In this article, Charles Larmore lays out the idea of an “ethics of reading”. Its concern does not lie with the consequences of reading, but rather with our very relation as readers to what we read, with our responsibility as readers to a text in interpreting what it says. Larmore discusses at length the nature of textual interpretation in order to show that this relation of responsibility is indeed ethical in nature since it consists in a relation to another person: what a text says or means is what the author effectively intended it to say or mean. Yet the ethical nature of the reading relation is special in kind since it relates us directly, not to the author, who is absent, but to the text, which unlike a person is unable to object to how it may be mistreated - that is, deliberately or negligently misread. In this fact there appears the ultimate import of the ethics of reading: it exemplifies the very essence of ethical thinking. The moral point of view consists in seeing in another’s good a reason for action on our part, apart from all consideration of our own good. As a result, our moral character shows itself most clearly in the way we treat the vulnerable, those with little power, few resources, or no social standing, who cannot make it in our interest to treat them well. In this regard, the ethics of reading does not have to do merely with one ethical relation among others. It points to the very heart of the moral point of view.