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December 20, 2010
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This article analyzes the last financial crisis focussing on the recurrent dynamics of externalities in banking. It shows that two major determinants of the crisis were the uncertainty of a new form of financial intermediation and the failure of regulation to cope with its externalities. Differently from more standard explanations, which are based on opportunism and/or irrationality of financial institutions, this analysis suggests that regulation has not just been insufficient. Regulation has contributed to financial instability too, supporting fragile conventions to handle uncertainty and encouraging regulatory arbitrage through financial innovation. Three implications are derived from this analysis and contrasted with the ongoing reforms of financial regulation in the US and in the EU. First, regulatory arbitrage is better dealt with by protecting banking from disintermediation than by extending prudential regulation to non-banks. Maturity transformation should be defined functionally and reserved to banks. Second, a major danger with ratings is that they support false conventions of safety. To avoid this outcome, the relevance of ratings for regulatory purposes should be reduced and rating agencies should be deterred from rating without verifiable background knowledge. Third, in order to reduce short-termism, regulation of banks' corporate governance should rather question than reinforce managerial accountability to shareholders.
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December 20, 2010
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Consensus on a general (bank) insolvency law at both the G20 and the EU levels remains out of reach. Consequently we should focus on truly systemic cross-border banks. Therefore “systemic” banks have to be identified on economical rather than political grounds. The smooth coordination of different competent national supervisors will not work without clear-cut rules on competencies and a transnational framework “regulation”. This framework should be based on a G20 insolvency standard that creates a global level playing field for cross-border banks groups with systemic impact. Given the overlap between prudential regulation on the one-side and crisis intervention and resolution tools on the other side, it seems appropriate to implement such a standard via a new Basel Accord.
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December 20, 2010
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The article presents the interplay between the mandatory bid rule and (European or national) company law. This rule is explained with reference to both the protection of investors' expectations as to the shareholding structure of the company and the promotion of the market's allocative efficiency. In accordance with the recent Audiolux judgment of the ECJ, the mandatory bid cannot be regarded as a manifestation of an overarching equal treatment principle in European company law. Some recourse to company law is in any case necessary to discern the limits of the mandatory bid. Indeed, the mandatory bid rule puts a heavy burden on collective shareholder action, and thus tips the balance of power between shareholders and management in favour of the latter. This is to be taken into account when determining the scope of application of the rule to joint activities of shareholders. This is also a matter of the internal structure of the company, which is only regulated in national, rather than European, company law. Thus, national company law becomes relevant in the interpretation of the mandatory bid rule in each jurisdiction, while the effet utile of the Takeover Directive must be preserved.