Analytic philosophy has taken for granted an account of the history of philosophy which jumps straight from Kant to Frege, leaving out Hegel and most of the nineteenth century. Such an understandig (e.g., that of Reichenbach’s Rise of Scientific Philosophy) depends upon viewing philosophy as the solution of certain discrete and specific “problems” raised by e.g., discoveries in physics or mathematics. But the rejection of traditional positivist doctrines (those invoked by Reichenbach) brought about by the work of Wittgenstein, Quine, and others, makes this latter conception of philosophy difficult to sustain. Consequently, analytic philosophy has become a movement without a clear self-image and sense of mission. Its old ideological roots have been cut, and it now sustains itself through a sense of professionalism rather than by a sense of cultural or historical role. However, it still retains the Reichenbachian account of the history of philosophy. This has led to problems in American philosophy departments, particularly an unwillingness to regard Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other “Continental” figures as being “really philosophers” and thus an unwillingness to include them in the curriculum.