Published by De Gruyter

Volume 102 Issue 2

Issue of Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie

Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available June 9, 2020

Titelseiten

Page range: I-III

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Articles

May 1, 2020

‘Pushing Through’ in Plato’s Sophist: A New Reading of the Parity Assumption

Evan Rodriguez

Page range: 159-188

Abstract

At a crucial juncture in Plato’s Sophist , when the interlocutors have reached their deepest confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor proclaims that there is yet hope. Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will equally clarify the other. But what justifies the Visitor’s seemingly oracular prediction? A new interpretation explains how the Visitor’s hope is in fact warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The passage describes a broader pattern of ‘exploring both sides’ that lends insight into Plato’s aporetic method.

June 9, 2020

Infinite Time and Contingent Beings: Aquinas’s Third Way Revisited

Christopher Gilbert

Page range: 189-208

Abstract

Many commentators have accused Aquinas of committing either a formal or an informal fallacy in his Third Way argument. I believe it is possible to revise the Third Way argument so as to avoid such errors. I here present a revision of the first part of the Third Way that is (a) immune to the objections most commonly raised against it, (b) consonant with the basic tenets of Thomism, and (c) plausible from a contemporary point of view.

June 9, 2020

Kant, Eudaimonism, Act-Consequentialism and the Fact of Reason

Martin Sticker

Page range: 209-241

Abstract

Kant considers eudaimonism as his main opponent and he assumes that his ethics is the only viable alternative to eudaimonism. He does not explicitly address theories differing from both eudaimonism and from his own. I argue that whilst Kant and Act-Consequentialists advocate different normative principles, their positions share the important abstract feature that they establish what is to be done from a rational principle and not based on what is in the self-interest of the respective agent, as Kant thinks eudaimonism does. Act-Consequentialism is thus closer to Kant’s ethics than is often assumed. I will demonstrate and vindicate this point with a new interpretation of the Fact of Reason. This reading also establishes that the notion of a Fact of Reason is less contentious than many of Kant’s critics believe. We should not expect that the Fact establishes Kantianism. Instead, the Fact is only supposed to count against a specific competing view of morality, namely, eudaimonism. Act-Consequentialists can accept the Fact as well.

May 1, 2020

Disentangling Cartesian Global Skepticism from Cartesian Problematic External-World Idealism in Kant’s Refutation

Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira

Page range: 242-260

Abstract

Kant’s Refutation targets what he calls the problematic idealist. This is understood by the mainstream of Kantian scholarship as the global skeptic that Descartes briefly adumbrated in his first Meditation. The widespread view in the literature is that the fate of the Refutation is tied to its success as an argument against this Cartesian global skepticism. This consensus is what I want to question in this paper. I argue that Kant’s opponent – the problematic idealist – is not the Cartesian global skeptic, but rather what I prefer to call here the Cartesian problematic external-world idealist. According to Cartesian global skepticism we cannot know whether our commonsensical beliefs are true until we rule out the skeptical hypotheses are false. In contrast, the Cartesian external-world idealist sees as problematic the assumption that the underlying nature of outer things of which we have ideas is mind-independent rather than caused by our own thinking being. My aim here is to disentangle Cartesian global skepticism from Cartesian problematic external-word idealism and show that, if measured against global skepticism, Kant’s Refutation is doomed to fail; while against problematic idealism, it is at least a promising argument.

June 9, 2020

Bolstering the Keystone: Kant on the Incomprehensibility of Freedom

Timothy Aylsworth

Page range: 261-298

Abstract

In this paper, I give an explanation and defense of Kant’s claim that we cannot comprehend how freedom is possible. I argue that this is a significant point that has been underappreciated in the secondary literature. My conclusion has a variety of implications both for Kant scholars and for those interested in Kantian ideas more generally. Most notably, if Kant is right that there are principled reasons why freedom is beyond our comprehension, then this would release his ethical views from an undesirable explanatory burden. It would be a boon for Kantians if they could ground their lofty claims about the unique, elevated status of rational agency without committing to an implausible view of libertarian freedom. I also suggest that there are certain debates concerning moral motivation and transcendental idealism that might have to change in response to Kant’s claims about the incomprehensibility of freedom.

Discussion

June 9, 2020

Les stoïciens et Platon – monistes ou dualistes ?

Vladimír Mikeš

Page range: 299-323

Abstract

The Stoics’ way of presenting principles – the active and the passive – is ambiguous because they say that principles are two while also suggesting that they are inseparable and thus interdependent. This ambiguity cannot be resolved in favour of one or the other side of the dilemma, as is shown by analysis of two possible models of the relations among principles – a causal and a categories-based model. This ambiguity is rather a necessary consequence of the Stoic view of principles and should be compared to the ambiguity of Plato’s concept of “principles” in the Timaeus . Plato’s Receptacle is in a similar relation to other constitutive elements of his cosmogonical account as are the two Stoic principles, each to the other. In particular, the relation between the Receptacle and qualities in it is to be seen as a systematic parallel to the relation of the Stoic principles (and probably also its historical model). The concluding claim is that Plato and the Stoics advance a similar kind of dualism which should be called such, despite its ambiguity. The ambiguity in both systems is due to the need to see the principles in such a relation as would reveal their dependence, and thus secure the basic unity of the cosmos.

Book Reviews

June 9, 2020

Benjamin Harriman, Melissus and Eleatic Monism. (Cambridge Classical Studies.) Cambridge: Cambridge Universitiy Press, 2018, xii+242 pp.

Mathilde Brémond

Page range: 324-327

June 9, 2020

Alan Kim (ed.), Brill’s Companion to German Platonism. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019, xi+388 pp.

Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire

Page range: 328-331

About this journal

The journal publishes exceptional articles in all areas of Western philosophy from antiquity up to contemporary philosophy. The Archiv articles are distinguished by precise argumentation and lucid prose.