government and political leadership in the Qur’ân is truly astonishing. Donner explains it as a consequence of Muhammad’s apocalyptic expectation of the Day of Judgment, which would obviate the need for laying down norms of government. This forced his successors “to develop a theory of political legitimacy with almost no Qur’ânic basis” (Donner 1998: 45). Madelung (1997: 16-17), by contrast, argues that Muhammad saw the precedent of the rulership of the families of the earlier prophets mentioned in the Qur’ân as applying to his

29 Sa’d b. Khaythama had insisted on drawing lots with his father because only one of them could participate in the battle of Badr, saying he would have let his father go had it not been for the promise of going to heaven (Waqidi, 1: 20). By contrast, a holy warrior evidently not so impressed by the latter promise during the battle of the Trench complained that “Muhammad used to promise that we would eat the treasures of Khosraw and Caesar [the Persian and Roman emperors]” (Life: 454).
family as well, seeing a Hashimite monarchy as the obvious solution to the problem of succession after his death. Although Madelung may be right in arguing that this hierocratic principle of kinship to the Prophet was closest to Muhammad’s intention of transforming his prophetic charisma to the charisma of his lineage by establishing a House of Muhammad on the biblical model of the House of David and the House of ʿImrân (Moses’) for him umma, three other principles were also imperfectly adumbrated in the sayings and deeds, which had a potential for further logical development and corresponding institutionalization.

The most important of these was the principle of seniority or precedence (sábiqa) in Islam. There was also the entirely principle of consensus (rida waʿl-jamâʿa). The weakest in terms of Prophetic endorsement was the surviving pre-Islamic principle nobility and leadership (sharaf waʿl-riyâsa) (Sharon 1984). This last principle was, however, favored by the Quraysh oligarchy of late converts whose hearts Muhammad had won at the final stage of unification of Arabia.

As Muhammad’s male offspring had predeceased him, Madelung (1997: 253) follows the Shi’a in seeing his famous designation of his son-in-law and cousin, ʿAli at Ghadir Khumm – “ʿAli is the patron (mawlâ) of whomever I am a patron of” – as his succession appointment, and points out that the oath of allegiance to ʿAli as the fourth caliph matched this formula. The position argued by Madelung became the principle of Hâshimite legitimism when ʿAli’s son succeeded his as the Caliph after his assassination with the proclamation, “I am al-Hasan, the son of Muhammad,” and was so addressed by the leading member of the Hâshimite clan, ʿAbd Allâh b. ʿAbbas somewhat later during his brief tenure of the caliphate (Madelung 1997: 311, 313). Paradoxically, however, the hierocratic model found relatively little support in the revolutionary power struggle after Muhammad’s death, and was only developed much later by the Shiʿite sects into the doctrine of Imamate. ʿAli, its main beneficiary, in fact gave his pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr and ʿUmar, and it was his precedence in Islam that primarily assured his succession as the fourth Caliph, though he also claimed consensus as the basis of his legitimacy in the civil war with Muʿāwiya (Sharon 1984: 130-32). The latter, greatly reinforcing the policy of the third Caliph, ʿUthman, subordinated the principle of precedence in Islam to that of nobility and leadership, and was accused by later generations of thus turning the Caliphate into kingship (mulk) with the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty.

Immediately after the death of the Prophet, Abu Bakr and ʿUmar were clearly apprehensive of the hierocratic principle, which would result in the caliphate and prophethood being reunited in the same family, meaning that the Banu Hâshim’ would have the monopoly of both (Lammens 1910: 16-17; Madelung 1997: 22). Abu Bakr and ʿUmar were of very modest origins, and must have counted on the support of “the disinherited” (mustadʿafun) who, as we have seen, were numerous among the early converts. They broke into a meeting of the Ansâr and pushed them into accepting Abu Bakr as the khalifa (successor) of the Messenger of God, and made an alliance with the obscure Fihrite on the margin of Quraysh,
Abu ’Ubayda b. al-Jarrah, who was ’Umar’s friend and was later designated as his successor but was killed in battle, to create the ‘triumvirate’ that took power after the death of the Prophet (Lammens 1910) and the ’Umayyads. Later, after succeeding Abu Bakr to the Caliphate, ’Umar ordered the murder of the leader of the Medinan Helpers, Sa’d b. ’Ubáda (Lammens 1910: 116-17, 142). Like the Hâshimites, the Ansâr “tried to restore their faded fortune by backing” ’Ali, and when he lost the First Civil War, they were no longer part of the political elite (Donner 1981: 274). The Hashimite clan had the satisfaction of burying Muhammad and excluding Abu Bakr and his daughter ’Áyisha from attending his funeral.

Abu Bakr, seconded by ’Umar and supported by the early Muslims claimed legitimacy on the basis of their precedence in Islam and developed the idea of the successorship (khilâfat) of the Prophet. They thus instituted the Caliphate and fought the Arab tribes which refused to accept that the Prophet had founded a state authorized to receive taxes as well as those how followed rival Arabian prophets in what became known anachronistically as the wars of apostasy (ridda). When readmitting the defeated ‘apostate’ tribes, Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, and ’Umar, his successor, exacted from their members, upon (re)conversion to Islam, the pledge to obey “whomever God had invested with authority” (wallâ Allâh ‘l-amr) (Kister 1994: 100-101).

Like the Hâshimites, the old oligarchy of late converts opposed ’Umar’s caliphate with the appeal to “O, House of Qusayy,” and gained ascendancy under the third caliph, ’Uthmân. After persuading ’Ali’s son, al-Hasan to abdicate the Caliphate, Mu’âwiya greatly reinforced ’Uthman’s policy and subordinated the principle of precedence in Islam to that of nobility and leadership, and was accused by later generations of thus turning the Caliphate into kingship (mulk) with the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty.

In contrast to his lack of attention to the normative regulation of the political order, Muhammad did institute a system of religious pluralism as a part of the realistic modification of the Meccan apocalyptic vision. The gentle prophet of the Meccan period, devoted to the restoration of the primal religion of Abraham whose “recitation” (Qur’ân) consisted of the communication of the Enochic “preserved tablet,” becomes “the Messenger of God” in the Medinan Verses, and the Torah and the Gospel are explicitly recognized as holy scriptures: “For each of you [i.e., Jews, Christians, Muslims] We have appointed a path and a way, and if God had so willed, He would have made you but one community […]” (Q. 5: 48). The Qur’ân (3: 64) also came up with the formula for integrating the Jews as anti-associationist monotheists into the united community: “Say: ‘O People of the Book, come to a word (which is) fair between us and you, (to wit) that we serve no one but God, that we associate nothing with Him, and that none of us take others as Lords beside God” (Emphasis added).

This accommodative pluralism was endorsed by divine revelation: “There is no compulsion in religion (lâ ikfrâh fî ‘l-din)” (Q. 2: 256). According to one im-
important tradition, this verse was revealed on the occasion of the Prophet’s decision to accept poll tax from the Magians (Zoroastrians) rather than requiring their forced conversion. This gave the Zoroastrians the same de facto status as the “people of the Book” (ahl al-kitâb). This decision provoked the indignation of a group of Muslims, including ‘Abd Allâh b. Ubayy, who criticized the Muhammad for granting the Zoroastrians the privilege he had denied the Arab polytheists and were called the ‘hypocrites’ (munâfitqun) on account of this opposition. Muhammad remained adamant, however, and reaffirmed that the Arab polytheists would be fought until they professed Islam (Kister 1994: 89-91).

The Islamicization of Arabia was completed ‘Umar, the second Caliph, who completed the wars of ‘apostasy’ and eradicated polytheism and the religion of the prophet of al-Rahmân and other rival prophets among the Arabs. He also expropriated and expelled the Jews of Khaybar and the Christians of Najran. He legitimated this final revolutionary step with a tradition of the Prophet saying during his terminal illness that “two faiths will not live together in the land of the Arabs (variant, Hijâz).” (Kister 1994: 94-95).

There is no evidence, however, that ‘Umar or anyone else used the term umma to refer to the unified Islamic Arabia, nor, a fortiori, to the vast political society unified by the Muslim state after the conquests. The notion of umma reverted to its original meaning of a community designated for salvation through a Prophet (Denny: 44, 52). Competing proselytizing religious communities were the striking feature of the religious situation in late antiquity and Muhammad conceived his own umma or community of believers in the same line, albeit as the best of them (Q. 3: 110) and their (golden) mean (Q. 2: 143). The Qur`ân also links the notion of religious community with the “people of the Book” (Q. 2: 63, 65; 5: 69-70; 22: 18). According to the earliest Qur`ân commentaries, the umma of Muhammad consisted of the Muslims not contaminated by a pre-Islamic birth” (Bashear 1997: 44). The Muslim umma was thus completely distinct from the society ruled by the Caliphate, which comprised other religious communities of the peoples of the Book. This enabled Muhammad’s successors to turn the de facto recognition of different religious communities in the late Sasanian empire into the pluralistic system of autonomous “protected” religious communities that was distinctively Islamic and eventually developed into the Ottoman millet system (Fowden 2001: 97-98). The notion of a political community subject to a ruler entered Islam much later and with the reception of the Persian political lore. It was the ancient idea of the subjects as the flock (ra’îyya) of their ruler who was to govern them with justice (Arjomand 2003).
Appendix: A typology of revolutions from revolution in world history

Type I: Integrative Revolution

Integrative Revolution is subdivided into three of our ideal types or models, Types I. 1-3, which are designed to cover the range of variation in the relation between revolution and the enlargement of the political community: 1) the revolutionary construction of an integrated political community from segmentary tribal societies or self-contained city-states; 2) the opening of oligarchies in the course of expansion of city-states into empires; and 3) the integration through the invasion of the center from a mobilized political island in the periphery. A fourth model will represent the better explored relationship between centralization of power and revolution, and constitute our second type of revolution (Type II).

(i) Integrative Revolution 1 (I.1): Constitutive Revolution.

Radical change in the political order may result from the incongruence between cultural and political integration. This can arise in a culturally unified society where the structure of authority remains segmented – confined to tribes or city-states. The larger society is culturally unified while political authority is segmented, except under martial emergency, and political integration remains either intermittent, in the form of ad hoc confederations of tribes and city-states, or weak, based solely on networks of personal ties among patrons and clients across the segments (Balandier 1985: 318-322). Such societies, including the “segmentary states” that are found to be prone to rebellions (Fallers 1968: 80), can be restructured through revolution. The type of revolution that belongs to these societies is an integrative revolution that constitutes a new political order by institutionalizing central political authority and unifying the segments into a more integrated political community. Its ideal type will accordingly be called ‘Constitutive Revolution.’ The first revolution in world history, the Akkadian revolution, belongs to this Constitutive type, as does the rise of Islam.


Aristotle’s idea of integrative revolution in oligarchies can serve as the starting point for our second model. According to Aristotle, oligarchies and aristocracies are prone to revolution because of those they exclude from the political society. Impoverished members of the governing class become revolutionary leaders; the regime is undermined by persons who are wealthy but excluded from office; and sedition arises when the circle of government is too narrow and “the masses of a people consists of men animated by the conviction that they are as good as their masters in quality” (Politics). From these considerations it would follow that the
type of revolution to which oligarchies and aristocracies are prone is what we shall call *integrative revolution*, revolution that enlarges the political community, broadens the franchise and/or other political rights, notably access to power.

Among the moderns, Pareto’s theory of revolution comes closest to Aristotle’s idea. Put simply, his theory is as follows: If access to the political class, the ruling elite, is blocked to energetic and resolute individuals – lions – from the lower classes, and if the ruling elite becomes weak and incapable of stern repression because of an increase in the proportion of foxes over lions in its composition, a revolution is likely to occur (Pareto 1968[1917-19]: 2227). In this situation, socially upwardly mobile individuals who are excluded from power develop into a revolutionary counter-elite that eventually seizes power and makes history the graveyard of yet another aristocracy (Pareto 1968[1917-19]: pp. 1304-1305, 2053-2057).


Integrative revolutions can begin at the center, or they can begin in the periphery. The latter constitute a distinct type which students of contemporary revolutions have often misconstrued as “peasant revolution.” Huntington (1968) called it simply “the Eastern type” of revolution. Medieval Islam offers us the possibility of a better understanding of this type of integrative revolution which I propose to call Khaldunian and put forward as our third structural ideal type of integrative revolution.

Ibn Khaldun, as we have seen, offers as a structural pre-condition of dynastic change, the endemic translocation of ruling authority and group solidarity between the periphery and the center in a dual social structure. He also paves the way for a theoretical move from dynastic change to revolution by considering the *superimposition* of new religiously (or ideologically) based solidarity upon existing, tribal group solidarity (’asabiyya).

The essentials of the Khaldunian type of revolution are the following. It begins in the periphery with a militarized solidary group that is united on the basis of a religious cause. The key factor for explaining the failure of the regime and the success of the insurgents is differential solidarity. The urban base of the regime lacks social cohesion while the already strong group solidarity of the insurgents is strengthened by a unifying religious cause. The revolutionaries progress gradually with a series of attacks on governmental forces. The end comes after a long time with the military defeat of the dynasty and the capture of its capital and other major cities.

**Type II: Tocquevillian Revolution**

Huntington’s “Western” type of revolution, which I will call the Tocquevillian ideal type, is the one most familiar to us. In this modern type of revolution, a cen-
Centralized state is already in place. In fact, revolution takes the form of the disintegration of the authority of the state and the collapse of the established political order at the center. As we shall see, most Integrative Revolutions have centralization as a consequence of the termination of revolutionary power struggle. What is distinctive of our Type II of revolution is that centralization also appears as a cause of revolution. The notion of the state, however, needs to be modified to the structure of domination or authority structure, especially if we wish to apply it to pre-modern revolutions.

**Historically-specific Ideal-types of Teleology of Revolution.**

The distinctive direction of a revolution as shaped by its intended or intentionally prefigured consequences will be called its teleology. Teleology can also be modeled by highlighting the distinctive features of each case. This ideal-typical characterization of consequences of revolutions as historical individuals is intended as a substitute for the putatively general or generic teleology of all revolutions as steps in the forward march of mankind in historical materialism and the popular 20th-century conception of revolution.

**Abbreviations**

Life: A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad. A translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah, Oxford University Press, 1955 (Page references to the original Arabic text of Ibn Ishâq’s Sira are given on the margin of Guillaume’s translation).

CM: Constitution of Medina (References are to the paragraphs of Documents A-H as edited in Serjeant 1978)


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