Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg

Volume 12 Issue 1

Issue of Analyse & Kritik

Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Krankheit als Funktionsgestörtheit

Eine Kritik an C. Boorses ‚objektiver‘ Krankheitstheorie

Markus Pawelzik

Page range: 5-33

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Abstract

Contrary to the bio-medical sciences most philosophers of medicine regard disease as an evaluative concept. C. Boorse’s well- known naturalist attempt to conceptualize disease exclusively on the basis of physiological fact seems highly plausible at first sight, since on this Supposition it is possible to make use of the impressive explanatory knowledge of modern medicine. But critical examination of his meta- physiological notion of “disease” as subnormal functioning shows that it does not conform to licensed medical disease-judgements. Furthermore his doctrine seems unjustified since it’s empirical implementability is highly questionable. This suggests that medicine is a naturalist enterprise that is guided by evaluation. An alternative conception of disease is advanced that tries to make the ‘nexus’ of physiological fact and evaluation intelligible: Disease is (extensionally) the class of physiological processes that (actually or prospectively) undermine the physiological conditions of human well-being.

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder

Bernard Gert

Page range: 34-46

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Abstract

I provide an account of irrationality that takes the concept of an irrational action as more basic than that of an irrational belief. While explaining the various elements of the OSM-III-R definition of mental disorders, I show that even though ( 1) not all mental disorders involve irrational beliefs or delusions, (2) not all irrational actions are due to mental disorders, and (3) not all mental disorders lead to irrational actions, there is a close conceptual connection between irrationality and mental disorders because both involve suffering or an increased risk of suffering an evil or harm, independent of the circumstances one is in.

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Ist „zwanghaftes Handel” ein paradoxer Begriff?

Ein Versuch der Beschreibung von Zwangssymptomen

Martin Löw-Beer

Page range: 47-66

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Abstract

What does it mean that a person is psychologically forced to do certain things? It is argued that there are, strictly speaking, no compulsive actions. Talking of compulsive actions people refer to intentional actions that are means of avoiding irrational panic attacks. People know that certain situations will cause them irrational fears and that is the reason why they avoid these situations. These irrational fears are either mediated by wrong perceptions or by emotional delusions. In the former case the people believe wrongly that they are in danger, while in the latter case they know that they “feel wrong”, but cannot help it. The compulsive elements cannot be found in the actions but in the irrational fears and the obsessions that are part of them.

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Wahn, Sinn, Sprache und Analyse

Kritische Notizen zu Wolfgang Tress’ „Vorklärungen zu einer psychologischen Medizin der Person”

Matthias Kettner

Page range: 67-87

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Abstract

I discuss Wolfgang Tress’ attempt to apply analytic philosophy to the field of psychiatry and psychological medicine. According to Tress the concept of a person as a rational intentional system is fundamental for psychological medicine and irreducible to concepts of the natural sciences. But the rationality assumptions that are crucial for the concept of a person need much more clarification than Tress provides. Furthermore, Tress’ concept of schizophrenia as a disorder of ‘semantic coherence of the person’ is seriously flawed empirically. Pragmatics rather than semantics should provide the methodological framework for the reconstruction of psychopathological concepts, such as “schizophrenia” and “delusion”.

Publicly Available May 12, 2016

Können Personen ein Gegenstand des Verstehens sein?

Ein Beitrag zur Hermeneutik der Person

Wolfgang R. Köhler

Page range: 88-110

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Abstract

ls it possible to understand not only linguistic expressions and actions but also persons? According to common sense it surely is. Here it is argued that to understand a person a fourfold knowledge is required, although this knowledge is not identical with the understanding of a person. The understanding of a person is cognitive, but neither complete nor scientific.

About this journal

ANALYSE & KRITIK

is devoted to the fundamental issues of empirical and normative social theory
is directed at social scientists and social philosophers who combine commitment to political and moral enlightenment with argumentative rigour and conceptual clarity
develops social theorizing in connection with analytical philosophy and philosophy of science
promotes the dialogue between Anglo-American and Continental traditions in the social sciences and ethics
publishes articles in English