



Research Article

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The Origin and Evolution of the Opposition between Testimonial and Factual Evidentials in Purik and Other Varieties of Tibetan

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Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to elucidate a special type of egophoric markers found in Purik and other varieties of Tibetan. These factual evidential markers, deriving from the Written Tibetan existential copula *yod*, are regularly used in Purik to profile not only events in which the informant participates, but also events which the informant is in the position to describe as facts even if she does not directly participate in them. The factual function of *yod* is argued here to reflect the indicative function *yod* served when it was the only existential copula at a stage of the language in which no evidential functions had grammaticalized yet. A comparison of the evidential inventory of Purik with those of other well documented Tibetan varieties reveals that it was in resultative constructions that *yod* first became contrasted by *'dug* *‘was there’, facilitating the reanalysis of two evidentially opposed existential copulas. Hence, the factual meaning of *yod* formed in contrast to testimonial *'dug*. The evolution of the factual *yod* is traced from its first emergence up to its restriction to egophoric contexts in Central Tibetan, and compared with that of egophoric markers in West Himalayish Bunan.

Keywords: factual evidential; wide-range egophoric; Tibetan

1 Introduction

According to the widely accepted definition of Aikhenvald (2004), evidentials indicate the source of information. Noting that some of the evidential constructions found in Tibetan, especially participatory evidentials, cannot be captured by this definition, Tournadre and LaPolla (2014: 240) propose a broader definition of evidential marking as “representation of source and access to information according to the speaker’s perspective and strategy”. Arguing that the characterization as indicating the source of information does only justice to very few verbal markers of the world’s languages, I suggest here to define evidentials as exclusively indicating one’s access to information. This definition of evidentiality fully corresponds with what Willet (1988) identifies as the common thread of all previous accounts of evidentiality, namely that it represents “the linguistic means of indicating how the speaker obtained the information on which s/he bases an assertion.”

For some reason though, as noted also by San Roque and Loughnane (2012: 152), Willet (1988) decides that his study of evidentials should not cover participatory evidentials, that is, verbal markers that indicate

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that someone accessed information through participation in an event. In a footnote, he writes: “Not included is a pair of “performative” suffixes used when the speaker was the agent of the action reported, since the source of evidence does not seem to be their primary meaning.” Aikhenvald (2004) and many others follow Willet in not considering markers indicating participatory evidence as evidentials. The definition of evidentiality as indicating one’s access to information allows us to include these markers again. Likewise, we have to include oppositions consisting of a conjunct marker indicating one’s privileged access to information and a disjunct marker indicating the absence of such privileged access (Hargreaves 2005).

The narrow definition of evidentials as indicating one’s access to information also entails another characteristic of such markers. If a marker consistently indicates how one accessed information, it has to also consistently be construed at the scene in which information manifested itself, and it has to consistently reflect the perspective of the first instance to provide information to others about that event (by the same logic as Lehmann’s [2011] subjective modalities are by definition construed from the perspective of the “assessor”). Bickel’s (2008) term “informant” is best suited to refer to the person from which information emanates and preferred over other terms proposed to account for the shift of perspective observed in connection with the markers in question, such as “epistemic source” (Hargreaves 2005), “locutor” (Curnow 1997, Aikhenvald 2004), “assertor” (Creissels 2008), and “source of information” (Tournadre 2008). Hence, whenever an evidential in the narrow sense is used in a simple statement, the informant is instantiated by the speaker; in a simple question, by the addressee; and in a simple reported speech clause, by the source. “Simple” means that these illocutionary acts only convey their proper illocutionary force, that is, a simple question does not convey any declarative notions, e.g., by expressing the speaker’s attitude associated with a question, and a simple reported speech clause likewise does not convey any non-reported notions, e.g., by expressing the current speaker’s attitude towards her report.¹ That evidentials are consistently construed from the perspective of the discussed instantiations of the informant is confirmed by the fact that in Aikhenvald (2004), the only markers for which the informant is not consistently instantiated by the addressee in questions are non-firsthand, non-visual, inferred, and reported markers (Aikhenvald 2004: 244), and these markers are defined here as indirect evidentials, given the fact that they all indicate indirect access to the scene in which the profiled information first manifested itself.

The shift of perspective just discussed is also characteristic of egophoric markers, which typically mark an event as involving the informant, and are opposed to allophoric markers not involving the informant.² In view of the topic of the workshop “Person and knowledge: from participant-role to epistemic marking”, in which the central ideas of the present article were first presented, the main purpose of this article is to explain why egophoric markers throughout Tibetan are regularly used also to describe events in which the informant does *not* directly participate. I will show that the egophoric functions documented for the existential copula *yod* in many Central and Eastern Tibetan varieties reflect the factual evidential function *jot* still serves in modern Purik, a variety of Tibetan spoken at its western periphery.³ I argue here that the factual evidential meaning of *jot* reflects the indicative function it served when it was the only existential copula at a stage of the language in which no evidential functions had yet grammaticalized. It was only when it became contrasted with *’dug* (Purik *duk*), a marker that thereby grammaticalized as indicating that the state profiled was directly witnessed, that *yod* grammaticalized as indicating a fact.⁴ The evidential contrast between *’dug* and *yod* is demonstrated to have first arisen in perfect constructions describing the

¹ Deictically sensitive expressions (Evans 2012) such as personal pronouns generally do not appear to convey the current speaker’s attitude even if they are construed from her perspective in reported speech clauses.

² Tournadre (1991) uses the term “heterophoric” for the latter member of the opposition, Post (2013) proposes “alterphoric”, Knuchel (2015) and San Roque, Floyd, and Norcliffe (in press) use “non-egophoric”. The term “allophoric” keeps everything Greek and is owed to Fernando Zúñiga, p.c., 10.2.2015.

³ For the conservative phonology of Purik, see Zemp (2014b), for a synchronic description of its evidentiality system, see Zemp (2017).

⁴ Note that forms found in Written Tibetan (abbreviated: WT) are transliterated according to the conventions of the written language (e.g., the glide *y*-, and voiced final consonants *-g* and *-d*), while their Purik reflexes are transliterated in accordance with their pronunciation as well as Purik phonology (e.g., the glide *j*-, and voiceless final consonants *-k*-, *-q*-, and *-t*).

present state resulting from a past event. The present article traces how the opposition between testimonial *'dug* and factual *yod* emerging from these perfects was transformed in different constructions in Purik, how *yod* tended to become restricted to egophoric contexts in Central and Eastern Tibetan, and, given that Purik only has a single equative copula, *in* (WT *yin*), which does not convey an evidential sense, how this equative copula became egophoric in other varieties of Tibetan when opposed to emerging allophoric counterparts. Lastly, the evolution of *'dug* and *yod* in Purik and other varieties of Tibetan is contrasted with that reconstructed for the egophoric/allophoric present markers in West Himalayish Bunan. Drawing on Widmer and Zemp (2017), I explain why egophoric markers which derive from first person agreement markers that were evidentialized in reported speech clauses, unlike the factual markers of Purik, exclusively occur when the informant participates in the profiled event.

2 A synchronic account of the Purik evidentiality system

The present section discusses the evidential opposition between the two existential copulas of Purik, testimonial *duk* and factual *jot* (§2.1), and the related distinctions found in resultative constructions (§2.2) and prospective constructions (§2.3).

2.1 Testimonial *duk* vs. factual *jot*

The factual meaning of Purik *jot* manifests itself most clearly when it is used as an independent existential copula and thereby contrasts with the testimonial *duk*. Both existential copulas are used to profile present states. In (1) – (3), *duk* indicates that this state was recently directly witnessed by the informant, whereas *jot* indicates that the informant knows it and does not need recent direct evidence. (Hence, the use of *jot* does not depend on the informant's involvement, e.g., as a possessor.)

- (1) *zamb-e-ri-ka pulispa duk / jot*
 bridge-GEN-DEM.PROX-LOC police.man EX.T / EX.F
 '(I saw / I know that) there are policemen by the bridge.'
- (2) *ŋa-a pene maŋmo duk / jot*
 I-DAT money a.lot EX.T / EX.F
 '(I saw / I know that) I have a lot of money.'
- (3) *k^ho zbri-a rgjala duk / jot*
 s/he write-INF good EX.T / EX.F
 '(I saw / I know that) she's good at writing.'

That both existential copulas are always construed from the perspective of the informant is exemplified by (4) and (5). In the question shown in (4), *dug-a* appeals to the addressee's recent experience, and *jot-a* to her knowledge. Accordingly, before the quotative *-lo* in (5), *duk* indicates that the source directly attested the profiled state, and *jot* that the source knows it.

- (4) *k^ho zbri-a rgjala dug-a / jot-a*
 s/he write-INF good EX.T-Q / EX.F-Q
 'Is she good at writing (from what you saw / from what you know)?'
- (5) *k^ho-a pene maŋmo dug-lo / jot-lo*
 s/he-DAT money a.lot EX.T-QUOT / EX.F-QUOT
 'Someone said that he has a lot of money (in his pocket / in his bank account).'

Purik *duk* and *jot* convey essentially the same testimonial and factual notions when they occur after the conjunctive *-(s)e*, the progressive *-en*, and the prospective *-tfa* participles (see Zemp 2017). However, because future events may never qualify as facts, the factual sense is turned into a certainive one in prospective contexts. Examples (6) – (8) illustrate the distinction between *duk* and *jot* after the prospective *-tfa* participle. The negated *mi-nduk* in (6) conveys information that can be checked by anyone and primarily refers to properties instantiated by the entity to be involved in an event. Its interrogative and affirmative factual counterpart *jot-a* in (7) conveys information that may only be accessed by the informant and therefore primarily refers to that informant's condition. The quotative *jod-lo* in (8) implies that the source from which the speaker has heard the information had privileged access to it.

- (6) *t^hjaq-tfa mi-nduk, ŋa-a ŋan-tfa mi-nduk, gjen-tsa-a t^hjoq*
 lift-INF2 NEG-EX.T I-DAT be.able-INF2 NEG-EX.T up-LIM-DAT lift\IMP
 ‘(I) can’t lift it, (I) can’t do it, lift it up a little higher!’
- (7) *jaraŋ-a jaŋ las ba-a ŋan-tfa jot-a*
 you(h)-DAT again work do-INF be.able-INF2 EX.F-Q
 ‘Will you be able to work again?’
- (8) *ŋa-s aβ-i-ka-na tri-s-p-in, diriŋ gaŋi tɛp-tfa jod-lo*
 I-ERG Agha-G-LOC-ABL ask-PST-NR-EQ today car arrive-INF2 EX.F-QUOT
 ‘I asked the Agha, and (he) said that today cars will get through (to Kargil).’

The assumption that the factual meaning of Purik *jot* is an evidentialized function of what *jot* did when it was the only existential copula of the language is confirmed by evidence from conditional clauses, where only *jot* but not testimonial *duk* may be used, even in a context such as (9), where the truth of a condition is assessed on the basis of current direct evidence. The most straightforward explanation for this is that testimonial *duk* never became possible in these contexts because only *yod* may facilitate the evidentially neutral proposition that is afforded there. Accordingly, only *jot* is possible before the nominalizer *-k^han* in (10).

- (9) *jaŋ stoŋ tɕik ɟnet-tfa jot-na d-o taŋ-ma rgo-f-in*
 again 1000 one find-INF2 EX-CND that-DEF give-INF need-INF2-EQ
 ‘If (you) can afford another 1000, (you) should give that.’
- (10) *pene jot-k^han-un*
 money EX-NLZR-PL
 ‘those who have money’

2.2 Perfect V-z-duk and inferential V-suk vs. factual resultative V-set

Testimonial *duk* and factual *jot* also contrast in resultative constructions. However, while *duk* is contained in two constructions, inferential V-*suk* and perfect V-z-*duk*, *jot* is only found in one, factual resultative V-*set*, which profiles a past event along with its present result.

The function of inferential V-*suk* (< *V-s-’*dug*) is illustrated by *soŋ-suk* and *p^hoχ-suk* in (11), and by *mel-ts^huk* (the *-s* is typically both affricized and aspirated after *-l*, *-r*, and *-n*) in (12). In all these examples, *-suk* indicates that a past event is inferred on the basis of its directly attested result. That the speaker is actually looking at the entity instantiating the result of the past event is confirmed by the testimonial progressive present V-*en-duk* at the end of (11).

- (11) *tfuli sarasire soŋ-suk, ot p^hoχ-suk, tfuli karpō fes-en-duk*
 apricot colored went-INFR light lit-INFR apricot white show-PROG-EX.T
 ‘The apricots have become colored, the light hit them; the white of the apricots shows.’

- (12) *k^h-i puksmo mel-ts^huk, jaŋ dorm-ek k^hjoŋ-tfa-o*
 you-GEN knee wear.off-INFR again pants-INDF bring-INF2-DEF
 ‘The knee (of your pants) is worn out; you’ll have to get new pants again.’

Perfect *V-z-duk* indicates the current validity of the directly witnessed result of an event, as illustrated by *taŋ-z-duk* ‘has been put’ (occurring twice) in (13) and *gaŋ-z-duk* ‘has become full’ in (14).

- (13) *koŋ-i goŋtsa-o ldabldab-a taŋ-z-duk, p^hjarp^hjar-la*
 coat-GEN lap-DEF hanging-DAT give-RES-EX.T hanging.down-DAT
taŋ-z-duk, zom-ba-mi-nduk, osmet-tfik t^h-en-duk
 give-RES-EX.T suit-INF-NEG-EX.T bad-INDF go-PROG-EX.T
 ‘The front of the coat is hanging down, (it) doesn’t suit (you), (it) looks awkward.’

- (14) *di kor-e-aŋ-na tfa mana gaŋ-z-duk, p^het-tfik p^hri-s*
 this cup-G-INE-MPH tea very be.full-RES-EX.T half-INDF reduce-IMP
 ‘In this cup, there is so much tea, reduce it by half!’

Factual resultative *V-set* (< **V-s-yod*) indicates both a past event and the present result to which that event led, and it indicates that the informant has firm knowledge of both the event and its result. In contrast to *V-suk*, which is negated by *ma*, the construction *V-set* cannot be properly negated due to its double focus. One may either negate the indication of the past event with *ma V(-s)* ‘did not V’ or the indication of the result with *ma V-pa EX* ‘the state reflects no V-ing’. Examples (15) – (17) illustrate contexts in which the informant acquired the knowledge required for the use of *V-set* as the agent of the profiled event. That the informant may also acquire this knowledge by closely monitoring an event from the outside, however, is illustrated by (18) – (21). Hence, the use of *V-set* is clearly not contingent on the informant’s active involvement in the profiled event. The use of *V-set* is further illustrated by (22), featuring a context in which the informant experienced an event and still experiences its result, and (23), where the informant enjoys privileged access as the father of the subject.

- (15) *sta-o stat-e joŋ-set*
 horse-DEF hand.over-CNJ come-RES
 ‘I have come to bring the horse (back).’

- (16) *k^ho-a skje-fik k^hur-set-a*
 s/he-DAT gift-INDEF carry-RES-INT
 ‘Did you bring her a present?’

- (17) *marpo zaŋsbw-i-aŋ taŋ-se zu-set ŋa-s*
 red copper-G-INE give-CNJ melt-RES I-ERG
 ‘I’ve melted (it) in a red copper.’

- (18) *nim-e-ka k^ha-o zu-set*
 sun-G-LOC snow-DEF melt-RES
 ‘The snow has melted in the sun.’ (I’ve been aware of it at several stages.)

- 19) *nas smin-set*
 wheat ripen-RES
 ‘The wheat has ripened.’ (I’ve been observing it.)

- (20) *skin saq mal-la baps-e jon-sed-lo*
 ibex all lower.land-DAT go.down-CNJ come-RES-QUOT
 ‘I heard that the ibexes have all come down (from the mountains) into the lower land.’ (My source observed the event, not only its result.)
- (21) *tʰu-u χol-set*
 water-DEF boil-RES
 ‘The water’s boiling.’ (I’ve had an eye on it.)
- (22) *laqp-i-ka tsʰerma zuk-set*
 hand-G-LOC thorn sting-RES
 ‘Thorns have pricked (my) hand.’ (I felt when it happened during work.)
- (23) *pʰru-u sil-ba son-set kʰatful-la*
 child-DEF read-NR went-RES Kashmir-DAT
 ‘(My) child has gone to Kashmir in order to study.’ (I know that for a fact, I was also involved in planning and deciding it.)

2.3 Prospective potential V-(t/n)uk vs. certaintive V-et

From among the two evidentially opposed constructions with prospective aspect, only *V-et* (< **V-yod*) directly reflects an existential copula attached to the verb root. Because the ending of *V-(t/n)uk* ‘might V’ does not directly reflect testimonial *ʹdug*, as both its forms and functions show, see §4, we will first deal with *V-et*. As mentioned above, when factual *yod* is used in prospective contexts, it indicates certainty. For the consistent prospective analysis of *V-et*, see Zemp (2017). This analysis entails that when *V-et* describes an ongoing event, the informant is assumed to be focusing on its continuation and its goal. Examples (24) and (25) illustrate that *V-et* is always construed from the perspective of the informant. While *tʰ-et* designates an ongoing motion controlled by the addressee in the interrogative example (24), the speaker uses the same verb form in the declarative (25) to describe her own motion. Similarly, still in (25), quotative *kʰo jon-ed-lo* indicates that the reported speaker had uttered her own plan to come.

- (24) *ga-r tʰ-et*
 which-LOC go-CRT
 ‘Where are you going?’
- (25) *ŋa kʰo-a su-se tʰ-et, kʰo jon-ed-lo*
 I s/he-DAT go.to.receive-CNJ go-CRT s/he come-CRT-QUOT
 ‘I’m going to receive him; someone said he’s coming.’

As other constructions containing factual *yod*, Purik *V-et* is not contingent on the informant’s participation in the profiled event. Instead, it is very commonly used to profile generic events, as broadly illustrated in (26) – (32). In all these contexts, the speaker expresses her certainty that an event will always take (or always takes) place given certain conditions. Generic events are less commonly profiled in questions, but it would be possible to ask at least the questions corresponding to (30) and (31), and one would thereby have to use *V-et*, i.e. *baŋ nam zer-et-a* ‘when does the adhan pray?’, or *...-na nespa jon-et-a* ‘is it (considered) a sin if (I ...)?’.

- (26) *bo zbzi-a man tʰ-et*
 dry.measure four-DAT dry.measure go-CRT
 ‘Four *bo* equal one *man*.’

- (27) *noskar t^haq-pa-na mar biŋ-et*
 rape grind-INF-CND oil come.out-CRT
 ‘When you grind rape(seed), oil comes out.’
- (28) *p^hrik ma skul-ba p^hur-et*
 DRM NEG move-INF fly-CRT
 ‘(It, a certain bird) can fly without moving (its wings at all).’
- (29) *k^hsu ma k^hsu-na kifik tab-et*
 wash NEG wash-CND flea cast-CRT
 ‘If (you) don’t wash (yourself), (you) will have fleas.’
- (30) *ʒbʒi na p^het-i-ka baŋ zer-et*
 four and half-G-LOC adhan say-CRT
 ‘At half past four the *adhan* (prayer) is said.’
- (31) *maharam men-k^han-la t^hoŋ-na nespa joŋ-et*
 family NEG;EQ-NLZR-DAT be.visible-CND sin come-CRT
 ‘It’s a sin if someone outside the family sees (it).’
- (32) *tozar za-tsa-na nor gaŋma kug-et*
 lunch eat-LIM-CND sheep all gather-CRT
 ‘He keeps all his sheep gathered while he eats lunch (a Kashmiri goat herder).’

Another common use of *V-et* is illustrated in (33) – (35). In these examples, *V-et* indicates that an event will (certainly) take place if the addressee does not take immediate action to prevent it. As in connection with generic events, *V-et* is clearly not contingent on the informant’s participation.

- (33) *zbrul-is so tab-et*
 snake-ERG tooth cast-CRT
 ‘(Watch out!) The snake is going to bite (you)! (Said when it’s already opened its mouth.)’
- (34) *o marius, kaŋma t^hu-jaŋ t^h-et*
 hey Marius foot water-INE go-CRT
 ‘(Watch out) Marius! (You’re) about to step into the water!’
- (35) *ŋj-i laqpa tʃaʃ-et*
 I-GEN hand break-CRT
 ‘(You’re) breaking my hand!’

In contrast to *V-et* in (33) – (35), Purik *V-(t/n)uk* is used to indicate future events that *might* take place. Warnings such as the one in (36) are thus much less urgent.

- (36) *wa, baŋ-po-a tsuru ma tsoŋ, ritfo taŋ-nug-hii*
 hey cow-DEF-DAT provocation NEG raise\IMP horn give-POT-DUB
 ‘Don’t mess with the cow! She might stab you with her horns!’

The ending *-(t/n)uk* is regularly used to profile events that are outside of the informant’s control, as (twice) in (37). Certain non-controllable verbs, such as *p^hot* ‘be capable’, can only be used with prospective *-(t/n)uk*, as in (38), but never *-et*. In contexts such as (39), the marker *-(t/n)uk* implies that the informant is not in control of her own actions. On the other hand, in (40), the same ending signals that the speaker is

only considering (i.e. has not yet decided on) a future action. And in (41) – (43), *-(t/n)uk* conveys a guess with regard to a future event. In sum, the allophoric prospective ending *-(t/n)uk* of Purik in all listed examples indicates a potential sense, that is, that an event might take place in the future. (That *V-(t/n)uk* must have originally predicted a future event on the basis of present indication and only came to convey restricted certainty when opposed to *V-et* (< *V-yod*) indicating certainty is discussed in §4.)

- (37) *jaa stor-uk jaa mi tfig-is k^hjer-uk,*
 either be.lost-POT or man one-ERG take.away-POT
de-i ηa-s gra len-tf-in
 that-GEN I-ERG compensation take-INF2-EQ
 ‘(I don’t care) whether (you) lose it or whether someone steals it, I will want the same back.’
- (38) *k^hjaŋ-a k^ho-ika rduŋ-ma p^hot-ug-a*
 you-DAT s/he-LOC beat-INF be.capable-POT-Q
 ‘Would you be capable of hitting him?’
- (39) *ηa-s k^ho-a rjaq zdam-nuk*
 I-ERG s/he-DAT DRM pull.together-POT
 ‘I might hug her (just like that).’
- (40) *jaran-a zaruri jot-na ηa-s jaran-a*
 you(h)-DAT important EX-CND I-ERG you(h)-DAT
šmul stoŋ sum ski-se taŋ-nuk
 rupee 1000 three borrow-CNJ give-POT
 ‘If it’s important to you, I might lend you 3000 rupees.’
- (41) *dj-uw-a tsam ri-ik*
 this-DEF-DAT how.much be.worth-POT
 ‘How much will this be worth (i.e. how much will actually be paid for it)?’
- (42) *ldan-ma zaχm-ek tsam-ts-ik t^ho-ok*
 become.done-INF day-INDF how.much-LIM-INDF go-POT
 ‘How many days will it take for it to be done?’
- (43) *di t^hin^hfas-po nan-po ganma-a k^hjet-tug-a*
 this carpet-DEF house-DEF all-DAT be.sufficient-POT-Q
 ‘Will this carpet be big enough for the whole room?’

2.4 Summary

It was shown in the present section that Purik *jot* has a factual meaning in those constructions in which it is opposed to testimonial *duk*, that is, as an independent copula and in resultative constructions. When employed in prospective contexts, *jot* viz. its reflex *-et* indicates certainty. That this meaning is not the one that arose in opposition to *duk* is suggested by the fact that the opposed prospective ending *-(t/n)uk* does not directly derive from testimonial *duk*, as both its forms and functions make clear (as explained in §5). The comparison with other varieties of Tibetan further reveals that the prospective constructions are innovations of the common ancestor of Purik and Balti only (as discussed presently). In any event, unlike egophoric verbal markers in other languages, none of the Purik constructions containing *jot* are contingent on the informant’s participation in the profiled event, even if they commonly occur in contexts in which the informant is a participant. What these constructions do is indicate that the informant knows a state or is certain that an event will take place.

3 The emergence of evidentiality in Tibetan

Its factual meaning reveals that Purik *jot* reflects an evidentially neutral existential copula that was only evidentialized when *'dug* was reanalyzed as syntactically equivalent while indicating that the profiled information was directly witnessed. That is, when *yod* was the only existential copula of the language, it can be said to have indicated facts the way indicative verb forms indicate facts in any language that does not grammatically encode evidential notions. As soon as it became contrasted to the testimonial *'dug*, however, *yod* came to emphasize that it indicates facts, and that the informant's knowledge does not depend on recent direct evidence. In other words, *yod* became evidentialized in its factual function.

Recall at this point that there is only a single equative copula in Purik, namely *in* (WT *yin*). Not surprisingly, this *in* does not convey any evidential meaning. In most other spoken varieties of Tibetan, *yin* has become opposed to a second equative copula, most frequently *re(d)* (Kham, Amdo, and parts of Central Tibetan), in some places also *pie* (e.g., Shigatse) or *rak* (Southern Mustang). In all those varieties that have two opposed equative copulas, *yin* is egophoric and the other allophoric. Assuming that the Tibetan varieties exhibiting two equative copulas derive from the system with a single equative copula as preserved in Purik, an assumption that will be confirmed beyond doubt below, the discussed evidence suggests that evidentiality first affected existential copulas and could only from there spread to equative copulas.

We then observe that, whereas *yod* is only found as an existential copula in written and spoken varieties of Tibetan, *'dug* is widely documented as a full verb – in Purik, for instance, the full verb *duk* means 'stay, sit'. This evidence suggests that *'dug* only secondarily acquired the functions of an existential copula (in those varieties in which it did). The question then arises in what context *'dug* acquired the syntactic functions of an existential copula, viz. in what context it became syntactically equivalent with *yod*, thereby facilitating the evidentialization of *yod*.

We saw in §2 that *duk* and *jot* in Purik contrast not only as independent copulas but also in the resultative *V-suk* (and *V-z-duk*) vs. *V-set*, and, somewhat less directly, in the prospective *V-(t/n)uk* vs. *V-et*. It is highly instructive to compare the Purik inventory of constructions containing *'dug* and *yod* to those found in other spoken varieties of Tibetan, as done in Table 1.

Table 1: The gross distribution of the existential copulas in Tibetan dialects

	Balti	Purik	Ladakhi	Sherpa	Lhasa	Dege (Kham)	Themchen (Amdo)
'dug/yod	--/✓	✓/✓	✓/✓	✓/✓	✓/✓	--/✓	--/✓
*V-s-'dug/yod	✓/✓	✓/✓	✓/--	✓/--	✓/✓	✓/--	✓/--
*V-'dug/yod	✓/✓	✓/✓	✓/✓	--/--	--/--	✓/✓	--/✓

What interests us most here is that the varieties spoken at the western and eastern periphery of the Tibetan dialect area lack an independent copula *'dug* while having an inferential construction reflecting **V-s-'dug*, namely Balti *V-suk* (Bielmeier 1985: 107, 110, 111, 113), Dege Kham *V-sɿʔ* (Häsler 1999: 194-195), Themchen Amdo *V-zəç* (Haller 2004: 145, 147), and Ndzorge Amdo *V-zəg* (Sun 1993: 950). Note that neither of these constructions appears to have ever been assumed to reflect **V-s-'dug*. Sun (1993: 953) proposes that *V-zəg* derives from the Old Tibetan indefinite article *zhig* ~ *cig*, which has the form *zəg* in Amdo; Wang (1995) suggests that it derives from the verb *gzig* 'see'; and Zeisler (2004: 658) assumes that Ladakhi *-tshug* is related to *mtshogs* 'similar'.⁵

That Amdo *V-zəç* derives from **V-s-'dug* appears plausible considering that the rhyme *-ug* in Themchen-Amdo regularly turned into *-əç*, as in *thug* > *tʰəç* 'meet' (Haller 2004: 48), *drug* > *tʃəç* 'six' (p. 46), *lug* > *ləç* 'sheep' (p. 421), and *sug* > *səç* 'bark (verb)' (p. 20); however, so did the rhymes *-ig*, as in *shig* > *çəç* 'louse', and *-ugs*, as in *dbugs* > *əç* 'breath'. While I have not found any parallels for the medial change of *-s-ɰ-* > *-z-* in

⁵ In all of Koshal's (1979: 217-225) examples illustrating Ladakhi *-tshug*, it occurs after *-t* or *-n*. But after *-n*, *-l*, and *-r*, Purik *V-suk* is also pronounced *V-tsʰuk*, as in (12) above. While Zeisler (2004: 658) notices forms lacking the *-t-*, but views them as reductions, it appears to me that Ladakhi *-tsʰuk* is like its Purik counterpart an allomorph of *-suk* occurring after *-n*, *-l*, and *-r* (and *-t*, where I do not perceive aspiration in Purik).

Amdo, Purik inferential *V-suk* bears testimony of the assimilatory loss of *-’d-* after *-s-*, and perfect *V-z-duk* of the voicing of *-s-* before *-’d-*.

That an independent existential copula *’dug* is missing in Kham and Amdo varieties that have a reflex of **V-s-’dug* is related to the fact that **V-s-’dug* has an inferential meaning in these varieties. As a consequence, it does not contrast with **V-s-yod* there (as shown in Table 1) but with past direct evidential **V-thal* containing *thal* ‘went past’.⁶ By contrast, in varieties in which **V-s-’dug* has a perfect meaning and contrasts with **V-s-yod*, such as Purik, Lhasa, and other Central Tibetan dialects, *’dug* serves as an independent existential copula. Clearly, the opposition of the two perfects, **V-s-’dug* and **V-s-yod*, facilitated the reanalysis of *’dug* as an existential copula contrasting with *yod*.

It is therefore crucial for the understanding of evidentiality in Tibetan to distinguish between resultative inferentials and perfects (for one among many who do not distinguish them, see Hill 2017). The Tibetan inferentials primarily describe a past event, indicating that it was inferred from its result, and the perfects primarily describe a present state, depicting it as the result of a past event. In Purik and Ladakhi, inferential and perfect constructions both derive from **V-s-’dug*.⁷ By contrast, in Lhasa, **V-s-’dug* is only used as a perfect, while the inferential construction derives from **V-s-bzhag* containing *bzhag* ‘was put (there)’. Both constructions are illustrated by two examples taken from Kalsang et al. (2013: 530), the perfect in (15a), and the inferential in (15b). The difference between the two is not, as suggested by Kalsang et al.’s translations, that the speaker witnessed the past event only in the first example. Rather, while the speaker describes the current result of a past event in the first example (perfect *V-s-’dug*), she describes a past event inferred from its result in the second example (inferential *V-s-bzhag*).

- (15) a. chags ‘dug.
broke ‘DUG
‘It broke/was broken.’ (and the speaker saw it break)
- b. chags shag.
broke SHAG
‘It broke/was broken.’ (the speaker sees the pieces but did not see it break)

Because only the perfect but not the inferential construction referred to a present state, only the former could become contrasted with **V-s-yod*. The opposed perfects facilitated the reanalysis of *’dug* as a testimonial existential copula contrasting with factual *yod*. By contrast, once fused to *-suk* or *-zəç*, the inferential suffix could no longer become detached from the preceding verb root (neither can Lhasa *-bzhag*).

As mentioned above and thoroughly explained in §5.1 below, the prospective constructions of Purik are derived from the resultative constructions. This conclusion is confirmed by evidence from the other varieties represented in Table 1. In Lhasa and Sherpa, there are no reflexes of either **V-’dug* or **V-yod*. And while the Purik constructions lacking the *-s-* formant have a prospective meaning, those found in Ladakhi (Koshal 1979: 195) and Dege (Häsler 1999: 178-179) have a present direct evidential meaning. Unlike in Purik and Balti, where the missing dental of postvocalic allomorphs will be argued in §5.1 to reflect the fact that prospective **V-(d)uk* was backformed from inferential **V-s(d)uk*, the present testimonial meaning of Ladakhi and Dege **V-’dug* corresponds with the fact that the dental is never missing there, suggesting that these constructions were formed by simply adding *’dug* to the bare root.

Having thus identified **V-s-’dug* as the locus in which *’dug* must have become reanalyzed as a testimonial existential copula contrasting with the factual *yod*, we have to take another step back into the prehistory of Tibetan in order to understand the origin of **V-s-’dug* and the constructions with which it became contrasted.

⁶ For this etymology, see Sun (1993: 952-953); for the evidence, see Häsler (1999) on Dege-Kham, Haller (2004: 37, 46-47) on Themchen-Amdo, Sun (2006: 117) on gSerpa, and Bartee (2011: 154) on Dongwang.

⁷ For the Ladakhi perfect *V-s-tok*, see Koshal (1979: 216-217).

4 The Proto-Tibetan origins of the resultative constructions

Based on the diverging functions in which all four stems of the maximally complex Written Tibetan verb paradigms (e.g., present *'g-*, past *bk-*, future *dg-*, imperative *kh-*) are found in Purik, Zemp (2016b) is able to reconstruct the original, Proto-Tibetan functions not only of the different onsets and onset clusters but also of a number of other features. Two of these features are listed below, because they considerably improve our understanding of the emergence and evolution of evidentiality in Tibetan.

- i. Simple verb stems were generally used to indicate a past event; when followed by the stative *-s* suffix, they indicated the result of an event.
- ii. Verbs were commonly concatenated without a subordinator when they described different facets of one and the same event (V_1V_2) or state (V_1-sV_2).

The described features facilitate the most plausible and economic account not only of how the onset distinctions evolved but also of a number other features found in various spoken and written varieties, a few of which are listed in the following.

The reconstruction of a stative meaning for the *-s* suffix accounts for:

- intransitive verbs in Purik with an *-s* in their root derive from telic verbs, those without an *-s* from atelic verbs, accordingly verbs with palatalized and unpalatalized vowels in other spoken varieties of Tibetan, see Zemp (2016b: 102)
- the *-s* marking the past of transitive verbs in Purik
- the *-s* marking the perfect of intransitive verbs in Written Tibetan
- loss of final *-gs* and *-ngs* but retention of *-g* and *-ng* in several varieties of different regions, such as Sherpa, Kyirong, Zangskar, and Cone (in the last variety, the recognition of the mentioned sound change allows for an account that is much more plausible and economic than that of Jacques 2014)

The assumption that subordinator-less concatenations were common in PT, rather than reflect elisions of subordinators, as generally assumed in the literature (e.g., DeLancey 1991, Zeisler 2004), accounts for:

- past direct evidential constructions, such as **V-thal*, **V-song*, and **V-byung*, derive from dynamic past constructions (see below)
- resultatives such as **V-s-'dug*, **V-s-bzhag*, and **V-s-bgyis* (see below)
- dozens of dramatizer-verb collocations found in Purik, Ladakhi, Jirel, and elsewhere, reflecting verb-verb collocations that were fossilized when the construction ($V-V$) ceased to be productive, e.g., Purik *poq p^hut-s* 'pulled out with verve' < *'uprooted and pulled out' (see Zemp 2016b: 104-5)
- seeming elisions of the conjunctive morpheme in the most common instances of $V-V$ found in OT (Zeisler 2004: 894-901) and spoken varieties, such as Purik, and Lhasa (DeLancey 1991)
- widely distributed *k^hjong* 'bring' and *k^hjer* respectively derive from **khi:-yong* 'carry and come' and **khi:-hyar* 'carry and go away', and *byung* 'appear' from **bi-yong* 'exit and come'

Hence, broad dialectal evidence suggests that it became increasingly common in Proto-Tibetan to describe past events that involved motion by concatenating the past form of a motion verb to the verb denoting the event itself, as in **V-song* 'went/moved V-ing', **V-thal* 'went past V-ing', **V-(y)ong(-s)* 'came V-ing', and **V-byung(-s)* 'appeared V-ing'. By employing a V_2 that indicated motion towards the deictic center, the latter two constructions appear to have made an account more dramatic. The neutral motion verbs employed in the former two constructions, evoking a trajectory, had a comparable, even if weaker effect.

At the same time, simple resultative $V-s$ must have increasingly tended to become reinforced by verbs such as *'dug* 'was there', *bzhag* 'was put and left there', and *bgyis* 'has been made'. In contrast to *'dug*, which conceptualized the entity instantiating the result described by $V-s$ as a single argument S, both *bzhag* and *bgyis* conceptualized it as the direct object O of a transitive event. As a consequence, while **V-s-'dug* lent itself to both an inferential and a perfect use, **V-s-bzhag* and **V-s-bgyis* are only found in an inferential

meaning in modern varieties of Tibetan.⁸

Broad evidence from modern dialects also suggests that when *V-s-'dug grammaticalized an inferential meaning, this entailed the evidentialization of the dynamic past constructions discussed above in this subsection. While, as discussed in §3, inferential *V-s-'dug came to contrast with V-thal in many Amdo and Kham varieties, it came to contrast with V-song in a number of dialects spoken in Northern Nepal, such as Sherpa, Jirel, Lhomi, Kagate, and Southern Mustang (see Volkart 2000). That the auxiliary *thal* was preferred over *song* in Amdo and Kham must be related to the fact that all of these dialects still use *song* 'went' as a full verb. It appears that Eastern Tibetan varieties became increasingly sensitive to animacy due to their contact with neighboring Lolo-Burmese and Ciangic languages (Bartee 2011: 177-178). This sensitivity likely ruled out the use of *song* with inanimate or other entities that were not in control of the motion they underwent, causing *thal* to be preferred in dynamic past constructions and to eventually grammaticalize as the past evidential marker.

Having shown in this subsection that the resultative constructions and the past direct evidential constructions with which they became contrasted in many Central and Eastern Tibetan varieties can be neatly derived from the features reconstructed for Proto-Tibetan in Zemp (2016b), we may now turn to the thorough internal reconstruction of how evidentiality evolved in Purik Tibetan.

5 The evolution of evidentiality in Purik

In §5.1, it is demonstrated that prospective Purik V-(t/n)uk < *V-(d)uk was backformed from resultative V-s(d)uk (< *V-s-'dug) before 'dug became available as an existential copula. This, in turn, allows us to identify the resultative inferential *V-s(d)uk as the first evidential construction in Purik and, in fact, the only one that grammaticalized an evidential meaning without being opposed by an equipollent counterpart. During the processes described in §5.1, *V-s-'dug was also retained in a perfect meaning. The opposition between perfect *V-s-'dug and *V-s-yod, which facilitated the reanalysis of two evidentially opposed existential copulas, testimonial *duk* and factual *jot*, is thoroughly reconstructed in §5.2. Before 'dug became used as a testimonial existential copula, *yod-sug was used much like 'dug later came to be used, so that *yod-sug was pushed into past time reference by 'dug, as argued in §5.3. This suggests that the other derived forms of *yod* found in different spoken varieties of Tibetan may also be older than the existential 'dug, as discussed in §6.

5.1 The backformation of prospective *V-(d)uk from resultative *V-s(d)uk

Some allomorphs of the Purik potential prospective -(t/n)uk lack a trace of a dental, and it represented a mystery to me for almost a decade why that dental was missing there. The dentalless allomorph -uk occurs after vowels and -r, -l, -n, and -s, and it is most evident after vowels that there should be a trace of a dental stop, most likely an -r-, if the ending had directly derived from -'dug.⁹ However, we find no trace of a dental in the potential prospective Purik forms of verbs ending in a vowel, e.g., *ʂku-uk* 'might steal', *ʃi-uk* ~ *ʃi-ik* 'might die', *lo-ok* (< *lo-uk) 'might match up', *tʃʰo-ok* (< *tʃʰa-uk) 'might go', and *be-ek* (< *be-uk) 'might open'.

We are able to account for the missing dental by assuming that the potential prospective V-(t/n)uk was backformed by subtracting the resultative -s- formant from the resultative inferential *V-s(d)uk, later Purik

⁸ The examples adduced by Haller (2000: 90-91) to illustrate Shigatse V-gi correspond with my assumption that it derives from the inferential *V-s-bgyis. However, Haller and others analyze V-gi as an imperfective construction equivalent with the V-gi-'dug of other Central Tibetan dialects.

⁹ For instance, WT *da dung* (Jäschke 1881: 247a) yielded *daruŋ* 'still' in many dialects, and WT *da de* (ibid.) *dare* 'now'. Similarly, the long forms of the Purik demonstratives *a(re)* 'that (distal, visible)' and *e(re)* 'the other' must contain an originally reinforcing demonstrative *de* 'that', i.e., *are* < **a de* and *ere* < **e de*, accordingly associative locatives such as *ŋatf-i-re-r* 'at our place' < **ŋatf-i de-r*.

V-suk, that is, a form of PT **V-s-'dug* whose dental stop had been assimilated to the preceding *-s-* only in certain environments. Specifically, we have to assume that the dentalless allomorphs *-uk* of the prospective *-(t/n)uk* were backformed from the form *-suk*, but those with a dental (i.e., *-duk* and *-nuk* < **-duk* / *N*) from *-sduk*. That is, the forms of the prospective suffix found in modern Purik indicate that by the time it was backformed from the resultative suffix, the *-t-* had been lost in the resultative suffix after vowels, hence **rga-uk* < **rga-s-suk* < **rga-s-'dug* and **bo-uk* < **bo-s-suk* < **'bo-s-'dug*, but retained after labials and velars, hence **thob-duk* < **thob-sduk* < **thob-s-'dug* and **phog-duk* < **phog-sduk* < **phog-s-'dug*. This is phonetically plausible. Table 2 shows the attested endings of the prospective *V-(d)uk* in the rightmost column, and their reconstructed predecessors as well as the reconstructed forms of the resultative *V-s(d)uk* from which the prospective endings must have been backformed to their left.

Table 2: Reconstructed and attested forms of *V-s(d)uk* and backformed *V-(t/n)uk*

Meaning 'appears to have ...'	Reconstructed resultative construction from which the prospective construction was backformed by subtracting the <i>-s-</i>		Reconstructed and attested forms of the prospective construction of Purik		
	Early Proto-Purik	Late Proto-Purik		Modern Purik	Meaning
looked'	<i>*lta-sduk</i>	<i>*ltas-suk</i>	<i>*lta-uk</i>	<i>łto-ok</i>	'might look'
mixed'	<i>*sre-sduk</i>	<i>*stres-suk</i>	<i>*stre-uk</i>	<i>stre-ek</i>	'might mix'
dug'	<i>*rko-sduk</i>	<i>*rkos-suk</i>	<i>*rko-uk</i>	<i>sko-ok</i>	'might dig'
died'	<i>*shi-sduk</i>	<i>*shis-suk</i>	<i>*shi-uk</i>	<i>fi-uk</i>	'might die'
stolen'	<i>*rku-sduk</i>	<i>*rkus-suk</i>	<i>*rku-uk</i>	<i>sku-uk</i>	'might steal'
turned'	<i>*skor-sduk</i>	<i>*skor-suk</i>	<i>*skor-uk</i>	<i>skor-uk</i>	'might turn'
driven'	<i>*strul-sduk</i>	<i>*strul-suk</i>	<i>*strul-uk</i>	<i>strul-uk</i>	'might drive'
taken'	<i>*len-sduk</i>	<i>*len-suk</i>	<i>*len-uk</i>	<i>len-uk</i>	'might take'
forgotten'	<i>*rjed-sduk</i>	<i>*rjet-suk</i>	<i>*rjet-uk</i>	<i>rdzet-uk</i>	'might forget'
hit'	<i>*phog-sduk</i>		<i>*phoq-duk</i>	<i>p^hoq-tuk</i>	'might hit'
poured'	<i>*lhug-sduk</i>		<i>*lhuk-duk</i>	<i>łuk-tuk</i>	'might pour'
given'	<i>*tang-sduk</i>		<i>*tang-duk</i>	<i>taŋ-nuk</i>	'might give'
obtained'	<i>*thob-sduk</i>		<i>*thop-duk</i>	<i>thop-tuk</i>	'might obtain'
had the energy'	<i>*lam-sduk</i>		<i>*lam-duk</i>	<i>lam-nuk</i>	'might have the energy'

The assumption that the prospective **V-(d)uk* was backformed from the resultative inferential **V-s(d)uk* does not only account for the different forms of the prospective construction of modern Purik, it also accounts for its function. In fact, **V-(d)uk* must have originally been construed as a prospective inferential. Hence, while resultative **V-s(d)uk* inferred a past event from its present result, prospective **V-(d)uk* came to predict a future event on the basis of present indication. In modern Purik, however, *V-(t/n)uk* was shown in (36) – (43) to indicate events that might take place in the future rather than events that seem to or are likely to take place in the future considering present indication. The semantic shift of *V-(t/n)uk* from prospective inferential to prospective potential was induced by the opposed certaintive *V-et* (< **V-yod*). That is, when the factual *yod* became employed after plain verb roots and thereby came to describe any event of which the speaker is certain that it will take place, the prospective inferential **V-(d)uk* was stripped of the events that seemed likely to take place in the future and left with those events that only seemed possible. But this factual *yod* became available only later, when perfect **V-s-'dug* was opposed by **V-s-yod*, as discussed in the next subsection.

The backformation of prospective inferential **V-(d)uk* from resultative inferential **V-s(d)uk* suggests that the originally stative *-s-* formant was analyzed as marking anteriority. At the same time, the dentalless

allomorph *-uk* of the prospective ending suggests that the construction was not analyzed as containing *'dug* at the time it formed. The reanalysis of *'dug* as an existential copula contrasting with *yod* was also facilitated by the perfect constructions discussed in the next subsection.

Recall that the opposition between a resultative and a prospective inferential can only be reconstructed for Purik and Balti. In other dialects, such as Ladakhi (Koshal 1979: 195), Tabo Spiti (Hein 2001), Dege Kham (Häsler 1999: 178), and Dongwang (Bartee 2011: 166-167), the construction *V-'dug* never lacks the initial dental of *'dug*, and accordingly, the meaning of *V-'dug* in these dialects differs from the one of Purik and Balti *V-(d)ug* in that it profiles directly witnessed present events. This suggests that *'dug* had been reanalyzed as indicating direct evidence in these dialects by the time *V-'dug* formed.

In Purik, by contrast, prospective potential *V-(t/n)uk* 'might V' < inferential **V-(d)uk* must have been backformed from the resultative inferential **V-s(d)uk*, and while the resultative inferential construction appears to have constituted the first evidential notion to grammaticalize in Tibetan, the two inferential constructions constituted the first evidential opposition to form in Purik. The discussed dentalless allomorphs of the prospective potential ending suggest that **V-(d)uk* was not conventionally analyzed as containing *'dug* at the time it was backformed from **V-s(d)uk*. And this implies that the opposition between *'dug* and *yod* arose only later.

5.2 The grammaticalization of the testimonial existential copula *'dug*

In order to demonstrate that the evidential contrast between *'dug* and *yod* first arose in the perfect **V-s-'dug* and **V-s-yod*, the goal of the present subsection is to determine the original meanings of these constructions, and to thus make it appear plausible that *'dug* and *yod* were reanalyzed as testimonial and factual existential copulas in these constructions. Our best clue regarding the original meanings of the perfects is Purik *V-z-duk*, which, as discussed, is still a perfect and means 'I can see a state that resulted from V'. That the independent *duk* in modern Purik serves the exact same function it serves in the perfect *V-z-duk* suggests that, first, *V-z-duk* preserves the original meaning of the perfect; second, *duk*, the part describing the present state, was extracted from that perfect; and third, the meaning of *duk* has not changed since either. Perfect *V-z-duk* does not have a direct counterpart containing *jot* in modern Purik. Without a doubt, however, Purik *V-set* derives from perfect **V-s-yod*. The peculiar double focus of *V-set*, indicating knowledge of a past event along with its present result, arose when the head of **V-s-yod* shifted from *yod* to V while the suffix fused to *-set*. Whereas the ending of *V-suk* < **V-s(d)ug* < **V-s-'dug*, which originally described the directly witnessed result of an event, was reanalyzed as indicating that a past event was inferred from its result when the head of the construction shifted from the auxiliary to V, the ending of *V-set* < **V-s-yod* could not be reanalyzed as qualifying how the past event was accessed. Instead, while the head of this construction shifted from *yod* to V and the construction went from primarily indicating knowledge of a present state to indicating knowledge of a past event, *V-set* did not cease to indicate knowledge of the resultant state when it came to primarily describe the past event that led to it.

That the perfect constructions were the locus in which *duk* and *jot* first became contrasted is also suggested by the fact that the meanings of the existential copulas can be shown to have mutually defined each other in the opposed perfect constructions. By contrast, there is no synchronic explanation for the meanings of the opposed inferential constructions in modern Purik, where the neatly defined resultative inferential *V-suk* is opposed to the factual *V-set* with its double focus.

As shown in §2, testimonial *duk* in modern Purik describes a directly witnessed present state and factual *jot* a known present state. Recalling that *'dug* was originally an eventive simple past meaning 'was there' and *yod* the only existential copula of the language, we may perfectly well understand how *'dug* and *yod* acquired the meanings they serve today when they first became contrasted in the perfect constructions. While resultative **V-s-'dug* 'event V resulted in a state that was (and probably still is) there' had already evolved into the inferential **V-s(d)uk* indicating that a past event was inferred from its result (see §5.1), **V-s-'dug* also remained to be used in a perfect sense, describing a present state resulting from a past event. This perfect **V-s-'dug* must have predominantly been used in contexts in which the present state resulting

from a past event was directly witnessed. However, this testimonial sense grammaticalized only when the construction became opposed by *V-s-*yod*. The until then only existential copula of the language was employed in the perfect construction to signal that the informant knows the state resulting from an event because she closely monitored that event and therefore does not need recent direct evidence to assert that its result holds at the moment of speaking.

Instead of a directly witnessed result, *V-s-*'dug* may also be viewed as indicating knowledge of the result of an event, and *V-s-*yod* as indicating knowledge of the event leading to a result.¹⁰ The meanings of the existential copulas of modern Purik then appear to have slightly generalized since they were shaped in the perfects. When existential copulas independently describe a present state, that is, not picturing it as the result of a past event, *jot* indicates knowledge of the history of that state and less the present state itself, while *duk* indicates knowledge only of the present state but not its history.

The meaning *yod* came to convey in perfect *V-s-*yod* is a product of two properties *yod* exhibited in contrast to *'dug*. First, while *'dug* indicated that something was directly witnessed, *yod* could be analyzed as describing facts just like all other verbal forms could before evidential notions came to be grammatically expressed by verbal constructions. Second, when *'dug* was reanalyzed as indicating that a state was directly witnessed, it was also reanalyzed as temporally bounded, making a statement only about the period of time during which a state was witnessed. By contrast, *yod* must have been analyzed as unbounded, that is, as not implying any temporal limit to the state it indicated. In terms of evidentiality, *yod* thereby came to indicate unrestricted access to the state profiled. The evidential contrast of the bounded *'dug* and the unbounded *yod* in the perfect constructions required that their syntactic functions aligned. Hence, both *'dug* and *yod* came to describe a state at the moment of speaking.

I mentioned above that *yod*, in contrast to *'dug* indicating that a state was directly witnessed, came to indicate that the informant knows a state and does not need recent direct evidence. This indifference to direct evidence is still consistently conveyed by *jot* in modern Purik. In fact, the truth of a statement using *jot* is not affected by temporary evidence against it. For instance, in (2) above, the statement using *jot* is true even if only little money happens to be in the speaker's pocket at the moment of speaking, and in (3), even if the subject just committed an error while writing. Accordingly, regardless of recent direct evidence, *jot* claims that the conveyed information is a fact. Thus, the scenario reconstructed here clarifies how a marker implying direct evidence, normally a strong foundation for a statement, becomes the weaker member of an opposition when the other marker harks back to the way it described facts when it was the only marker of its syntactic category.

Hence, it is clear that *'dug*, originally a verb form meaning 'was there', was reanalyzed as an existential copula when it became contrasted with *yod* in the discussed perfect constructions. It was also in *V-s-*'dug* and *V-s-*yod* that the existential copulas acquired the evidential functions they serve in modern Purik. While both existential copulas became employed after a number of participles (see Zemp 2017), the factual *jot* also became attached to plain verb stems. In analogy to the prospective inferential *V-(*d*)*uk*, which had previously been backformed from resultative inferential *V-s(*d*)*uk* as discussed in §5.1, *V-*yod* acquired a prospective meaning and thereby came to contrast with *V-(*d*)*uk*. As shown in §2.3, *V-*yod* came to indicate that the informant is certain that an event will take place, and this caused the opposed *V-(*d*)*uk* to become restricted from indicating that an event will take place considering present indication to indicating that an event might take place.

It is instructive in this context to take a quick look at the neighboring Balti dialect (Read 1934, Bielmeier 1985). While Balti shares both resultative V-*suk* and V-*set* and prospective V-(*t/n*)*uk* and V-*et* with Purik, *jot* has remained the only existential copula in Balti until today. That is, neither the resultative nor the prospective opposition had to entail the conventionalization of an independent existential copula *'dug*, even if they clearly did in Purik.

¹⁰ Note that the perfect *V-s-*'dug* does not imply that the past event is inferred – the present state is described as the result of a past event, and no doubt is conveyed as to whether the witnessed state might only seem to be the result of that event but, in reality, not have resulted from it.

5.3 The evolution of past direct evidential *jot-suk*

Yet another piece of evidence corroborates our findings that in Purik, *'dug* only became available as an existential copula after it had become opposed to *yod* in the discussed perfect constructions, and that, before the perfect opposition arose, *'dug* took part in the resultative **V-s-'dug* which fused into the inferential **V-s(d)ug*, and prospective inferential **V-(d)ug* was backformed from this resultative inferential. Apart from the two basic existential copulas *duk* and *jot*, Purik has a third, derived existential copula *jot-suk* that indicates a directly witnessed ongoing state of the past, as illustrated in (44). Mismatches between form and function of this *jot-suk*, as discussed presently, suggest that *jot-suk* was originally employed in a function that was similar enough to the one in which *'dug* was later employed for *jot-suk* to be pushed into the more remote past by *'dug*. This means that **yod-sug* also formed at a time when *'dug* was not yet available as an existential copula.

- (44) *di-ka p^horʒon maŋmw-ek jot-suk,*
 this-LOC pigeon a.lot-INDEF EX.F-INFR
ŋatʃa ʔeb-a-na zbwar p^hur-e soŋ
 we.PE arrive-NR-CND DRM fly-CNJ went
 ‘There were a lot of pigeons here; when we arrived they flew away (at once).’

The past direct evidential existential copula *jot-suk* exhibits the following form-function mismatches: While *jot* normally describes a present state, it describes a past state in *jot-suk*. Similarly, while *-suk* is normally based on present or recent evidence, it is based on past evidence in *jot-suk*. And while *-suk* elsewhere indicates an inference, it indicates direct evidence in *jot-suk*.

The most plausible way to account for that evidence is by assuming that, before *'dug* had become available as a testimonial existential copula, **yod-sug* was formed in analogy to the resultative inferential **V-s(d)ug*, without the *-d-* after the *-s-* due to the final *-d* of *yod*, see Table 2. Owing to the differing host, while **V-s(d)ug* inferred a past event on the basis of its recently witnessed result, **yod-sug* inferred an ongoing state on the basis of recently witnessed evidence. Hence, both **V-s(d)uk* and **yod-sug* were based on evidence witnessed shortly before the moment of speaking. It was only when *'dug* became available as a testimonial existential copula and thereby came to describe present states in opposition to *yod* that *jot-suk* was pushed into indicating directly witnessed ongoing states of a more remote past. That the past meaning of Purik *jot-suk* must be secondary is also suggested by evidence from the Amdo variety of Themchen (see Haller 2004: 72), where *jozəç* < **yod-sug* describes inferred present states, presumably because Themchen lacks an existential copula *'dug* that would have pushed *jozəç* into referring to past states.

The two reflexes of **yod-sug* found in the opposite peripheries of the area in which Tibetan is spoken confirm our assumption that an inferential suffix *-s(d)uk* was productive before *'dug* became used as an existential copula. We will see presently that a number of other derived forms of *yod* may be just as old.

6 The evolution of further evidential copulas in other varieties of Tibetan

Derived forms of *yod* played a crucial role in restricting the range in which simple *yod* is used in many spoken varieties of Tibetan to almost exclusively egophoric contexts, as discussed in §6.1. In addition, the allophoric equative copulas found in many varieties likely stem from the suffixes and auxiliaries that were attached to *yod* in the mentioned derived forms, as suggested in §6.2.

6.1 Derived forms of *yod*

Apart from the just discussed **yod-sug*, we find (note that the etymologies given in the following do not necessarily reflect the analysis of the respective authors) **yod-'dug* in gSerpa (cf. Sun 2006: 117), **yod-bgyis* in Dongwang and Themchen (employing *bgyis* ‘made’, cf. Bartee [2011: 157] and Haller [2004: 70, 72]), **yod-bas* in Shigatse and Kyirong (possibly employing *bas* ‘made, done’, cf. Haller [2000: 76] and Huber [2005: 107, 118-119] respectively), and **yod-'gag* in Ladakhi (employing *'gag* ‘has stopped’, cf. Koshal 1979; perhaps also reflected by the Dege-Kham visual existential *ηge*, cf. Häsler [2001: 9]). These derived existential copulas appear to reflect a late PT stage in which *yod* was generally used to describe states and could be qualified by a following verb. Note that the variety of these derived forms of *yod* conforms with the assumption made above that *'dug* was only later employed to describe present states, namely directly attested ones.

In Southern Mustang, we find the existential copula *öta rak* (Kretschmar 1995: 108) reflecting **(y)od-a-rag*. It appears that the simple PT past form *rag* ‘touched’, which also grammaticalized as an existential copula indicating non-visual direct evidence in East Purik, Ladakhi (see Bielmeier 2000), and Tabo (Hein 2001), did not directly become attached to *yod*, but only after an additional *-a*. It is interesting to note in this context that in Purik, adjectives are regularly followed by an *-a* when they describe a temporary or transitional state (see Zemp 2014a: §3.4.4). Hence, *rag* was likely used after adjectives and an *-a* suffix in order to indicate that the state described by the adjective was felt. Accordingly, **yod-a-rag* served to describe any felt present state. Lhasa *jö:re ~ joare* likely reflects this same **yod-a-rag*.¹¹ For the change of PT **-a-* to *-e-* before *q, ng*, see Zemp (2014b: 185-186).¹²

Scholars appear to have recently agreed in attributing a factual meaning to the derived forms of *yod* discussed, while the simple *yod* is labelled egophoric or personal (see Table 3). I argue here that the derived existential copulas inherited their factual meaning from their base *yod*. After this *yod* had been evidentialized by *'dug*, it described any state the informant was in the position to represent as a fact (as it still does in modern Purik). In some varieties, however, the derived forms of *yod* came to be conventionalized in contexts in which the informant lacked privileged access to the profiled fact. At the same time, *yod* tended to become restricted to contexts in which the informant had such privileged access. This process accounts for why scholars focusing on the evidential systems of Central Tibetan did not recognize that the factual meaning originally adhered to the simple rather than the derived forms of *yod*.

Table 3: Labels proposed for the threefold distinction of existential copulas in Central Tibetan (and related varieties such as Tabo Spiti, see Hein 2001)

	<i>yod</i>	<i>yod-red</i>	<i>'dug</i>
Hein 2001	speaker’s involvement	speaker’s unspecified knowledge	speaker’s perception
Zeisler 2004	personal self-evident	generic	immediate perception
DeLancey 2012	personal	generic	immediate
Hill 2013	personal	factual	testimonial
Tournadre and LaPolla 2014	egophoric	factual	sensual
DeLancey forthcoming	personal	factual	direct evidential

The factual meaning of *yod* may still be recognized in Central Tibetan sentences such as *bod-la g.yag yod* ‘there are yaks in Tibet’, see DeLancey (1986: 204-205). The only involvement this *yod* presupposes on the part of the speaker is that she has asserted the presence of yaks in Tibet enough times for her to know that they did not just cross the border from Nepal or break out of a zoo but are actually endemic to Tibet. Unfortunately, ever since Edward Garrett (2001: 102-103) claimed that *yod* implies possession (viz. a “first-

¹¹ Lhasa *jö:re* is etymologized in a number of ways in the literature, for instance, as *yod-red* in Tournadre 2009 [2003], as **yod-pa red* in DeLancey (1990, 1992), and as **yog-red* in Denwood (1999) and DeLancey (forthcoming).

¹² The existential use Bartee (2007: 386) describes for *re* in Dongwang, a Southern Kham dialect spoken in Yunnan province of China in the eastern periphery of the Tibetan dialect area, thus provides a parallel to the existential *rak* found in the Western Tibetan varieties mentioned above.

person argument”) in this sentence, scholars seem to have avoided this example in illustrating the meaning of *yod*, or at least reproduced the question marks Garrett put before the translation ‘there are yaks in Tibet’, see Gawne (2014: slide 6).

6.2 The evidentialization of equative copulas

The derived forms of the existential copula *yod* are also likely to have played a central role in the process by which evidentiality spread from existential to equative copulas. I mentioned above that Purik has only a single equative copula *in* (WT *yin*). Since it never became opposed to an equipollent second equative copula, Purik *in* never grammaticalized an evidential notion. In most dialects, however, *yin* has become opposed to an equipollent second equative copula. The most widely attested equative copula opposed to *yin* is *re(d)* (Amdo, Kham, Lhasa); Shigatse has *pie*, and Southern Mustang *rak*. All of these equative copulas were found above to have also commonly been attached to *yod*. I must leave it open whether it was after *yod* that the mentioned auxiliaries were first contrasted to *yin*. What we know is that of the two evidentially opposed equative copulas, *yin* is always the egophoric one and thus used in contexts in which the informant has insider access to the profiled information, while *re(d)*, *pie*, and *rak* are allophoric and thus used where she has outsider access.

It is important to note here that the origins of the evidential distinction of Tibetan are barely recognizable in the equative copulas. Compared to the existential copulas, both equative copulas appear to describe facts alike, and the allophoric one does clearly not convey a testimonial notion. An interesting question is therefore whether we may still be able to distinguish equative copulas of the Tibetan type from an accordingly binary evidential opposition of equative copulas that reflects an original distinction between first and third person agreement markers that were evidentialized in reported speech clauses (see §7).

Let us have a look at two contexts in which the egophoric equative copula *yin* may be used in some varieties of Tibetan, however, in which an egophoric equative copula originating from a copula indicating first-person agreement is less likely to be used. Future research must show whether an equative copula of the latter type may nevertheless secondarily acquire such uses.

The first of these contexts is the one in which a simple *yin* does not equate the informant but an item in the informant’s possession with another item, as in *’di nga’i deb yin* ‘this is my book’. The second context appears to be rarely attested for Tibetan. In many dialects, the equative copulas are used after nominalized forms of the verb to indicate future (*V-gi-yin/red*) or past events (*V-pa-yin/red*). In both these constructions, *yin* is almost exclusively used when the informant is the agent. Exceptional occurrences of *yin*, where the informant is not the agent, are documented for Kham Tibetan, as shown in example (45), originally from Kraft and Hu (1990: 52.13), and adduced by Häslér (2001: 14) and Bickel (2000: 7-8).

- (45) *laso, laso. ηε: khōla se: tshō.*
 yes yes 1ST.ERG 3SG.DAT say will
khō tatā ō:-le yĩ:
 3SG.ABS immediately come-IMPERFECTIVE AUX:ASSIMILATED
 ‘Yes sir, yes sir! I’ll tell him. He shall come immediately.’

While Häslér (2001) explains this use of *yin* with an agent differing from the informant in terms of ‘empathy’, I suggest that this use of *yin* is characteristic of the broad egophoric meaning it acquired when it became contrasted by a second, allophoric equative copula, after it had been the only equative copula of the language until then. Hence, that Purik *jot* and Dege *yin* may be used to describe events in which the informant does not directly participate points to the fact that both these copulas were originally the only members of their syntactic category, and that they were evidentialized in contrast to an emerging allophoric member of the same category. The following section serves to show that a narrower, strictly egophoric marker likely reflects a first person agreement marker evidentialized in reported speech.

7 The evidentialization of person agreement markers in Bunan

We saw in §2 that the Purik markers containing a reflex of *jot*, described as egophoric because they regularly occur when the informant herself performed the profiled event, also regularly occur when the informant is not a participant of that event. For instance, resultative *V-set* may be used when the informant closely monitored a past event up to its result, prospective *V-et* to describe generic events, which always take place under certain conditions, and plain *jot* whenever the informant has the personal experience to picture a state as a fact. The Purik markers were argued in §§3–5 to occur in the mentioned non-egophoric contexts because they contain the existential copula *yod*, which came to indicate a factual evidential notion viz. unrestricted access to the profiled state when it became contrasted by *'dug* indicating that a state was directly witnessed. In §6, it was shown that, in Central Tibetan, *yod* tended to become restricted to egophoric contexts by derived forms of *yod*, which took over most non-egophoric factual contexts. Nevertheless, the original factual meaning of Central Tibetan *yod* is still revealed in some contexts (e.g., in *bod-la g.yag yod* ‘there are yaks in Tibet’). In §7, we saw that even the equative copula *yin*, which was evidentialized in many Central Tibetan varieties when the suffixes occurring after *yod* were reanalyzed as allophoric equative copulas, may still be employed in equations that do not directly involve the informant, revealing the factual origin also of *yin*, which is still the only equative copula in Purik.

In contrast to Tibetan, egophoric markers in West Himalayish Bunan exclusively occur when the informant is the subject (actor, undergoer, or experiencer) of the profiled event. The following paragraphs demonstrate that the strictly participatory occurrence of egophoric markers in Bunan reflects the fact that they originate from first person agreement markers.

Widmer (2015) makes it clear that the Bunan opposition between egophoric and allophoric viz. conjunct and disjunct present markers derives from an earlier distinction between first and third person agreement markers. Tables 4 and 5 (all tables are from Widmer 2015) contrast the forms Widmer finds in modern Bunan with those documented by August Hermann Francke (1909), and Table 6 shows the diachronic processes that may be inferred.

Table 4: Conjunct and disjunct marking in Bunan (verb *lik*- ‘to make’)

	SG	PL
CJ	<i>lik-tɛ-ek</i>	<i>lik-tɛ-^hek</i>
DJ	<i>lik-tɛ-are</i>	<i>lik-tɛ-^hak</i>

Table 5: Francke’s (1909) present tense paradigm

	SG	PL
1	<i>ligce^a</i>	<i>ligche^a</i>
2	<i>ligcana</i>	<i>ligchagni</i>
3	<i>ligcare</i>	<i>ligchak</i>

Table 6: Proposed reanalysis of person markers

SG		PL
first person	⇒	conjunct
second person	⇒	-
third person	⇒	disjunct

Hence, in Bunan, first and third person agreement markers were respectively reanalyzed as egophoric and allophoric markers. Widmer and Zemp (2017) are able to show that their evidentialization must have been triggered in reported speech clauses. Drawing also on Zemp (2016a), the diverging functions of the Bunan markers documented at different stages, along with other properties of the language as well as comparative

evidence from Sunwar and Dolakha Newar, allow us to neatly reconstruct the evidentialization of person markers in Bunan. A brief sketch of the crucial processes is aimed to demonstrate that an egophoric marker developing from a first person marker is generally unlikely to be employed in describing an event in which the emerging informant is not the subject.

In languages with person agreement markers that may be used in simple and reported speech clauses alike, in reported speech clauses, an event in which the reported speaker was the subject may be referred to by either a third person marker, an indirect form reflecting the current speaker's perspective, or a first person marker, a direct form reflecting the original speaker's perspective. Likewise, a third person marker may be analyzed as reflecting either the original or the current speaker's perspective. We have no means of knowing when, at what stage of earlier Bunan, the perspective of the predicate in reported speech clauses was generalized as always being construed from the perspective of the original speaker, but we know that the generalized perspective of the reported speaker (and later the informant) was a crucial condition for the evidentialization of person agreement markers in reported speech clauses.

Two other processes particular to reported speech clauses make it clear that it was in this clause type that the agreement markers of Bunan were evidentialized. First, we saw above that second person markers found no place in the new binary system. In reported speech clauses, the loss of second person markers is entirely plausible. While second person markers are generally infrequent in simple statements (Widmer and Zemp 2017: 50), they were at some point entirely avoided in reported speech clauses in Bunan, because they were generalized as always being construed in the current speech situation, hence, to always refer to the current addressee and never the addressee of the reported speech event.

Second, like in many other languages of that region, coreferent personal pronouns are deleted in Bunan. This deletion often operates on the very pronouns that would occur in reported speech clauses, namely when a personal pronoun pointing to the reported speaker was already used in the preceding matrix clause, as in (46) and (47). As a consequence, the deletion of coreferential pronouns is a recurring characteristic of hybrid reported speech (Tournadre 2009 [2003], Widmer and Zemp 2017: 66-67). Again, we do not know when the deletion of coreferential pronoun became a rule in Bunan, but we know that it was crucial for the evidentialization of the person markers in that it left the distinction between the reported speaker and other persons to the predicate of the reported speech clause.

(46) *tal=dzi riŋ-k-are tət gjokspa kjuma ra-k-ek*
 3SG=ERG.SG say-INTR-PRS.DJ.SG 3SG quick home come-INTR-PRS.CJ.SG
 'She_i said that she_i will come home soon.'

(47) *tal=dzi riŋ-k-are tət gjokspa kjuma ra-k-are*
 3SG=ERG.SG say-INTR-PRS.DJ.SG 3SG quick home come-INTR-PRS.DJ.SG
 'She_i said that she_i will come home soon.'

The generalization of the reported speaker's perspective in the construal of the predicate in reported speech clauses, which facilitated the evidentialization of the Bunan person markers, likely involved the following steps. At some point, first person markers were conventionalized as always reflecting the perspective of the reported speaker, that is, as always being direct forms. This step was favored by the fact that one only exceptionally quotes other people about one's own actions, and it entailed that one had to use third person markers in such contexts from then on. Recall that until then, third person markers occurring in reported speech clauses could normally be analyzed as reflecting either the original or the current speaker's perspective. When third person markers were conventionalized in reported speech clauses about the current speaker, this prompted the conventionalization of the original speaker's perspective also for third person markers. The earlier stage of Bunan in which the predicate of reported speech clauses was consistently calculated from the perspective of the reported speaker and thus served to point to either the reported speaker or someone else is documented for Sunwar (DeLancey 1992: 58, Widmer and Zemp 2017: 64-65).

The evidentialization of the first and third person agreement markers in Bunan preconditioned that the predicate of reported speech clauses was consistently calculated from the perspective of the reported

speaker. At this stage, the first person marker indicated that the subject of the reported speech clause was the reported speaker, and the third person marker indicated that it was someone else. It was only now that third person markers could be employed to signal outsider access also in contexts in which the reported speaker was the subject. The way former third person markers are used in statements in modern Bunan suggests that they were employed to indicate outsider access when the reported speaker lacked control over an event, as in (48), or when she observed her own actions in a dream or a movie, as in (49).

(48) *gi dat-k-are*
1SG fall-INTR-PRS.DJ.SG
'I am falling!'

(49) *gi ek bar ra-k-are*
1SG one time come-INTR-PRS.DJ.SG
'I appear once (in this video).'

This leaves open the question whether the first person marker was ever used in Bunan when the speaker was the dative experiencer and a stimulus was brought to her. In any case, examples (50) and (51) from modern Bunan show that the former third person marker is also used in such contexts.

(50) *gi=tok karma tant-k-are*
1SG=DAT star see-INTR-PRS.DJ.SG
'I can see the stars.'

(51) *gi=tok soj ts^hor-s-ε-are*
1SG=DAT cold feel-DETR-MID-PRS.DJ.SG
'I feel cold.'

While the third person marker was employed to signal outsider access when the reported speaker was the subject, the first person marker remained to be used when the reported speaker was in control of the profiled event in the reported speech clause or when she had an endopathic sensation, as suggested by the simple statements from modern Bunan given in (52) and (53). That is, the first person marker was reanalyzed as conveying insider access, which better than Hargreaves' (2005) equivalent term 'privileged access' contrasts with the outsider access conveyed by the original third person marker. Since reported speech clauses by default represent insider information, the Bunan first person marker can be said to have absorbed the expression of insider access from their context much like Tibetan *yod* absorbed its factual meaning from evidentially neutral clauses, through a process Croft (2000: 126-127) calls hypoanalysis. Crucial in the present context is the fact that the Bunan first person marker in the course of its evidentialization never expanded the range in which it is used. This means that, unlike Tibetan *yod*, Bunan *-ek* remained strictly egophoric, occurring only in contexts in which the informant participates in the profiled event. Specifically, unlike Tibetan *yod*, the egophoric marker of Bunan never came to describe facts about third persons. Conversely, it was the allophoric original third person marker which expanded its range by becoming employed to signal outsider access in situations that used to be described by the first person marker.

(52) *gi len lik-tε-ek*
1SG work do-TR-PRS.CJ.SG
'I am working.'

(53) *gi tsher-k-ek*
1SG be.sad-INTR-PRS.EGO.SG
'I am sad.'

The strict egophoricity of Bunan *-ek* was also retained when the evidentialized binary opposition with allophoric *-are* was extended from reported speech clauses to simple statements and questions. The extension into statements likely proceeded faster than that into questions. In statements, unlike in questions, second person markers had been rare to begin with, and accordingly the second person markers that had to be replaced by either *-ek* or *-are* were much rarer in statements than in questions. Note that the generalization of the evidentialized binary opposition over the original ternary person agreement distinction implied that the speaker of simple statements and the addressee of simple questions were, like the reported speaker, treated as the persons from which information emanates, that is, as informants.

8 Concluding remarks

Hence, the range in which egophoric and allophoric markers are used synchronically in a given language should allow us to make hypotheses about the origins of the opposition. If an egophoric marker is also used to describe facts about third persons, and if it is opposed to an allophoric marker that indicates direct evidence, this marker likely reflects a once evidentially neutral marker that was only evidentialized when it became opposed to a testimonial marker. Conversely, if an egophoric marker occurs only when the informant is the subject, and if facts about third persons are described by the allophoric marker, the two markers may reflect first and third person agreement markers that were evidentialized in reported speech clauses.

Future research must show whether the scenario reconstructed for Purik Tibetan in this article also applies to oppositions between factual egophoric and testimonial allophoric markers described for other languages. That is, whenever a factual marker is observed to contrast with a testimonial marker, one should consider whether the factual marker may derive from a marker that was evidentially neutral because it was the only member of its syntactic category. At the same time, one should try to determine in which constructions the factual and testimonial meanings mutually define each other most neatly, and address the question whether the testimonial marker may have only secondarily become employed in the syntactic category of the factual marker in these constructions. Of course, one should also consult comparative evidence if available. The insights of the present article may thus help in improving our understanding of egophoric/allophoric oppositions found in other languages of the world, such as Galo, a language spoken in Arunachal Pradesh, North-East India, where *-tó* and *-gée* indicate whether first-hand knowledge “is derived from personal experience or eyewitness” (Post 2013: 117). A primary contrast between participatory/factual and visual/sensory is also found in Oksapmin (Loughnane 2009: ii), Foe (Rule 1977: 72, San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 141), and other languages spoken in Papua New Guinea. In Pole, for instance, two opposed resultative constructions respectively indicating visible and previous evidence (Rule 1977: 52, San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 136) are reminiscent of the perfect **V-s-yod* and **V-s-'dug* reconstructed for Purik. And the visual/sensory past marker of Fasu appears to be derived from the participatory past marker (Loeweke and May 1980: 74, San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 143), suggesting that a neutral marker may not only be evidentialized by equipollent markers. A last case in point mentioned here is Kaike, a language spoken in Nepal, whose contrasting resultative constructions with a conjunct and a disjunct existential copula (Watters 2006: 316) like those of Pole strongly resemble the perfects reconstructed for Purik.

9. Abbreviations

Purik:

ABL: ablative, COND: conditional, CNJ: conjunctive, CRT: certaintive, DAT: dative, DEF: definite article, DRM: dramatizer, DUB: dubitative, (E)MPH: emphatic marker, EQ: equative copula, ERG: ergative, EX.F: factual existential copula, EX.T: testimonial existential copula, G(EN): genitive, IMP: imperative, INE: inessive, INF: infinitive (*-pa*), INF2: prospective infinitive (*-tfa*), INFR: inferential, LIM: limitive, LOC: locative, NEG: negation, NLZR: nominalizer (*-k^han*), PL: plural, POT: potential, PROG: progressive, PST: past tense, Q: interrogative, RES: resultative

Bunan:

1: first person, 2: second person, 3: person, CJ: conjunct, COMP: complementizer, COP: copula, DAT: dative, DJ: disjunct, ERG: ergative, EXPR: expressive vocabulary, EXT: extension particle, FOC: focus, FUT: future, GEN: genitive, HON: honorific, INTR: intransitive, MID: middle, NZR: nominalizer, PART: participle, PFV: perfective, PL: plural, PRS: present tense, PST: past, Q: question, SG: singular, SUG: suggestive, TR: transitive

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