This book is an attempt at a rethinking of Being and relationality towards the world onto a level that in Western modernity in which I grew up, has been explicitly avoided. I would like to call this level the level of ‘lived time’. I mean by lived time the level of sensuality, of affect as a mode to relate to the world.

I got an initial idea of how one might think about lived time from the work of the philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Bergson’s work is about duration. For Bergson, duration is a plane of experienced time that got silenced in Western modernity by an excessive focus on measured time. In duration, lived time is plural (lived temporalities). It is a plane of the given where everything exists as temporality, rather than as distinct material entity. My aim was to give an account of lived time as a plane of the socio-cultural and the biological-technological environment in Guatemala. Empirically, I have looked for example at temporalities of sweetcorn, temporalities of water and temporalities of cable TV in Guatemala. Theoretically, I have explored the plurality of temporalities that I encountered as ‘virtual, qualitative multiplicity’. This is a key term in Gilles Deleuze’s reading of the philosophy of duration. Deleuze thereby characterizes the plurality and productivity of the plane of the sensual, which he calls the ‘virtual’. The first chapter of the book will introduce time as virtual, qualitative multiplicity. To describe Guatemalan everyday life as virtual, qualitative multiplicity of lived temporalities was the long-standing project of this work. The encounter between Guatemalan everyday life and Deleuzian philosophy helps to concretise the abstract and strange Deleuzian terminology as well as to open up a perspective on Guatemalan everyday life that can be characterized as follows:

While Bergson locates duration within nature, Deleuze explores the plane of the sensual within capitalism. For Deleuze, capitalism is characterized by immanence – by an actual that has turned virtual. The
fleetingness, intensity and disembeddedness of everyday life in global capitalism leads for him in tendency to a factual and perceptual immanence of the given. Everything seems to be in a permanent state of openness, intensity, chance and change that is more reminiscent to lived time than to measured time. My interest in the various lived temporalities in Guatemala had to do with my experience of these dimensions of global capitalism in London.

Why explore duration in Guatemala? I got fascinated by the amount of lived time in everyday life on earlier visits to that country. In traditional subsistence, on open markets and in overland-buses, it seemed to me that one was better off when orienting oneself by lived time, relating as a sensual surface to the sensual heterogeneity of the given. This is not just in order to appreciate the sensual richness of this down-to-earth way of life, but as a mere strategy of survival, and as a mode of relating to the given that the material environment seems to suggest anyway. The Deleuzian reading of duration worked very well to emphasize during the process of analysis those moments that had fascinated me when taking up the empirical material.

Because the research was set in Guatemala, I naturally ended up with a displacement of the Deleuzian reading of duration. Deleuzian theory is – under different names – in one-way or another not only always concerned with virtual, qualitative multiplicities, but also with the ‘event’. During the process of analysis, I not only explored lived temporalities empirically by way of the virtual, qualitative multiplicity, but I also developed a theory of what I now would call ‘inhabiting the event’. While the multiplicity is a concept that came to account in my work for the socio-cultural and the biological-technological given, the event is a concept that came to account for agency within this given (which, in the book is called ‘becoming-active’). While the Deleuzian event, in my reading, provides the terminology for an agency that affirms the new features of global capitalism, ‘inhabiting the event’ is meant to provide a perspective for an ethical agency within global capitalism. An ethical agency, within the inter-relational framework that I will apply in this book, might be characterized as one to which a politically aware self feels ‘yes, this is how I want to do it’.

This latter achievement of the book is an unintended consequence of the original research project. It draws on my making sense first of duration and then of Deleuzian theory against the backdrop of psychoanalysis. This encounter was first implicit, in the choice of the research settings, and then became increasingly explicit, developing from chapter to chapter in the theoretical introductions. I will use the opportunity of this preface to introduce the idea of ‘inhabiting the event’ as what I consider to be a response to the challenges of the contemporary global capitalist given. First, I will define the event and
what I mean by ‘inhabiting the event’ (II). Then, I will explain how ‘inhabiting the event’ responds to global capitalism (III). Thereafter, I will outline how this approach developed throughout the book (IV), and how it contributes to contemporary cultural theory (V). Finally, I will lay out the basis on which I consider it legitimate to study ‘inhabiting the event’ in Guatemala (VI & VII).

II

What is an event and what do I mean by ‘inhabiting the event’? The event is an explosive moment in the realm of lived time that generates the actualisation of something new. For Deleuze, the event is explicitly pre-individual. Under the name of the ‘Univocity of Being’, he describes in The Logic of Sense how virtual singularities, rather than actual people, organise themselves in such a way that there emerges a balance of tension between sameness and difference that sets free an unfolding of newness. Deleuze declares these conditions to be an ontological given. As ontological given, the successful build-up of the event is part of Being, and thus rendered out of question.

In this book, by contrast, I assume that it always takes the sensuality of a self to relate to the plane of lived time, and that where an event builds up, this self has passively taken up contact with the sensuality of an other (object or subject) in the world. Thus, the event as an organisation of lived time into a balance of tension between sameness and difference still takes place on the plane of the virtual. But the (self-)organisation of singularities is treated in this book as the mental achievement of a self. The singularities that organise themselves unconsciously in the mind, are in this book specified as the felt sensuality of a self and the felt sensuality of an other. Deleuze rejects any reference to self or other in order to fully concentrate on the level where there are only intensities, rather than actual material entities. He seems to fear that to take account of a self and its other would prevent a focus onto the realm of lived time as a plane of immanence. I will argue, by contrast, that it takes just a shift of emphasis from the event as something in itself within immanence towards the event as something that enables a self to become active within immanence.

The basis for such an argument is a common ground between the Deleuzian event and the concept of triangulation in psychoanalysis that I have encountered during the research for the present book: Drawing on insights from inter-relational psychoanalysis (Jessica Benjamin 1988), I came to understand the balance between sameness and difference on which rests the productivity of the event to be the outcome of a life-long development of human lived time. Then, the balance between sameness and difference is not ontologically given,
but a balance of tension within the human mind that is shaped by affec-
tive memories from the entire life, and especially by affective
memories from encounters with the first significant others of a human
being. In the encounter with the first significant others of a human be-
ing, something like a prototype for the event, an architecture for one’s
affective encounters with the world throughout adult life, develops. In
this perspective, the build-up of the balance of tension between same-
ness and difference is something that is naturally conflictive, because
human beings’ inter-relational capacities are unevenly developed, and
even in the most harmonic relations there happens to be unpredictable
things in the course of a life-time that might challenge one’s encoun-
ters with the world for the rest of one’s life.

There is an important difference between the event as ontological
given and the event as the outcome of life-long accumulated human
inter-relational experiences: In the former approach, the productive
and creative encounter of singularities is rendered normal and this
norm is all that the picture renders visible. In the latter approach, by
contrast, the productivity, creativity and openness of the event, and
even the singularity of the encountering agents, is pictured as ideal.
Besides this ideal, there is space for all those degrees of human imper-
fection and vulnerability that might prevent an encounter between self
and other to be predominantly characterized by productivity, creativ-
ity, openness and singularity. In fact, the focus of psychoanalysis is
explicitly directed towards all these less then ideal moments – the im-
perfections, inhibitions and apparent irrationalities that human beings
actually exhibit in their encounters with the world. Thus, I call ‘inhab-
itating the event’ the ethical appropriation of the concept of the event as
an ideal model for virtual inter-relationality between actual human be-
ings and the world in a way that accounts for human imperfection in
living this ideal. I consider this appropriation to be necessary, because
I ascribe the event a key role within the exploitative logic of global
capitalism.

III

What does the move from the event towards ‘inhabiting the event’
have to do with global capitalism? In its passage from modern indus-
trial capitalism to global capitalism, production processes have been
simplified, speeded up and multiplied by technological inventions in a
way that leading cultural theorists characterize contemporary capital-
ism no longer mainly by production, as did Marx, but by consumption
(see for example Baudrillard 1968, 1970, Lash/Urry 1994). Also, ac-
tual distinctions that in modernity divided between a realm that func-
tioned according to the exploitative logic of capitalism and a realm
that was constructed as an outside to capitalism and which functioned as a space for life unfolding in its own right (such as public/private, male/female, work/home, culture/nature) have disintegrated. Therefore we are left with a plane of immanence on which life is just too easily functioning only according to the rules of the ever more aggressive capitalist economy. Through the event, subjects can integrate into their encounter with the world these disintegrating tendencies of global capitalism. While in the literature by and on Deleuze, the event usually expresses characteristics that are compatible with the requirements of global capitalist economy (such as productivity, singularity, flexibility and joy), ‘inhabiting the event’ adds to these characteristics particularly human requirements, such as care, trust and responsibility in inter-relationality with other human beings. This human dimension is likely to enter into conflict with global capitalism. It is now no longer an outside, but rather a supplement to the logic of global capitalism, as I will elucidate now.

Ultimately, it is narcissism that is at issue. Narcissism is a concept that goes back to the work of Sigmund Freud (1914), on whose classical definition I will rely in the following. Narcissism describes the libidinal organisation of a self that is only preoccupied with itself. Its mind will not include others as others in its view of the world, or not perceive these as equal. Actual others will appear only in their function for the self. Following Freud, there are two main variants (see Wahl 2000): narcissism at the level of the Ego, and narcissism at the level of the Id. In the first case, the Ego consumes the entire libido that the self could otherwise invest in its relations to others in the world. The self thereby keeps itself independent from others. The self perceives satisfaction in representing its own activity, beauty and well-being. This, one could say, is narcissism characteristic of Western modernity: The Enlightenment with its technological, welfare-related and scientific achievements over the course of the past few hundred years has developed such a degree of human knowledge of, and control over life that material reality really seemed to support a representation according to which a certain kind of human being (predominantly male, white, Western, middle-aged etc.) appeared to be independent from others and at the centre of the world.

The entire Deleuzian philosophy is opposed to this kind of Western modern narcissism. Time as virtual, qualitative multiplicity departs from the concerns of the Ego towards the world as it is in itself—a plurality of singular, active, living temporalities. The plane of lived temporalities, however, entails its own danger of narcissism. Here, there is no longer an actual unity, such as the self as represented by the Ego. Together with the rest of actual reality, the subject in global capitalism is, in tendency, turning virtual. The actual part of the self, the Ego, disintegrates and all that is left is unconscious, sensitive
navigation. The self relates to the world by way of attraction, rather than by way of representation. The self encounters the world on the plane of sensuality, the plane of lived time. It perceives what it feels attracted to, and gives resonance to these attracting impulses. This is a dynamic that focuses on the other, rather than on the self. However, it is also narcissism, because the self only gives resonance to what produces attraction for itself in the other.

The fifth chapter of this book will introduce the idea that the attracting impulses that initiate an encounter with the other, only reflect the desire of the self. In this kind of narcissism, one could say, relationality is similar to consumption: the self just ‘eats’ the other (bell hooks). The self orientates itself in the joy that it perceives when relating to an other and in the resonance to the perceived impulse that it then perceives in itself. The narcissism of the Id is compatible with the consumption-orientated culture of global capitalism in that informing oneself (about what is available) as well as selling something also function through the positive sensation that a product produces in a potential consumer. However, not only narcissistic, but every encounter between self and other that takes place in lived time starts with a libidinal attachment. The question is what happens next.

My argument in the book will be that the Deleuzian event remains on the level of narcissistic consumption, while inter-relationality potentially can proceed to a second stage, namely the holding of the other as other. I will argue that the self can first affirm and then go beyond the consumption-orientated logic of global capitalism. In what I, following inter-relational theory (J. Benjamin 1988), will depict as mature form of inter-relationality, the other to which the self relates is still a living temporality, rather than a material entity. But after and beyond the moment of libidinal attachment, there is the holding of the difference between the living temporality of the self and the living temporality of the other. At stake are now not just resonance (the perception of sameness between self and other), but also the valuation of holding the other as significant for, though different from the self and outside its realm of influence (the perception of difference).

The Deleuzian event entails an acknowledgement of the importance of difference as well. ‘Univocity of Being’ (Deleuze 1969) consists not only in sameness, but also in difference. However, the holding of the co-existing unfolding of two or more different, though related temporalities in Deleuze is presented exclusively as an ontological characteristic of the virtual. Difference does not imply holding a relation with an actual other. The unfolding of sameness and difference in Deleuze takes only the shortest moment possible – the moment that it takes to produce a sensation. The Deleuzian approach affirms the fleetingness and singularity of the global capitalist given by theorising relationality with the world only on the basis of this shortest
possible moment. The Deleuzian event is impersonal. There is no expectation to relate to the other as significant other human being over time. This is why any agency based on the Deleuzian event is prone to be narcissistic – orientated in the well-being of the self, rather than in the quality of the relation with a specific other. To long for a relation with an other as actual other, implies a readiness for long-term commitment – and this is exactly what is absent in the Deleuzian approach, what would go against the grain of global capitalism, and what I have added in this book through inter-relational psychoanalysis. It is the quality of sociality that is at stake in the passage from the event towards ‘inhabiting the event’. This book will offer a perspective for sociality within global capitalism that first affirms, but then goes beyond the Id-based form of narcissism classified above as characteristic of global capitalism. This notion of sociality implies care, responsibility, trust and potentially long-term commitment in the encounter with actual others.

IV

How did ‘inhabiting the event’ develop as an issue in this work? The object-relational Freudian psychoanalysis of Melanie Klein (1930) became one of the battlegrounds that Deleuze, together with Felix Guattari, chose for unfolding their argument (see Deleuze/Guattari 1972). Klein, in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading, argues that the little child moves in her development from a pre-mature position where feelings towards her first significant other remain grounded in momentary, fragmented, intensive impressions towards a position where the child’s feelings towards this other integrate into a representation that holds beyond any momentary intensive impression. Both in Kleinian object-relational psychoanalysis and in Deleuze/Guattari, human perception seems to me to start with a sensual impression (a virtual object, or the virtual other), which then extends into a representation of the actual object (the actual other). The virtual other thus is a sensual impression from the surface of the actual other, and one perceives first the former and then the latter. Deleuze and Guattari’s project involved emancipating the virtual from the actual other by cutting the link between the virtual impression and the representation from which this was taken. Kleinian object-relation theory (on which inter-relational psychoanalysis builds)¹, by contrast, emphasizes that this link exists

¹ Theorists of object relations focus on the self and the objects to which it relates when relating to the world, while theorists of inter-relationality emphasize that the other, when it is a human being, is itself a self, not just an object.
and that it is worth reaching the level of the actual other (the level of representation). For object-relation theory, the perception of the other as whole other is more mature, because it allows for object-constancy, for holding the other over time. According to Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, the really fascinating things – productivity and creativity – take place in the virtual. They wanted to emancipate the virtual from the actual. For them, virtual relationality was unjustifiably rendered secondary in psychoanalysis, oppressed by the focus on the actual. It is important to keep in mind that Deleuze and Guattari wrote in the spirit of the ’68 revolution in France that was directed against an overcome actual, while now, forty years on, global capitalism has produced a socio-cultural given in which there hardly is any actual anymore. Now the emancipation of the virtual from the actual has become a dominant characteristic of capitalism and Deleuze’s approach affirms this characteristic. Now the virtual’s dangerous side – a narcissism of the Id that prevents inter-relationality proper – becomes apparent. It might now be liberating to remember the potential extension that object-relation theory provides for the Deleuzian approach.

Retrospectively, one can follow through the entire book how my exploration of Deleuze’s positive and detailed reading of the virtual entails from the beginning a bias towards inter-relational approaches within psychoanalysis: the first chapter introduces Guatemala as the setting of the empirical research together with Deleuze’s reading of Bergson. Why should one study Deleuzian immanence in Guatemala? In this research, it worked as a setting where I could study the temporal conditions of global capitalism (read as Deleuzian immanence with the approach of Scott Lash) with a difference, namely with that extra bit that later, at the moment of analysis of the material, I should find in selected moments of the work of inter-relational psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin. The second chapter uses Walter Benjamin to read temporalities of traditional subsistence, but what I find thereby could have been found as well with the work of object-relational psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott on whom Jessica Benjamin draws for her concept of the social space in-between self and other (see chapter six of this book). This social space entails both the surrender to the continuous relation with the other within the realm of lived time and the recognition of the other as actual other that the processes of traditional subsistence in the second chapter of this book describe. The third chapter reads temporalities at the open market with the theory of territorialisation by Deleuze and Guattari. This goes back mostly to Guattari and, as the sixth chapter reveals, Guattari uses the work of child researcher Daniel Stern to develop his approach. This is the work with which Jessica Benjamin departs from the work of Melanie Klein’s student, object-relational theorist Donald W. Winnicott (see J. Benjamin 1988) by arguing that already from birth on, the human being ac-
tively chooses his or her affective environment (the territory through which it will feel held), rather than just being passively dependent on the activity of the sufficiently favourable environment. The fourth chapter employs the theory on aggression by object-relational psycho-analyst Otto Kernberg (1992) to displace the Deleuzian theory of an active death-drive. In retrospect it seems to me that Kernberg’s theory worked so well together with Deleuze, because he seems to operate as well with a concept of primary triangulation, reminiscent of the one introduced in the fifth and sixth chapter as corrective to Deleuze’s theory of the other in the event through the work of Jessica Benjamin (see Scharff 1999). Thus, the inter-relational approach by Jessica Benjamin that is introduced on its own terms in the last chapter as an extension to the Deleuzian theory of the event, had been implicit in every empirical and theoretical moment throughout the research process.

V

Is such an alteration of the Deleuzian event relevant? Let us take a look at the works of contemporary Deleuzian cultural theorists. Deleuzians tend to focus on the fascinating productivity, creativity and openness of the virtual. The actual is there, but it seems to me to be perceived as a kind of enemy to the fascinating aspects of the virtual. Its value for making Deleuzian ideals work in the actual that the present book emphasizes, remains so far largely undiscovered. Brian Massumi for example (2002, chapter 1) has become among Deleuzians a major point of reference for theorising affect. This was for a text (and the book that this text introduced) in which he explored affect in reminiscence to the Deleuzian event. Massumi emphasizes the autonomy of affect from the actual in order to highlight its creative dimension. More, he turns to the language of science to elaborate affect as something that takes place explicitly autonomous from the involvement of an actual self or other. Affect, in his reading, encounters the other only on the level of the skin. Thereby, Massumi’s notion of affect dismisses the chance to relate to the other in an active, personal way. For Massumi, however, there is affect, and there is emotion. Emotion is personal, but according to Massumi, it is not creative. Consequently, Massumi shows how the actual impacts the event in its manifold social dimensions (ibid, chapter 3), but the social that he comes up with does not entail solidarity. ‘Inhabiting the event’, by contrast, attempts to show how affect can be creative, productive, open and personal. Only if the self relates through the event not only to the virtual, but also to the actual other, I would argue, there is a perspective for sociality that goes beyond the Id-based form of narcissism.
that I have depicted above as characteristic of global capitalism – towards solidarity, trust and meaning.

Luciana Parisi (2004) offers an exploration of sexual desire in the age of global, technology-based communication that is reminiscent of Massumi in that it celebrates contemporary technological achievements as liberating the world from the actual. She departs from ‘actual sex’, where the flows of libido are morally chained to the habitual repetition of the ever-same in the conjugal bedroom, dominated by the ultimate objective of discharge. She investigates how contemporary culture functions – by way of the event – through ‘abstract sex’, sensuality freed from the enclosure of the bedroom. Parisi brings to light a rich vocabulary for sensual encounters that take place in the virtual and that will never be extended into actual relations between self and other. However, in the light of contemporary global capitalism where the actual has turned virtual, the singularity and fleetingness that Parisi emphasizes, seems to me to be in danger to confirm the Id-based narcissism of the capitalist given. One might characterize contemporary global capitalist culture by abstract sex: play, joy, fascination – but only as long as there is attraction, only for the moment, and only for fun. Actively striving for a relation with an actual other that is worth holding might now be the dimension of inter-relationality that liberates from current socio-economic tendencies. It could bring in trust, care, generosity, and responsibility – dimensions that are so dear to human existence, but that go against the grain of global capitalism. One might call this ‘love’, as something that is grounded in, but goes beyond ‘sex’. Extending the virtual into the actual thus could open up a passage from abstract sex into abstract love. By extending abstract sex into abstract love, inhabiting the event could mean to turn desire from being a principle of the consumer-orientated culture of global capitalism into a device for meaningful human inter-relationality.

If one translates ‘inhabiting the event’ into abstract love, though, the scope for turning the Deleuzian event around into something else and something better is in danger to be restricted to friends and family. Lived time, by contrast, is about affection by the other. This terminology is more neutral than the desire-based notions of sex and love. As such, it could also work for qualifying relations with work colleagues, neighbours, fellow citizens etc. Lash (2002) argues that industrial capitalism would have been primarily about exploitation (of workers, women and nature) and post-industrial, or global capitalism would be primarily about exclusion that is deeply characteristic of global capitalism. I am strongly convinced, however, that the fleetingness of global capitalist encounters and the Id-based narcissism that is an expression of this brings with it its own peculiar form of affective

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2 Jessica Benjamin called her book ‘The Bonds of Love’.
exploitation. Given that the fleeting material circumstances and the disintegration of pre-given, actual value systems in global capitalism tend to suggest relation only to those impulses perceived in the other that reflect the own self, I fear that global capitalism is prone to a dimension of play in inter-relationality that will pervert the social. Holding relations with actual others and actively contributing to trust, weight and responsibility within them becomes in global capitalism a challenge for the singular human being that goes far beyond relations between partners, friends and family – those relations that are conventionally constructed as grounded in love.

It is interesting to refer at this point to a recent book on ‘nomadic ethics’ by Rosi Braidotti (2006). In her outline of ‘nomadic subjectivity’, it seems to me that she adds some characteristics to what I would see as characteristic of the Deleuzian event in order to transgress the exploitation of global capitalism. Braidotti unfolds the Deleuzian event as ethical concept against the backdrop of the fleetingness and exploitation of global capitalism. My hesitation consists in the following: If it would work to just want to relate to the world in a generous, non-profit etc. way, and then this already happens – great! The psychoanalytic assumption of previous experiences entering passively through the unconscious as bio-psychological baggage all present encounters with the world, however, lets one doubt that it is so easy. In this book I understand the event as a fragile balance of tension between sameness and difference that gets built up in every encounter anew, that is always in danger to break down again, and in relation to which every actual human being exhibits a kind of personal signature that has developed throughout their life-time and that impacts how a concrete event will be lived. This book could support Braidotti’s project in that it provides with what I here have called ‘inhabiting the event’ a materialist basis for her ethics. In contrast to Braidotti who considers mutual recognition to be a theme of the past (ibid, p. 158), however, I would not want to give up the expectation to live these values also in relation to significant actual others. I think one is likely to remain on the level of Id-based narcissism, if ethics are lived as a set of values with which a singular self encounters any other whatsoever in the world, rather than as a basis for significant inter-relationality with particular actual others. It might be a valid strategy to survive and even at times to enjoy the fleetingness of global capitalism, but it gives up the expectation to fulfil what inter-relational theory (Benjamin 1988, 2002) argues to be a basic human requirement – significant inter-relationality with significant actual other human beings.

Finally, let us turn to Antonio Negri (2003), who offers also a materialist perspective for the possibility of solidarity in global capitalism. Poverty and love are the material preconditions for the ‘multi-
tude’ in which he sees the potential for going beyond the fleetingness of global capitalism. It seems to me, however, that Negri, reminiscent to Braidotti, equates what I have called above ‘abstract sex’ and ‘abstract love’. The Id-based narcissism of the Deleuzian event seems to become in his reading the basis for solidarity between actual human beings with which these can oppose global capitalism from within (Negri: the theology of the common). The openness of the self that emerges once the actual has disintegrated seems to me to be equated with solidarity among actual people. In the present book, one might say, the Guatemalan research setting distinguishes itself from global capitalism also through poverty and love: A basic mode of subsistence forces the people whom I lived with in Guatemala to relate to the world in an open way. There is little departure from the immanence of the given. Substantial parts of the research are set within a family-home where I tried to describe the amount of engaged sociality that had fascinated me so much and that one might call love. My approach is idealistic as well, but maybe Negri’s account of poverty and love as ideal material condition that one might or might not find oneself in, could benefit from my attempt to reconstruct the theoretical ideas that expressed themselves in the Guatemalan research setting and that in my reading turned out to be not covered by the Deleuzian approach to the event.

VI

But does the event exist in Guatemala? With regard to the psychoanalytic concept of the Oedipus-complex with which I compare the Deleuzian event in this book, it has been shown that the concept rests on very culture-specific assumptions about the actual world that would make any straightforward translation to non-European contexts highly problematic (see for example Fanon 1952, Mahler 2000, Said 2003). The division between sameness and differentiation, by contrast, is so basic that it can arguably be observed everywhere. People in Guatemala might not use this model to explain their own temporal development. But it is possible to observe this binary in concrete, empirical inter-relationality between people and world. For example in chapter four I ask Guatemalan people how they cope with the unreliability of others in relation to agreed times for meeting. Usually, the overall answer is, people just wait. They just accept the other’s non-keeping of his or her promise. In the framework of this research, one could say that there is sameness, rather than individual differentiation.

The reasons why something is the way it is, are historically grown. Carrying one’s children in a scarf on one’s back, treating boys as more valuable than girls, watching on cable TV all day long US-American
activity-orientated forms of life, ...all these particularities of Guatemalan everyday life potentially contribute to the development of an adult’s affective architecture in a very culture-specific way. But that such an affective architecture will develop somehow, and that this will consist in some kind of balance of tension between establishing a bond of sameness and a subsequent process of self-differentiation, was incontestable in my encounters with Guatemala. I tried to relate the passive engagement of people with their material environment to the environment in which they live; e.g. waiting for the bus. Thus, reminiscent to psychoanalysis, there is an exploration of material significant others within Guatemalan everyday life and how the encounter with these might shape the development of one’s affective architecture as a response to a given affective environment. On the empirical level, the book offers an indulgence in the encounter with material conditions that produce slowness, sensuality and non-linearity. These context conditions then become the basis for exploring, on the theoretical level, the temporalities that it takes for a human self to engage with the world through the event.

VII

How did ‘inhabiting the event’ work as methodology? The research project started from sameness. I wanted to find out why there was so much affective resonance with my friends and acquaintances in Guatemala. Every encounter that is grounded in lived time is ideally organised as event. It starts from something that links, on a virtual level, a self and an other. The other, at the point of contact, is a sensitive impulse and the self is a feeling of attraction. Gradually thereafter, actual differences will come in. ‘Inhabiting the event’ in this way offers a practical perspective for intercultural communication in a globalising world that is characterized by movement and change. Shall I read a book on India before I go out with my Indian flatmate? Shall I avoid communication with someone to whom I feel close, but who happens to be thirty years older than me? Shall I fence off if my landlord introduces a flatmate to our house from a religious sect that in the way I grew up has been presented as dangerous? No, at least ideally, if not always empirically, I try out what is possible, and on the way I will perceive where limits set in. Actual differences exist, such as nationality, age or religion. I can be so much more open in my encounter with these, however, if I allow myself to start with the affective moment that establishes communication and then, gradually, to integrate differences. It is logically consistent development to employ this mode of intercultural communication, so feasible in everyday life practices,
How did I apply this approach concretely? At the moment of writing the empirical texts, I tried to focus explicitly not on a ready-made, ethical or ideal representation of the actual other as other, but on the affirmation of the ‘real’ plane of lived time in-between me and the other, below the censorship of the Ego that attempts to perceive only what would be acceptable to perceive. The felt dynamic then unfolded into a representation that expressed this ‘real’ state of affect between me and the other. The subjectivity of the approach is intentional. Affirming the singularity of one’s perception is a pre-condition for perception on the plane of the virtual.

The radicalism of this approach comes to a test where it goes against politically correct ways to represent the other. For example, chapter one introduces the reader to Guatemala as a site of lived time through Mayan mythology. The link between present Guatemalan everyday life and Mayan mythology is not only linked to the actual renewed interest in Mayan heritage for a re-valuation of indigenous culture after the civil war that I encountered in Guatemala, but also to my European background from which I was fascinated by indigenous everyday life as other to what I had known so far. Hervik/Kahn (2006) would dismiss this subjective dimension as ‘ethnographic surrealism’. In my account, by contrast, this part expresses the ‘real’ dimension of utopia, the feeling to have found something better than what I had known from Europe that became so central in the process of analysing the material of this research.

The empirical texts might be read best as explorations and illustrations of Deleuzian concepts. For example, in chapter four, I might have been the only person who perceived the mentioned fart as unpleasant. However, I do not claim to give an account of how people in Guatemala perceive farting in the bedroom. In the chapter, the fart is about dynamics in the realm of lived time that are set free by a disguised threat to the Ego. There is also a contemplation of the toilet paper in chapter four that might express so much European-ness that it would possibly sound strange to any Guatemalan, but this part of the chapter does not claim to give an account of the meaning of newspaper as toilet paper in Guatemala for Guatemalans. Rather, this is an empirical exploration of the theoretical idea of envelopment as a dynamic on the plane of lived time.

One major achievement was to discover a way to let theory and empirical material meet on a plane of immanence, within lived time. I followed an intuition that the moments in the Deleuzian texts that attracted me and the moments in Guatemalan everyday life that I had tried to capture by way of my empirical descriptions, went back to the same themes, just expressed by different means – here by empirical
descriptions in Guatemala, there by Continental philosophy. I tried to recall representations of the respective others from the described empirical material, and then awaited whatever attached itself from the theory to these in order to make sense of them. To let the moment of resonance saturate into clear, inner representations of both empirical material and theory was the step beyond Deleuze. This emphasis on doing justice to the other as actual, not just virtual other brought the research towards a proper inter-relational dimension. The attempt to let theory and empirical material encounter each other through my memory on a plane of immanence implied that moments from current context conditions during the process of analysing the material, as well as moments from my own distant past, entered the research. Both of these dimensions became productive parts of the overall research results.

Because I took seriously the challenge of ‘inhabiting the event’ in that I first followed and then analysed my real interest and baggage in lived time in Guatemala, people confronted with the challenge of global capitalism can find in my readings of Guatemalan everyday life perspectives to (re-)learn ways to affirm lived time (as opposed to rationality and structure, see tradition-chapter), ways to build up a feeling of space within the openness of lived time (see market-chapter), ways to cope with the unpleasant, with aggression and frustration in a socially sustainable way (see the chapter on the unpleasant) and ways to relate to the other on the basis of mutual recognition, but grounded in the preconscious realm of the real dynamics that there are taking place within affect, rather than only in the realm of consciously acceptable representations (see bus-chapter and final chapter).

VIII

Let us conclude this preface. Why has Western modernity such a problem with affirming the level of lived time below the actual? Arguably, this is due to a fear of the self losing control, a fear of de-differentiation, a fear of nebulosity. The book will show that on the realm of affect not everything is out of control, undifferentiated and diffuse. It is just that the concepts and dimensions used for orientation change. They change from a level of visible entities of humans and objects to a microscopic level of singularities. The Deleuzian and psychoanalytic theory employed in this book spell out this virtual microscopic perspective on a theoretical level, and the empirical descriptions show how this theory might play out in actual reality.

The book explores lived temporalities in Guatemala against the backdrop of contemporary global capitalism, understood as a sociocultural given in which the actual has turned virtual. As soon as one
encounters the other in the realm of lived (virtual) time, rather than in the rationality-based realm of the actual, the biases set in that one carries through life; the affective architecture, the prototype of which developed mostly in the encounter with the first significant other in life (J. Benjamin: ‘the bonds of love’). Ideally, there is a balance of tension. But normally, this encounter is more conflictive. Better: this balance is conflictive by nature. This potential for conflict entails the entire range of power, of above below relations. The potential for conflict emerges from the tension between sameness and difference through which the event unfolds. ‘Inhabiting the event’ means to provide concepts that give one words to articulate the differences between the temporalities of the human in all their imperfection and vulnerability and the event as temporal organisation of the human mind for productive participation in global capitalism. When words are available for the real dynamics that take place within the realm of the lived temporalities of the human, below the ideal of the event, the human being can fight for a recognition of these temporal conditions and necessities and thus include them into his or her global capitalist everyday life.

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