The 1960s saw the beginnings of a genuine scholarly inquiry into the nature, appeal, and history of fascism, which, perhaps if not utterly olympian in objectivity, was certainly much less biased than the earlier polemical and partisan writings on the subject. From this scholarship emerged the fact that the numerous fascist movements – nearly every European country experienced at least one such – were not necessarily the same as Hitlerite National Socialism on the one hand, or Italien Fascism on the other. Indeed, the programs, social bases, and the character and background of the leaders of the different fascist groups varied from country to country, from rith to left, and from aristocracy to proletariat, although, to be sure, the notion that integral nationalism and authoritarian government was the only possible answer to revolutionary marxist internationalism and decadent liberal democracy found its greatest support in the middle and lower-middle segments of society. Nonetheless, the fact remains that all fascisms were not Hitlerisms nor were they merely carbon copies of Mussolini’s Italy.

In Latin America, Chile (along with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) similarly experienced a fascist movement, as indeed might be expected from its open and sophisticated political system – in many ways virtually a Latin European state in South America. Organized

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1) The Chilean usage which spells Nacism (Nacismo Chileno) with a 'c' will be followed in this paper in order to distinguish it from German Nazism. The latter movement indeed had adherents in Chile – mostly however among German citizens and Chileans of German background. Nacismo criollo, as it was often called, was entirely separate from the German movement, its adherents being Chileans who were Chilean nationalists, not German.


in 1932 by Jorge González, Carlos Keller, and some other like-minded friends, the Chilean Movimiento Nacional-Socialista lasted until 1946, but its trajectory reached its apogee in 1938 and declined steadily thereafter to eventual extinction. Far and away the dominant personality in its history was Jorge González von Marees, Jefe from 1932 to 1942. In fact both the earlier successes and the later failures of the movement were very largely his responsibility. And among the failures, most clearly was his direct responsibility in organizing an unsuccessful putsch during the presidential campaign of 1938 which resulted in the massacre of some 63 young Nacistas by the police. Then several years later (1941) a further Nazi assault and killing of a Radical Party conventioneer resulted in his being forcibly put under psychiatric examination. Thereafter, and still today, he has been popularly regarded as somewhat loco.

When in 1945 he joined what he had earlier denounced as the decadent and plutocratic Liberal Party, and even rose to be its general secretary, he opened himself wide to the charge of "traitor" from his former followers and caused general dismay in Chilean public opinion for his rather peculiar political career. The said dismay, the taint of lunacy, and the Germanic ring of his name, of the movement’s name, and of many of his followers’ names have all blended into a general popular picture which continues to see him as a puny and pathetic parody of Adolf Hitler. Moreover, for lack of any monographic scholarship in English (or in Spanish for that matter) dealing specifically with the Nazi Jefe and his movement, the general popular picture has tended to become incorporated into the historiography of the period.

4) Although the Movimiento Nacional-socialista de Chile changed its name to Vanguardia Popular Socialista in January 1939, and then again in 1942 merged with a break-away group to form the Unión Nacionalista, which expired in 1946, it was in doctrine and personnel very much the same movement throughout.

5) When in 1968 the Socialist Senator Carlos Altamirano was similarly confined for mental examination, immediately the precedent of the González von Marées incident was called to mind; see “Altamirano, un peligroso caso de paranoia política”, La Nación (Santiago), 28 May 1968, p. 5.

6) To this writer's knowledge there are presently two doctoral dissertations being prepared on the M.N.S.: Michael P o t a s h n i k , Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles; and Hugh B i c h e n o , Pembroke College, Cambridge, England.
Ernst Halperin, for example, basing himself on Olavarría Bravo, writes that the "Chilean Nazi [sic] Party was effectively disposed of by having the Nazi leader González von Marées taken to a mental hospital for examination"\(^7\), while Frederick Pike follows Carlos Keller in saying that "...González probably became obsessed with holding and extending his power, until by 1938 he showed signs of having become a cynical opportunist who was, at least temporarily, emotionally and nervously unbalanced"\(^8\). Ricardo Donoso similarly says that "the personality of the creole Führer ... did not give rise to serious worries in those days [1936] because his statements bordered on the picturesque"\(^9\).

These judgements notwithstanding, the following pages will attempt an impartial even sympathetic reconsideration of the jefe's career and character with an eye both to giving the man his just due and to delineate a fascist movement which was genuinely Chilean and not just an extension of German National Socialism.

Jorge González von Marées was born in Santiago in 1900 to parents of considerable quality and definite bourgeois standing. His father was a prominent physician in the capital and his grandfather had been a notary in Talca. In politics the González family were strong balmacedistas, so much so that the father, who was studying in Germany when the Revolution of 1891 overthrew Balmaceda, lost the government stipend he had received for his medical education.

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\(^7\) See Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, p. 47, n. 11. Arturo Olavarría Bravo, as Minister of Interior, was the one who ordered Jorge González' confinement and psychiatric examination. He recounts the incident with bemused pride in his memoirs (Chile entre dos Alessandri: memorias políticas, Vol. I, Santiago, 1962, pp. 519-528), even quoting a BBC broadcast which opined that "if in Germany there had existed a minister like the Chilean Mr. Olavarría, the world would not have had to suffer a Hitler".

\(^8\) See Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880–1962, Notre Dame, Ind., 1963, p. 393, n. 171. Carlos Keller, the most prominent intellectual in the M.N.S., became disgusted with Jorge González' leadership, especially after the putsch of 1938. Not wanting to attack the jefe directly, he resorted to writing a quasi-historical novel which portrayed the jefe as becoming increasingly fanatic-al and aberant; see La locura de Juan Bernales (Santiago, 1949). The novel was written in August and September of 1940, i.e., prior to the mental examination incident of May 1941.

This experience, together with the general liberal outlook of the family, no doubt left them with a definite anti-oligarchy populist-liberal political tendency – a tendency Jorge exhibited all his life.

But if his paternal heritage was aspiring middle-class Chilean, his personality and thought were rather more the disciplined and rigorous middle-class German. Sofía von Marées was the daughter of a retired Prussian army officer who had been wounded in the Franco-Prussian War and consequently pensioned. The family was originally Huguenot, but Sofía had been brought up Catholic by her mother. Her uncle was the notable 19th century German painter Hans von Marées.

When Marcial González (Jorge's father) died in 1905, Sofía, who had been visiting Germany, respected her husband's wishes and returned to Chile to bring up her children there. Five years later, in 1910, she was married again to Enrique Ewerding, a German himself and a professor of German for many years at the Instituto Nacional in Santiago. Hence Jorge, though he lived the whole of his life in Chile after 1905, was nevertheless brought up in a household which savored not a little of the burgherdom of Imperial Germany: proper, proud, ambitious, stern, and moralist – characteristics likewise exhibited in his own personality. Indeed, his widow states that he was more “European” than Chilean in mental outlook 10.

But the home environment did not go so far as to make him a gringo as was frequently the case with many of the second and third generation Chilean-born offspring of German parents, particularly if both parents were German. In fact he never attended a German School (Deutsche Schule), which one might have expected from his German mother and stepfather; his education rather was in the Instituto Nacional and the Universidad de Chile, from which he received the law degree in 1923. The thesis he presented was entitled “The Problem of the Worker in Chile”, and it reflected his keen interest in the populist and reformist proposals of the first Alessandri administration 11.


The election of 1920, which brought Arturo Alessandri Palma to the presidency – commonly regarded as marking the entrance of middle-class reformism into the government – had revolved around the so-called social question which had been welling up since the turn of the century. An urban proletariat had emerged in the big cities, the nitrate fields, and the coal mines, and, together with the long-familiar rural proletariat (the *rotos*), constituted a wretchedly poor, uncouth, and debased mass on the bottom of the social pyramid. The problem was what to do with this culturally depressed social group—restrain it and control it, as many of the older generation and upper classes were inclined to think, or reform it, moralize it, and educate it, as the progressive spirits and particularly many of the youth felt.

Jorge González was to be found most definitely and decidedly among the latter. At the age of 20 (in 1920) he wrote a letter to his mother expounding, as it were, his youthful ideas regarding the mistaken direction Chile had taken since 1891 and the remedy therefor, namely: educate the people, that is, the proletarian masses, so that they may be able to better themselves socially and economically, and thus better the Republic in consequence – no scent of revolutionary anarchism or marxist socialism here, just good bourgeois self-improvement and self-reliance. To implement these ideas he organized and ran a voluntary evening school for the education of the sons of the working classes (1920–23) and was president of a “League in Favor of Popular Education.” All this during his university years.

Then, once he had his degree in hand (1923), he began a public career at the bottom of the totem-pole. For two years (1924–25) he held the post of justice of the peace (*juez de subdelegación*) in the Santiago suburb of Ñuñoa. Frequently this inferior judicial post was not taken very seriously by its incumbents, but Jorge González applied himself with concern to the common complaints and pleadings which came before him. Similarly, as municipal police judge (*juez de subdelegación*), he tried to do his best for the people he served.

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10) In English a good discussion of the onset of the social question with references to an enormous volume of Chilean source material may be found in *Pike*, Chile and the United States, chs. V and VII. Also for the politics of the period see *Gil*, The Political System of Chile, ch. II.

12) The letter is presently in the possession of Sra. Laura de González together with other personal papers and documents.

14) *La Liga en pro de Educación Popular ‘Rafael Sotomayor’*; see papers in the possession of Sra. Laura de González.
de policía local), a post to which he was advanced on 23 December 1925, and then later as legal secretary of the municipality of Ñuñoa he showed himself a very conscientious and assiduous doer of his duty. Finally his services were rewarded by his being appointed mayor (alcalde) of Ñuñoa in 1932. An indication of his self-denying and rigorous character may be seen in the fact that as mayor during the depression crisis he reduced his own salary and sold the automobile maintained by the municipality for mayoral dignity. But his municipal career ended with the socialist coup of Marmaduke Grove on 4 June 1932. By then, however, he had already founded a new political group which thenceforward occupied him completely.

The period 1924–32, of course, was the era of quasi-constitutional reformist government dominated by the military’s ‘honorable mission’ and the presidency of General Carlos Ibáñez. Jorge González, whose early public career coincided with these years, was partial to the Ibáñez brand of reform by strong executive government (gobierno fuerte) to the end, ultimately, of reestablishing the fallen prestige of the Republic. He had read (in the German original!) and had been greatly impressed by Spengler’s book “The Decline of the West”, and had reflected long on how Chile should recover her former commanding position in Latin America. The remedy appeared to him to consist in strong clean nationalist government which would replace the self-serving and corrupt plutocracy that since 1891 had run the Republic under a liberal parliamentary system where personalist and partisan politics (poliiquería) substituted for the progressive modernizing policies which would serve the interests of the collective whole instead of just the wealthy few. The government of Carlos Ibáñez was a step in the right direction; its fall in July 1931 – coming as it did in full depression, followed by the old-fashioned neo-oligarchic administration of Juan Estéban Montero, and then the ef-

15) Personal interview with Sra. Laura de González and papers in her possession; see also "Semblanza del Jefe Nacista", Trabajo (Santiago), 20 July 1933, p. 5.
17) See Jorge González v. M., El mal de Chile: sus causas y sus remedios, Santiago, 1940, Chs. I and II.
fervescence and turmoil of the "Socialist Republic" in mid-1932 — left Chile at the crossroads. It was a time for political action.

The collapse of the Ibáñez dictatorship opened the way for such action. The whole gamut of political ideologies of the postwar era broke through and pushed aside the old 19th century politics by the oligarchic few. By 1932 Chile's economic development and concomitant social evolution had advanced sufficiently far to disrupt the traditionalist bi-class society. The Communist Party (founded in 1912) and the Socialist Party (organized in April 1933) struggled to represent the interests of the proletariat, while the Radical Party emerged as the embodiment of most of the aspirations of the middle classes. The Conservatives, moreover, were wrestling with the social doctrines enunciated in Quadragesimo Anno (1931) which gave rise several years later (1938) to the proto-Christian Democrat Falange Nacional. Only the Liberals, representing great capital for the most part, remained unmoved and unchanged, advocating laissez-faire and return to the parliamentary system of 1891–1924.

What was lacking in this political mix was a reformist nationalist party which would roughly represent the position of the Ibáñez government. Such political niche was filled by the Chilean Nacistas

The Movimiento Nacional-Socialista de Chile was founded on 5 April 1932, i.e., Jorge González' 32nd birthday. Carlos Keller — himself only 34 at that time and since 1927 an official in the Bureau of Statistics — tells the story as follows. In March 1932 he was in-
vited by General Francisco Javier Díaz, who had had military training in Germany, to meet another young man at the general’s house whom Díaz knew to be very interested in political action, namely, Jorge González. General Díaz showed them a copy of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party program which he wanted to see adopted, with some minor adjustments, by a national-socialist party in Chile. Jorge González, however, felt that a specifically Chilean nationalist program which sought to recapture the spirit and vigor of the 19th century Portalean constitution should be aimed at. Keller found himself in agreement with González as opposed to Díaz, but he suggested a greater emphasis on “socialism” than González’ nationalism had contemplated. González accepted the suggestion and a few days later at González’ home (5 April 1932) the two of them together with several other personal friends created the M.N.S.; all agreed that González should be the leader.

They took the name national-socialist from the German party which at that time was making its spectacular rise to power and which, on account of their German backgrounds, they naturally felt inclined to emulate. However, they were not an overseas offshoot or extension of the German party, or of the Italian party for that matter. Jorge González explained the relationship very clearly:

“We consider that fascism, in its fundamental ideas, is not only an Italien movement, but a world movement. It incarnates the spontaneous and natural reaction of common men against the political decomposition produced by the democratic-liberal state. It signifies the triumph of the “grand politics”, this is, of the politics directed by the few superior men of each generation, over the mediocrity which

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for Alessandri in 1920 and for Carlos Ibáñez after 1924. A brilliant man, he nonetheless was a difficult personality to work with and always remained a free and independent spirit in the M.N.S.; see Raúl Silva Castro, “Discurso de recepción al académico don Carlos Keller”, Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia, Año XXVI, No. 61 (1959), pp. 91-96; see also Who’s Who in Latin America: Part IV, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, 3rd ed.; Stanford, 1947, p. 96.


constitutes the character of liberalism; it signifies also the predominance of the ethos of the race over economic materialism and internationalism. In this sense we are fascists, without that signifying, in any sense, that we intend to copy Italian fascism or German Hitlerism. Our movement is characterized by its essentially nationalist tendency.

In fact, when later the German Nazi Party did extend its activities to Chile in an attempt to indoctrinate and harness the German-Chilean community to its ends, it disparaged the Chilean Nacistas for not being nearly anti-semitic enough, and more particularly for advocating that German-Chileans should give up their carefully nourished German ethnic identity and assimilate themselves completely to the Chilean ethos. The plain fact is that the creole Nacistas never received any support, financial or otherwise, from the German government.

During the first year of its existence the movement gained recruits by personal contact and press advertisement. A series of public lectures and printed pamphlets set forth the movement's ideology, and a "nacista page" was hired in the daily newspaper El Imparcial. The

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24 Quoted from El Imparcial (Santiago), 25 October 1932, in: Julio César Jobet, Ensayo crítico del desarrollo económico-social de Chile, Santiago, 1955, p. 196. The quote was a reply to the question of whether Chilean Nacism had a fascist tendency.

25 For a first treatment of this subject see Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933–1941, New Haven, 1967, chs. V, VII, VIII, and X.

26 Personal interview with Carlos Keller, Santiago, May 1972, and with Sra. Laura de González. Both assert in most definite terms the lack of any financial or other connection between the two national-socialisms. Claus von Plate, the editor of the German language newspaper Cóndor, which he founded in 1938 as the organ of the German-Chilean Bund, further confirms this; personal interview in Santiago, May 1972. It is significant that Frye, working nearly exclusively from the captured German documents, makes absolutely no mention of Jorge González or the M.N.S.; see Nazi Germany... The distinction is also sustained by a very good journalistic account of Chilean Nacism: Edward Tomlinson, "South America Snubs Fascism", The New York Times, 11 September 1938, Section 4, p. 5.

27 Early Nacista literature includes the following: El Movimiento Nacional-Socialista de Chile: declaraciones fundamentales – plan de acción – organización – programa (Biblioteca Nacista No. 1; Santiago, 1932; revised slightly and republished in 1933 and 1934 editions); Jorge González v. M., El Movimiento Nacional-Socialista de Chile, como única solución de la crisis política y social de la República (Biblioteca Nacista No. 2; Santiago, 1932; and two more editions in 1932); Carlos Keller, Nuestro problema monetario (Biblioteca Nacista No. 3; Santiago, 1932); Roberto Vergara Herrera, Descentralización administrativa (Biblio-
membership grew steadily so that one year after its miniscule beginning it was in a position to publish its own weekly, suitably named *Trabajo*. The ideology of Chilean Nacism was defined by Jorge González in an address to the first general assembly of the movement (21 June 1932) as follows:

"Above all, Nacism is a national movement, not a political party in the style of the old parties of the liberal epoch. Its goal does not consist of attempting to realize a rigid and dogmatic program, but in trying to create a civil force, surcharged with life, from which there will arise a new conception of the State in harmony with the social, economic, and intellectual tendencies of the century.

Nacism is a popular movement. In it all the sane elements of the nation will take part, all those Chileans who feel the passionate desire to redirect the national destiny into new channels... All the creative forces of the nation, the industrialist and the worker, the professional and the employee, will find a place in our ranks to work in common for the collective betterment...

Nacism is a moral force. All the spiritual values of the race: probity, rectitude of intention, the unquenchable faith in the destiny of the country... will be rehabilitated by us and concentrated in a mighty impulse that will reestablish the national prestige... To reestablish in Chile the pride of race – that is our fundamental mission.

But along with being a moral force, Nacism will know also how to be a physical force which will not fear to respond to violence with violence. Condemnable in principle, violence is necessary when reason finds itself unable to impose sensible judgement...

Nacism is a socialist movement. But our socialism has no point of contact whatever with the marxist international, nor with any of...
those utopian doctrines which hold that the greatness and happiness of peoples revolves around economic materialism exclusively. Nacista socialism is not predicated on the class-struggle but on the cooperation of the diverse social groups... We are socialists in the sense that in all national activities we desire that the profit motive and private interest be replaced by “social functions...”.

The Nacista concept of the State grants to it full authority over all national activities. It is the State which ought to control and direct private initiative with the object of making it yield a maximum of effectiveness for the benefit of the common weal...

Nacista socialism translates itself, therefore, into the concept of the individual being the servant of the State. Consequently the logical corollary of our political ethic is discipline... Discipline which permits the placing of each one in the post which corresponds with his capacity...

Nacism, finally, instead of programs considers men... Hence let us, along with organizing the active forces of the nation around our ideology, dedicate ourselves from principle to the task of selecting human elements which at the opportune time will be able to make a reality of our aspirations. Chile, in these times, more than programs, needs men. Needs vigorous and resolute personalities ready to act and with a clear concept of their duties to the collectivity... This demanding and frankly fascist ideology nonetheless found supporters, and especially among young men of the urban middle, lower-middle, and working classes. That such was the case was due in no small measure to the personality of the Jefe, who from the beginning stamped his character and spirit on the movement.

Jorge González, as intimated above, was a man of rigid self-control and self-discipline, which, when coupled with unquestionable intellectual ability and personal ambition, produced a personality capable of considerable achievement. Add to that the fact that he was embued with an exacting sense of moral uprightness and adhered to a rigorous code of personal honesty — indeed a puritanical code which forbade smoking and drinking — and one sees an individual self-ser-

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tain in serving some high moral purpose. Jorge González' character had much that was commendable about it, and it certainly was viewed as noble by the idealistic young men who were attracted to him. But notwithstanding this, it also had its darker side of indignant exasperation and anger at the compromising tendencies of more easy-going men – really a rather unreasonable personality.

Besides the moral quality of his character, there was also the appeal of his mind. He was an intellectual, a man well-read in history, and a very perceptive commentator on Chile's past experience and present problems. His speeches, with beautiful clarity and coherence, developed a cluster of ideas on a central theme, rather than dispensing political rhetoric and emotional tirade. He became a fine orator with a lucidity of thought that could only make him more compelling to his listeners. Talented mind that he was, however, he inclined to be overserious and humorless. Withal, he was an intense, cerebral, and moralistic individual who lived modestly with very bourgeois values all his life.

30) Those who knew him all agree that Jorge González was personally an honorable man; interviews in May 1972 with Julio Philippi Izquierdo, Foreign Minister in the government of Jorge Alessandri; Guillermo Izquierdo Araya of the Movimiento Nacionalista de Chile (see below, p. 16, n. 61) and prominent Ibanista; and Carlos Keller; see also Sergio Recabarren Valenzuela, Mensaje Vírgente (Santiago, 1964), pp. 101-102. A Nacista in his youth, Recabarren Valenzuela later became a leftist Deputy and Minister of Interior (1955) under Ibáñez (p. 15).

31) The following speeches were subsequently printed: Pueblo y Estado: discurso pronunciado... a su salida de la cárcel, el 12 de enero de 1936 (Santiago, 1936); Nacismo o Comunismo: discurso pronunciado por radio... el 28 de julio de 1936 (Santiago, 1936; and another edition in 1937); La violencia nacista y los partidos políticos: discurso pronunciado... el 28 de agosto de 1936, con ocasión de los ataques dirigidos al M.N.S. desde los bancos parlamentarios de todos los partidos (Santiago, 1936); La mentira democrática: versión taquigráfica del discurso pronunciado... en el Estadio Puchacay de Concepción, el 7 de diciembre de 1936, con motivo de la tercera concentración nacional del M.N.S. (Santiago, 1936); La hora de decisión: discurso pronunciado... por la radio de la Cooperativa Vitalicia, el 14 de enero de 1937 (Santiago, [1937]); Tres discursos parlamentarios: posibilidades económicas de Chile – la verdad sobre el complot nazi y la quinta columna – solución del problema de la defensa nacional (Santiago, 1941).

32) He was married in 1923 to Laura Alliende Wood with whom and by whom he lived happily and had four children. In Carlos Keller's novel, La locura de Juan Bernales, the character Inés Flores becomes the protagonist's mistress; however, I have it from Keller himself that in real life she was not González' mistress but his own!
Moreover, he espoused none of the atavistic neo-barbarism which so grossly disfigured some of the European fascisms. His heroes were Chile's 19th century statesmen: Diego Portales, Manuel Montt, and José Manuel Balmaceda. He wanted his country to recapture the stern frugal probity of those statesmen (to be sure somewhat idealized) and not to return to some barbarous heathen past. Heroic and striving he wanted to be, but within the context of civilized society. Virtue and honor were his canons of conduct. Needless to say, such exaltation of the traditional view of noble behavior had particular appeal to youth. Jorge González was their Galahad, pure and true, and he apparently saw himself in such light.

From virtually a gathering of friends on 5 April 1932, the M.N.S. grew into a small political party which polled some 22,500 votes out of 488,904 (ca. 4.0%) in the municipal elections of 4 April 1938 — its high point. Until 1936, however, the movement went nearly unnoticed by the general public. In that year the Jefe went to jail for 61 days for calling the editor of the government-owned daily (La Nación) a pimp, and scuffles between the dun-shirted Nacistas and the likewise uniformed Communist and Socialist youth resulted in several deaths. Furthermore, the disbandment of the conservative oligarchic Milicia Republicana (July 1936) — mistakenly taken abroad as Chile's fascist party — left the M.N.S. out in the open, so to speak, as the real fascist force in Chile. Jorge González had meanwhile tour-

81 See Raúl Maragán M., ‘Hermano de un mártir nacional-socialista se dirige a su ex-Jefe, Sr. González von Marées”, Trabajo, 13 June 1942, p. 3; see also, Keller, La locura de Juan Bernales.
82 See Trabajo, 5 April 1938, p. 1, and 6 April 1938, p. 1; the M.N.S. elected 29 regidores out of a total of 1,485 (ca. 2%). This compares favorably, however, with the meager 6,000 votes garnered in the previous municipal elections of 7 April 1935; see Trabajo, 11 April 1935, p. 2. Nacista electoral strength unquestionably was in the big cities: Santiago, Valparaíso, Concepción, and Temuco.
83 See Trabajo 1935 and 1936 for full particulars; see also, Keller, La locura de Juan Bernales, pp. 33-63. Regarding uniforms, of course, all three political groups had such for their organized youth, the Communists being the first, and all three baited each other. Jorge González apparently did not particularly like wearing uniforms, but his youthful followers loved them, so he went along; personal interview with Sra. Laura de González.
ed the country whipping his youthful followers up to fervid nationalism, attacking both the Popular Front and Communism on the left and laissez-faire liberalism and the Alessandri administration on the right. The slogan was: contra la politiquería y el comunismo. The government responded with a sequence of repressive police actions which sought to discourage and disorganize the M.N.S. The March 1937 congressional elections, however, returned three Nacista deputies (for Santiago, Valparaiso, and Temuco), among them Jorge González, who received the largest majority of the several deputies elected for Santiago.

Once in Congress he announced that he would neither align himself with the leftist opposition, nor with the rightist government, which in his view was nothing more than a plutocratic self-serving group of oligarchs practising the "democratic lie." Particularly

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when Alessandri’s Minister of Finance, the international capitalist Gustavo Ross Santa Maríá, emerged as the presidential candidate of the Liberal and Conservative Parties, did the M.N.S. (as likewise the Popular Front) take a stand of uncompromising enmity against the government. There was no Pact of the Düsseldorf Industrial Club in Chile; rather fascism there had a populist leftist hue. When Carlos Ibáñez was permitted to return from exile in May 1937 and was presently proclaimed presidential candidate by the Alianza Popular Libertadora, a newly organized grouping of his personalist followers and some leftists, there was no question but that the M.N.S. also would endorse his candidacy. This touched President Alessandri personally, however, for Ibáñez was one of the leaders of the military revolt against him in 1924 and 1925. He hated Ibáñez and all surrounding him with a passion which was to have tragic consequences in September 1938. In fact the presidential election of 1938 was to be one of the most memorable of this century.

The first flash came on 21 May 1838 at the traditional opening of Congress when the president reads his annual “state of the nation” address. Fearing a disrupting demonstration by the left, Alessandri

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41) See Jorge González v. M., El problema del hambre: sus causas y su solución, conferencia dictada en el Teatro Principal de Santiago, el 18 de abril de 1937, Santiago, 1937. The high-handed authoritarianism of a rightist, even somewhat reactionary government whose economic policies favored great capital (so as to revive the economy) could only leave anyone wishing to forge a mass-based party in opposition. Had there indeed been a threat of a Communist revolution, or had even a leftist government remained in power after 1932 no doubt the M.N.S. might have attracted more of the middle aged middle-class who, as it was, continued to support the Radical Party in the main.

42) After the six-year experience of first a ‘socialist republic’ and then a rightist reaction, the popularity of Carlos Ibáñez among large segments of the Radical, Socialist, and even Communist Parties was immense. A secret committee of Radicals (including the later Radical president Juan Antonio Ríos) and Communists attempted to substitute Ibáñez for Aguirre Cerda as the candidate of the Popular Front. A section of the Socialists split off and supported him as the Union Socialist Party. Ibáñez represented nationalist populist reform; see Ernesto Würth Rojas, Ibáñez: caudillo enigmático, Santiago, 1958, pp. 203–205; and René Montero Moreno, Confesiones políticas, Santiago, 1958, pp. 99–101; see also The New York Times, 17 October 1937, p. 41.

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had the congressional Salon of Honor occupied by police. But when the President arrived and started to speak, the Popular Front deputies, together with the three Nacista deputies, stood up and began to walk out — not, however, without insulting each other and those remaining so much that one deputy was moved to assault Jorge González who thereupon drew a pistol and fired a shot into the air. He was immediately pounced upon and taken away (two other Socialist deputies were severely beaten by the police), all of which led to his being sentenced to one and half years in jail. He appealed the sentence but it was finally denied on 25 August 1938. In the meantime he had worked all-out for Ibáñez, but with the anti-government forces divided between two candidates (Aguirre Cerda and Carlos Ibáñez) it was fairly clear that the government candidate Ross would likely win the election on October 25th. This was the situation which brought Jorge González to his most fateful decision.

In the event of a possible government intervention at the polls (as Alessandri had done in 1924), Ibáñez had made arrangements with some friendly army units to step in and oust the president. However, as of September 5th, Ibáñez apparently felt that as yet there was no indication that any intervention would take place and consequently he was opposed to attempting a coup at that time. Jorge González, who had been in on the Ibáñez plotting, on the other hand faced a jail sentence if the government's candidate won, which seemed very likely. Hence he secretly organized, unbeknown to his lieutenants in the M.N.S., a small group of some 63 young Nacistas who, the day after the big Ibañista rally in Santiago (September 4th), would try to trigger off a coup by attacking the Moneda and hoping that the Army and populace would join in, thus in effect forcing Ibáñez' hand.

The attempt failed, however, because, among other reasons Ibáñez did not act. But it roused such a fear on the part of the President that he countenanced the systematic shooting of all the rebel youths, even

45) The most detailed account of this key event is to be found in Donoso, Alessandri..., Vol. II, ch. XIV; see also Boizard, Historia de una derrota, pp. 79–112; Javier Cox Lira, Ibáñez y el 5 de setiembre, Santiago, 1939; the magazine "Hoy" which devoted a special supplement wholly to the matter (29 November 1938); Würth Rojas, Ibáñez..., pp. 206–210; Montero Morenño, Confesiones políticas, pp. 101–103; Recabarren V., Mensaje vigente, ch. V; and Carlos Droguett, Los asesinados del Seguro Obrero, Valparaíso, 1972.
though they had surrendered and were in the hands of the police. After the truth became known (the government at first tried to suppress it), there was public revulsion at such craven behavior which undoubtedly hurt Ross and threw votes to Aguirre Cerda. Yet the really decisive factor was Ibáñez' withdrawal of his candidacy (he was immediately arrested on September 5th) and Jorge González' instructions to his followers to vote for Aguirre. Thus the whole Ibañista vote was joined with the Popular Front vote to give Aguirre Cerda a narrow majority of 222,720 to 218,609 for Ross. In these circumstances the Nacista vote was certainly decisive.

Jorge González had given himself up on September 6th when he learned of the death of the 63 young Nacistas. He has since been faulted for not accompanying his youthful followers in their armed assault, but it should be remembered that neither he, nor anyone else, could have foreseen a massacre in the event of failure. Furthermore, he had stationed himself at a radio transmitter in order to coordinate the several separate operations in the plan of the putsch. And indeed, many have been the coups and attempted coups in which the leader was not immediately in the front firing line. But be that as it may, he was loyal enough to his followers to turn himself in when it became clear they had failed, and honest enough towards Ibáñez to declare to the authorities that he was solely responsible.

40) See Donoso, Alessandri... Vol. II, chs. XV and XVI; and Boizard, Historia de una derrota, pp. 113–167.
47) Ibáñez' letter of withdrawal was dated 12 October 1938; González' letter entitled “Un imperativa de conciencia nos obliga a poner todas nuestras energías al servicio del candidato popular” was dated 16 October 1938. Both letters were printed in an irregular hand-set issue of Trabajo, called 'Trabajo brujo', in mid-October 1938. Javier Cox Lira, the editor of Trabajo, had been arrested and held in Antofagasta until the lifting of the extraordinary measures ten days before the election. He then immediately returned to Santiago, visited Jorge González in jail to obtain the above-mentioned letter, and himself together with a printer set the type and printed 'Trabajo brujo'; personal interview with Javier Cox Lira, Santiago, May 1972.
49) At that time he did not know that they had been massacred, only that many had been killed; see “Los reportajes con Jorge González”, “Hoy”, 29 November 1938, p. 10.
A hearing was held and a judgement handed down just two days before the election (October 23rd): Ibáñez was exonerated and released; Jorge González was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. During his detainment, moreover, there had been a period during which he had feared for his life. Thus a victory for Ross meant twenty years, not just a year and a half, and possibly even death. Hence, one can easily understand his support for Aguirre Cerda. Aguirre, in fact, had visited Ibáñez in jail to cement their political cooperation, and presumably had indicated at that time that in the event of his victory he would amnesty any convicted of involvement in the putsch. The victory won, he was true to his word and pardoned Jorge González and the other convicted Nacistas in one of his first acts as president (24 December 1938).

The putsch had failed but Ross had been defeated, and now all involved were set free. It seemingly had worked out for the best in the end. Yet the impression made on Chilean public opinion by the blatantly unconstitutional act of Jorge González and the subsequent massacre of surrendered prisoners really spelled the beginning of his decline. It came at a time when Hitler had begun to bully his eastern neighbours for "German territory" outside the Reich and to burn the Synagogues at home; at a time when Stalin was trying and executing many of his former copartisans; and at a time when Franco was obviously closing in on the Spanish republicans. Chileans, who had lived through the constitutional irregularities of the period 1924-32 wanted no more irregular governments. After the Popular Front victory — a victory for democracy — the Nacistas' antidemocratic image seemed as out of order as the violence of the putsch. Consequently the M.N.S. sought to change its face.

In a meeting in Santiago (14–17 January 1939), the decision was taken to change the name of the movement to Vanguardia Popular Socialista, to reemphasize the economic nationalist anti-oligarchic side of its ideology, and to reject all totalitarianism and racial
theories of superiority. All of this, of course, was calculated to make the old Nazi movement more palatable to the new Popular Front government, and, in contradistinction to some of the more rightist Ibañista elements, Jorge González indeed publicly declared his support for Aguirre Cerda.

Thus as leader of the Vanguardia, Jorge González continued his career in Congress. Two developments there may be credited to his initiative—one being the extraordinary tax on revenues from exports levied on the U.S. copper companies for the purpose of financing the newly created Corporación de Fomento (CORFO). He also took it to be his congressional duty to scrutinize the conduct of the government, and it was in this regard that he pressed the charge that the Minister of Foreign Relations, Abraham Ortega Aguayo, had allowed extortion in the granting of entrance visas to Jews who were fleeing Nazi Germany. The matter eventually resulted in a presidential...
investigating committee and the resignation of that minister. Such damaging scrutiny, along with the unfavorable reaction of the Vanguardia to Aguirre Cerda’s pardoning of the police who had perpetrated the massacre of September 5th, led to cooler relations between the government and the Vanguardistas.

On 12 February 1940, moreover, the Vanguardia had already suffered a serious fracture when a number of members, dissatisfied with Jorge González’ leadership, broke away and organized the Ibañista Movimiento Nacionalista de Chile which was strongly opposed to the Popular Front government as favoring the Communists too much. Thus there were now two fascist movements in Chile. Yet, in such a foreign policy matter as closer cooperation or alliance with the U.S. and the allies, Jorge González stood together with the Nacionalistas in being strenuously opposed. Like many nationalist Chileans, even many Radicals, his sympathies were definitely with the Axis; the Allies he regarded as greedy economic imperialists. Thus the stage was set for an open break with the government. It came after the Vanguardia failed to make any headway in the congressional elections of March 1941.

At a Radical Party Convention in Santiago in May 1941 a group
of young Vanguardistas made an insulting demonstration in the street and one of them fired into the Radical crowd killing one delegate and wounding several others. This was the last straw. Minister of Interior Olavarría Bravo, after consulting President Aguirre, pulled a dirty but effective trick on their Jefe. According to the sanitary code, persons deemed likely to endanger public safety may be apprehended and held for psychiatric examination. That was what happened to Jorge González on 24 May 1941, although he was in no way insane. The effect, nevertheless, was to cover him with ridicule, and many Chileans were inclined to think that a man who exhorted his youthful followers to “heroicos locos” must somehow be unbalanced himself. It was his political death.

64) See Olavarría Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri, Vol. I, pp. 519-522; see also The New York Times, 17 and 18 May 1941, pp. 6 and 32 respectively. A seventeen year old youth admitted shooting the deadly bullet.

65) Police raids and arrests had turned up a letter from a Vanguardista leader in Santiago to a provincial subordinate which opined “that the unanimous view of the people is that we must again embark on another 5th of September” — something that no one wanted to see repeated; see The New York Times, 21 May 1941, p. 1. Jorge González himself released the following statement to the press: “I do not feel morally responsible for the events of last night. It is a matter simply of one of those disgraceful incidents of the present political struggle which are provoked, more than not, by the ambient of spiritual anarchy and passions in which the ruling regime has submerged the republic. Together with lamenting the incident, I declare that the persecutions of which we are made the object, under pretext of chastisement for this unfortunate political event, only contributes to confirm us in our position of struggle against a regime that oppresses Chile”; quoted from Olavarría Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri, Vol. I, p. 522.

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67) The incident also rebounded against Olavarría Bravo who was forced by the Radical Party Committee to resign from the ministry on the grounds that he was too high-handed and dictatorial; see Olavarría Bravo, Chile entre dos Alessandri, Vol. I, pp. 528-535; see also The New York Times, 14 June 1941, p. 5; and Newsweek, 23 June 1941, p. 29.
After this he remained leader of the Vanguardia only one more year, during which time his dominant objective was to restrain the government from breaking relations with the Axis and its corollary: joining the Allies in alliance. In the presidential election of February 1942 the Vanguardia supported Ibáñez along with the parties of the right (Liberals and Conservatives) against Radical Juan Antonio Ríos. Ibáñez, of course, was the candidate of those sympathetic to the Axis, while Ríos represented those who hoped for the Allies. This bipolarization of public opinion led the two separate fascist groups (the Vanguardia and the Nacionalistas) to again consider union with each other, which materialized in the Unión Nacionalista in 1942 under the presidency of Juan Gómez Millas (subsequently rector of the University of Chile). Jorge González resigned; he had made too many enemies both within and without his movement to continue with any prospect of political success. Indeed, when he ran for his seat in the congressional elections of March 1945 he was defeated. He retired to the practice of law.

If, then, at this point he seemed a tarnished idol to many of his former followers, he clinched that view—virtually turning traitor in their eyes—by joining the Liberal Party, and such a Liberal he became that he rose to be general secretary of the party before he resigned in September 1951 to campaign for Arturo Matte Larraín, scion of the oligarchy and son-in-law of Arturo Alessandri. It

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68) See the revived Acción Chilena which was heavily concerned with this issue: "British capitalism and Soviet bolshevism have concluded an alliance 'in articulo mortis' directed against the European nations. The two retrograde forces of the world confess, finally, their absolute brotherhood and their hatred of cultured civilization" (No. 1, 27 September 1941, p. 9); the last issue (No. 47, 15 December 1942) printed a speech by Jorge González advocating close affinity with Argentine to resist U.S. pressure (pp. 8–9). Chile broke diplomatic relations with the Axis in January 1943. See also The New York Times, 24 May 1942, p. 2.

69) See Gil, The Political System of Chile, pp. 70–71; see also The New York Times, 17 January, 1 and 2 February 1942, pp. 6, 27, and 1 respectively. Ríos defeated Ibáñez 260,034 to 204,635.

70) Personal interview with Guillermo Izquierdo Araya; see also Acción Chilena, "Entrevista con Juan Gómez Millas, presidente de la Unión Nacionalista", No. 28 (11 April 1942); and The New York Times, 26 June 1941, p. 6.

71) Personal interview with Sra. Laura de González. See also the letter written by a brother of a Nacista killed in the September 5th massacre accusing ex-Jefe Jorge González of 'treason' in Trabajo (nueva época), 13 June 1942, p. 3.

72) See El Mercurio, 15 September 1951, p. 25. Matte Larraín was the Liberal and Conservative candidate in the presidential election of 1952; Pedro Alfonso was
was perhaps this move, more than any other in his political life, that has caused complete amazement and has tended to confirm the notion of mental unbalance. Why should he join the most "momio" party of all after having spent his previous political career calling it a party of corruption and self-interest? The answer is not at all clear.

His widow ways he thought he might be able to implement some of his ideas through the party since it had no commanding ideology of its own. He thought he might possibly give the party some ideological direction, but was unsuccessful she admits. A former follower who became a politician himself in the 1950s says that as of the end of the war he (González) thought that the right would likely be returned to power and wanted to be in a position to influence public policy when this should happen. It is true that he had become disgusted with the parvenue behavior of some of the leaders of the left as a consequence of his earlier close relations with the Popular Front government. However, such explanations beg the question as to why he could not have followed the Ibañistas after the war and thus would have been on the winning side in 1952. That he did not is indicative of some further explanation.

Another former follower and later prominent Ibañista, perhaps

the Radical and Salvador Allende the Socialist candidate; Carlos Ibáñez, of course, won the election (see note 79 below).

78) Personal interview with Sra. Laura de González; that he did have some such motive is not entirely outside the realm of possibility because the Liberal Party was definitely the most 'wide open' ideologically; also his antecedents had been Liberal.

74) See Recabarren V., Mensaje vigente, pp. 105-107; Recabarren sees González' motives as being nonetheless perfectly consistent and laudable in that he "was determined in his resolution to make from the government a profound rectification ..." (p. 105).

76) Personal interview with Sra. Laura de González.

78) Recabarren explains it as follows: "... the leader of National-Socialism had abandoned the just and promising non-conformist position within the left - adopted under the deciding influence of ex-minister Pedro Foncea Aedo and seconded by the youthful group which after the massacre ascended to the directing circles - upon verifying the fact that the Popular Front did not face up to the real and integral transformation which [Jorge González], before all the other politicians of his epoch, contemplated and advocated. He remained thus unable to join later with Ibáñez in the National and Popular Movement of 4 September 1952. He stood apart, like Moses, although he knew how to search out the promised land" (Mensaje vigente, p. 195).
comes closer to the underlying motive in feeling that he (González) may have wanted somehow to justify himself before his critics – especially those of the cultured classes; to atone, as it were, for his youthful excursion into political extravagance. To the present writer, this seems the most understandable and satisfying explanation for an admittedly unexpected political conversion. As a man of culture and intelligence, Jorge González no doubt realized by 1945 that the liberal-democratic state in some form or other, be it only a false front, was the form of political organization which all peoples in the West (and indeed in the East) aspired to. The seemingly reactionary doctrine of integral nationalism embodied in a frankly elitist and hierarchically structured state was not the wave of the future as many had hoped (and feared) in the 1930s. His denial of liberal-democracy was probably his most serious error in political philosophy, and must account, in a period of last lingering authoritarian government by the old-fashioned right (1932–38), for his lack of truly wide appeal – able and energetic though he was. The Radical and Socialist Parties were rather “the wave of the future”, not the Nacistas.

After the defeat of Matte Larraín by Ibáñez in the presidential election of 1952, Jorge González withdrew completely from politics. His companionship with the Popular Front after 1938 and then with the Liberals after 1945 left him unpalatable to his erstwhile political allies, the ¡bañistas, and consequently he was not called upon to participate in their government (1952–58). And then in 1958 he underwent his first operation for a brain tumor which four years later, after a second operation, finally caused his death at the age of 62 (14 March 1962).

The matter of the brain tumor has led some to the conclusion that

77) Personal interview with Guillermo Izquierdo Araya.
78) For a similar conclusion see Recabarren V., Mensaje Vigente, pp. 107–108. That he never became a reactionary anti-reformist Liberal may be appreciated by the fact that in the presidential election of 1958 he wanted the Liberal Party to support Eduardo Frei, then the popular and capable rising Christian Democrat; see El Mercurio, 20 August 1957, p. 17.
79) Ibáñez had 446,439 votes to Matte Larraín’s 265,357; see Gil, The Political System of Chile, p. 227.
80) Personal Interview with Sra. Laura de González; see also El Mercurio, 15 March 1962, p. 23.
those of his earlier political actions which seemed to exhibit mental unbalance were in fact due to the tumor. Medical opinion, however, suggests that if it were a malignant tumor it could only have been in his brain for a short period of time before it was operated upon in 1958 or it would have killed him quickly. If, on the other hand, it was a benign tumor, it could have been present indeed for a number of years. Yet his most egregious political act (5 September 1938) occurred a full twenty years earlier, and it can be explained rationally by other reasons — improper though they may seem. A man who advocated the virtues of the “leadership principle” and “political violence for self-defense” when confronted with a difficult situation, might be reasonably expected to act according to his principles, if only to maintain his self-respect not to mention the respect of his political followers. To this writer that seems a sufficient explanation for the 5th of September, as well as his resistance to arrest at 3:00 A.M. in May 1941, rather than sliding over into the murky realm of semi or quasi crazyness only possibly caused by a brain tumor discovered some two decades later. Jorge González was not insane; he was a political failure.