Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg

Volume 11 Issue 2

Issue of Analyse & Kritik

Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Norminterpretation und ökonomische Analyse des Rechts

Christian Kirchner, Stefan Koch

Page range: 111-133

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Abstract

Normative economics and a hermeneutic approach to interpretation of legal norms are only compatible if - and this is the exception - such legal norms have the goal of accomplishing economic efficiency. But economic analysis of law as a positive approach may be used in the legal interpretation process in order to evaluate different options of norm interpretations. In fields of law where economic issues are at stake such a methodological evaluation of interpretative variants are superior to common sense analysis and should be applied. But even in fields where non-economic issues play a major role an economic analysis is a helpful tool in order to get aware of the opportunity costs of economically sub-optimal solutions. Economic analysis of law thus becomes an integral part of the norm interpretation process without colliding with the autonomy of the legal decision enhancing the rationality of the endeavour.

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Kooperative Strategien im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation eines N-Personen-Spiels

Andreas Diekmann, Klaus Manhart

Page range: 134-153

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Abstract

Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod’s research on iterative prisoner’s dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player- version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners’ dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some ‘nice’ strategies like ‘tit-for-tat’ are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, this does not solve the cooperation problem. On the contrary, the relative success of some ‘nice’ conditional cooperative strategies is paralleled by a rapid decline of cooperation in large groups.

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Das Verhältnis von Moral und Rationalät: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit David Gauthiers

Morals by Agreement

Jean-Louis Arni

Page range: 154-178

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Abstract

The relation between morality and rationality (in the sense of rational choice and rational behaviour) is a prominent theme in (the tradition of) moral philosophy. D. Gauthier’s account of this relation is an extraordinarily impressive one. He attempts to demonstrate a general coincidence (at different levels) between rationality and morality. His approach is discussed in what follows, and it will be shown that most of his ‘coincidence claims’ are exaggerated.

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Kollektive Güter und individuelle Verantwortung

Anton Leist

Page range: 179-196

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Abstract

In acting within large groups the single actor typically suffers from the symptom of irrelevance of his contribution. A single contributory effect may be extremely small or, due to ‘threshold effects’, even non-existent. Given such conditions not only self-interested action, also purely altruistically motivated contribution seems to be rendered irrational. The article reasons that the famous ‘principles of generalization’ are of no help on this problem. However, a ‘principle of division’ could be used in showing, that in many situations of collective action altruistically motivated contribution is rationally sound.

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

What Does Doing One’s Part of a Joint Action Involve?

Raimo Tuomela

Page range: 197-207

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Abstract

The paper gives a conceptual clarification of what the notion of a part of a joint action (project, etc;) involves. The - mutually recognized - division of a joint action into parts can be based on social norms (viz. formal or informal rules, or proper social norms such as conventions or group specific social norms) or it can be based on agreement, coercion, or some analogous social mechanism. The paper also discusses the notions of a we-intention, of the intention to perform an action as one’s part of a joint action, and of an agent’s intentionally performing an action as his part of a joint action.

About this journal

ANALYSE & KRITIK

is devoted to the fundamental issues of empirical and normative social theory
is directed at social scientists and social philosophers who combine commitment to political and moral enlightenment with argumentative rigour and conceptual clarity
develops social theorizing in connection with analytical philosophy and philosophy of science
promotes the dialogue between Anglo-American and Continental traditions in the social sciences and ethics
publishes articles in English