The political attitudes of Krzysztof and Janusz Radziwill towards the election of Wladyslaw IV and

The attitudes of the elite of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and especially of representatives of Radziwill family (Krzysztof and Janusz) towards the election of the last two Vasas are an interesting problem for deliberations and research, especially taking into account differences in the country’s internal and foreign situation in 1632 and 1648, which determined the activities of mentioned above. This article was mainly intended to discuss the problem connected with the attitudes of the Lithuanian nobility towards the election of a new king and also indicating the role of connections of Wladyslaw IV and Jan Kazimierz with the Jagiellonians in political games. Answering the question of what and how influenced the attitudes and moods among the nobility, their argumentation to support one or other candidate requires many years of research and use of methods developed by other humanities, such as sociology, social psychology or political science.1


Vilnius Convocation
One of the most active Lithuanian magnates in the first half of the 17th century was the Lithuanian Hetman, Krzysztof Radziwill, whom historians have recognized as the main creator of the success of Wladyslaw Zygmunt Vasa. Immediately after the death of Zygmunt III Vasa, he failed to attend a meeting of senators initiated by the Archbishop of Gniezno Jan Wezyk in Warsaw. During the debates, they discussed, among others, problems related to securing the borders against a possible attack by Moscow, about which Radziwill was repeatedly informed by the Grand Lithuanian Hetman Sapieha and his son Kazimierz Leon10. The prince of Birza had other plans, and together with the bishop of Vilnius, Abraham Woyna, he led the transformation of the nobility gathered at the Lithuanian Tribunal into the Vilnius convocation, which took place on May 15, 1632. During the meeting resolutions were adopted to ensure security internal and external to the Grand Duchy. Lithuania was also distinguished from the Crown, which led to the Sapieha disagreement, with the Voivode of Vilnius Lew, who claimed that the provision was contrary to the provisions of the Lublin Union of 1569. The resolution of the Convocation also described all matters that had to be resolved before the election of a new king11.
Krzysztof Radziwill in a letter to the Archbishop of Gniezno Jan Wezyk, explained the Vilnius Congress with the necessity of guaranteeing the military security of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, Senators assembled on consilia in Warsaw, including the Grand Lithuanian Chancellor Albrycht Stanislaw Radziwill, had already decided on this subject. This resulted in further misunderstandings. The Convocation and the decisions taken on it caused numerous objections, especially Lithuanian senators who were absent during the session, including the Voivode of Vilnius Lew and Deputy Chancellor Pawel Stefan Sapieha. Both of them attended a conference of senators in Warsaw and considered the decisions taken there. The Great Lithuanian Hetman believed that the provisions adopted during the convocation were contrary to the law and the provisions of the Lublin Union. He also announced that he would ignore the decisions taken at the congress, which was probably the result of the organization's disregard for him, and he was the leader of one of the largest factions in Lithuania. The open attack of the Voivode of Vilnius on the actions taken by the Field Hetman was certainly also connected with political rivalry between Sapieha and Radziwill12.
After the death of Wladyslaw IV Vasa (May 20, 1648), the Lithuanian Field Hetman Janusz Radziwill, like his father Krzysztof, tried to secure a decisive role on the Lithuanian political scene13. Acting as the marshal of the Tribunal, he decided to take over the role as a defender of the nation and bypassing the interrex person, he mobilized the nobility gathered around him. Already on May 23, 1648, he met with Lithuanian Senators in Vilnius: the Vilnius Bishop Abraham Woyna, the Samogitian Bishop Jerzy Tyszkiewicz, the Voivode of Troki Mikolaj Abramowicz and the Castellan of Polock Krzysztof Rudomin Dusiacki. In connection with the problems of obtaining funding for the enlistment of 10 Sapieha L., ( troops against the Cossacks, they decided to convene the Lithuanian convocation14. Its main inspirator was Janusz Radziwill, who tried to win over his political opponents, including the Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor Kazimierz Leon Sapieha. The deliberations lasted probably from 3 to 10 June. A large group of senators gathered there: mentioned above Abraham Woyna, voivodes: Vilnius, Krzysztof Chodkiewicz, Troki Mikołaj Abramowicz, Smolensk Jerzy Karol Hlebowicz, castellans: Vilnius, Jan Kazimierz Chodkiewicz and Vitebsk Jozef Klonowski, and other influential people including Aleksander Chodkiewicz, Hieronim Sanguszko and Jerzy Billewicz. For the most part, these were the servants of Janusz Radziwill, but it is worth noting that people associated with the court of Vasas (Chodkiewicz) and those cooperating with Kazimierz Leon Sapieha also appeared at the Convocation. The leaders of the Sapieha faction and the most influential members did not appear at the meeting15. Janusz Radziwill was also aware that the Convocation was not legal, and he explained his behavior by referring to the tradition: "exemplum antecesorów naszych temporis interregni"16, thus probably referring to the actions of his father during the interregnum in 1632. For the main reason for convening the convention, he, of course, gave the threat from the Cossacks of Bohdan Chmielnicki. Therefore, it was necessary to mobilize quickly and raise funds to finance the army and waiting for the Convocation Parliament, which was to begin its deliberations in mid-July, would be a waste of time. Reactions to the Vilnius Convocation were different. Some regional assemblies decided to conditionally support the resolutions adopted there or only some decisions (local councils of: Grodno, Upita, Witebsk, Smolensk, Lida, Wilkomierz and the Samogitian Principality), others rejected them altogether (local council of Brzesc Litewski), and still others summarized them with silence (e.g. Nowogrodek and Wilkomierz local councils)17.
The great Hetman, apparently taught by the protests of nobles and Senators against the Vilnius Convocation convened by Krzysztof Radziwill, received written declarations that those absent from the Vilnius deliberations would not oppose the resolutions passed there18. One of the most important decisions that Janusz Radziwill managed to push through during the convocation proceedings was the decision to grant him funds from the Lithuanian treasury for the enlistment of a 6,000th army. Of course, he was to be the commander in chief due to the poor health of Grand Hetman Janusz Kiszka19.
Over the years discussed, the Radziwills in various ways, including ways inconsistent with the law, tried to secure themselves a leading role on the political scene of the Grand Duchy. By calling convoluted Lithuanian convocations, on which binding decisions were made, they actively participated in politics, which was perceived by the majority of noble society as an illegal activity. Arguing the necessity to convene convocations, they most often cited the need to secure the state and finance the army, which was to defend Lithuanian borders threatened by real or not enemy attacks (e.g. in 1632 raised the threat from Moscow). Both Radziwills tried to act as a defender of their homeland and, most importantly, aspired to the role of organizers of political life during the interregnum, regardless of the protests of the opposition. The deputies of the Lithuanian Tribunal were to be the main supporters of the Convocation, and senators, nobles and other officials, who were sure to give it the character of legality, were called. The actions taken were aimed, through direct participation in politics, to influence decisions taken by the rulers, in this case, interrex and senators gathered around it. On the other hand, Krzysztof and Janusz to some extent tried to guarantee not so much military security, but a political balance between the Grand Duchy and the Crown. Their other goal was certainly to establish a relatively coherent policy of Lithuanians during the interregnum, of course in line with the reasons of the Radziwills of Birze line. Both using the fact of the death of the ruler, in the initial phase of the interregnum, they tried to play a leading role on the political scene, which gave them the necessary influence among the nobles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania20.

The mobilization of the nobility and participation in the Parliament deliberations
After the death of Zygmunt III, Senators gathered over his body in Warsaw decided to convene the Convocation Parliament on June 22, 1632. The head of the chamber of the deputy was the Lithuanian Hetman Krzysztof Radziwill, whose task he tried to ineffectively pronounce21. However, it should be recognized that it was a neat political run, aimed at gaining applause among the nobility. It was only a brand image that represented Radziwill as a man who did not desire offices, dignities, and fame, but only the good and security of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Finally, he accepted the offered function and made himself known as a consummate politician, perfectly maneuvering among the debaters, in such a way as to push through individual plans (plans of the prince Wladysław Zygmunt?). It also seems that Radziwill was also able to realistically assess the political situation of the state and often resigned from ruthlessly pushing the rights of dissidents in order to calm the parliamentary debate and lead to a happy ending of the interregnum22.
Przez posłańców, czyli bezpośrednio do adresatów, co zdaje się wskazywać, że sam książę zaufanych nie miał, zostały wysłane listy do powiatu brasławskiego (10) i wileńskiego (14)"24. In addition, letters to the Crown were also sent to Jan Bal in the Ruthenian Province (12), a certain Kunicki to the Wolyn (12), and to the Courland prince Frederick and his nephew Jacob, who were to be handed over to the nobles living in Livonia and Courland25. It seems, however, that this list is not full, and there could have been more letters sent by Krzysztof Radziwill to the nobility. However, the amount of correspondence mentioned above testifies to the hugeness of work that the Field Hetman put into proper preparation for the electoral parliament and the election of Wladyslaw Zygmunt to the king. Certainly, he also used all possible contacts and his own clientele in order to promote political goals that were to be voted on in the Parliament, and yet it was not only about the personality of the future ruler. The interregnum period after the death of Zygmunt III showed how effective and efficient the faction system worked out by the prince and his ancestors through years of political activity26.
To attract the masses of the nobility to himself, the Field Hetman used fairly simple argumentation, claiming that "gotowem wszystko na to ważyć żeby prawa i swobody publiczne restaurowane były"27. In the first half of the 17th century, such postulates were popular among the nobility, although they cannot be compared with the overtones of similar slogans 50 or 100 years later. The gentry even asked Krzysztof Radziwill herself to "o spólne dobro, i naprawę praw, swobód i wolności naszych zastawiając się i one do pożądanego przywieść chciał effectu"28. It can be assumed that in the aforementioned case it was also about religious rights and equality, which Krzysztof Radziwill demanded as Calvin. The Lithuanian Hetman in the aforementioned correspondence also asked the addressees for assistance at his side during the elected parliament, presenting himself as a very experienced politician: "jako temu któregoś przez tak wiele sejmów doznał, że prater bonum publicorum nie zwykłem, nie privatnego szukał"29.
Even before the electoral meeting, Krzysztof Radziwill tried to convince the nobility and the magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to gather at Liwno, from where their was supposed to go together to Warsaw. On the spot, the Field Hetman wanted to create a separate camp from the Crown noblemans. However, the motives of such a prince's action are not known. Perhaps he wanted to demonstrate in this way the strength and political determination of the Lithuanians towards the Poles and the influence of citizens of the Grand Duchy on the election of a new king. After an unsuccessful action, the Field Hetman tried to persuade senators, including Lew Sapieha, to establish a Lithuanian camp on the other side of the Wisla River at Praga in Warsaw. The Voivode of Vilnius refused Radziwill, arguing that he never stood on this side of the river, the election never took place there and it would be difficult to persuade others to stop in this place. In addition, he claimed that the bridge that had to be crossed over was unfinished and "słabo go robią, pamiętam iż na elekcji świeżo zmarłego króla Jego Mci Pana naszego, most od króla ś. Pamięci Augusta mocno i żelazem okowanemi dębowemi palami budowany rozerwał się z wielką szkodą ludzi, ten słabo budowany bodaj wstrzymał, ale sama przeprawa przez most ciężka i niebezpieczna będzie narodowi naszemu"30. Lew Sapieha himself, however, promised to wait for Radziwill one day at Praga, probably pointing out maliciously that he must for this reason give up his participation in the Catholic Holy Mass31. 29 Free translation: "as you have met in so many Sejms, that prater bonum publicorum I have not used them and not looking for privat"; Radziwill K., (1632, August 9). Letter. [Krzysztof Radziwill to recipient unknow in Zabludów]. Archival Material. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, sec. IV, ms. 321, 5 and next. 30 Free translation: "they do it poorly, I remember that at the election of the newly deceased king, the bridge from the king Augustus was firmly ironed with oak stilts built ruined with great harm to people, this poorly built has probably stopped, but crossing the bridge itself is hard and dangerous for our nation"; Sapieha L., ( Janusz Radziwill did not participate from the very beginning in the Convocation Parliament, for which the meeting arrived 4 days after its commencement, on July 21, 164832. It cannot be unambiguously determined whether this was a purposeful operation of the hetman calculated to obtain a specific effect. It should be remembered that Radziwill's political activity was largely determined by the military situation in Ukraine, and it was most likely that he could not appear at the beginning of the Parliament. During the senatorial vote, the Lithuanian Hetman tried to justify the necessity of establishing the Vilnius Convocation: "iż złamanie prawa było spowodowane koniecznością twardej obrony; prosił by wsparto uciśnioną ojczyznę"33. Radziwill, therefore, realized perfectly well that the steps taken by him were not in accordance with the law, in his opinion, however, justified by the threat of the state. The Samogitian foreman also tried to confirm that he was granted funds from the Lithuanian treasury for the enlistment of 6,000 troops, which he obtained after a stormy discussion on July 25. During the debates of the Parliament, he also sought the rights of dissidents, wishing, among other things, to fortify the Warsaw Confederation, delete the verdicts of the dissenters and the decree of 1640 regarding the Vilnius congregation34.
Janusz, unlike his father, was in a faction not connected with the future king, and for the interregnum period, he played the role of the dissident in favor of the Vasa, especially Jan Kazimierz, and the Sapieha faction. He supported the candidacy of Jerzy I Rákoci, prince of Transylvania, who was supposed to be a convenient candidate, above all for the nobility of Protestant denomination. In 1648, the internal situation became complicated, and the state was plunged into civil war and the Field Hetman could not devote sufficient time to the electoral procedures. Therefore, it should not surprise that Janusz Radziwill, who a few weeks before the beginning of the Parliament stated that he was unable to think about the election until he was devised a way to secure the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth35. He often expressed his bitterness in the fact that nobles and senators did not care about the fate of the state and the result of the election36. The political and foreign situation of the state was more secure in 1632, even despite the alleged Moscow threat, when Krzysztof Radziwill was able to engage in the electoral fight almost entirely.

The election of a new king
The real candidate for the throne of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1632 was the eldest son of Zygmunt III Vasa -Wladyslaw Zygmunt37. The Swedish king, Gustaw Adolf, also submitted his candidacy, but he realized that his chances of winning were negligible. He mainly wanted to bring confusion among the nobility and in the camp supporting Polish Vasa to the throne with his pretension. In the first months of the interregnum, there were rumors that the protestant's efforts were supported by Krzysztof Radziwill. However, this should only be considered as a rumor. Contacts that Radziwill had with Gustav Adolf are considered attempts to probe his political plans.. The deliberations of the elected parliament concerned various topics and, in principle, no discussion was given about the person of the future ruler of the Commonwealth, for which Wladyslaw Zygmunt was de facto considered38. On November 8, he won the election and became king. Krzysztof Radziwill, announcing the decision of the Vilnius province, allegedly stated: "życzemy, aby JeJM diucturnctate Impery Jagiełła Triumphi Bolesława Krzywoustego, sprawiedliwością Kazimierza Wielkiego, miłością poddanych Zygmunta Pierwszego, pomnożeniem swobód i wolności szlacheckich Zygmunta Augusta, mądrością Stephana był ozdobiony adejnował [...]"39. In his speech, the references to Vasa's relationship with the Jagiellons are clearly visible, because they were remembered by the people of Republic as victorious and defenders of freedom. A few days later the Grand Lithuanian Chancellor Albrycht Stanislaw Radziwill congratulated Wladyslaw IV Vasa in the name of the whole of his family40. The ceremonial speech presenting the new king was given by Archbishop Jan Wezyk41.
The situation associated with the choice of the king in 1648 was more complicated, so it should be given a little more space. For the main rivals to the throne of the Commonwealth, two Vases were considered: Jan Kazimierz and his younger brother, the bishop of Wroclaw, Karol Ferdynand. Initially, senators did not want to take sides, and only the archbishop of Gniezno, Maciej Lubienski, leaned towards older Vasa brother and even tried to persuade Janusz Radziwill to support his candidacy42. The agent of the Brandenburg court, Peter Bergmann, also mentioned Archduke Leopold and the Neuburg prince as candidates. However, the Legate of the Brandenburg Elector Friedrich Wilhelm I, Johann Hoverbeck, proposed that he should submit his candidacy because he is very likely to succeed43. In contemporary literature, however, it is recognized that it was only a skillful compliment of the ambassador44.
In August 1648, a new candidate for the throne of the Commonwealth appeared -the Transylvanian Prince Jerzy I Rakoczy, supported by the Lithuanian Hetman Janusz Radziwill. He counted on the support of dissenters, including Calvinists, Arians and "Dyzunici", as well as the help of the Brandenburg elector, Wallachian hospodar, Sweden, Turkey and Bohdan Chmielnicki. The proposals submitted by his deputies did not meet with much sympathy in Warsaw. However, the candidacy of a Transylvanian had great support among the noblemen of Ukraine, headed by the Ruthenian voivode Jeremi Wisniowiecki45.
During the electoral parliament, the candidacy of the bishop of Wroclaw Karol Ferdynand gained the lead. In October, however, came the news of Rakoczy's death, and his supporters, along with Janusz Radziwill, fearing the Jesuits who stood behind Charles Ferdinand, voted in favor of Jan Kazimierz. Under the influence of these events and the defeat suffered at Pilawce, the rest of the supporters of Karol Ferdynand went to the side of the ex-Jesuit. After some time, the Lithuanian states announced that if the king was not chosen, Jan Kazimierz would still choose a Great Lithuanian Prince -he was threatened with breaking the union46.
The meeting in Nieporet on November 1, 1648, where Janusz Radziwill negotiated the principles of supporting Jan Kazimierz's candidacy by Lithuanian dissidents, was also of great importance for the electoral struggle47. The meeting was briefly summarized in Albrycht Stanisław Radziwill's diary "U królewicza Kazimierza byli hetman, a zarazem starosta żmudzki, i wojewoda smoleński, którzy, zanim przybyli do Warszawy, zboczyli zaproszeni do niego i zostali przez niego pozyskani"48. Eventually, Jan Kazimierz, after supporting his candidacy by Bohdan Chmielnicki, was elected king of the Republic on November 17, 164849. However, it is difficult to answer the question of how Janusz Radziwill would respond to Jan Kazimierz's candidacy if Rakoczy were still alive.

Conclusions
The interregnum in 1632 and 1648 can be an interesting contribution to the analysis of the attitudes of the elites of the Commonwealth. It seems that Krzysztof Radziwill was perfectly aware of the prevailing mood among the privileged layer, and he became a role-model for nobility. During the interregnum, the masses, especially Lithuanian, fearing the Moscow threat, sought strong support in a person who was able to provide them with both external and internal security. As an example, one can present the nobility of the Minsk region, which sought precisely for the Field Hetman to suppress war robberies, bypassing the Grand Hetman, thus pointing to Krzysztof's position in the Grand Duchy and even translating it into military units50.
During the interregnum in 1648, another role in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had to be played by Janusz Radziwill. It seems that he was mainly a defender of dissidents, protestants, and to a lesser extent, like his father, a whole group of nobles regardless of religion. A large part of his activity was absorbed by matters related to the conflict in Ukraine, which made him unable to work as efficiently as Krzysztof at reconciling military and political matters, especially those related to elective procedures. Perhaps the impact on such a turn of events had the personality of Janusz Radziwill, who was not as charismatic as his father who was able to focus a serious group of nobles around him. It seems that this skill was lacking in the Field Hetman in 1648, although of course, the internal and foreign situation of the state had a great importance in the analyzed aspect51.
The method of cooperation of the two Lithuanian Field Hetmans with Radziwill family from Nieswiez was also different. During the interregnum of 1632, the Grand Lithuanian Chancellor, Albrycht Stanislaw Radziwill, actively cooperated with Krzysztof, who even appealed for cooperation within the framework of the Radziwill family in one of the letters: "abyś mi tego dopomóc raczył, żebyśmy zgodni ze sobą na tej przyszłej elekcji wszystko mówili, rozumieli, czynili"52. This suggests that during the interregnum after the death of Zygmunt III, the Radziwill family, despite their religious differences, tried to work out a common political line and support their activities during the interregnum. In other words, Albrycht Stanislaw's cooperation coincided with Janusz, who alleged that the Field Hetman ordered the plundering of his district of Pinsk because of their dispute at the meeting with Jan Kazimierz on November 19, 1648. Previously, during the convocation and elective Parliament, the Grand Lithuanian Chancellor was also very strict about matters related to protestants. The bad relations between the Radziwill's family could have resulted from a private conflict. In 1637, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwill was Janusz's match in his efforts to marry Maria, the daughter of the governor of Braclaw, Stefan Potocki. However, the Lithuanian Chancellor decided to marry Potocka, who was 10 years younger, causing a considerable scandal which ended in a sharp family conflict53.
48 Free translation: "Among the prince Kazimierz were: the hetman, and also the staroste of Zmudz, and the voivode of Smolensk, who, before they came to Warsaw, strayed invited to him and were recruited by him"; A.S. Radziwiłł It is also interesting to compare the arguments for choosing a specific candidate for the throne. In the case of Wladyslaw Zygmunt, we are dealing with the eldest son, meticulously prepared by his father to act as the king. Zygmunt III's poor health was very well known to the magnates and nobility, and thus his death was expected for a few years54. Therefore, the society was prepared for such an eventuality and could have elaborated some electoral preferences in the event of the monarch's death. The nobles, for whom one of the highest values was tradition (heredity of the throne, the right of seniority) wanted to continue the rule of the Vasa, and thus the Jagiellonian. References to the aforementioned dynasty and the Piasts, and even Stefan Batory (probably through his marriage to Anna Jagiellonka) are also visible in the speech of Krzysztof Radziwill, who submitted the decision of the Vilnius province to the gathering of the new king. He wished the king-elect that he would be accompanied in his reign with all the greatest advantages of the previous rulers of the Commonwealth: victories and triumphs, wisdom, justice, love and respect for rights and freedoms55. Wladyslaw Zygmunt was also generally liked by the nobility, he was valued for his prowess and participation in wars with Moscow, and he also had the seeds of his court, where he could support his election policy. After all, he was also a Moscow tzar and a legitimate Swedish king, who had been named after the death of King Zygmunt III. In addition, the other princes resigned from the electoral battle56. The agitation of Prince Krzysztof was already at the final stage of the electoral struggle of Wladyslaw Zygmunt, which he had been fighting for many years, and there were no major obstacles to his victory.
The situation became more complicated in 1648. The dead king did not leave children who could become his possible successors. The nobility was also surprised by the situation, because the king's death was not expected (Wladyslaw IV was only 52), and therefore he had no specific electoral preferences. Two brothers from the Vasa family were candidates to the throne, which probably already introduced ambiguity among the noblemen who did not fully know whether to support Jan Kazimierz or Karol Ferdynand who represented the same values in terms of tradition and connections with the Jagiellonian. Both of them did not enjoy great sympathy among the nobility57. Jan Kazimierz was perceived as a wasteful person, quickly bored and shunned public activity. His only advantage was that he was a good soldier, but after a while, he was bored even with this activity. Karol Ferdynand also had many disadvantages; he was considered to have unpleasant contacts, and he was impulsive and unforgiving. The nobles, after the wasteful rule of Wladyslaw IV, valued his frugality, which eventually gave him some popularity58. Additional problems were caused by the candidacy of Jerzy I Rakoczy, who seemed the best candidate for the protestans and led to even greater divisions. Jerzy Kubala believed that Janusz Radziwill, proposing the above-mentioned candidacy, wanted to unite all the dissidents around him, oppose them to Catholics, lead to the election of Rakoczy and ultimately obtain huge influence in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and even the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth59. Apart from tradition, the freedom of religion and the defense of the rights of protestants played a significant role among the nobility, at least Lithuanian. The private ambitions of Radziwill, who apparently could not cope with the growing importance of the Sapieha faction in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with Kazimierz Leon, had a great influence on the situation. The election of 1648 required the nobility and the magnates to concretize their requirements and firmly support one of the candidates. Therefore, various rumors have been disseminated. A lot of false information about the candidates to the throne was dissolved, and one of the most interesting is the one in which Wladyslaw IV before his death supposedly stated that under no circumstances should not, his brothers Jan Kazimierz or Karol Ferdynand be chosen to be king. The other rumor suggest that the dead king recommended to the throne his brother-in-law -the Prince of Neuburg, Philip Wilhelm60. The ongoing uprising in Ukraine and the attitude towards the candidates to the throne of Bohdan Chmielnicki also had an impact on the course of the election in 164861.
It is also worth mentioning the benefits that members of the Radziwill family received for their support. During the interregnum, Prince Wladyslaw Zygmunt promised Krzysztof, in exchange for support, the Vilnius Voivodeship. After the death of Lew Sapieha in 1633, however, Janusz Tyszkiewicz received this office, which was met with indignation of the Radziwills, including Albrycht Stanislaw. He forced Tyszkiewicz to resign from office, and the king offered him the Field Hetman position. In the meantime, Krzysztof Radziwill resigned from the Vilnius Castellany, which was finally received by Aleksander Ludwik Radziwill. In June 1633, the Field Hetman also received the goods of Newel and Siebiez. Two years later he became a Grand Lithuanian Hetman. Janusz Radziwill received fewer broadcasts for obvious reasons. After the death of Adam Kazanowski at the beginning of 1649, the king offered him in the Minsk region, borysowski district office62.
The attitudes of Krzysztof and Janusz Radziwill and the elite of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania towards the election of the last two Vasas are an interesting problem for further deliberations and research, especially taking into account differences in the country's internal and foreign situation in 1632 and 1648, which determined the activities mentioned above. This article was mainly intended to discuss the problem connected with the attitudes of the Lithuanian nobility towards the election of a new king. Answering the question of what and how the attitudes and moods among the nobility were influenced, their argumentation to support one or other candidate requires many years of research and use of methods developed by other humanities, such as sociology, social psychology or political science.