Published by De Gruyter

Volume 20 Issue 2

Issue of German Economic Review

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Contents
Journal Overview

November 30, 2019

Issue Information

Page range: i-iv

November 30, 2019

Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning: A Theoretical Model With Heterogeneous Labor, Biased Technical Change and International Sourcing

Thomas Gries, Stefan Jungblut, Henning Meyer, Tim Krieger

Page range: 129-170

Abstract

The employability of an aging population in a world of continuous and biased technical change is top of the political agenda. Due to endogenous human capital depreciation the effective retirement age is often below statutory retirement age resulting in permanent non-employability of older workers. We analyze this phenomenon in a putty-putty human capital vintage model and focus on education and the speed of human capital depreciation. Introducing a two-stage education system with initial schooling and lifelong learning, not even lifelong learning turns out to be capable of aligning economic and statutory retirement. However, well-designed education programs will keep more workers in highly productive activities at the end of their working life, and hence will substitute for simple social transfers, or for an early switch towards very low paid jobs.

November 30, 2019

Factors Driving German Physicians’ Managed Care Participation

Andree Ehlert, Dirk Oberschachtsiek, Thomas Wein

Page range: 171-193

Abstract

Recent German health care reforms were intended to increase efficiency and quality of medical supply by introducing managed care (MC). Participation of physicians in MC contracts, however, is still limited. This study econometrically identifies factors determining physicians’ MC participation. The data has been obtained from a telephone survey among 500 German physicians. Economic implications of our results regarding future MC development in Germany are discussed.

November 30, 2019

Like Father, Like Son: Inheriting and Bequeathing

Carlos Bethencourt, Lars Kunze

Page range: 194-216

Abstract

This paper incorporates indirect reciprocal behavior in the context of bequeathing decisions into an otherwise standard OLG model. We provide conditions for the existence of a unique steady state with operative bequests. Contrary to standard OLG models, we show that taking into account such behavioral interactions allows one to rationalize both an increasing and U-shaped pattern of the inheritance to GDP ratio over time, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Moreover, the model predicts a nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between the size of an unfunded social security program and the long-run stock of per capita capital, which in turn provides a novel explanation of the inconclusive empirical findings on the relationship between social security, savings and long-run growth. Ricardian equivalence is shown to hold in a special case of the model.

November 30, 2019

The Demand for Index-Based Flood Insurance in a High-Income Country

Martin Achtnicht, Daniel Osberghaus

Page range: 217-242

Abstract

Increased flooding is expected to be one of the greatest threats caused by climate change. Flood insurance helps to cope with the risk of flooding, but take-up rates are relatively low in many places. Mainly in developing countries, index-based flood insurance - where the insurer’s payout is based on pre-agreed weather indices instead of actual loss - has been marketed recently. In this paper, we investigate whether the introduction of index-based flood insurance with relatively low premiums is likely to attract new customers in a high-income country, namely Germany. We use data from a discrete choice experiment combined with damage data for a major flood in 2013. We find index-based flood insurance to attract similar customers as traditional damage-based, while the latter is preferred on average. Our results suggest that not many new customers would enter the market, once index-based flood insurance were available.

November 30, 2019

Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics Into the Core

Heinrich H. Nax

Page range: 243-256

Abstract

Dynamics for play of transferable-utility cooperative games are proposed that require information regarding own payoff experiences and other players’ past actions, but not regarding other players’ payoffs. The proposed dynamics provide an evolutionary interpretation of the proto-dynamic ‘blocking argument’ (Edgeworth, 1881) based on the behavioral principles of ‘aspiration adaptation’ (Sauermann and Selten, 1962) instead of best response. If the game has a non-empty core, the dynamics are absorbed into the core in finite time with probability one. If the core is empty, the dynamics cycle infinitely through all coalitions.

About this journal

German Economic Review (GER), the official publication of the German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik), is an international journal publishing original and rigorous research of general interest in a broad range of economic disciplines, including:

macro- and microeconomics
economic policy
international economics
public economics
finance
business administration

The scope of research approaches includes theoretical, empirical and experimental work. Innovative and thought-provoking contributions, in particular from younger authors, are especially welcome. GER is edited by an international board of editors and associate editors from Europe and overseas. This ensures access to an international pool of referees and guarantees a high intellectual standard of published contributions. Editors are committed to a prompt turnaround of submissions.

German Economic Review publishes original research of general interest in a broad range of economic discplines, including macro- and microeconomics, public economics, business administration and finance. Authors are invited to submit papers devoted to policy analysis as well as theoretical and empirical papers. All submissions are refereed. The journal's internationally composed board of editors is committed to maintaining a high standard of quality.

As the official journal of the Verein für Socialpolitik (German Economic Association), German Economic Review is provided to all the members of the association. At the same time, the journal aims at a wider international audience and invites participation and subscriptions from economists around the world.

GER is published four times a year, in English, and is available online.
Sets of data used are available at the German Economic Review Data Archive under http://journaldata.zbw.eu/journals/ger.

150 years „Verein für Socialpolitik"

De Gruyter congratulates the "Verein für Socialpolitik" on its 150th anniversary!