The exploration of the modification of signifieds, which interpret human activities, social phenomena and the dialectics between them, has as indispensable presupposition the acceptation on a methodological level of the process of transformation of three necessary elements (thought, semiosis, world) for the perception and ontological identification of physical entities or cultural objects. The phenomenological theory of the beginning of the 20th century seems to consolidate this acceptation and, at the same time, refute it. According to this philosophy, it is very important for one to know the structure of the action of "taking into consideration of something". This structure is perceptible if, free from theoretical schemes of interpretation and bias, one examines what is revealed by itself. This principle seems to contradict a possible theory of semiotics, which intends to define the borders of semiotics by exploring the evolution of phenomena, concepts and interpretations. Notwithstanding, Husserl, citing Franz Brentano's term intentionality, speaks of the extensive character of the conscience, which is not defined as an interior sealed space, but as a flux of experiences, opened towards the world. This paper aims at questioning the term intentionality and its importance for a theory on the borders of semiotics by evoking the example of Aristotle's terms synonymy and homonymy.