Investigating Inferences in Sequences of Action: The Case of Claiming “Just-Now” Recollection with Oh That’s Right

Abstract: This paper offers an exploratory Interactional Linguistic account of the role that inferences play in episodes of ordinary conversational interaction. To this end, it systematically reconsiders the conversational practice of using the lexico-syntactic format oh that’s right to implicitly claim “just-now” recollection of something previously known, but momentarily confused or forgotten. The analyses reveal that this practice typically occurs as part of a larger sequential pattern that the participants orient to and which serves as a procedure for dealing with, and generating an account for, one participant’s production of an inapposite action. As will be shown, the instantiation and progressive realization of this sequential procedure requires local inferential work from the participants. While some facets of this inferential work appear to be shaped by the particular context of the ongoing interaction, others are integral to the workings of the sequence as such. Moreover, the analyses suggest that participants’ understanding of oh that’s right as embodying an implicit memory claim rests on an inference which is based on a kind of semantic-pragmatic compositionality. The paper thus illustrates how inferences in conversational interaction can be systematically studied and points to the merits of combining an interactional and a linguistic perspective.

Keywords: Interactional Linguistics, Conversation Analysis, inferences, action recognition, forgetfulness, confusion, recollection, oh that’s right

1 Approaching inferences from an Interactional Linguistic perspective

As part of this special issue on the topic of Inferences in Interaction and Language Change, my broader aim in this paper is to offer an Interactional Linguistic perspective on the role of inferences in episodes of ordinary conversational interaction and how they can be studied. With this perspective, the analyses and findings presented in this paper will be germane to, and oscillate between, two larger research domains: Conversation analysis (CA) and linguistics (see Section 2 below).

As an analytic concept, inferences have been much more prominent in mainstream linguistic inquiry than they have in CA. This is especially true for pragmatics and certain strands of text and discourse linguistics, where inferences have been studied from a range of different angles, e.g., with respect to the role they play in language change or in communication more generally (see Deppermann, this issue as well)
as Rosemeyer & Ehmer’s introduction to this issue for an overview). Linguists in these fields often think of inferences as interpretations – typically of additional or implicit (i.e., not semantically represented) meaning components – that recipients derive or deduce from speakers’ utterances in a systematic or rule-governed fashion (see, e.g., Sperber & Wilson 1986, 9-15). This general conception is then often molded in particular, discipline-specific ways (see, e.g., Macagno 2017). In many Gricean and Neo-Gricean studies, for example, inferences are conceived of as the recipient-sided (though not necessarily mirror image) counterpart of implicatures (e.g., Detges n.d., 2). Quite clearly, what a speaker implicates in an utterance, rather than explicitly saying it, needs to be inferred somehow by its recipient (or else can result in misunderstandings). However, as pointed out by Bach (2006, 8-9), recipients’ recognition or reconstruction of implicatures is far from capturing exhaustively all the different facets of inferential work that can be observed in conversational exchanges. Put differently, inferences do not reduce to the recognition of implicatures, as participants to a conversation can infer many other things besides implicatures from an utterance, such as pragmatic presuppositions that the interlocutor holds or information about the co-participant for example (see Levinson 1983, 48-53 for an illustration). Just what participants do in fact infer in actual, real interactional situations has often remained speculative, given that much of this work has been done with the help of constructed examples, thus relying on the intuitive plausibility of analytic claims about these examples.

While CA, in contrast, insists on the use of real interactional data for doing analysis as a methodological imperative, its stance towards the notion of inferences can perhaps best be characterized as ambiguous. On the one hand, CA practitioners have generally shown very little interest in studying inferences or inferential processes per se (but see Pomerantz 2017, see also Walker, Drew & Local 2011), let alone in producing detailed accounts of how they can be related to, or derived from, “what is said”. In part, this is due to the fact that CA’s primary research focus is not so much on (linguistic) meaning(s), but rather on (social) action(s) (cf. Schegloff 1995a, Drew 2017), and the organization of these actions in sequences of actions (e.g., Schegloff 1990, Schegloff 2007). This research focus, together with CA’s analytic reliance on participants’ own displayed understandings of the pragmatic import of prior turns (see Section 2 below), seems to have rendered explications of how implicit, non-lexical, or pragmatic meaning can systematically be derived from linguistic structure somewhat irrelevant, or at best as being of secondary importance (cf. Levinson 2013, Walker, Drew & Local 2011). Another factor that may have contributed to CA’s indifference towards studying inferences could be that they involve cognition or cognitive processes, about which CA practitioners have been hesitant, if not reluctant, to make any claims. While this is not the place to review the methodological merits of an a priori cognitive agnosticism in the analysis of social interaction (see, e.g., Potter & te Molder 2005, Drew 2005, Hopper 2005), it is fair to say that this analytic mentality has had, and continues to have, a constraining or perhaps even an inhibiting effect on the study of phenomena like inferences, which, due to their tacitness, appear to fall into the cognitive domain (see also Deppermann 2012 and Deppermann, this issue).

On the other hand, CA has, of course, recognized the general relevance of inferencing for the accomplishment of mutual understanding in interaction. In fact, the early development of CA has been strongly fostered by Garfinkel’s (1967) insight that participants interpret others’ actions (in conversation as elsewhere) by means of an inferential process that Garfinkel – drawing on Karl Mannheim – called “the documentary method of interpretation”. Oversimplifying a little, this process consists of treating the other’s action(s) as if they were “documents” of an underlying pattern, whose properties can be inferred from the nature of the document (the action), but which is at the same time also used to interpret the document/action in question (see Heritage 1984a, 84-97). The empirical and inductive reconstruction of these underlying patterns (i.e., the sets of practices, methods, and procedures that the participants use to produce and interpret designed-to-be-recognizable actions) by directly observing how members of a society or culture use them to accomplish mutual understanding in talk-in-interaction lies at the heart of what CA sets out to do (cf. Sacks 1995, 226 & 236-237, see also Schegloff 1995b). Some scholars have therefore argued that inferences and inferential processes are actually of central importance to the CA enterprise, and that CA practitioners should therefore not shy away from investigating them (see Deppermann, this issue).

But how, then, can we approach inferences or inferential processes in social interaction from a CA perspective despite the fact that they are not directly observable? That is, how can we study inferences...
systematically without at the same time violating CA's basic methodological principles? What is important for CA is that claims about inferential processes on part of the participants are grounded in the interaction itself, by reference to the visible traces they leave in it (cf. Pomerantz 2017). In this regard, a rather useful conception of inference is already offered by Gumperz (1982). In the course of outlining his interactional sociolinguistic approach, he states:

Conversational inference, as I use the term, is the situated or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in an exchange assess others’ intentions, and on which they base their responses. (Gumperz 1982: 153)

This conception of inference features a number of key elements that are highly compatible with basic CA tenets. For one, it emphasizes the fundamentally situated or context-bound nature of inferences in conversational exchanges. Second, it highlights the procedural character of inferencing, by urging us to think of inferences as processes of interpretation, rather than as more or less static products. Relatedly, rather than resulting in definitive interpretations of (additional, implicit etc.) meaning(s) that can be systematically derived from what is said, this process is viewed as consisting of participants' assessment of each other's pragmatic intentions. And finally, it highlights the relevance of this process for, and its relation to, surrounding talk by pointing out that participants' responses are essentially based on their judgment of what the other might have been up to with their immediately preceding talk. This is commensurate with the fundamental CA tenet that “a pervasively relevant issue (for participants) about utterances in conversation is ‘why that now?’” (Schegloff & Sacks 1973: 299, see also Clift, Drew & Local 2013) and that participants' analysis of what the other(s) might have been up to with their talk is made publicly available (to each other, but thereby also to the analyst) in sequentially subsequent turns (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974, 728-729). In this sense, participants’ next turns necessarily reveal (at least parts of) the inferential work they did (see Pomerantz 2017).

As has been noted in prior CA work (e.g., Pomerantz 1984b, Schegloff 2007, 19-21), inferential processes of this kind become particularly visible in talk when the action that a prior turn projects or makes expectable next is not immediately forthcoming. The resulting silences are then inference-rich and participants’ responses to these silences often display that, and which, inferences have been drawn from the absence of expectably relevant next conduct. This can be seen in Excerpt 1, which is taken from Pomerantz (1984a).

Excerpt 1 [Pomerantz (1984a: 76)]

| A: D’ they have a good cook there? |
| A: Nothing special? |
| B: No, everybody takes their turns |

A's question in l. 01 requests an assessment of a cook and is designed to invite an affirmative (yes-like) answer (cf. Hayano 2013, 405-406, Sidnell 2010, 86-87). When B does not immediately respond affirmatively, a bit of inferentially rich silence ensues (l. 02), and A subsequently reworks the inquiry that initiated the sequence. In l. 03, A then chooses a turn design that reverses the polarity of the question in l. 01 and invites a confirmation for a (more) negative assessment instead (Nothing special?). This reworking clearly shows that A inferred from the silence in l. 02 that B might not think well of the cook after all. Moreover, B's prompt confirmation of the reworked inquiry (l. 04) suggests that this inference was, indeed, licensed by the silence in l. 02.

What examples like this also show is that participants orient to the sequential structures of conversation that CA seeks to identify and describe as being normative in character (cf. Heritage 1984a). The production of an action typically establishes sequential relevancies that the next speaker has to deal with, and that the speaker doing the action normatively expects the next speaker to address. And it is by reference to these

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1 This normativity results from the fact that participants generally rely on the sharedness of their tacitly held commonsense procedures for producing recognizable actions and hold each other morally accountable for their application in both the production and the interpretation of actions (see Garfinkel 1963, Sacks 1995, passim).
expectations and relevancies that clear departures from them, like silences or non-responses, are inference-rich (cf. Heritage 1984a). But by the same token, and by reference to the same sequential relevancies and normative expectations, any conduct that a co-participant produces next will be inferable as carrying out one or the other action in light of what preceded it. As Hutchby & Wooffitt (2008) summarized it:

 [...A] distinctive feature of CA is its position that the sequential and the inferential orders of talk-in-interaction are in fact two sides of the same coin. That is, participants can utilize the sequential ordering of a turn – its place in an unfolding sequence – as a key resource in determining what kind of action its producer is engaged in. (Hutchby & Wooffitt 2008: 42)

And at the same time a particular response will necessarily reveal, to some extent at least, what its speaker inferred the prior speaker to have been up to with their talk. In other words, interactants are permanently “caught up in a web of inferences” (Levinson 1983: 321) which is provided for by the sequential organization of talk and the basic structural relationship of adjacency between turns (cf. Schegloff 2007, 14-16). So while processes of abductive inferential reasoning thus appear to be a major, and perhaps even an indispensable, ingredient in participants’ mutual analysis of their actions and their ability to produce contextually appropriate next turns/actions (see Deppermann 2012, Levinson 2006a, Levinson 2006b, Heritage 1984a), these processes only become visible in the sequential unfolding of talk and can only be reconstructed from the ways in which participants’ actions constitute each other as they emerge sequentially.

Therefore, what is needed if we want to study inferences or inferential processes in episodes of naturally occurring conversational interaction is a sequential approach. What is more, because the sequential context of a turn/an utterance furnishes inferential affordances for the participants, it appears useful to focus on recurrent and relatively stable sequential environments whose orderly accomplishment the participants can be shown to orient to. In such relatively stable sequential environments, it should be possible to systematically reconstruct the inferential work that the participants have to engage in to talk the pattern into existence.

This is the approach that I will adopt in the following, thereby proposing it as one possible way to systematically investigate inferences or inferential processes in interaction from a CA-informed linguistic perspective (see Section 2 on data and method). To minimize preliminaries, I will take a conversational practice that is well-attested in prior CA work as my point of departure. The practice consists of participants’ use of the lexico-syntactic format oh that’s right to (implicitly) claim “just-now” recollection of something previously known but not taken into account as relevant (Section 3.1). Supplementing earlier accounts of this practice, I will demonstrate in Section 3.2 that it is normally deployed as part of a larger sequential pattern that participants can be shown to orient to as a sequentially organized procedure for dealing with inapposite actions (their inappositeness resulting from the fact that they are based on false presumptions). This will prepare the ground for my subsequent discussion of the role that inferences play in the progressive realization of this sequence type (Section 4). This discussion will proceed in two steps, starting with a reconstruction of the inferential work that participants have to engage in throughout the turns that lead up to the memory claim embodied by oh that’s right (Section 4.1). Since, linguistically speaking, participants’ claim to “just-now” recollection by uttering oh that’s right is implicit in nature, I will then sketch a systematic basis for how participants infer the pragmatic import of oh that’s right as embodying such a claim (Section 4.2). As I will show, this inference rests on a kind of semantic-pragmatic compositionality of the change-of-state token oh and the format that’s right. In Section 5, I will summarize the different kinds of inferential work that figure in the progressive realization of this sequence type and use these findings to reassess the role that inferences play in conversational interaction more generally. I will end with proposing that inferences in interaction are a domain that invites further research from a CA and/or a CA-informed linguistic perspective.

2 Outside CA, the notion of adjacency has become most strongly associated with a special kind of structural unit in the organization of conversational talk, namely the adjacency pair (cf. Schegloff & Sacks 1973, Schegloff 2007). However, adjacency has a more general sense in CA; one that extends beyond the rather rigid organizational form of the adjacency pair. In this more general sense, adjacency is understood as a basic structural relationship between turns-at-talk which can be formulated as follows: “[A]bsent any provision to the contrary, any turn will be heard as addressed to the just prior, that is, the one it is next after” (Schegloff 2006: 86, see also Heritage 1984a, 260-264, Drew 1997: 76, and Sacks 1987).
2 Data and method

The methodological framework for this paper is Interactional Linguistics (see inter alia Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2001, Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2018, Barth-Weingarten 2008, Fox et al. 2013, Deppermann 2007). Interactional Linguistics (hereafter IL) seeks to empirically study linguistic phenomena in their natural habitat in social interaction by using CA methodology, i.e., by subjecting recordings of natural interactional data to qualitative and inductive micro-analyses (see Heritage 1984a: chapter 8, Schegloff 2007, Sidnell 2010, Sidnell & Stivers 2013, Clift 2016). Like CA, IL “treats speech as an ongoing or emergent product in a social semiotic event and language as providing one set of resources for the accomplishment of goals or tasks within this event” (Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2001: 3). What distinguishes CA from IL is that, whereas CA is traditionally primarily interested in the principles (or as CA practitioners prefer to call it the organizations of practices and actions) that underlie social interaction more generally (see, e.g., Schegloff 1997, Schegloff 2010), IL focuses more strongly on the linguistic features of conversational practices. So IL is primarily interested in discovering “how languages are shaped by interaction and how interactional practices are molded through specific languages” (Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2001: 3) by investigating how the resources of any given language are deployed in the service of implementing social actions and organizing interactions. A distinctive methodological aspect of both approaches is that the researcher needs to show that the identified conversational or linguistic practices and methods are real and relevant for the participants themselves. So CA and IL adopt a participant (an “emic”) perspective and require the analyst to warrant their analytic claims by reference to participants’ conduct in the data in question, i.e., by adducing evidence from the interaction itself that the participants are demonstrably oriented to the identified features or practices in conducting their interactions. Most commonly, this is done by looking at the next (or sequentially subsequent) turn(s), because it is there that participants most visibly display what they understood the immediately preceding turn(s) to have accomplished (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974, 728-729). This has come to be known as the “next-turn proof procedure” (see Hutchby & Wooffitt 2008: 13, Sidnell 2013, 79-92).

The database for this study consists of roughly 20 hours of audio-recorded British English (BrE) and American English (AmE) telephone calls. A substantial amount of this data (roughly 14.5 hours) comes from traditional CA corpora, which were recorded at various points between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s (see Appendix A for a more detailed overview of the data (corpora) that formed the database for this study). Approximately 8 hours of this material represent data from speakers of AmE, the remaining 6.5 hours represent data from speakers of BrE. These traditional CA corpora were supplemented by an additional 5 hours of recordings from the CallFriend corpus (AmE, recorded in the mid-1990s). The combined data sets were then systematically inspected for occurrences of oh that’s right and relevant portions of the data have been (re-)transcribed according to the GAT 2 conventions for English (Couper-Kuhlen & Barth-Weingarten 2011) in order to make them accessible for repeated and detailed inspection (see Appendix B for a glossary of the transcription symbols). A few more cases were added opportunistically (e.g., when encountering a relevant fragment during teaching preparations). This procedure yielded a collection of 22 instances of oh that’s right uses, the great majority of which were found in the AmE data. With two exceptions, one of which can be seen in Excerpt 5 below, all of them are produced as a single turn-constructional unit (TCU) (cf. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974) and without a clear intonation break after oh. All 22 instances in the collection were then subjected to detailed sequential analysis. While the analyses were performed on a case-by-case basis in order to respect the particularity and the integrity of every single case (cf. Schegloff 1997, Schegloff 2010).

3 Fox et al. (2013) rightly point out, though, that this difference is not categorical and that the “disciplinary boundaries” between CA and IL can occasionally blur or be muted in IL studies.
4 The CallFriend corpus is available online at http://talkbank.org/access/CABank/ (last access: March 1st, 2017) and was used with friendly permission from representatives of the TalkBank Project (MacWhinney 2007).
5 It is not the aim of this paper to make any variationist claims about differences in use between BrE and AmE. Indeed, the heterogeneous composition of the database precludes making any such claims. The passing mention of the skewed distribution of oh that’s right in the data sets used here is to be understood as a first ‘plain observation’. I leave it to future variationist and/or corpus linguistic investigations to confirm or disconfirm its validity.
2005), the individual cases were then also compared and inspected for common features in the aggregate. The examples shown here to illustrate and warrant more general claims thus stand as representatives for the entire collection.

3 On oh that’s right in conversation

In the next two sections, I will illustrate central aspects of participants’ use of the lexico-syntactic format oh that’s right in conversation. Based on prior CA research, I will begin with recapitulating the pragmatic import of this format, establishing it as a conversational practice that participants use to claim “just-now” recollection (Section 3.1). Supplementing these earlier accounts, I will then show that this practice commonly occurs in sequential contexts that follow a relatively regular and stable pattern (Section 3.2). This pattern seems to reflect a sequentially organized procedure or sequence type that participants engage in to deal with inapposite actions – inapposite in that they are based on false presumptions. With this procedure, participants jointly and systematically produce a ‘cognitive’ account for these actions, namely momentary forgetfulness or confusion and subsequent recollection on part of the doer of the problematic action. These sections will prepare the ground for my subsequent discussion of the role that inferences play in the progressive realization of this sequence type (Section 4).

3.1 The pragmatic import of oh that’s right

CA researchers have repeatedly taken note of participants’ use of the composite lexico-syntactic format oh that’s right. To the best of my knowledge, the earliest description of its pragmatic import dates back to a footnote to Heritage’s (1984b) seminal paper on the change-of-state token oh, where he notes that speakers of English can use oh that’s right to claim “just-now’ recollection of something known but not previously taken into account as relevant” (Heritage 1984b: 339). The apparent adequacy of this characterization is reflected in the fact that it has been re-invoked several times in later CA and CA-informed papers (e.g., Schegloff 1991, Local 1996, Stivers 2005, Couper-Kuhlen 2012). Most commonly, this description has been warranted by reference to the following example, in which Shirley offers her friend Geri a place to stay in San Francisco over Christmas.


01 Shi: °hh SO:;
02 it’s a fOur bedroom HOU:SE.
03 (0.2)
04 Ger: m_[HM, ]
05 Shi: °hh so if yOu guys want a plAce to STA:Y;
06 (0.3)
07 Ger: ((click)) °hh oh w’ll THA:NK you;=
08 =but you we ha’
09 <<l> you KNOW;>=
10 =VICtor.
11 -> Shi: <<h, f> °H;=
12 -> =that’s °RI:GHT.>=
13 Ger: =thAt’s why we were GO:ing;=
14 =[ we ]
15 -> Shi: =[[<<h, f> i ] forGO:T;=
16 -> =comPLE:tely.>
17 Ger: YE:AH;
When Geri rejects Shirley’s offer by reference to a mutual acquaintance named Victor (l. 07-10), Shirley responds with ‘that’s right’ in l. 11-12. The beauty of this example lies in the fact that Shirley subsequently makes explicit what her ‘that’s right’ had conveyed implicitly before. In l. 15-16, she confesses that she forgot about (and, by implication, now remembers – note the past tense in ‘forgetting’) the fact that Victor lives in San Francisco and that local accommodation is therefore not a problem for Geri and her partner. This constitutes uncontroversial evidence that Shirley used the ‘that’s right’ in l. 11-12 to claim “just-now” recollection of this fact.

However, such subsequent “unpackings” are infrequent in the data, and they are certainly not necessary to hear “that’s right” as embodying a claim to “just-now” recollection. This can be seen in Excerpt 3, in which two friends, named Sarah and Debbie, are updating each other on their future endeavors.

Excerpt 3 [CFEngn6239:Rejected, 07:38-07:54]

01 Sar: and I decided to apply to the Monterey: international
       <<creaky, dim> Management program.>
02 (0.8)
03 because ((silent yawning for 1.4 seconds))
04 i’m talking the Gee mat Anyway;=
05 =<<creaky, dim> in January,>==<<p, breathy> and-> h°
06 (0.9)
07 Deb: you’re not gonna apply (to) the translation program?
08 (0.5)
09 Sar: i DID=  
10 =i got [rejected.]=  
11 -> Deb: [<<p O: that’s] [RI:ght.> ]  
12 Sar: =[and they sEnt me a NOther
       rejection notice,=
13 =for n[O REASON;]=  
14 Deb: =[ha ha ha °(i)hh ]=
15 Sar: =<<h> like rIght O:ver n thanks] rIving;>

Even without any explicit mentioning of “having forgotten” and/or “now remembering” in this excerpt, Debbie’s ‘that’s right’ in l. 11 is, in light of what went on before (see l. 07-10), hearable as indexing that, contrary to what Debbie’s candidate understanding in l. 07 had suggested, she actually knew that Sarah did apply to the translation program (and perhaps also that she got rejected), but that she had momentarily forgotten this and only now remembered it.6 I will return to the details of this case shortly, but for now, we can record the following: ‘that’s right’ is a conversational practice with which its producer claims to “just-now” remember something previously known, but which s/he had momentarily forgotten or not taken into account as relevant. Moreover, as can be seen from participants’ ability to make this “meaning” explicit (as in Excerpt 2), uttering ‘that’s right’ only indexes (or indexically points to) such a claim. However, given the relative infrequency of such subsequent “unpackings”, the claim to forgetfulness and subsequent

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6 As Sacks’ points out in his discussion of “The baby cried. The mommy picked it up.”, which he begins by noting that “the mommy” can be heard to be the mother of the baby, establishing that an utterance is hearable in a certain way by reference to the analyst’s, the reader’s, or any other’s understanding of it is merely an explication of a bit of vernacular knowledge and is not to be viewed as a finding or as constituting analysis. Instead, it marks the potential starting point for an analysis in that it posits a research problem, namely how it is possible that the utterance is hearable that way (cf. Sacks 1995, 236-237, see also Schegloff 1995b: xli).
recollection embodied by *oh that's right* usually remains linguistically implicit. How is it possible, then, that a combination of *oh* and *that's right* can embody such an implicit claim? As we shall see in the next section, part of an answer to this question can be found in the sequential contexts in which *oh that's right* occurs.

### 3.2 Sequential aspects of the practice

It is noteworthy that, across instances, there seems to be a relatively consistent and systematic pattern to the way in which conversational sequences featuring *oh that's right* uses are organized. This sequential pattern consists of three steps that are realized in three (often, but not necessarily, consecutive) turns and can be generalized as follows: The pattern begins with speaker A producing a first turn that implements some action (e.g., asking a question, forwarding a candidate understanding, making an offer). With this turn, speaker A typically displays or makes otherwise publicly visible a presupposition or some sort of pragmatic background assumption s/he holds. Usually, these presumptions can be seen to have informed the very production of the action that the turn delivers. In a second step, the co-participant B responds with what can be vernacularly glossed as a ‘reminder’ (of sorts). More technically speaking, this response, which is typically delivered in the form of a declarative statement, retrospectively launches (or activates) a sequence from second position. In other words, it initiates a retro-sequence (see Schegloff 2007, 217-219 for a fuller account) and performs a multi-faceted action which does several things at once. On the one hand, it challenges A’s action by undermining, rejecting, or even correcting the presumption A’s turn conveyed. On the other hand, it positions A as (actually or in fact) knowing better than what his/her first turn suggests, while simultaneously offering a clue as to what the problem may be with A’s turn (or specifically with the presumption it conveyed). So, as is typical of turns that initiate retro-sequences, B’s response has a retrospective and a prospective dimension. By exposing two incompatible knowledge states about a given state of affairs, it treats the action implemented by A’s preceding turn as problematic and holds A accountable for its production. At the same time, however, it exerts prospective response-relevance. By providing or pointing to relevant information and by conveying that A should know this information, B’s response already invokes momentary confusion or forgetfulness on A’s part and proposes this as a possible account for A’s production of the problematic first action. In fact, these ‘reminders’ often look very similar to counter-informings (Robinson 2009), except that they additionally convey that A should already know the information provided. In essence, this ascription amounts to an implicit socio-epistemic challenge (cf. Heritage 2013a, 379-383) that A can then either accept or reject in the next turn. In the third step, A then responds with *oh that’s right*, thereby claiming, as we have seen in the previous section, “just-now” recollection of what B has just presented not only as relevant information but also as information that A should know. With this, A essentially embraces the epistemic attributions made in B’s response and, in doing so, registers the inadequacy of the first action and withdraws the action as well as its sequential implications. This is suggested by the fact that the production of *oh that’s right* typically leads to sequence closure. Often, B either minimally acknowledges A’s claim to “just-now” recollection (e.g., with *yeah*), or one of the participants simply moves on to next matters. Both participants thus treat the production of the problematic first action as having been sufficiently accounted for and in no need of further interactive, remedial work. Figure 1 summarizes this abstract sequential pattern schematically.

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7 As I have shown elsewhere, explicit cognitive attributions to self post *oh that’s right* (such as *I forgot* or *my brain is so fried*) are accountable actions in their own right, whose occurrence can often be explained by reference to particular features of the context in which they are produced (Küttner 2016, 149-153).
To see how this pattern manifests itself in real data, let us now return to Excerpt 3, the relevant portion of which will be repeated here for convenience. I will continue to use numbered arrows in the margin to mark the turns that realize the individual steps of the pattern.

Excerpt 3’ [CFEngn6239:Rejected, detail]

((Sarah and Debbie are friends. They are updating each other on their future endeavors.))

(6 lines omitted)

07  1-> Deb:  you’re no:t gonna applY (to) the transLAtion progra:m?
08                   (0.5)
09  2-> Sar:  i ↑↑DID?=      
10   (2->)       =i ↓got [re↑JE:Cted. ]=
11  3-> Deb:           [<<p> O:h that’s] [RI:GHT. ]
12      Sar:                             =[and they ↑sE]nt me a↑↑NOther
13      rejEction notice,=
14      =for n[O ↑↑REA:son;]=
15      Deb:         [hh°
16                   ]=
17             =[ ha ha ha *(i)hh
18      Sar:   =[<<h> like rIght O:ver n thanks]↑↑GIving;>

In l. 07 of this fragment, Debbie forwards a candidate understanding, offering what she inferred from Sarah’s preceding announcement for confirmation (cf., e.g., Heritage 1984b: 319, Antaki 2012), namely that Sarah has decided to abandon her previous plan of applying to the translation program. This turn houses a presupposition that Debbie holds: That Sarah did not yet make an attempt at applying to the translation program (note the future tense and the negative in you’re no:t gonna applY (to) the transLAtion progra:m?). Therefore, it is potentially hearable as being advice-implicative, implying that Sarah should apply (cf. Shaw,
This presupposition and the possibly resultant overtones of advice in Debbie’s turn are what Sarah takes issue with in her response, which retroactively renders Debbie’s turn in l. 07 the first turn of the sequential pattern I sketched above. After a bit of silence (l. 08), Sarah responds with a counter-informing i↑↑DID?=i↓got re↑JE:Cted (l. 09-10). The first part of this turn – the pro-termed repeat i↑↑DID? – removes the negative from Debbie’s candidate understanding, transforms the tense to simple past, and thereby rejects the presupposition it contained. Moreover, Sarah’s turn is at least equivocally designed as a reminder of sorts, conveying that Debbie should actually know that Sarah did apply to the translation program. This is suggested by two design features of Sarah’s turn: First, she is using the most minimal lexico-syntactic design that is available for rejecting the presupposition in Debbie’s turn (Sarah could, in principle, also have used a full repeat like Well I did apply, but I got rejected, for example, which would present this as news of some sort). Note, in this regard, that Sarah also abstains from using any turn-initial preface (such as well or oh) to signal, introduce, or downtone her upcoming rejection of the presupposition contained in Debbie’s turn (see Heritage 1998, Heritage 2015). And secondly, with the high pitched high-rising intonation contour on ↑↑DID?, Sarah prosodically contextualizes puzzlement about Debbie’s inquiry or perhaps even surprise at being asked such a thing (cf. Keisanen 2007: 260 & 276). In retrospect, the preceding silence (i.e., the timing of the response) further contributes to this contextualization.

With this response, which makes the epistemic attribution that Debbie should know better than what her candidate understanding suggests, Sarah implicitly issues a socio-epistemic challenge. And Debbie hears it that way by coming in with a quietly produced O:h that’s RI:GHT (l. 11), which embraces this epistemic attribution by claiming “just-now” recollection, just before the main content word of Sarah’s continuation with ↓got re↑JE:Cted has been produced. So the timing of Debbie’s O:h that’s RI:GHT embodies the interactional claim that she has been able to revise her initial presupposition on the basis of Sarah’s ↑↑DID? alone (which is why I put the marker 2-> before the talk in l. 10 in parentheses). In overlap with Debbie’s recollection claim, Sarah transforms the current sequential trajectory by immediately adding information about recent related events which, unlike the previous information about her having been rejected, are indeed news to Debbie, namely that the institution sending out the rejection notices was making its decision unnecessarily clear by sending her a second one at an undue time (l. 12-13, 15). With the continuous production of her turn

That these design features contribute to making Sarah’s ↑↑DID? in l. 09 at least equivocally hearable as a reminder (as opposed to a ‘mere’ or ‘plain’ counter-informing) becomes clear when comparing it to cases like the following. Here, Roberta’s declaratively formatted topic-proffering candidate understanding in l. 02 receives a lexico-syntactically more substantial response with final falling intonation (well i↑DID go to Italy. in l. 04). Note also the additional well-preface, which projects a dispreferred or disaligning but not a challenging response.

Liz’s response is met with a newsmark (<<ff> you ↑↑`DID?> in l. 05) which is prosodically designed to convey ‘surprise’ (cf. Wilkinson & Kitzinger 2006). This treatment generates a longish telling sequence about Liz’s trip to Italy, which begins with Liz giving an account for why she did not send Roberta a postcard (l. 09-10 and data not shown). Liz’s account suggests that Roberta could not have known that Liz ended up travelling to Italy after all and treats Roberta’s surprised newsmark as an appropriate response. Here, then, both participants treat Liz’s trip to Italy as ‘news’ to Roberta and orient to Liz’s turn in l. 04 as a counter-informing rather than a reminder of something Roberta should expectably know. Cases like these render Sarah’s turn-design choices in Excerpt 3 remarkable, suggesting that they are potentially implicated in making her turn in l. 09 at least equivocally hearable as a reminder.
over Debbie’s recollection claim, Sarah virtually ‘buries’ Debbie’s admission of forgetfulness (which is not to say that she hasn’t heard and/or registered it), and sequentially deletes it (as well as her reminder in l. 09-10) by simply moving on to another bit of informing. Sarah thereby minimizes the exposure of Debbie’s memory lapse, whose parenthetic invocation and admission serves as a jointly produced account for Debbie’s inapposite advice-implicative candidate understanding, and glosses over its interactional and interpersonal significance. As a result, Debbie is able to receipt Sarah’s response as a whole with laughter (l. 14), displaying amusement at Sarah’s slightly overdramatic report of having been rejected twice, instead of having to deal extensively with the interactionally rather delicate issue of having forgotten about an incident in Sarah’s life which may have important ramifications for her future career.

With minor modifications, the same sequential pattern can be observed in Excerpt 2. Shirley’s offer (l. 01-02, 05) displays her presumption that local accommodation might be a problem for Geri (step 1->). Geri then undermines this presumption (and thus the relevance of Shirley’s offer) by making reference to a mutually known acquaintance who lives in San Francisco. Note Geri’s appeal to shared knowledge by inserting <<l> you KNOW;> (l. 09) just before naming the acquaintance as well as her use of the recognitional reference form VICtor in l. 10 (cf. Sacks & Schegloff 1979) in this regard. Inasmuch as Shirley could have known about Victor and the possibility that Geri and her partner stay with him, this, too, positions Shirley as potentially knowing better than what her offer suggests (step 2->); an epistemic attribution that is embraced by Shirley’s claim to “just-now” recollection with oh that’s right (step 3->).9

Relatively stable and consistent sequential patterns like this one are typically reflections of participants’ routinized ways of dealing with recurring tasks or managing recurrent problems in interaction (cf. Schegloff 1986, Schegloff 2006). In this case, the described pattern can be conceived of as a sequentially organized procedure that participants engage in to deal with, and to produce an account for, actions that are inapposite or problematic because they are based on what participants treat and attend to as flawed presuppositions or false presumptions. The characterization of the pattern as a sequentially organized procedure is warranted by reference to the fact that participants orient to it as such, as can be seen from cases in which the respondent initially takes a different tack. In Excerpt 4, for example, Emma and Lottie, who are sisters, are about to close their phone call, when Emma proffers a conjecture about the starting time of Lottie’s work shift (l. 01-02). As it turns out, this conjecture is factually flawed. But rather than invoking forgetfulness on Emma’s part, Lottie initially does something else, as is indicated by the exclamation marks preceding the numbered arrows in the margin.


01 1-> Emm:  you’d (gOing/gOne) to WORK? uh=
02 1-> Lot:  yOU don’t go to wOrk till “THREE::,
03 (0.4)
04 !2-> Lot:  FOUR:.
05 (0.6)
06 !3-> Emm:  [oh;=FOUR. ]
07 2-> Lot:  [todAy’s SA:]turday.
08 (0.2)
09 3-> Emm:  ↑^OH;=
10 3-> =<<dim> ↑that’s <<creaky> RI:GHT.>>
11 Lot:  YEA:H;
12 Emm:  ^huh <<h, f, acc> ↑A::ND i’ll sEe you NEXT week;>

9 Beyond these sequential similarities, the two fragments differ, however. Interactionally, Shirley is arguably not under the same kind of obligation to remember Victor or the fact that he lives in San Francisco (although Geri later upgrades its relevance with that’s why we were GO:ing in l. 13) as Debbie is with respect to the rejection of Sarah’s application to the translation program (but see Heritage 2005: 189 on the interactional significance of Shirley’s recollection claim to prevent a possible hearing of her offer as having been ‘phony’). Moreover, offering something of potential benefit to somebody (e.g., assistance), even if what is offered turns out to be useless or uncalled for, appears to be a much less problematic action than forwarding a potentially advice-implicative candidate understanding which is based on false presumptions. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to these interactional differences.
In l. 04, again after a bit of silence (l. 03), Lottie responds with a minimal factual correction of Emma’s conjecture, or in more technical terms an “other-initiated other-repair” (cf. Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977). While this correction also holds Emma accountable for having made a “mistake”, it doesn’t position Emma as potentially knowing better at this point in the sequence (it is also not done with the marked prosody that we saw on Sarah’s correcting reminder i ↑↑ DID? in Excerpt 3). In other words, Lottie’s response doesn’t provide any resources that would enable Emma to reconcile the exposed incompatibility of her expectations with the state of affairs Lottie has just presented as the correct one. During the subsequent 0.6 seconds of silence (l. 05), Emma can be seen to wait for such reconciliatory information and Lottie can be seen to withhold it (cf. Robinson 2009). With her oh;=FOUR in l. 06, Emma then accepts Lottie’s counter-informing correction and treats it as having imparted news of some sort. There is nothing in principle which would prevent Emma from (unilaterally) claiming “just-now” recollection at this point in the sequence with oh that’s right, but we can note that Lottie’s response so far didn’t position Emma as, in fact, knowing better than what her conjecture suggests. Just at this point, however, Lottie extends her response with a turn-component which does just that. Her assertion that today’s SA:turday (l. 07) serves as a reminder of some sort and invokes Emma’s confusion of today with a weekday as an account for the faultiness of Emma’s conjecture. That is, it positions Emma as knowing about Lottie’s different working hours on the weekend. It is only now that Emma responds with ↑^OH;=<<dim> ↓that’s <<creaky> RI:GHT.>> (l. 09-10), thereby aligning with this epistemic attribution, before moving on to closing the call (l. 12) – which suggests that her false conjecture has been sufficiently dealt with and accounted for.

Further evidence for the claim that this sequential pattern is the outcome of a sequentially organized procedure, whose orderly accomplishment the participants orient to, can be found in Excerpt 5, in which Debbie has just explained how she came to make the decision to call Sarah. As part of her appreciation of Debbie’s call, Sarah reports that Bryn – a mutual friend – has previously tried to arrange a phone call between the two, suggesting that Sarah should call Debbie from her mother’s place, presumably in order to save her the costs of making the call (l. 01-05). This report occasions an inquiry from Debbie in l. 06 as to whether Sarah actually followed through with Bryn’s suggestion and is at her mother’s house.

Excerpt 5 [CFEn6239:Mom’s house, 03:51-04:05]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Sar:  &lt;&lt;:-)&gt; but It’s a gOod thing you CA:LL,=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>=becAuse i tOtally apPREciaʔ&gt;=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>=BRYN was lIke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>°h &lt;&lt;stylized, h&gt; i THINK you should cA:ll debbie from your &lt;&lt;creaky&gt; mOm’s house.&gt;&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>h° [he he he he]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>1-&gt; Deb:  [a:h;=are yo]u at your MO:M’S?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>!2-&gt; Sar:  ↑↑^NO;=</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 08   | !3-> Deb:  =[<<p> NO;>]
| 09   | !2-> Sar:  =[  i’m   ] at ↑↑MYʔ? |
| 10   | (.) |
| 11   | !3-> Deb:  [<<creaky> o:h.>]
| 12   | 2-> Sar:  yO[u] j ust cA:ll me <<creaky> BA::CK.> |
| 13   | (0.3) |
| 14   | 3-> Deb:  <<p, l> aO::H; |
| 15   | 3-> that’s <<creaky> RI:GHT.>> |

Debbie’s question in l. 06 makes visible her presumption of not knowing exactly where Sarah currently is, or more specifically of not knowing whether she is at her mother’s house or not. And it is this presumption which turns out to be problematic. Although Sarah begins to answer Debbie’s question with a type-conforming response in l. 07 (cf. Raymond 2003), her ↑↑^NO with a high-pitched rising-falling intonation contour is prosodically designed to indicate that Sarah takes issue with some aspect of this question (cf.
Raymond 2010). In overlap with Debbie’s acknowledging receipt (l. 08), Sarah continues her response with what would arguably have become \textit{i’m at ↑↑MY (place)} – again an other-initiated other-repair or correction which doesn’t position Debbie as knowing better than what her question suggests. In l. 12, however, Sarah abandons this turn-component and transforms her response to a socio-epistemically challenging reminder \textit{you just cA:lled me <<creaky> BA::CK.>}. Note how these two response options are also distinctly attended to by Debbie. The incipient correction receives only a stand-alone \textit{<<creaky> o:h.>} (l. 11), whereas the challenging reminder is met with a version of \textit{oh that’s right} (l. 14-15). As was noted earlier, this is only one of two cases in the entire collection in which \textit{oh that’s right} is produced with a clear intonation break after \textit{oh}, that is as two separate TCUs (\textit{oh + that’s right}). In terms of the pragmatic import of Debbie’s turn in l. 14-15 and the shape of the sequence as a whole, this does not seem to have any effects. However, it can be taken to reflect Debbie’s orientation to the fact that Sarah’s challenging reminder in l. 12 makes relevant more from Debbie than a mere indication of having undergone a change of state from misinformed to now correctly informed with \textit{oh} (cf. Heritage 1984b). So Debbie can be seen to adjust her response on-line by producing the \textit{that’s <<creaky> RI:GHT.>>} in l. 15 as an increment to her turn (cf. Schegloff 1996a) so as to align more strongly with the sequential relevancies that Sarah’s reminder established.

More generally, cases like the ones in Excerpt 4 and Excerpt 5 also evince participants’ orientation to the sequential pattern summarized in Figure 1 above and warrant its characterization as a sequentially organized (and systematically achieved) procedure for dealing with inapposite first actions. The pragmatic merit of this procedure is that it yields an observable and reportable “cognitive” account for the occurrence of these actions (cf. Drew 2005). And it does so very effectively, without escalating the threat to intersubjectivity that the inappropriateness of the first action poses. Even as innocent bystanders or overhearers of their talk, we would be able to report that one of the participants in the examples above had simply been confused or momentarily forgotten something relevant, but then remembered it. As we have seen, this account is generated jointly (by both participants), procedurally (over the developing course of these sequences), and methodically. Put differently, \textit{oh that’s right} typically occurs in sequential environments that systematically provide for, or invite, its speaker to claim “just-now” recollection post momentary confusion or a memory lapse. Moreover, the procedure and the memory claim it engenders are extremely versatile interactional objects (or means) which can be deployed to deal with, and often to ultimately withdraw, various types of inapposite actions with different degrees of social or interpersonal delicacy. As we have seen, the inapposite actions that are handled with this procedure range from socially rather unproblematic ones, such as one participant making an expendable offer (Excerpt 2), to interpersonally more delicate ones, such as when friends and family members (e.g., siblings) forward potentially advice-implicative actions which are based on false presumptions (Excerpt 3) or factually wrong conjectures about the other’s daily routine (Excerpt 4), to queries which call one’s competence as a member who lives up to general normative expectations of epistemic responsibility into question (Excerpt 5, see Stivers, Mondada & Steensig 2011). Most of the times, however, forgetfulness or confusion and subsequent recollection are only implicitly invoked in these sequences (recall that subsequent explicit claims like in Excerpt 2 are infrequent), which is why this sequence-type virtually lends itself to a more detailed exploration of how inferences figure in its progressive realization.

4 Inferences in \textit{oh that’s right} sequences

This section is concerned with a systematic reconstruction of the inferential work that is required from the participants when engaging in the sequentially organized procedure that was described in the preceding section. This account will consist of two parts. I will first discuss the inferential underpinnings of the turns leading up to \textit{oh that’s right} in the outlined sequential pattern (Section 4.1), and then offer a sketch of how participants can be seen to infer the pragmatic import of \textit{oh that’s right} as claiming “just-now” recollection somewhat compositionally from the pragmatic import of its constituent parts (Section 4.2).

10 As I have shown elsewhere, participants can also use this procedure reflexively, e.g., to retroactively provide for the “non-askability” of a question (see Küttner 2016, 141-145).
4.1  Inferential underpinnings of the sequence leading up to oh that's right

As was noted earlier, each next turn necessarily reveals at least some of the inferences its speaker has drawn from the (immediately) preceding talk, especially in environments that exhibit an underlying sequential organization whose orderliness the participants can be shown to orient to. In this respect, the relatively stable and recurrent sequential pattern described in the previous section provides a solid framework in which the participants’ inferential work can be systematically reconstructed on a turn-by-turn basis.

Let me begin this reconstructive account with speaker A’s first action (step 1-> in the pattern) and the inferential work B has to do in order to respond with a socio-epistemically challenging reminder which invokes forgetfulness or confusion on A’s part (step 2-> in the pattern). First, B must of course recognize the presuppositions contained in A’s first action and/or the pragmatic presumptions on which it is based (i.e., answer the question ‘why that now’). Depending on how accessible these are from the talk or the nature of the action itself, their recognition may require more or less inferential work from B. In Excerpt 3, for example, Debbie’s presumption that Sarah did not yet make an attempt at applying to the translation program is expressed by her use of the future tense and the negative in you’re not gonna apply (to) the translation program? (l. 07). It is thus directly accessible from the linguistic design of her turn and its recognition arguably requires very little (if any) inferential work on Sarah’s part.11 Similarly, the fact that Debbie’s turn in l. 06 of Excerpt 5 (are you at your mom’s?) is hearable as performing the action of asking a question can be seen to conventionally convey her presumption of not knowing exactly where Sarah currently is (cf. Heritage 2013a, Heritage 2013b). Thus, the recognition of this pragmatic presumption arguably does not require much inferential work from Sarah either. This is different in Excerpt 4, where what turns out to be problematic about the first action (Emma’s conjecture) is a tacit background assumption. Here, Lottie has to infer from Emma’s conjecture about her (Lottie’s) starting time at work that one possible basis for its falsehood could have been the fact that Emma tacitly mistook “today” for a weekday. It is only because Lottie can inferentially reconstruct this possible misapprehension on Emma’s part, that she can offer today’s Saturday (l. 07) as a possible clue to what went wrong with Emma’s conjecture. To put this more generally, if they are not directly recognizable from the linguistic design or the nature of the first action itself, B may have to infer which presumption(s) could have formed the basis for A’s production of the problematic first action.

Moreover, B must assess these presumptions against the background of what can be, or should be, intersubjectively established and find that A’s action is based on presumptions that conflict with what B expects to be part of their common ground (cf. Clark 1996, Enfield 2006, Sidnell 2014). This requires some sort of participant tracking of what the other can be reasonably expected to know, given common sense and their shared interactional history. That is, it requires what Schegloff (1991: 164) has called “interactional bookkeeping” and what Heritage (2012: 25) has called an “epistemic ticker”.

Further, B must hear A’s action as being genuinely intended. Now, as Garfinkel (1963, 1967) has shown, this appears to be a default assumption in what Schütz (1945, 1962) called “the natural attitude of daily life”. However, in light of what appear to be actions that are based on background assumptions that noticeably (for the participants, that is) depart from what should be in the common ground (e.g., the caller asking the called party on a landline where s/he is), it is certainly possible that B could come to the conclusion that A’s first action is not genuine or tongue-in-cheek (and perhaps laugh it off). So finding that this is not the case is an interpretive accomplishment (see also Levinson 1983: 48, footnote 28).

In sum, B has to identify or recognize the presumption(s) on which A’s first action is built and find that it/they are incompatible (and unintendedly so) with what should be in the common ground. This provides a basis for B to infer that forgetfulness or confusion of some relevant piece of information on A’s part could be one possible reason for, or source of, this incompatibility, which is what B invokes in his/her response. That B invokes forgetfulness or confusion on A’s part in his/her response must be inferable for A, given

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11 The linguistic design of Sarah’s countering response may be seen to reflect this. The pro-termed repeat i ↑↑DID? is “parasitic” on Debbie’s preceding turn, and, by removing the negative and adjusting the tense to simple past (see above), targets and works on precisely those linguistic elements that express the presupposition in Debbie’s turn.
that A responds to it with the claim to just-now recollection embodied by *oh that's right* in the third step, and given that participants’ subsequent conduct (minimal acknowledgment of this claim, moving on to next matters) suggests that they treat this as a fitting and appropriate response. The question is how this inferential process is triggered by B’s response. Above, it was loosely stated that B invokes forgetfulness or confusion by positioning A as actually knowing better than what his/her first action suggests. The foregoing analyses suggest that there are at least two different ways in which this can be done. First, B can assert a state of affairs that more or less directly contrasts with, or rejects, the presumption(s) on which A’s first action is based (as in Excerpt 2 and Excerpt 3). In those cases, B’s response typically includes subtle linguistic cues which index B’s stance that this contrasting state of affairs should be known to A, or that B assumed it to be part of their common ground. Geri’s rejection of Shirley’s offer in Excerpt 2, for example, contains the inserted marker *you KNOW* (l. 09), and Sarah’s response in Excerpt 3 (*i ↑↑DID?*) indexes this stance by being done with the most minimal lexico-syntactic format available for rejecting Debbie’s presumption as well as with highly marked, and thus implicative, prosody.

Alternatively, B can assert a state of affairs which undermines the presumption(s) on which A’s first action was built more indirectly, by providing A with the necessary resources to locate the problematic presumption(s) him-/herself. In Excerpt 5, for example, Sarah asserts a state of affairs (*yOu just cA:lled me <<creaky> BA::CK.>*) which, by pointing to how Debbie could know where Sarah currently is, enables Debbie to find that she *does* in fact know this, and that her inquiry into Sarah’s whereabouts has therefore been pointless. More importantly even, the asserted state of affairs is one to which A clearly should have epistemic access (e.g., because it is accessible to everyone, like the fact that *todAy’s SA:turday* in Excerpt 4, or because what is formulated is an action in which A was the agent, like in *yOu just cA:lled me <<creaky> BA::CK.>* in Excerpt 5). On the one hand then, B’s assertion of an obvious or clearly knowable fact which enables A to recognize the inappropriateness of his/her first action holds A accountable for not having used this information in the first place. On the other hand it makes this assertion hearable as a reminder of some sort, and by implication as invoking momentary forgetfulness or confusion on A’s part.

In either case, B asserts a state of affairs that s/he assumes to be part of their (A’s & B’s) common ground. Irrespective of whether B indexes this assumption linguistically or tacitly relies on A to recognize it by reference to the taken-for-granted commonsense properties (especially the accessibility or knowability) of the asserted information (e.g., what day it is, what the other did just a few moments ago), it is this characteristic feature which makes B’s response inferable as issuing a socio-epistemic challenge (see also Ehmer & Rosemeyer, this issue, who describe a similar inferential process in which one participant challenges another by asking for information that are assumed to be part of their common ground). In other words, this is what enables A to infer that B is invoking forgetfulness or confusion of relevant information on A’s part with his/her response.

These then are the inferential underpinnings of the sequence leading up to *oh that’s right*. As an interim summary, we can note that, while the particular exigencies of the interactional situation may occasionally require some local inferential work from the participants, most of the inferential processes and mechanisms described here appear to be essential components of the sequential pattern as such, much like inferential requirements for the procedure to work at all.

### 4.2 Inferring the pragmatic import of *oh that’s right*

The previous section considered the inferential underpinnings of the sequence leading up to participants’ use of *oh that’s right*. However, in order to complete the sequence, B must be able to hear A’s uttering of *oh that’s right* as essentially meaning ‘I just now remembered this’. But how is it possible that a combination of the tokens *oh* and *that’s right* can embody this implicit claim to “just-now” recollection in response to turns and turn-components such as *but you we ha*’ <<l> you KNOW;>=VICtor (Excerpt 2), *todAy’s SA:turday* (Excerpt 4), or *yOu just cA:lled me <<creaky> BA::CK.>* (Excerpt 5)? After all, if taken literally, A merely says *oh what you just said is right* in these cases. So the pragmatic import of *oh that’s right* as meaning ‘I just now remembered this’ has to be inferred by B somehow. But what forms the basis for this inference?
As far as *oh* is concerned, we know from previous CA work that the various uses of *oh* have a common semantic-pragmatic core meaning (Heritage 1984b, Heritage 1998, Heritage 2002). Put simply, *oh* conveys that its producer has undergone a change of state (e.g., in knowledge, awareness, or the like). Claiming to have undergone such a change of state is clearly a vital ingredient in the action of claiming “just-now” recollection, because the process of remembering or recollecting something clearly entails a change of state in awareness with respect to a given state of affairs (from previously-known-but-forgotten to renewed awareness of it).

How about the import of *that’s right* in this composite format then? To get a sense of its import, let us look at how *that’s right* is used as a responsive turn-format in its own right, i.e., not in combination with *oh* but independently. There are two basic ways in which *that’s right* can be used responsively (cf. Küttner 2016), depending on the relative distribution of knowledge or access to knowledge about a given state of affairs that participants assume for each other. On the one hand, *that’s right* can be used to confirm a preceding turn (or rather the proposition expressed in it). This use of *that’s right* requires that its producer has, or can legitimately claim, to be authoritatively informed about the matter at hand (cf. Schegloff 1996b: 180, Barnes 2011a). So if there is an epistemic asymmetry in favor of the respondent with respect to the matter at hand, which may be signaled or taken for granted by the participants (cf. Heritage 2012, Heritage 2013a, Heritage 2013b), *that’s right* is hearable as doing confirmation. We can see this in Excerpt 6, in which Leslie calls the rectory and reaches Mr. Foster, the local clergyman, to inquire about the church program for the upcoming Sunday.

**Excerpt 6 [Field:2:01:1, 00:00-00:14]**

```
01  Les:  U:HM:,  
02       on SUNDay;=  
03   =i t"Ake it that IS corrEct.=  
04   =tha:t (.) there ISN’T a sUnday school.  
05   (0.3)  
06  ->  Fos:  thAt’s RIGHT;  
07   Les:  [YEH.]  
08  Fos:  [it’s] it’s it’s it there’s nO [service at A:LL.]  
09   Les:  [it’s a GROUP sEr]vice.=  
10  Fos:  =it’s a grOup service in the E:vening.=
```

In l. 01-04 of this fragment, Leslie forwards a conjecture that is designed to elicit a confirmation of her understanding that there will not be a Sunday school on Sunday. This is accomplished through a display of slight uncertainty about the correctness of this information (*i t"Ake it that IS corrEct*, l. 03). Mr. Foster, who, as the local clergyman, can legitimately claim epistemic authority over the scheduled church program – and is treated as such by Leslie in that she calls him to receive a confirmation from him – then responds with *that’s right* (l. 06), which does just that: confirm Leslie’s conjecture. As far as the import of *that’s right* in *oh that’s right* is concerned, however, this is certainly not the relevant use of *that’s right*. As was shown above, the *oh that’s right* speakers were “only” treated as knowing better than what their previous contribution suggested, but not as being authoritatively informed about the matter at hand compared to their co-participants. So confirming as an action does not relevantly figure in the use of *oh that’s right*.

However, *that’s right* can also be used non-confirmatively. If the first speaker assumes to be authoritatively informed about the matter at hand, or if no asymmetry in epistemic access is invoked, a response with *that’s right* is hearable as the co-participant independently endorsing the prior turn’s substance (see again Schegloff 1996b: 180, see also Barnes 2011a, Barnes 2011b, Betz 2014 for similar distinctions). In other words, the respondent then uses *that’s right* to explicitly assert (but not to authoritatively establish) the rightness of the prior turn’s substance by reference to their own independent experiences with, or knowledge of, the matter at hand. And this entails that this experience or knowledge has been established prior to the here and now (cf. Heritage 2002). As such, this type of *that’s right* use makes a tacit claim to prior knowledge...
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of the matter at hand. It is typically used to claim equal epistemic access or to re-claim epistemic rights that the respondent had not been accredited by the first speaker. This can be seen in Excerpt 7, where an independently endorsing *that’s right* is used to implement an agreement with an assessment (l. 08).

Excerpt 7 [Field:U-88:2:2:4, 04:20-04:34]

((Kevin has just reported that he passed through Salisbury, recently.))


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<td>Kev:</td>
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In l. 06, Kevin forwards a subjective first (follow-up) assessment of Salisbury’s assets as a shopping place, perhaps in pursuit of a stronger form of agreement than Leslie had provided with her two previous *YE:S* tokens (l. 03-04). To this, Leslie responds with *that’s right* (l. 08), which (more strongly) agrees with Kevin’s assessment by explicitly asserting its rightness. At the same time, this assertion of the rightness of Kevin’s assessment implicitly conveys that Leslie’s agreement is rooted in her own experiences with Salisbury as a place to buy antiques at. This is nicely underpinned by Leslie’s subsequent specification of the kind of antiques that are, in her opinion, particularly good to buy in Salisbury, namely *BOOKS* (l. 09). It can be noted that Kevin does not treat Leslie as being authoritatively informed about the matter at hand, but that Leslie uses *that’s right* to mark her agreement as being rooted in her own (prior) experience.

It is this pragmatic capacity of the independently endorsing *that’s right* to make a tacit claim to prior knowledge or experience that is mobilized in *oh that’s right*. This provides a systematic basis for the pragmatic import of *oh that’s right* as embodying a claim to “just-now” recollection in response to statements such as *today’s SATurday* (Excerpt 4), *yoU just cA:lled me <<creaky> BA::CK.>* (Excerpt 5), or the like. The format combines the change-of-state semantics of *oh* with the epistemic affordances of the independent endorsement *that’s right* (see Küttner 2016 for a more elaborate treatment). Whereas the former marks a change of state in awareness, the latter is used to assert the rightness of, and to thereby claim prior knowledge of, the information the co-participant has just presented as relevant and previously known to the *oh that’s right* speaker. In fact, this is why and how *oh that’s right* aligns with and embraces the epistemic attributions the co-participant makes in the preceding response.12

This “compositional” modeling becomes even more plausible, if it is recalled that B’s reminding response in the larger sequential pattern (step 2−) initiates a retro-sequence (cf. Schegloff 2007, 217-219). *Oh that’s right* is thus not only the third step in the larger sequential pattern, it is also produced as a direct response to a turn that has new “firstness” (i.e., that exhibits response-relevance itself). This provides a firm and consistent basis for viewing the pragmatic import of *oh that’s right* as being somewhat compositionally derived from the pragmatic import of the responsive uses of *oh* and *that’s right*, respectively. This pragmatic

12 It is interesting to note that similar composite formats are used to claim “just-now” recollection in other languages. Finnish, for example, uses the composite format *ai nii(n)* in a very similar fashion (cf. Koivisto 2013). This format consists of the change-of-state token *ai* and the anaphoric affirmative token *nii(n)*, which can be used for doing both confirmations as well as strong or independent endorsements/affirmations. In German, the tokens *ach(JA)*/(‘oh (yes)’) and *(das) stimmt* (‘(that’s) right’), as well as combinations thereof, have been found to be usable for making memory claims in interaction (see Betz & Golato 2008, Betz 2015). These cross-linguistic parallels may point to a more general underlying mechanism by means of which combinations of change-of-state tokens and affirmative formats can be used to index some form of memory claim.
compositionality, in turn, provides a systematic basis for participants to infer that a speaker, in and by uttering *oh that’s right* in these contexts, is implicitly claiming to have “just-now” recollected information that was previously known but not heretofore taken into account as relevant.

From a diachronic perspective, this underlying compositionality would make it reasonable to assume that *oh that’s right* sediments as a functional resource or a pragmatic marker which is no longer constructed on the instance, as it were. From a synchronic perspective, it is hard to judge whether this development is currently taking place or not. On the one hand, the fact that *oh that’s right* is typically deployed as part of a larger sequential pattern that is recurrent enough to be recognizable and describable does indeed suggest some sort of functional sedimentation. So does the fact that it is typically produced as a single TCU, and often even under one coherent intonation contour. On the other hand, there are cases in which it is realized as two separate TCUs (e.g., Excerpt 5 above). Moreover, participants can occasionally be shown to circumvent or avoid making a recollection claim by withholding the production of *that’s right* after *oh* in contexts where it would have been possible or even appropriate (J. Heritage, personal communication, see also Heritage 1984b, 313-315 and especially his fragment (31) for a candidate instance of this phenomenon). These, then, are indications that *oh that’s right* is (still?) locally produced. While this issue awaits further study, it is time to summarize the central insights of the present inquiry.

5 Summary and conclusions

My broader aim in this paper was to offer an Interactional Linguistic perspective on the role that inferences play in episodes of ordinary conversational interaction. To this end, I focused on a well-attested conversational practice, namely using *oh that’s right* for claiming “just-now” recollection of something previously known but not taken into account as relevant. This practice virtually lent itself to an interactional investigation of the role that inferences play in interaction for two reasons. First (and from a more CA-informed perspective), *oh that’s right* predominantly occurs as part of a relatively stable and consistent sequential pattern, which provides an opportunity for a systematic analysis of how inferences figure in the progressive realization of this sequence type. Second (and from a more linguistic perspective), the recollection claim embodied by *oh that’s right* is typically realized implicitly. This allows for an analysis of how it is possible for participants to infer the pragmatic import of *oh that’s right* as embodying such a claim.

With respect to the second point, we have seen that the pragmatic import of *oh that’s right* appears to have a compositional basis. It combines the change-of-state semantics of *oh* with the epistemic affordances of *that’s right* which result from its speaker’s assertion of the rightness of the prior turn’s substance. This constitutes a systematic basis for participants to infer – upon hearing *oh that’s right* being uttered – that its producer has just remembered something previously known, but momentarily forgotten, confused, or not taken into account as relevant. Moreover I have shown that *oh that’s right* turns are typically firmly lodged in sequential environments that systematically provide an opportunity for their producer to make such a recollection claim. As we have seen, the preceding turn is frequently equipped with epistemic attributions that seem to enable, or even invite, the *oh that’s right* speaker to claim “just-now” recollection (and by implication prior momentary confusion or forgetfulness). Since the participants can be shown to orient to these features, I have argued that this sequential pattern reflects a sequentially organized procedure that the participants engage in to deal with, and to jointly account for, the occurrence of an inapposite action (the inappositeness of which results from the fact that it was based on (a) false presumption(s)).

Instantiating and navigating this sequentially organized procedure requires inferential work from both participants. Some of this inferential work seems to be necessitated by the local contextual particulars of the occasion and the specific quirks of the actions being done, such as how accessible the problematic presumption(s) on which the inapposite action is built is/are from the talk or the nature of the action itself. Besides this contingent inferential work, the instantiation of this procedure also requires other, more generic inferential work from the participants. Using a sequential approach, it was possible to reconstruct a number of inferential processes and mechanisms that appear to be integral and fundamental components of the procedure as such, much like inferential prerequisites for it to work. Take the inferential processes...
that enable the recipient of the inapposite action to invoke forgetfulness or confusion on part of the doer of the inapposite action by responding with a reminder of sorts, for example. Similarly, it was possible to reconstruct how this invocation of forgetfulness or confusion becomes inferable for the doer of the inapposite action by reference to the respondent’s assertion of a state of affairs that s/he recognizably assumes to have been part of their common ground. In CA terms, these processes and mechanisms mainly pertain to aspects of action-recognition, i.e., to the ways in which participants are able to recognize what the other is doing with their talk and to respond accordingly (cf. Levinson 2013). They thus also stand in a (somewhat converse) relationship to the practices of action-formation, the study of which constitutes one major domain of CA inquiry (see Schegloff 2007: xiv).

These findings provide further support for the idea that, inasmuch as participants continually inspect each other’s observable conduct for its pragmatic import, inferences are part and parcel of our ability to act and to organize our conduct in social interaction (cf. Deppermann 2012, Deppermann this issue). Reflexively, the actions we perform in the course of interaction continuously build up and expand what Haugh (2017) felicitously calls an “inferential substrate”, a cumulatively co-constituted backdrop of assumptions and dynamic background knowledge against which our talk becomes inferable as carrying out certain actions. Although, as Haugh (2017) further notes, the inferences we draw can occasionally become exposed as focused objects of the current interactional business, for the most part, they remain embedded in the actions we perform. If these points are taken, studying inferences or inferential processes from an interactional perspective could (and perhaps should) become as much a part of the CA/IL agenda as studying any other aspect that can be shown to relevantly figure in participants’ accomplishment of (social) action and their management of intersubjective understanding in interaction. Specifically, such studies could yield revealing insights into how action recognition works in interaction (cf. Levinson 2013, Pomerantz 2017) and enhance our understanding of some of the ways in which (socially shared) cognition figures in interaction (cf. Schegloff 1991, Deppermann 2012, Levinson 2006a, Levinson 2006b).

On a more general note, this study has hopefully also contributed to illustrating how a CA and a linguistic perspective can mutually inform and enrich each other. The Interactional Linguistic approach, in combining both perspectives, enables us to better understand how certain linguistic forms can be used to do the actions that participants demonstrably orient to and how the sequential structures of conversation contribute to, or provide a framework for, participants’ understanding of what these forms do in the interaction.

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References


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Appendix A – Additional information on the composition of the database

Traditional CA corpora (approximately 14.5 hours of conversational material)
1) American English data (approximately 8 hours of conversational material)
   - Newport Beach (NB) corpus (recorded in 1968 in Western California; consists of a set of recordings of telephone calls from an elderly couple’s beach house, largely between them and their friends and family)
   - Santa Barbara Ladies (SBL) corpus (recorded in the late 1960s in Western California; consists of a set of recordings of telephone calls between various women in private settings)
   - Individual calls (a set of individual recordings of telephone calls between friends in the U.S., including the well-known HGII (Hyla & Nancy), Two Girls/TG (Ava & Bee), Frankel (Geri & Shirley) conversations)

2) British English data (approximately 6.5 hours of conversational material)
   - Field corpus (recorded in the mid- to late 1980s in a family’s home in Southwestern England; consists of recordings of telephone calls among friends and family members)
   - Rahman corpus\(^{13}\) (recorded in 1980/1981 in the Northern UK; consists of recordings of telephone calls among friends and family members)

CallFriend corpus (AmE, recorded in stereo by the Linguistic Data Consortium at the University of Pennsylvania in the mid-1990s)
Roughly 5 hours of material from the CallFriend corpus were used to supplement the above corpora.
More detailed information about the CallFriend corpus and the recording procedure can be found at https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC96S46 (last access: Sep 29, 2017).

\(^{13}\) I thank John Heritage for sharing the Rahman corpus with me.
Appendix B - Summary of the most important GAT 2 transcription conventions


Sequential structure

Gradual overlap and simultaneous talk

= fast, immediate continuation with a new turn or segment (latching)

In- and outbreaths

°h / h° in- / outbreaths of appr. 0.2-0.5 sec. duration

°hh / hh° in- / outbreaths of appr. 0.5-0.8 sec. duration

°hhh / hhh° in- / outbreaths of appr. 0.8-1.0 sec. duration

Pauses

(.) micro pause, estimated, up to 0.2 sec. duration appr.

(-) short estimated pause of appr. 0.2-0.5 sec. duration

(--) intermediary estimated pause of appr. 0.5-0.8 sec. duration

(---) longer estimated pause of appr. 0.8-1.0 sec. duration

(0.5) / (2.0) measured pause of appr. 0.5 / 2.0 sec. duration

Other segmental conventions

: lengthening, by about 0.2-0.5 sec.

:: lengthening, by about 0.5-0.8 sec.

::: lengthening, by about 0.8-1.0 sec.

ʔ cut-off by glottal closure

and_uh cliticizations within units

uh, uhm, etc. hesitation markers, so-called “filled pauses”

Laughter and crying

haha, hehe, hihi syllabic laughter

((laughs)), ((cries)) description of laughter and crying

<<laughing>> laughter particles accompanying speech with indication of scope

<<:-)> smile voice

Continuers

hm, yes, no, yeah monosyllabic tokens
hm_hm, ye_es, no_o  
bi-syllabic tokens

ʔhmʔhm  
with glottal closure, often negating

Accentuation

SYLLable  
focus accent

sYLLable  
secondary accent

!SYL!lable  
extra strong accent

Final pitch movements of intonation phrases

?  
rising to high

,  
rising to mid

-  
level

;  
falling to mid

.  
falling to low

Pitch jumps

↑  
smaller pitch upstep

↓  
smaller pitch downstep

↑↑  
larger pitch upstep

↓↓  
larger pitch downstep

Changes in pitch register

<<l>  
lower pitch register

<<h>  
higher pitch register

Intralinear notation of accent pitch movements

`SO  
falling

`SO  
rising

¯SO  
level

ˆSO  
rising-falling

ˇSO  
falling-rising

↑´  
small pitch upstep to the peak of the accented syllable

↓´  
small pitch downstep to the valley of the accented syllable

↑¯SO bzw. ↓¯SO  
pitch jumps to higher or lower level accented syllables

↑↑`SO bzw. ↓↓`SO  
larger pitch upsteps or downsteps to the peak or valley of the accented syllable
Loudness and tempo changes, with scope

<<f>  >  forte, loud
<<ff> >  fortissimo, very loud
<<p>  >  piano, soft
<<pp> >  pianissimo, very soft
<<all> >  allegro, fast
<<len> >  lento, slow
<<cresc> >  crescendo, increasingly louder
<<dim> >  diminuendo, increasingly softer
<<acc> >  accelerando, increasingly faster
<<rall> >  rallentando, increasingly slower

Changes in voice quality and articulation, with scope

<<creaky> >  glottalized
<<whispery> >  change in voice quality as stated

Other conventions

<<surprised> >  interpretive comment with indication of scope
((coughs))  non-verbal vocal actions and events
<<coughing> >  ...with indication of scope
(   )  unintelligible passage
(xxx), (xxx xxx)  one or two unintelligible syllables
(may i)  assumed wording
(may i say/let us say)  possible alternatives
((unintelligible, appr. 3 sec))  unintelligible passage with indication of duration
((...))  omission in transcript
->  refers to a line of transcript relevant in the argument