

# Identity Tensions: The Case of Michail Golovatov's Release

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## *Abstract*

The aim of this article is to investigate what perceptions towards European Union, Austria and Russia exist in terms of Lithuanian identity. This question arises from a chosen case of Michail Golovatov's release and intense discussions within Lithuanian media about this issue in summer of 2011. Although it seems that incident and later diplomatic conflict is directly related with Austria and judicial arguments, but Austria and its actions provoked broad considerations what Lithuania's relations with European Union, its member states and even Russia are. First, article analyses theoretical significance of identity and its relation with foreign policy. Second, methodological tools of discourse analysis are formulated in order to analyse selected texts which compose the discourse of the case. Third, according to the meanings found interpretations explaining how Lithuanian identity is constructed through perceptions towards EU, Austria and Russia are presented.

## *Keywords*

Identity, foreign and security policy, discourse analysis, Lithuania, Austria, European Union, Russia

## Introduction

Austria's decision to release Michail Golovatov after detention in Vienna became one of the main topics of political discussions in Lithuania in the middle of July 2011. He was the head of the 'Alfa' group that stormed the TV tower and other national buildings on 13 January 1991. According to the European arrest warrant, which was passed on 18 October 2010, this person is wanted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, Michail Golovatov was released less than one

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day after the detention (according to the European arrest warrant, the detention should last at least 48 hours). This rapid decision also diverted attention to Russia, which possibly put under pressure on Austria's institutions in order to achieve fast release of the detainee.

Although it seems that situation should be analysed in judicial terms<sup>1</sup>, this incident has provoked debates and discussions in Lithuania not as much as related with legitimacy of Austria's behaviour, but more with European Union (EU) values, solidarity, Lithuania's self-positioning within EU and even sensitive historical memory of Soviet Union behaviour that Russia has been identified until now. These considerations can be summarised in terms of Lithuanian identity (relation between Self and Other), which, talking about EU and Russia, is usually reduced to the two main clichés: Russia is understood as the main dangerous and threatening Other; whereas EU is very relevant and important because of the idea of 'returning to the West'<sup>2</sup>.

What versions of EU's and Russia's representations in Lithuanian identity can be found? Paying attention to analyses about Lithuanian identity and its relation with EU, the previously mentioned idea of 'returning to the West' dominates. Summarising Laurynas Jonavičius, Gražina Miniotaitė and Inga Pavlovaitė researches, essential ideas about the 'returning to the family of Western countries'<sup>3</sup>, willingness to identify themselves with Europe through common history, values and heritage<sup>4</sup> or returning to the lost El Dorado restoring Western Lithuanian identity<sup>5</sup> can be found. In addition to this, the content of Europeanness in Lithuanian identity is defined through cultural dimension, which dominates and

<sup>1</sup> For example, why Austria did not according to European arrest warrant passed on 18 October 2010; whether Austria's actions were legal according to special limitation for crimes of European arrest warrant made until 7 August 2002; If Austria's limitation was legal in this case, how following documents had to be applied: 1957 European Convention on Extradition, 1995 European Union Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure, 1996 Convention relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union.

<sup>2</sup> Kęstutis Paulauskas claims that United States is presented as the biggest and the best friend in Lithuanian discourse and practice, whereas EU is mostly associated with the idea of 'returning to the West' as a way to belong to European community. Kęstutis Paulauskas, *Kieno saugumas? Kuri tapatybė? Kritinės saugumo studijos ir Lietuvos užsienio politika* (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2010), 161–162).

<sup>3</sup> Laurynas Jonavičius, 'Geopolitical projections of new Lithuanian foreign policy', *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 17 (2006), 18.

<sup>4</sup> Inga Pavlovaitė, 'Being European by joining Europe: accession and identity politics in Lithuania', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16(2) (2003), 239.

<sup>5</sup> Gražina Miniotaitė, 'Lithuania's Evolving Security and Defence Policy: Problems and Prospects', *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2006* (2007), 190.

helps to justify distance from Russia<sup>6</sup>; as it is stated 'in European politics Lithuania has to internalise EU as a part of its corporate identity, because Lithuania is a part of European collective identity'<sup>7</sup>.

When Lithuania is considered as having 'returned', new searches begin. They can be concluded with the image of 'Lithuania – regional centre', which gives the opportunity to observe the complexity of relations between Lithuania and EU. For example, on the one hand, the idea about regional centre is a sign that identity of 'returning to the West' is being changed to the identity of Lithuania as an integral Western part<sup>8</sup>. However, in the context of new narrative, internal tension between Lithuania as a national state and Lithuania as a member state of EU<sup>9</sup> emerges. Jonavičius links the new conception not only with a membership within EU, but also with mutual relations with Russia (to create democratic barrier and to protect itself from Russia's influence<sup>10</sup>). Thus, the construction of new conception allows to view more various perspectives of identity (domination in the region, relations with Russia, relations with EU). Nevertheless, the question about regional centre is the conclusion of existence in new geopolitical situation and efforts to search for new national foreign policy, which also reveals relations with 'old' EU.

Russia is still understood as the main Other in the context of Lithuanian identity. Even Russia's analysis among the Baltic States shows that these countries do not intend to refuse negative understanding of Russia<sup>11</sup> – it remains as one of the most securitised objects of foreign policy<sup>12</sup>. Thus, Russia is usually understood as a threat in the context of Lithuanian identity ('the image is related with Lithuania's understanding that Russia will always remain as a threat'<sup>13</sup>). This is

<sup>6</sup> Gražina Miniotaitė, 'Convergent geography and divergent identities: a decade of transformation in the Baltic states', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16(2) (2003), 220.

<sup>7</sup> Nortautas Statkus, Kęstutis Paulauskas, 'Lietuvos užsienio politika tarptautinių santykių ir teorijų praktikos kryžkelėje' (Lithuanian foreign policy on the cross-road of theories and practice), *Politologija* 42 (2006), 29.

<sup>8</sup> Jonavičius, 'Geopolitical projections of new Lithuanian foreign policy', 35.

<sup>9</sup> Gražina Miniotaitė, 'Europos normatyvinė galia' ir Lietuvos užsienio politika' ('Normative power Europe' and Lithuania's foreign policy), *Politologija* 43 (2006), 3–19.

<sup>10</sup> Laurynas Jonavičius, 'Geopolitical projections of new Lithuanian foreign policy', 35.

<sup>11</sup> Dovilė Jakniūnaitė, 'Baltijos valstybės ir Rusija: liminali dvišalių santykių būseną' (Baltic States and Russia: Liminal Foreign Policy with Undefined Borders), *Politologija* 71 (2013), 41.

<sup>12</sup> Dovilė Jakniūnaitė, 'Studija apie Lietuvos ir Rusijos santykius, arba kodėl mes dar ilgai neturėsime 'normalių' santykių su Rusija' (Study about Lithuanian Russian relation, or why we will nor have the 'normal' relations with Russia), *Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas* 1 (2008), 136.

<sup>13</sup> Nortautas Statkus, Kęstutis Paulauskas, *Tarp geopolitikos ir postmoderno: kur link sukti Lietuvos užsienio politikai?* (*Between geopolitics and postmodernism: where Lithuania's foreign policy should go?*), (Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 2008), 65.

proved by the researches that investigate the relation of Lithuania and Russia from different perspectives. For example, while analysing historical issues (recognition of occupation, prohibition of soviet symbols), Diana Jurgelevičiūtė admits that ‘negative self definition dominates: identity is defined through opposite to Soviet time and modern Russia’<sup>14</sup>. This proposes a hypothesis that the relevance of 13 January events in this case will show similar tendency: the negative image of Russia is still constructed through history.

However, do previously mentioned tendencies of identity are still relevant in the context of Golovatov’s release? Has Lithuania, according to Merje Kuss, become a country of united Europe, which defends Western identity from Russia’s culture and otherness?<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, are there any important and still sensitive traumas related with historical memory, which provoke understanding, that Russia is a threat, and at the same time stimulate disappointment and mistrust of the West since Second World War?<sup>16</sup> How Austria and EU are treated – are they distinguished, contrasted or equated? Eventually, what composes Lithuania’s understanding of its place and role?

The main purpose of this research is to find out how understanding of Lithuanian identity reveals through identification of its relations with European Union, Austria and Russia. First, the relation between identity and foreign policy is explained in this text; second, the strategy of discourse analysis is presented; third, discussions about Golovatov are analysed and the results are presented.

The article is based on idea that willingness to understand and explain a state and its actions in international arena cannot involve only analysis of geographical location and given resources. More important factor is the identity which let explore how foreign policy is constructed through social, cultural and political practices<sup>17</sup>. Therefore, one of the main assumptions is that a state is the result of

<sup>14</sup> Diana Jurgelevičiūtė, ‘Diskusijos dėl sovietinio paveldo – reikalavimas atlyginti okupacijos žalą Lietuvos vidaus ir užsienio politikoje’ (Discussions about Soviet memory – requirement to compensate the damage for the occupation in domestic and foreign policy), in Raimundas Lopata, Justinas Dementavičius, Alfonsas Eidintas, Bernardas Gailius, Alvydas Jokubaitis, Diana Jurgelevičiūtė, Simona Merkinaitė, Vytautas Radžvilas, Inga Vinogradnaitė, *Istorija kaip politinio mąstymo veiksnys* (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2012), 422.

<sup>15</sup> Merje Kuus, *Geopolitics Reframed: Security and Identity in Europe’s Eastern Enlargement* (New York, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 60.

<sup>16</sup> Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European: A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London, New York: Routledge, 2010).

<sup>17</sup> Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics’, in *Rethinking Geopolitics*, ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh, Simon Dalby (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), 2.

sovereignty, security and discourse of identity<sup>18</sup>. Chosen case is interesting because it connects Lithuania's relations with recent partner (EU) through a conflicting situation. At the same time, Russia is involved and its role highlights different aspects of relations between Lithuania and EU. In this research there is no purpose to answer the question whether discovered perceptions could be treated as typical for general context of Lithuanian identity or they are unique only in the case of Golovatov's release. Thus, this research is based on the discourse analysis of the case, possible comparisons are left for further investigations.

## **Identity and foreign policy**

The research is based on an assumption that state's situation in international arena, its geopolitical location is not objectively given, but constructed through global writing<sup>19</sup>. It could be explained as a discursive tool which is used to form international politics through different types of places and people<sup>20</sup>. The attention paid to different typologies under which the world is divided, raises the question how we can talk about international politics using subjective writings. The idea about identity is used as a way to find an answer; it is also used as an instrument to construct foreign policy and state's actions in international politics.

First and foremost, identity is defined through the searches and the answers to the question 'who are we?' There are two possible strategies how to describe self-identification. First, to have an identity means to know who you are and with whom you identify yourself. This is the way to identify with somebody else you feel alike and share similar attitude to the world<sup>21</sup>. Other explanations and definitions usually stress the importance of difference – self-identification in relation with Other (identities of nations and states are constructed through relation with other nations and states)<sup>22</sup>. Therefore, seeking to describe a framework for this research, identity is treated as a following statement: I know who I am, when I understand who the

<sup>18</sup> Merje Kuus, 'Critical Geopolitics. Introduction', in *The International Studies Association Compendium Project*, ed. Robert A. Denmark, Renee Marlin-Bennett, 8.

<sup>19</sup> Ó Tuathaigh, 'Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics', 18.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>21</sup> Vessela Misheva, 'European Origins and Identities', in *Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Andrew M. Blasko (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008), 35.

<sup>22</sup> Michael Barnett, 'Culture Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo', *European Journal of International Relations* 5(1) (1999), 9.

other is (although various scholars differently describe whether Other has to be threatening and radical in order to construct identity<sup>23</sup>, in this research necessity of radical Other is not taken as essential assumption). Identity as a difference between Self and Other is realised through creating borders understood as foreign policy – practices of demarcation which describe daily life of state<sup>24</sup>. These borders should be understood not as physical ones. Reversely, postmodern theoretical backgrounds ask how they are created through symbols, marks, identifications and narratives<sup>25</sup>.

Theoretical relation between identity and foreign policy could be perfectly illustrated by the idea that ‘national identity is one of the most important factors determining foreign policy; on the other hand, foreign policy constructs national identity as well (especially using relevant real or imagined threats)’<sup>26</sup>. State’s identity does not form before foreign policy – it reveals through practices of foreign policy<sup>27</sup>. As Lene Hansen claims, this is based not on causal relation but on constitutive one<sup>28</sup>. This relation between foreign policy and identity is based on the assumption that identity is not stable, but varies and transforms depending on practices of foreign policy – foreign policy is related with reproduction of identity<sup>29</sup>.

How this relation emerges and what is the first impulse – the question who am I and who is the Other or practical action determining this question? Paulauskas claims that post-structuralists do not try to solve the problem of actor – who is secret writer who wants to construct identity of state<sup>30</sup>, or which motives raise his reaction and initiative to write. Nevertheless, the answer about first impulse is not very important, because post-structuralistic researches are based on idea

<sup>23</sup> According to David Campbell, in order to exist, a state always has to formulate its identity and it is possible only through difference and danger. Danger is understood as a constant condition being in the world. Therefore, it is possible to discuss about the existence of a state and identity but not only temporary mobilisation during critical moments (David Campbell, *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, 12, 92). However, various ways to formulate difference between Self and Other is also possible (i.e., construction of different through geography, politics, civilisation, nations etc.). Other not necessarily is radical and threatening threat (Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), 6

<sup>24</sup> Ó Tuathaigh, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics’, 4.

<sup>25</sup> Henk Van Houtum, ‘The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries’, *Geopolitics* 10 (2005), 675.

<sup>26</sup> Česlovas Laurinavičius, Raimundas Lopata, Vladas Sirutavičius, ‘Kritinis požiūris į Lietuvos užsienio politiką: kas pasikeitė nuo Augustino Voldemaro laikų?’ (Critical Approach to Lithuanian Foreign Policy: What Has Changed since Augustinas Voldemaras’ Times?), *Politologija* 54 (2009), 93.

<sup>27</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice*, xiv.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.2.

<sup>29</sup> Campbell, *Writing Security*, 76.

<sup>30</sup> Paulauskas, *Kieno saugumas? Kuri tapatybė?*, 19.

of intertextuality – texts and arguments refer to other texts<sup>31</sup>. Regarding this, overlapping meanings are being created and there is no point to find which one was the first. Interfaces between texts, overlap and adaptation of meanings and formation of understanding allows to talk about representation of common identity and foreign policy through contexts of politics, academy, media and even popular culture<sup>32</sup>.

This article is based on discourse analysis. It is usually explained choosing from three perspectives: analysis of ideology, studies of social change and social constructivism<sup>33</sup>. The third way was chosen. According to its assumptions, discourse analysis seeks to identify socially constructed reality, it benefits to search for an answer how the world is understood and what kind of meanings are constructed through texts<sup>34</sup>.

Hansen suggests following research design: one or 'a few Selves' are being analysed (which and how many states, nations or other subjects of international politics will be analysed. For example, David Campbell analyses security policy of United States; choosing to analyse a few subjects, in comparison, how European integration is being considered in national discourses could also be a way of research), is specific period or concrete event taken (one event, a few events from time perspective or daily practices), selection of texts<sup>35</sup>. According to these criteria, guidelines for the research are following: one Self – Lithuania; concrete event from specific time perspective – Golovatov's detention in Austria.

Texts have been selected not according to their size, authors or form (article, comment, interview, etc.)<sup>36</sup>. The research is grounded on different texts and different authors<sup>37</sup>. The chosen period of time is from 15 July 2011 until 15 August 2011. This means that texts were taken from the very beginning, when the first

<sup>31</sup> Hansen, *Security As Practice*, 8.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>33</sup> Inga Vinogradnaitė, *Diskurso analizė kaip politikos tyrimo metodas: metodinė priemonė politikos mokslų studentams* (Discourse Analysis as a Method of Political Science: Methodological Help for Students of Political Sciences), (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2006), 33.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>35</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 66–67.

<sup>36</sup> Interviews with the main heads of the state or press releases with their comments; interviews taken from people participated in 13 January, opinions of concrete politicians (usually members of Seimas); articles of commentators, analysts, academicians or public figures; responsive comments – all are taken as the main material for this research. Various texts which, for example, discuss about changes in consuming Austrian goods after Golovatov's release are considered as more or less illustrative context.

<sup>37</sup> Jennifer Milliken, *The Study of Discourse in International Relations: Reflections on Research and Methodology* (Hungary: Central European University, 1998), 10–12.

publications in media about Golovatoŭ's release have appeared. One month is chosen because the issue dominates the public discussions in this period. Texts from newspapers (*Lietuvos rytas* and *Respublika*) and the Internet news portal ('Delfi.lt') were used. The main criterion of choosing previously mentioned media sources was their accessibility and popularity<sup>38</sup>.

Although Jennifer Milliken claims, that international relations researches are usually concentrated on political elite seeking to understand how discourse standardises and disciplines, it is far more valuable to analyse not only the discourse of elite, but books, media or academic papers<sup>39</sup>. This shows how widely such discourse is spread and how it is used in daily life. In addition to this, it forms understanding about social life in a wider way than only the analysis of decision makers<sup>40</sup>.

Regarding the limits of size and a huge amount of sources (overall 158 texts are available: in newspapers *Lietuvos rytas* and *Respublika*, there are 14 articles directly related with Golovatoŭ's detention and release, in news portal 'Delfi.lt' even 130 texts were found). In order to control the variety of given information, three directly with the research and the main purpose related categories have been formed: attitude towards Austria; attitude towards EU; attitude towards Russia<sup>41</sup>. According to them, parts of texts directly referring to one of the three categories were taken and classified (for example, quotes about Russia, its impact to Lithuania, EU, historical debates, etc.).

Realisation of discourse analysis is based on induction. It means that any anticipatory hypothesis is not formulated, unique results are received through observation. Discourse analysis has been implemented analysing all chosen texts

<sup>38</sup> According to the results taken from media audience research and provided by TNS Gallup, average audience of daily paper *Lietuvos rytas* has been 15.2% or 394,000 readers (mostly in Lithuania) from 30 May 2011 to 28 August 2011 (this concrete period is analyzed because it covers chosen period of this research). In case of daily paper *Respublika*, its audience accordingly has been 4.5% or 116,000 readers. Internet portal 'Delfi.lt' is chosen because according to TNS Gallup Internet audience research, it has been the leader according to the number of unique visitors – in 2011 there were 2.5 million readers (data about concrete months is not provided). *Žiniasklaidos tyrimų apžvalga 2011*, TNS (2012), 20, 34, [http://www.tns.lt/data/files/Metines\\_apzvalgos/Ziniasklaidos%20tyrimu%20apzvalga%202011.pdf](http://www.tns.lt/data/files/Metines_apzvalgos/Ziniasklaidos%20tyrimu%20apzvalga%202011.pdf).

<sup>39</sup> Discourse analysis is often related with discussions about official domination, prevailing ideology or relations with opposition. However, the purpose of this research is not related with deconstruction of political elite or ideology, but seeks to analyse existing perception in public sphere.

<sup>40</sup> Milliken, *The Study of Discourse in International Relations*, 10.

<sup>41</sup> Unlimited categorisation of texts is allowed. Categories can be formulated for every different project according to the research. (Rawi Abdelal, Rose McDermott, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Identity as a Variable', *Perspectives on Politics* 4(4), 2006), 17.



and their parts directly related to the main goal. Interpretations of discovered meanings are distinguished according to dominating tendencies. To summarise, there is no single and correct way of reading the texts: they can be chosen for other researches with different questions (therefore, interpretations also can be different)<sup>42</sup>. Thus, in the context of the case, induction and provided results are very controlled, any risk of uncertainty of final conclusions does not exist.

## **Austria and European Union in Lithuanian identity**

The texts revealed different attitudes towards EU as a common club proving the fact of being a part of the West, and Austria as a Western country and one of the members of that club. Seeking to present the results, it is impossible to avoid the problem of using concepts 'Europe' and 'European Union'. In some cases, these terms function as synonyms, in other contexts concepts are clearly separated or even contrasted. Therefore, the use of them is depended on concrete situation without aiming to define their relation beforehand.

### **Austria – disloyal benefit seeker or mistaken ally?**

The attitude towards Austria is apparently negative. Is Austria perceived as a hostile Other in the discourse? How understanding about EU is being transformed because of Austria's actions in the case? It is important to stress that in many cases considerations about Austria's behaviour are related to broader considerations about EU and Russia. Although Austria seems to be the main culprit of diplomatic conflict, in the broader context Austria is more like an impulse to debate about EU, Lithuania's relations with EU members, Russia's role and its impact to European countries. First, Austria is analysed because of concrete actions and arguments ('arguments in warrant are not sufficient for decision to arrest'<sup>43</sup>), whether procedures have been performed or have been performed correctly. Moreover, information about statements made by Austria's officials or messages about situation

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<sup>42</sup> Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 41.

<sup>43</sup> 'Austrija teigia gavusi neaiškų Europos arešto orderį dėl M. Golovatovo' (Austria claimed receiving unclear European arrest Warrant regarding M. Golovatov), *Delfi.lt (BNS)*, 16 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/austrija-teigia-gavusi-neaisku-europos-aresto-orderi-del-mgolovatovo.d?id=47664497>.

and Lithuania's reaction in the media are widely presented<sup>44</sup> ('Lithuania is furious due to release of former KGB agent', *Der Standard* announces. 'Rage because of Austria', *Salzburger Nachrichten* makes a title<sup>45</sup>).

When procedural and legal arguments are changed to evaluation, Austria becomes important in the common context of being in EU: how members belonging to the same club and following the same principles can ignore them? Emanuelis Zingeris, the former Chair of the Seimas Committee on European Affairs, incidentally, suggesting ceasing diplomatic relations with Austria, claimed that 'we believe that this gob to Europe's face will be evaluated by our EU and NATO partners'<sup>46</sup>. The phrase 'gob to Europe's face' already tells about Austria's separation from Europe and condemnation due to the trampling of common values. Constructed division can be illustrated by the idea 'that has been an insult [...] to the whole nation which during the terrible night of January 13 fought not only for its own liberation, but for the values of Western civilization'<sup>47</sup>. Coming back to the question about the definition of identity (who we are?), we can identify that Lithuania treats itself as European, and Western country, which follows common principles and values. Therefore, according to the division between Self and Other, Austria is considered negatively because it does not correspond to Lithuania's attitude and understanding what Western country should be and how should behave.

Therefore, the following question is how Austria's otherness is stressed. First, descriptions about this country are taken from its history: for example, 'Hitler's

<sup>44</sup> For example, 'He (Audronius Ažubalis – J. L.) has told that it is old Lithuania's wound. I understand that and it is important to behave very sensitively. But even it is related with old wounds, it does not change any facts that there are principles of judicial procedures which have to be followed', Foreign Minister of Austria Michaelis Spindelegger talked with journalists in Brussels. ('M. Spindelegger: Austrija supranta klausimo jautrumą Lietuvai, bet elgėsi pagal teisines procedūras' (M. Spindelegger: Austria understands sensitivity of the issue for Lithuania, but it has acted according to judicial procedures), *Delfi.lt (BNS)*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/mspindeleggeris-austrija-supranta-klausimo-jautruma-lietuvai-bet-elgesi-pagal-teisines-proceduras.d?id=47725353>).

<sup>45</sup> 'Austrijos spauda marga pranešimais apie Lietuvos reakciją į M. Golovatovo paleidimą' (Austria's media is flickering with announcements about Lithuania's reaction to M. Golovatov's release), *Delfi.lt (BNS)*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/austrijos-spauda-marga-pranesimais-apie-lietuvos-reakcija-i-mgolovatovo-paleidima.d?id=47711041>.

<sup>46</sup> Šarūnas Černiauskas, 'Socialdemokratai ir 'tvarkiečiai' sušvelnino URK poziciją dėl Austrijos' (Socialdemocrats and members from Order and Justice party soften the position of the Committee of Foreign Affairs regarding Austria), *Delfi.lt*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/socialdemokratai-ir-tvarkieciai-susvelnino-urk-pozicija-del-austrijos.d?id=47706731>.

<sup>47</sup> Vladimiras Laučius, 'Ar buvo įžeista Austrija' (Was Austria insulted), *Delfi.lt*, 25 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/vlaucius-ar-buvo-izeista-austrija.d?id=47939437>.

homeland Austria [...] belongs to the favoured club but Lithuania does not?<sup>48</sup>, 'it is widely known that soviet agents found possibilities to act and weaved their plots in Austria after the Second World War'<sup>49</sup>, [...] from such similar small incidents the way to Anschluss and the Second World War has started'<sup>50</sup>. Austria is seen as a shelter for shady persons having ties with Russia: 'in Europe Austria is considered as a state in which routes of people with questionable past intersect'<sup>51</sup>, 'this is its exclusivity'<sup>52</sup>. This proves border demarcation developing in the discourse: it is clear that through historical allusions and links with Hitler or Soviet agents, there are efforts to prove that Austria's behaviour and exclusivity in negative sense is not an instantaneous case, but permanent in its essence. Therefore, as it is explained, Golovatov was not released accidentally and it was not a mistake. At the same time, Lithuania is different compared to Austria, because Lithuania identifies itself with totally different matters. In this way, demarcation and refusal of Austria is created and grounded.

Austria's behaviour is linked to its friendly relations with Russia. When announcements about Golovatov's release were published, Vytautas Landsbergis considered 'what kind of European Union member Austria is, if it openly violates European law pandering to the third state'<sup>53</sup>. Maybe this is why Austria is 'excluded' from EU because of its duplicity, which is articulated not only due to the ignorance of Lithuania's historical traumas, but also due to calculations in the energy sector:

<sup>48</sup> Vladimiras Laučius, 'Austrijos sprendimas dėl kagėbisto M. Golovatovo – gėda visai ES' (Austria's decision due to KGB agent M. Golovatov – shame for the whole EU), *Delfi.lt*, 17 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/vlaucius-austrijos-sprendimas-del-kagebisto-m-golovatovo-geda-visai-es.d?id=47675527>.

<sup>49</sup> Vilija Aleknaite-Abramikiene, 'Sovietų agentai Vienoje paliko galingus čiuptuvus' (Soviet agents left powerful tentacles in Vienna), *Delfi.lt*, 19 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/politics/v-aleknaite-abramikiene-sovietu-agentai-vienoje-paliko-galingus-ciuptuvus.d?id=47747669>.

<sup>50</sup> Šarūnas Černiauskas, 'L. Asanavičiūtės motina žinią apie M. Golovatovo paleidimą sutiko su ašaromis' (Loreta Asanavičiūtė's mother reacted to M. Golovatov's release with tears), *Delfi.lt*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/lasanaviciutes-motina-zinia-apie-mgolovatovo-paleidima-sutiko-su-asaromis.d?id=47711393>.

<sup>51</sup> 'Estijos analitikas: Lietuvos ir Austrijos krizė labai rimta' (Estonian analyst: the crisis between Lithuania and Austria is very serious), *Delfi.lt*, 19 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/estijos-analitikas-lietuvos-ir-austrijos-krize-labai-rimta.d?id=47745409>.

<sup>52</sup> Danas Nagelė, 'Austrija parodė Europos interesus' (Austria showed Europe's interests), *Respublika*, 19 July 2011, 3.

<sup>53</sup> 'V. Landsbergis: kokia čia ES narė, kuri atvirai laužo Europos teisę pataikaudama trečiajai šaliai' (V. Landsbergis: what kind of EU member state which openly violates European law pandering to the third country it is), *Delfi.lt* (*ELTA, BNS*), 16 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/vlandsbergis-kokia-cia-es-nare-kuri-atvirai-lauzo-europos-teise-pataikaudama-treciajai-saliai.d?id=47664067>.

‘Austria’s decision was determined by the fear to anger strategic partner in energy sector from which depends Austria’s role as a distributional centre of Russian gas in EU’<sup>54</sup>. Thus, Austria’s actions embody two very important conflict spheres in Lithuania’s and Russia’s relations: refusal to recognise historical crimes and consumption of Russian resources (‘there are no doubts that a factor of natural gas performs no worse than KGB or army today’<sup>55</sup>). In this place, the border between Lithuania and Austria is demarcated not only because of different attitude towards values, but also because of unacceptable and, presumable, inappropriate behaviour for European state.

Russia (‘at least 15 years there are loud talks that Austria has become a paradise for Russian mafia’<sup>56</sup>) very clearly separates Austria from common European club and removes Austria from Western geopolitical image to the East side. This tendency can be also observed from the reaction of the society: Austria’s and Russia’s relations as discrediting and degrading respect to Austria have been illustrated by various Internet movements<sup>57</sup>, even bars (for example, ‘Piano Man Bar’) have suggested searching for Austrian goods in Moscow<sup>58</sup>. Thus, Austria in the context of this case is treated as betrayer (‘we are shocked after Austria’s decision, it is a betrayal’<sup>59</sup>).

The emerging antagonism to Austria interestingly grounds previously mentioned aspect about the dynamics of identity. Likely, before Golovatov’s release Austria has been one of the EU member states with which Lithuania has been

<sup>54</sup> ‘Sausio 13-osios bylos įtariamąjį austrai paleido’ (Austrians released a suspect of 13 January case), *Respublika*, 18 July 2011, 2.

<sup>55</sup> Aleknaitė-Abramkienė, ‘Sovietų agentai Vienoje paliko galingus čiuptuvus’.

<sup>56</sup> Petras Ragauskas, ‘Lietuva – Austrija. Papildomas aspektas’ (Lithuania – Austria. Additional aspect), *Delfi.lt*, 20 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/pragauskas-lietuva-austrija-papildomas-aspektas.d?id=47787087>.

<sup>57</sup> ‘Regarding to Austria’s decision to release former KGB agent Michail Golovatov which is suspect in 13 January case, resentful citizens invite to set candles near the Embassy of Austria in Vilnius. Invitations are distributed through social network ‘Facebook’. (‘Prie Austrijos ambasados kviečiama uždegti žvakutę’ (Invitations to set candles near the Embassy of Austria), *Delfi.lt (BNS)*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/prie-austrijos-ambasados-kvieciama-uzdegti-zvakute.d?id=47730525>); ‘Protesting against Austria’s actions, ‘Facebook’ users from Lithuania are changing their profile pictures to Austria’s flag with hammer and sickle’ (Šarūnas Černiauskas, ‘Lietuva gali siekti M. Golovatovo turto arešto’ (Lithuania may seek to arrest M. Golovatov’s property), *Delfi.lt*, 18 July 2011 (<http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/lietuva-gali-siekti-mgolovatovo-turto-aresto.d?id=47721767>).

<sup>58</sup> Aleksandra Gudilkina, ‘Vilniaus baras siūlo austriškų prekių ieškoti Maskvoje’ (Bar in Vilnius suggests to search for Austran goods in Moscow), *Delfi.lt*, 20 July 2011, (<http://pilietis.delfi.lt/naujienos/vilniaus-baras-siulo-austrisku-prekiu-ieskoti-maskvoje.d?id=47785159>).

<sup>59</sup> ‘Dėl Austrijos sprendimo – nota ir protesto akcija’ (Regarding to Austria’s decision – note and protest), *Delfi.lt (BNS)*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/del-austrijos-sprendimo-nota-ir-protesto-akcija.d?id=47698021>.

maintaining customary diplomatic, political and economic relations (this can be seen from literature review: any extraordinary role has not been given for Austria in previous researches about Lithuanian identity). However, interpretation of Austria's behaviour, to which Lithuania has reacted with diplomatic note and withdrawing its ambassador from Austria<sup>60</sup>, has definitely determined the formation of anomalous negative attitude towards Austria and complement to Lithuanian identity as well. This proves constituency of relation between foreign policy and identity: certain and unexpected practice reproduces and complements attitude and representations existed before then.

Thus, negative attitude towards Austria is revealed in the discourse. A few important dimensions related with Austria's representation could be discussed. One is condemnation due to non-compliance of European and even civilisation principles. To maintain friendly relation with Russia means to prioritise pragmatic politics than values. Austria becomes the Other to Lithuania. It is defined declaratively stressing historical facts that discredit Austria. The importance of other relations with EU and Russia, and their significance can also be observed through the relation with Austria. Austria is treated as the main 'culprit' in the context of those relations.

### **European Union – foundation of values or fiction?**

The analysis of EU representations is complicated because of several reasons. First, the relation between EU and Europe is differently defined in various sources: they are treated either as synonyms (EU is the same as Europe) or separate units. Second, another problem is Austria's and EU separation – in some sources Austria is associated with EU as a concrete case which embodies the attitude and politics of the whole EU. On the other hand, Austria's behaviour is contrasted to EU ideological background. Therefore, doing the analysis, (1) positions of politicians and other high Lithuanian representatives, and (2) opinions of commentators and analysts are distinguished paying attention to different attitudes towards EU in the context of diplomatic conflict with Austria.

Although politicians directly talk about EU or the whole Europe quite rarely, they evaluate EU positively. Principle of solidarity is emphasised. It is explained

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<sup>60</sup> Šarūnas Černiauskas, 'Lietuva konsultacijoms atšaukia ambasadorių Austrijoje, Austrijai įteikta nota' (Lithuania withdraws its Ambassador in Austria for consultations, diplomatic note is handed to Austria), *Delfi.lt (BNS)*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/lietuva-konsultacijoms-atšaukia-ambasadoriu-austrijoje-austrijai-iteikta-nota.d?id=47702035>.

as unique EU value, which was violated by Austria: ‘we expect solidarity from Austria. First and foremost, solidarity and recognition of the same EU values’<sup>61</sup>. The attitude of political elite shows positive evaluation of EU and contraposition to Austria’s behaviour at the same time. This could be explained that Europeans are represented as those who follow quite abstractly understood values and principles of Western civilisation. At this point, the identification with whom you identify yourself is very important: values acceptable to Lithuania are associated with European Union; therefore, Lithuania identifies itself with Association, whereas Austria is demarcated because of different attitude towards values. However, paying attention to the texts written by commentators, experts, etc., which are not directly related with political opinion, the situation is totally different – EU is considered negatively on terms of values and principles. This is based on a few arguments.

First, the crisis of EU values is stressed. Discrepancy between ideal imagination (Europe as civilisation) and reality (European Union and its political practices) is observed. This gap can be summarised by the claim that ‘Europe has never been such as Lithuania has been imagining’<sup>62</sup>. Seeking to explain what kind of Lithuanian identity can be observed through the relation with EU, contradictions emerge. Conception of ‘returning to the West’ was associated with the idea about Europe – defender of democracy, human rights and freedoms, hearth of Christian civilisation and peaceful shelter for small countries (this can be understood as a content of European and Western values mentioned analysing attitude towards Austria). Thus, Europe as a cultural and geographical space has been considered as ‘natural’ home for Lithuania<sup>63</sup>. However, it seems that EU daily political routine does not correspond to the vision about the European idea. Therefore, Union is blamed due to the crisis of values and ideas, domination of pragmatic politics in certain member states: ‘how we will combine vision of our civilised democratic Europe with the real politics of European countries which is based not only on democracy and human rights but also on Russian gas?’<sup>64</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Andrius Švarplys, ‘Lietuva ir Europa viena kitos nesupranta’ (Lithuania and Europe do not understand each other), *Delfi.lt*, 2 August 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/asvarplys-lietuva-ir-europa-viena-kitos-nesupranta.d?id=48194107>.

<sup>63</sup> Inga Vinogradnaitė, “‘Kelias Europon’”: europietiškojo identiteto konstravimas Lietuvos viešajame diskurse 1990–2000 metais’ (The way to Europe: the construction of European identity in Lithuanian public discourse 1990–2000), in *Europos idėja Lietuvoje: istorija ir dabartis*, ed. Darius Staliūnas (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos institutas, 2002), 188.

<sup>64</sup> Švarplys, ‘Lietuva ir Europa viena kitos nesupranta’.

The close relations with Russia due to the calculation in energy sector (through this aspect EU is specifically associated with Austria) is an essential factor proposing the domination of pragmatic politics. Even though quite bluntly, both positions can be summarised as following: EU does not have values, they are changed to pragmatic and economically beneficial relations with Russia ('it is clear that pragmatics absolutely dominates in the relations of EU member states, whereas common position, values and interests are only a camouflage of pragmatic interests and actions')<sup>65</sup>. Around this axis, all the talks about EU and critics around which it revolves. Conceivably, the most characteristic comment was made by Vladimiras Laučius. In the text published the next day after Golovatov's release, he said that 'Russian gas overcame EU morality again. [...] What is EU today? It is a part of the world which is more than anything concerned about glamorous clothes, expensive cars and with precision measured (size of cucumbers, etc.) food'<sup>66</sup>. Thus, consistent definition and image about Lithuanian identity is formed through negative difference. Crisis of values and good relations with Russia, as well as in Austria's case, leads to previously mentioned assumptions about Lithuania as a promoter of European values, which demarcates borders within Europe between those who do not follow principles and those who do (Lithuania). Therefore, as a reaction to EU crisis of values and attempts to solve differences in domestic position, Lithuanian identity as a saviour emerges.

The idea about Lithuania's mission in Europe is not unique and specific only in analysed discourse. During the inter-war period, Oskaras Milašius talked about North Athens: Lithuania as a spiritual nation can raise Europe and return it to its roots. Returning EU to its values and rescue from the crisis exactly becomes the mission of Lithuania. Maybe the most illustrative rhetoric about Lithuania as saviour of EU values can be found in what Audronis Ažubalis, the former minister of foreign affairs, back then stated: 'Defence of Lithuania's interests is a battle for EU and its values as well'<sup>67</sup>. Through concrete events, Lithuania uncovers EU crisis of values and seeks to revive solidarity: 'we need and we can find a way and show it to others how European Union can move away from the marsh in which it is

<sup>65</sup> Giedrius Česnakas, 'M. Golovatovo istorija ir nūsikusę 'draugai': ar Lietuva nepanašėja į Austriją?' (story of M. Golovatov and turned away 'friends': Does Lithuania become similar to Austria?), *Delfi.lt*, 24 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/gcesnakas-m-golovatovo-istorija-ir-nusikusedraugai-ar-lietuva-nepanaseja-i-austrija.d?id=47913289>.

<sup>66</sup> Laučius, 'Austrijos sprendimas dėl kagėbisto M. Golovatovo – gėda visai ES'.

<sup>67</sup> 'URM: ministerijai adresuotame Austrijos laiške naujų teiginių nerasta' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Any new statements were not found in Austria's letter to the Ministry), *Delfi.lt*, 22 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/urm-ministerijai-adresuotame-austrijos-laiske-nauju-teiginiu-nerasta.d?id=47850431>.

sitting<sup>68</sup>. Emphasis of intolerant Austria's behaviour and endeavours to consider it in EU level are understood as the main purposes helping to implement mentioned mission due to EU existence: 'Lithuania will face much more complicated task – to avoid that Austria's action would not be punished at EU level [...]. Non-punishable breaking of EU norms can destroy EU. One or another end of the conflict with Austria will have essential impact to the whole EU'<sup>69</sup>.

Although Kuus claims that new EU countries see their mission to develop and secure Western values from Eastern civilisation<sup>70</sup>, in the context of analysed case it is not so much important to stop possible expansion of Russian civilisation to the West, but to revive European attention towards values. Normative task of Lithuania is orientated to EU seeking to prove that pragmatic interests should be refused. Paying attention to Lithuania's size and geographical location, it is questioned whether this idea could be understood as a deliberate strategy to treat values as a calculated element of power<sup>71</sup> and geopolitical objective to concentrate attention in Central and Eastern Europe. The only assumption can be made that the formulation of Lithuania's mission highlights its willingness to reduce limits of Lithuania's Europeanness: 'Golovotov's crisis has unexpectedly become a good chance for Lithuania to demonstrate that we are not a small EU newcomer having complexes and always pulling sleeves of EU old-timers'<sup>72</sup>. In other words, the most important task is to strengthen Lithuania's role in EU through morality and values.

Another important aspect of critique is discussions about historical memory. History maintains important in forming attitude towards foreign policy in Central and Eastern countries<sup>73</sup>. In this case, Golovotov's personality covers not only concrete incriminatory crimes but the whole historic harm from Soviet Union. Therefore, the release has encouraged discussing that EU does not understand principled Lithuania's struggle: 'Western Europe has not experienced terror of Soviet Communism and, therefore, it does not understand experience of Eastern

<sup>68</sup> Šarūnas Navickis, 'Lietuva turi išvesti ES iš liūno' (Lithuania has to show Europe out of marsh), *Delfi.lt*, 19 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/politics/snavigkis-lietuva-turi-isvesti-es-iliuno.d?id=47745053>.

<sup>69</sup> 'Laiko ženklai', *Lrytas.lt*, 21 July 2013, [http://m.lrytas.lt/?data=20110719&id=nuo19\\_a8110719&p=2&sk\\_id=&view=2](http://m.lrytas.lt/?data=20110719&id=nuo19_a8110719&p=2&sk_id=&view=2).

<sup>70</sup> Kuus, *Geopolitics Reframed*, 60.

<sup>71</sup> Česnakas, 'M. Golovotovo istorija ir nusisukę "draugai": ar Lietuva nepanašėja į Austriją?'

<sup>72</sup> Monika Garbačiauskaitė-Budrienė, 'Lietuva – Austrija: réksmingo patriotizmo pliusai' (Lithuania – Austria: advantages of loud patriotism), *Delfi.lt*, 29 July 2011. <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/mgarbaciauskaite-budriene-lietuva-austrija-reksmingo-patriotizmo-pliusai.d?id=48079455>.

<sup>73</sup> Maria Mälksoo, 'Europe's new vanguard or the old "security modernists" in a fancy dress? The Baltic states against the images of Eastern Europe in the EU', in *Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook* 31–59, ed. Andres Kasekamp (Tallinn: Eesti Välispoliitika Instituut, 2008), 4.



Europe. The conflict exists because two different moralities of historical justice exist<sup>74</sup>. Together with constant endeavours to equate communist crimes to Nazi ones, Western responsibility due to concession to Moscow during Yalta and Potsdam conferences remains into question. This maintains expectations to attain moral grants from Western countries to the Baltic States<sup>75</sup>. Here, as Maria Mälksoo claims, the issue of Eastern Europe history and related senses of injustice and nuisance remain relevant because they ground the relations with other EU states<sup>76</sup>.

Therefore, disregard of historical war crimes and crimes against humanity showed by one member state becomes an impulse to observe common EU position. Linking the relation between identity, foreign policy and relevance of history, Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Golovatov's release sent books and movies about events on 13 January 1991 to other EU member states ('the reminder [...] in order to revive their memory'<sup>77</sup>). Nevertheless, EU delay to make Lithuania's raised questions as common EU problems (EU Commissioner Viviane Reding after Lithuania's appeal to react to existing situation, claimed that it is a matter of two countries Austria and Lithuania<sup>78</sup>) becomes one more reason to criticise and mistrust the EU. This tendency as if being proved by Mälksoo statement that in Poland and the Baltic states remembrance of betrayal after the Second World War encourages to think whether the past is truly the past<sup>79</sup>.

Then what, according to the representations existing in the discourse about EU, can be said about Lithuanian identity? Lithuania's attitude towards EU is based on sustained distance. EU remains in the position of Other, it is not a unanimous space Lithuania belongs to. How this situation is even possible?

Erik Noreen and Roxanna Sjöstedt, after their research about Estonian collective identity, talk about dynamics of identity and existence of a different Other where the relation between Self and Other has not necessarily to be antagonistic<sup>80</sup>.

<sup>74</sup> Švarplys, 'Lietuva ir Europa viena kitos nesupranta'.

<sup>75</sup> Tomasz Zarycki, 'Uses of Russia: The Role of Russia in the Modern Polish National Identity', *East European Politics and Societies* 18(4) (2004), 614.

<sup>76</sup> Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European*, 72.

<sup>77</sup> 'Lietuva siunčia ES šalims knygas ir filmus norėdama priminti, kas vyko per Sausio 13-ąją' (Lithuania is sending books and movies to other EU countries in order to remind what happened in 13 January), *Delfi.lt (BNS)*, 29 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/lietuva-siuncia-es-salims-knygas-ir-filmus-noredama-priminti-kas-vyko-per-sausio-13-aja.d?id=48093335>.

<sup>78</sup> 'V. Reding: viena – teisinis, kita – politinis klausimas' (V. Reding: one is judicial, but other – political question), *Delfi.lt (ELTA)*, 20 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/vreding-viena-teisinis-kas-kita-politinis-klausimas.d?id=47780199>.

<sup>79</sup> Maria Mälksoo, 85.

<sup>80</sup> Erik Noreen, Roxanna Sjöstedt, 'Estonian Identity Formations and Threat Framing in the Post-Cold War Era', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(6) (2004), 737.

This is the reason why Lithuania, being a part of EU, keeps the distance, which is not necessarily grounded by radical hostility. It seems that EU is seen as partial Self. In this way, inconsequential actions can be explained: on the one hand, EU is associated with principles of coexistence corresponding to the position of Lithuania; on the other hand, it is stated that ‘Europe is really ill’<sup>81</sup>. Lithuania becomes capable or seeking to cure.

Thus, this analysis highlights a few important things. First, political elite tends to follow the idea about EU values (possibly associating with European civilisation) and using them to make opposition to Austria. Second, it was found that the critical attitude towards EU prevails in the discourse analysed. It could be distinguished in a few relevant parts: (a) EU faces the crisis of values; (b) EU and separate member states have tied friendly relations with Russia because of pragmatic calculation (directly related with the crisis of identity); (c) Lithuania’s mission as a reaction to the crisis of values; (d) Lithuania’s mistrust of Western countries because of historical memory. Hence, Lithuania searches for community and the way for ‘returning to the West’ identifying through similarities with other European countries; previously mentioned aspects of critique enable to say that EU is still the Other and the distance between EU and Lithuania remains.

### **Russia – only historical context or permanent threat?**

Another significant question is how in the context of diplomatic conflict with Austria Russia, which is blamed because of the pressure made to Austria’s officials to release former KGB officer, is seen. Two important dimensions appear: historical disagreements updating antagonism to Russia and new damaging actions of Russia.

Golovatov’s release reminded Lithuania’s and Russia’s issues about historical explanations and interpretations. Some announcements from Russian media appeared in the discourse: interviews with Golovatov, veterans of brigade ‘Alfa’, their appeal to the former President of Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev where the tragedy of 13 January is called as a ‘secondment to Vilnius’<sup>82</sup>. Information from Russia was oriented to interpretations of 13 January events, which were totally different than Lithuania’s position. In Lithuanian texts, any references or

<sup>81</sup> ‘Lietuvos ryto’ savaitė’, *Lietuvos rytas*, July 22, 2011, 2.

<sup>82</sup> Alia Zinkuvienė, ‘Sausio 13-osios bylos kronika’ (chronicle of 13 January case), *Respublika*, 28 July 2011, 2.

endeavours to debate with this information were not found<sup>83</sup>. However, it was reacted by official level, practice of foreign policy – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania handed diplomatic note to Russia expressing concern due to unrealistic claims made by Ambassador of Russia to Austria<sup>84</sup>.

One of the main things revealed in the discourse about Golovatov is the predominant opinion that Russia's attitude towards history has not changed a lot since January 1991 ('we should admit to ourselves that Russia will not recognise neither occupation, nor 13 January, it will not extradite suspects in crimes and Medininkai case'<sup>85</sup>). For example, Zingeris claims that 'we believed that Russia would change in 20 years. Everything was acting'<sup>86</sup>. What can be seen from such a characterisation of Russia? First, identity is constructed describing Lithuania as a victim<sup>87</sup>. Its traumatic history (occupation, 13 January, refusal to extradite criminals) becomes relevant in the new context and this strengthens understanding that Russia is the threatening Other. Lithuania is being oppressed in the modern world<sup>88</sup> – in this case not recognising actions of 13 January and not conceding the ability to detain main actors. Association between present Russia and USSR can be observed in Egidijus Vareikis idea quoted in Vladimiras Laučius text: 'everything is going to pot by those who say that Russia today is not a former USSR'<sup>89</sup>. Problems related with historical grievances, especially their emergence in new situations, link previously existed negative attitude towards Russia with today: the perceptions

<sup>83</sup> In this context, the interview of Russian Ambassador to Austria Sergey Nechaev should be distinguished because it evoked broad discussions and even comments of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Audronius Ažubalis. The ambassador claimed that 'Austria's officers showed high level professionalism and objectivism considering this contrived warrant and did not allow involve Austria into dirty political intrigues created by unfair politicians from the third state who want to get dividends squaring accounts with their historical memory'. Interview was put in official website of Foreign Ministry of Russian Federation. During another interview, A. Ažubalis claimed that 'I think it shows that Russia, its diplomatic service and politicians will have to go a long way until Russia will be able to turn back, look at its history and accept it as it is, and after that to find enough power to admit that there were a lot of tragic events which, unfortunately, were initiated by Russia or Soviet Union' (Eglė Samoškaitė, 'Lietuva įteikė notą Rusijai' (Lithuania handed diplomatic note to Russia), *delfi.lt*, 21 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/lietuva-iteike-nota-rusijai.d?id=47813997>).

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Česnakas, 'M. Golovatovo istorija ir nususukę 'draugai': ar Lietuva nepanašėja į Austriją?'

<sup>86</sup> Černiauskas, 'Socialdemokratai ir 'tvarkiečiai' sušvelnino URK poziciją dėl Austrijos'.

<sup>87</sup> Jurgelevičiūtė, 'Diskusijos dėl sovietinio paveldo – reikalavimas atlyginti okupacijos žalą Lietuvos vidaus ir užsienio politikoje', 451.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Vladimiras Laučius, 'Demonstratyvus politikos neišmanymas. Nauja mada ar sena yda?' (Demonstrative ignorance of politics. New trend or old defect?), *Delfi.lt*, 4 August 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/vlacičius-demonstratyvus-politikos-neismanymas-nauja-mada-ar-sena-yda.d?id=48252097>.

of being a victim are still relevant in recent relations with Russia. So while the connection between severe past and its constant revival today exists, Russia is the main (threatening) Other in Lithuanian identity and such role remains permanent.

Texts show even more complicated attitude towards Russia's actions. Russia does not threaten by military power but tries to affect Lithuania by other means – this time breaking solidarity between EU member states: 'the work is done and maybe one more state award will adorn the chest of KGB veteran. There is a reason for this: two EU states are provoked'<sup>90</sup>. Tomasz Zarycki, while talking about Russia's place in Polish self-understanding, claims that today military threat is not the main issue of consideration. However, danger is observed in other dimensions, for example, the biggest danger for Poland sovereignty is its dependency on Russian gas<sup>91</sup>. Thus, in the case of Lithuania and Russia, although not associated with military threat, uses other dangerous measures such as economic, energetic methods or even tries to provoke instability within EU (In the context of analysed case, it is difficult to ground this tendency with concrete actions in foreign policy, but taking a broader look, the purpose to reach energy independence could be considered as a prove). Therefore, Russia's actions and negative impact more or less correspond to the level of radical Other which David Campbell described.

Existing fear because of Russia's efforts to divide and destroy the relations between EU member states ('in a philosophical sense, this is the way how EU foundation based on solidarity of all members is being destroyed'<sup>92</sup>) raises the question how EU will respond to Russia's provocations: 'it will become clearer when we see how other EU states, old-timers and powers will react to this case: British who are famous of their juridical precise and principles, Germans, French, Italians and Spanish'<sup>93</sup>. This tendency can be observed in political practices when bilateral diplomatic conflict is raised to European level appealing to the heads of EU institutions<sup>94</sup>.

<sup>90</sup> Ramūnas Bogdanas, 'Nesantaikos obuolys su nematomais antpečiais' (Apple of enmity with invisible straps), *Delfi.lt*, 20 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/rbogdanas-nesantaikos-obuolys-su-nematomais-antpeciais.d?id=47781165>.

<sup>91</sup> Zarycki, 607–608.

<sup>92</sup> Bogdanas, 'Nesantaikos obuolys su nematomais antpečiais'.

<sup>93</sup> 'Apžvalgininkai: kai kurie politikų ir teisėsaugos pasisakymai dėl Austrijos – neracionalūs ir parodomieji' (Analysts: some outgivings from politicians and judicial representatives regarding Austria are irrational and demonstrative), *Delfi.lt (BTV)*, 19 July 2011, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/apzvalgininkai-kai-kurie-politiku-ir-teisesaugos-pasisakymai-del-austrijos-neracionalus-ir-parodomieji.d?id=47771095>.

<sup>94</sup> The Speaker of Seimas Irena Degutienė appealed to the former President of European Parliament Jerzy Buzek asking to answer why Austria violated the principle of equality and consider this issue in

In conclusion, the relation between Lithuania and Russia, its impact on Lithuanian identity, the relation between Self and Other is clearly observed. This Other here is associated with negative, destructive and even aggressive actions. This is proved by the main two groups of representations: (1) relevance of historical polemics with Russia nowadays contributes to the maintenance and further construction of victim identity – this is the way how Russia is still viewed as negative and dangerous Other to Lithuania; (2) Russia's threat is not because of military power but other ways of action. In the analysed discourse, the attention is mostly paid to endeavours to weaken EU foundation by destroying solidarity and good relations between EU member states. This strengthens the role of Other in Lithuanian identity even more, because it is unpredictable what Russia's impact would be if its actions (efforts to discredit or make damaging debates within EU) succeeded.

## **Conclusions**

Golovatov's release has encouraged not only to discuss relations between Lithuania and Austria, its peculiarities of domestic politics or legal system. Considerations about the relations between Lithuania and EU, what does membership in EU mean have been also taken as very important issues. In addition to this, Russia's role and its impact on Lithuania and Lithuania's relations with partners have also been discussed. This case 'framed' Lithuania between the two main pillars of geopolitics and identity – being in Europe, which is usually associated with the idea of 'returning to the West', and Russia, which is considered as the main threatening Other. It is important that any difference between media sources (the texts were collected from) has not been found (i.e. tendentially pro-Russian opinions or the same support for EU). Accordingly, the tendency in Lithuanian media allows to observe the variety of different positions and present existing tensions between those positions and opinions.

Lithuanian identity of a follower of European values dominates. It is perfectly revealed while analysing the attitude towards Austria, where one of the main aspects demarcating border between Lithuania and Austria, transforming it to Other is Austria's condemnation because of betrayal of common civilisation principles and

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EP (Europos ir Austrijos parlamentų prašoma atlikti tyrimą dėl M. Golovatovo paleidimo' (European and Austrian Parliaments are asked to do an investigation because of M. Golovatov's release), *Delfi.lt* (BNS), 19 July <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/europos-ir-austrijos-parlamentu-prasoma-atlikti-tyrima-del-mgolovatovo-paleidimo.d?id=47753949>).

values. Relations between Lithuania and EU are seen through difference between Self and Other, where EU is only a partial Self, but not the common and united place in which Lithuania feels a full member. This difference is not related with security problems. It is related with different EU and Lithuania's attitudes towards values. Together with critique to EU due to its relations with Russia, the dimension of historical memory related with mistrust and disappointment of the West remains important and at the same time limits the idea of becoming a fully integrated part with other Western European members. One of the possible reasons why EU is not understood as an integral part of Self is that Lithuania does not find self-created image of Europe as the Western civilisation in EU and this discrepancy does not allow to fully implement the purpose of 'returning to the West'. Therefore, as a reaction to different but at the same time critical representations of EU, the idea about Lithuania's mission emerges – to rescue EU from the crisis of values and return to fundamental European principles, at the same time reducing Lithuania's uncertainty and integrating EU into Self.

Lithuania describes itself as a victim in the relations with Russia. Substantially, this is related with different historical representations. In Golovatov's case, remembrance of events of 13 January even intensified this dimension of identity and transferred it from the past to the present. The image of threatening and dangerous Other is being formed further although it seems that debates have been related only with historical issues. In addition to this, new challenges and new dangerous forms of Russia's actions are named. Therefore, in the context of Lithuanian identity, discourse about Russia is constructed using security definitions and this country is radical Other in analysed texts.

Reflecting all previously mentioned aspects how Austria, EU and Russia has been described, Lithuania's self-perception seems problematic because either partners (EU, Austria as one of the EU members), or enemy Russia are seen through multidimensional Self-Other perspective. Identity is constructed in such way that Lithuania is surrounded by Others, just the level of hostility depends on a concrete case. Only one Self for Lithuania is Western civilisation – self-created and idealised image of Europe. Therefore, actions in the real international arena and at the same time the search for untraceable principles form a division with others.