The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Published by De Gruyter

Volume 5 Issue 2 - “Field Experiments” edited by John A. List

December 2006

Issue of The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Contents
Journal Overview

Advances Article

Contributions Article

December 31, 2005

Does Framing Matter for Conditional Cooperation? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment

Stephan Meier

Abstract

Framing a decision situation differently has affected behavior substantially in previous studies. This paper tests a framing effect in a field experiment at the University of Zurich. Each semester, every student has to decide whether to contribute to two social funds. Students were randomly informed that a high percentage of the student population contributed (or, equivalently, that a low percentage did not contribute), while others received the information that a relatively low percentage contributed (or a high percentage did not contribute).The results show the influence of framing effects is limited. People behave in a conditional cooperative way if informed either about the number of contributors or about the equivalent number of non-contributors. The positive correlation between group behavior and individual behavior is, however, weaker when the focus is on the defectors. The field experiment also shows gender differences in social comparison.

December 31, 2005

Competitive Work Environments and Social Preferences: Field Experimental Evidence from a Japanese Fishing Community

Jeffrey P Carpenter, Erika Seki

Abstract

Models of job tournaments and competitive workplaces more generally predict that while individual effort may increase as competition intensifies between workers, the incentive for workers to cooperate with each other diminishes. We report on a field experiment conducted with workers from a fishing community in Toyama Bay, Japan. Our participants are employed in three different aspects of fishing. The first group are fishermen, the second group are fish wholesalers (or traders), and the third group are staff at the local fishing coop. Although our participants have much in common (e.g., their common relationship to the local fishery and the fact that they all live in the same community), we argue that they are exposed to different amounts of competition on-the-job and that these differences explain differences in cooperation in our experiment. Specifically, fishermen and traders, who interact in more competitive environments are significantly less cooperative than the coop staff who face little competition on the job. Further, after accounting for the possibility of personality-based selection, perceptions of competition faced on-the-job and the treatment effect of job incentives explain these differences in cooperation to a large extent.

December 31, 2005

Instrument-Induced Bias in Donation Mechanisms: Evidence from the Field

Bailey Norwood, Jayson L Lusk

Abstract

Eliciting actual donations toward a public good has been proposed as a means of estimating a lower bound to individuals compensating surplus, and can be accomplished using mail/phone surveys or field experiments. This study shows that when warm-glow is present, the elicitation instrument decreases the transaction costs of donating. This presents an obstacle to using the donation mechanism. As a remedy, we propose the use of a multi-donation mechanism where subjects can direct their donation to alternative public goods. Results from a field experiment confirm this instrument-induced bias can be large, suggesting field experiment practitioners should seriously consider how their experimental procedures may alter economic behavior.

December 31, 2005

Online Fund-Raising Mechanisms: A Field Experiment

Yan Chen, Xin Li, Jeffrey K MacKie-Mason

Abstract

We implemented one of the first web-based online field experiments of fund-raising. We embedded our experiment in the Internet Public Library to test four mechanisms: Voluntary Contribution (VCM), Premium, Seed Money and Matching. Although the gift size is not significantly different across mechanisms, the Seed and Matching mechanisms each generate significantly higher user click-through response rate than the Premium mechanism. Because this is one of the earliest embedded, web-based field experiments, we report our methodology findings in some detail. Cookies work better as participant assignment techniques than pop-up windows and elicitation of geographic information. Participant clickstream data that nominally demonstrate a desire to donate is a poor predictor of actual giving.

About this journal

Objective
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (BEJEAP) welcomes submissions that employ microeconomics to analyze issues in organizational economics, consumer behavior, and public policy. Articles submitted to BEJEAP can come in two formats: research papers and letters. Authors should bring to their analysis whatever microeconomic theoretical, experimental or econometric tools are helpful. We publish both empirical work and applied theory (though not more abstract forms of applied theory), and our aim is to disseminate papers that have practical implications for public policy, organizational or individual decision making.

Topics

Design of organizations and institutions
Industrial organization
Health economics
Public finance
Labour Economics
Economics of education, family, development, law, or the environment
Effects of domestic and international policy

Article formats
Research Papers, Letters

> Information on submission process