journal: Journal of Mathematical Cryptology

Impact Factor: 1.2

Open Access Published since January 25, 2007

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology

ISSN: 1862-2984

Editor-in-chief: Massimiliano Sala

Submit manuscript

About this journal

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology is a fully peer-reviewed, open access, electronic journal that provides readers with free, instant, and permanent access to all content worldwide.

Aims and Scope

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology is a forum for articles in the area of mathematical cryptology.

Topics

Boolean functions

Elliptic curve cryptography

Mathematical cryptology

Information security

Quantum cryptology

Algebra

Algebraic geometry

Coding theory

Combinatorics and graph theory

Number theory

Probability and stochastic processes

Work linking math to cryptology

Work in the mathematical foundations of crypto

Theoretical aspects of cryptology

Mathematical foundations of cryptology

The scope includes mathematical results of algorithmic or computational nature that are of interest to cryptology. While JMC does not cover information security as a whole, the submission of manuscripts on information security with a strong mathematical emphasis is explicitly encouraged.

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology accepts submissions of research articles, reviews, and communications. Submission of a manuscript implies that the work described is not copyrighted, published, or submitted elsewhere, except in abstract form. The corresponding author should ensure that all authors approve the manuscript before submission.

Your Benefits

As an author of Journal of Mathematical Cryptology, You benefit from

fair and constructive peer review

quick online publication of accepted papers (continuous publication model)

language polishing services upon acceptance for authors from non-English speaking regions

no limitations on colour figures and word count in published articles

all articles are freely available to the academic community worldwide without any restrictions

promotion of published papers to readers and citers

distribution to open access directories (such as DOAJ) and thousands of libraries worldwide

liberal policies on copyrights (authors retain copyright) and on self-archiving (no embargo periods) (License to Publish (CC-BY))

secure archiving by De Gruyter and the independent archiving service Portico

Article Processing Charges

In order to sustain the publishing process, each article accepted for publication in Journal of Mathematical Cryptology is subject to an Article Processing Charge of €1000. This fee is used to cover the costs of the peer-review process, professional typesetting and copyediting, as well as online hosting, long-term preservation, and extensive promotion to potential readers. There is no submission fee. Information regarding payment of the charge will be provided following acceptance for publication. For more information please go to Article Processing Charges.

========

Christmas/New Year PROMOTION

We offer a -75% DISCOUNT on Article Processing Charges for manuscripts submitted between December 1, 2023 and February 10, 2024.

========

Publication Ethics and Editorial Policies

Detailed information on Editorial Policy, Publication Ethics, Instructions for Authors etc. can be found in the Supplementary Materials section.

For more information on De Gruyter Publishing Ethics, please see the De Gruyter Guidelines online here.

Special Issues

We invite groups of researchers, conference organizers and individual scholars to submit their proposals for Special Issues.

To submit your proposal, please, complete the Special Issue proposal form and send it to the Editorial Office – jmc_editorial@degruyter.com.

Abstracting and Indexing

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology is covered by the following services:

Baidu Scholar
Cabells Journalytics
Chronos Hub
CNKI Scholar (China National Knowledge Infrastructure)
CNPIEC - cnpLINKer
DBLP Computer Science Bibliography
Dimensions
DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals)
EBSCO (relevant databases)
EBSCO Discovery Service
Engineering Village
Genamics JournalSeek
Google Scholar
Inspec
Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST)
J-Gate
JournalGuide
JournalTOCs
KESLI-NDSL (Korean National Discovery for Science Leaders)
Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet)
MyScienceWork
Naver Academic
Naviga (Softweco)
Norwegian Register for Scientific Journals, Series and Publishers
Primo Central (ExLibris)
ProQuest (relevant databases)
Publons
QOAM (Quality Open Access Market)
ReadCube
Reaxys
Scilit
SCImago (SJR)
SCOPUS
Semantic Scholar
Sherpa/RoMEO
Summon (ProQuest)
TDNet
Ulrich's Periodicals Directory/ulrichsweb
WanFang Data
Web of Science - Emerging Sources Citation Index
WorldCat (OCLC)
X-MOL
Yewno Discover
zbMATH Open

Supplementary Materials

Topics

External Links

Volume 17 Issue 1

January 2023

Regular Articles

Open Access February 15, 2023

Plactic key agreement (insecure?)

Daniel R. L. Brown

Article number: 20220010

More Download PDF

Abstract

Plactic key agreement is a new type of cryptographic key agreement that uses Knuth’s multiplication of semistandard tableaux from combinatorial algebra. The security of plactic key agreement relies on the difficulty of some computational problems, particularly the division of semistandard tableaux. Tableau division can be used to find the private key from its public key or to find the shared secret from the two exchanged public keys. Monico found a fast division algorithm, which could be a polynomial time in the length of the tableaux. Monico’s algorithm solved a challenge that had been previously estimated to cost 2 128 steps to break, which is an infeasibly large number for any foreseeable computing power on earth. Monico’s algorithm solves this challenge in only a few minutes. Therefore, Monico’s attack likely makes the plactic key agreement insecure. If it were not for Monico’s attack, plactic key agreement with 1,000-byte public keys might perhaps have provided 128-bit security, with a runtime of a millisecond. But Monico’s attack breaks these public keys’ sizes in minutes.

Open Access February 20, 2023

Algebraic and quantum attacks on two digital signature schemes

Vitaly Roman’kov, Alexander Ushakov, Vladimir Shpilrain

Article number: 20220023

More Download PDF

Abstract

In this article, we analyze two digital signature schemes, proposed in Moldovyan et al., that use finite noncommutative associative algebras as underlying platforms. We prove that these schemes do not possess the claimed property of being quantum safe. We also show that in many cases these schemes are, in fact, vulnerable to “classical” algebraic cryptanalysis.

Open Access March 21, 2023

A construction of encryption protocols over some semidirect products

Shuji Isobe, Eisuke Koizumi

Article number: 20220018

More Download PDF

Abstract

In CANDARW ’18, Isobe et al. proposed a secure encryption protocol on non-abelian groups based on the Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld key exchange protocol. There have remained two weak points on the protocol: one is that the protocol is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) in a slightly restricted sense, what they call IND-rCCA secure, and the other is that the conditions imposed on groups and hashing schemes are too strict to make the protocol practical. In this article, we propose an IND-CCA secure protocol that resolves those problems. The key idea is to employ some specific semidirect product as platform groups, so that we can achieve the exact IND-CCA security from concise conditions on groups and hashing schemes. Our protocol is not dependent on any computational assumptions on abelian subgroups.

Open Access June 5, 2023

A code-based hybrid signcryption scheme

Jean Belo Klamti, M. Anwarul Hasan

Article number: 20220002

More Download PDF

Abstract

A key encapsulation mechanism ( KEM {\mathsf{KEM}} ) that takes as input an arbitrary string, i.e., a tag, is known as tag- KEM {\mathsf{KEM}} , while a scheme that combines signature and encryption is called signcryption. In this article, we present a code-based signcryption tag- KEM {\mathsf{KEM}} scheme. We utilize a code-based signature and an IND - CCA2 {\mathsf{IND}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CCA2}} (adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) secure version of McEliece’s encryption scheme. The proposed scheme uses an equivalent subcode as a public code for the receiver, making the NP-completeness of the subcode equivalence problem be one of our main security assumptions. We then base the signcryption tag- KEM {\mathsf{KEM}} to design a code-based hybrid signcryption scheme. A hybrid scheme deploys asymmetric- as well as symmetric-key encryption. We give security analyses of both our schemes in the standard model and prove that they are secure against IND - CCA2 {\mathsf{IND}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CCA2}} (indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) and SUF - CMA {\mathsf{SUF}}\hspace{0.1em}\text{-}\hspace{0.1em}{\mathsf{CMA}} (strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack).

Open Access June 30, 2023

Provable security against generic attacks on stream ciphers

Alexander Moch

Article number: 20220033

More Download PDF

Abstract

Recent lightweight hardware-based stream cipher designs keep an external non-volatile internal state that is not part of the cipher’s hardware module. The purpose of these so-called small-state ciphers is to keep the size of the hardware and the power consumption low. We propose a random oracle model for stream ciphers. This will allow us to analyse the recent small-state stream cipher designs’ resistance against generic attacks and, in particular, time-memory-data tradeoff attacks. We analyse the conventional construction underlying stream ciphers like Grain and Trivium, constructions continuously using the external non-volatile secret key during keystream generation like Sprout, Plantlet, Fruit, and Atom, constructions continuously using the external non-volatile IV, and constructions using a combination of the IV and the key like DRACO. We show the tightness of all bounds by first presenting the time-memory-data tradeoff attacks on the respective constructions, establishing the upper bound on security, and then presenting the proof of security to establish the lower bound on security. In this work, we extend the theoretical work done by Hamann et al. who introduced the DRACO stream cipher at FSE 2023. We use the same random oracle model as the aforementioned work and apply it to the earlier work by Hamann et al. presented at SAC 2019, which showed security for two of the four constructions we consider in this work. Our model is equivalent but allows for a much simpler proof of security. Furthermore, we provide a proof of security for stream ciphers continuously using the secret key during keystream generation, giving upper and lower bounds for all four generic stream cipher constructions proposed so far.

Open Access September 25, 2023

Access structures determined by uniform polymatroids

Renata Kawa, Mieczysław Kula

Article number: 20220017

More Download PDF

Abstract

In this article, all multipartite access structures obtained from uniform integer polymatroids were investigated using the method developed by Farràs, Martí-Farré, and Padró. They are matroid ports, i.e., they satisfy the necessary condition to be ideal. Moreover, each uniform integer polymatroid defines some ideal access structures. Some objects in this family can be useful for the applications of secret sharing. The method presented in this article is universal and can be continued with other classes of polymatroids in further similar studies. Here, we are especially interested in hierarchy of participants determined by the access structure, and we distinguish two main classes: they are compartmented and hierarchical access structures. The main results obtained for access structures determined by uniform integer polymatroids and a monotone increasing family Δ \Delta can be summarized as follows. If the increment sequence of the polymatroid is non-constant, then the access structure is connected. If Δ \Delta does not contain any singletons or the height of the polymatroid is maximal and its increment sequence is not constant starting from the second element, then the access structure is compartmented. If Δ \Delta is generated by a singleton or the increment sequence of the polymatroid is constant starting from the second element, then the obtained access structures are hierarchical. They are proven to be ideal, and their hierarchical orders are completely determined. Moreover, if the increment sequence of the polymatroid is constant and ∣ Δ ∣ > 1 | \Delta | \gt 1 , then the hierarchical order is not antisymmetric, i.e., some different blocks are equivalent. The hierarchical order of access structures obtained from uniform integer polymatroids is always flat, that is, every hierarchy chain has at most two elements.

Open Access November 21, 2023

Further research results on confusion coefficient of Boolean functions

Zhenyu Liu, Zepeng Zhuo

Article number: 20210039

More Download PDF

Abstract

The notion of confusion coefficient (CC) is a property that attempts to characterize the confusion property of cryptographic algorithms against differential power analysis. In this article, we establish a relationship between CC and the transparency order (TO) for any Boolean function and deduce some relationships between the sum-of-squares of CC, signal-to-noise ratio, and TO. We also give a tight upper bound and a tight lower bound on the sum-of-squares of CC for balanced s-plateaued functions. Finally, the results generalized a lower bound on the sum-of-squares of CC of Boolean functions with the Hamming weight k .

Volume 13 (2019)

Volume 12 (2018)

Volume 11 (2017)

Volume 10 (2016)

Volume 9 (2015)

Volume 8 (2014)

Volume 7 (2013)

Volume 6 (2012)

Volume 5 (2011)

Volume 4 (2010)

Volume 3 (2009)

Volume 2 (2008)

Volume 1 (2007)

Journal Impact Factor	1.2	2022, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2023)
5-year Journal Impact Factor	1.0	2022, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2023)
Journal Citation Indicator	0.23	2022, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2023)
CiteScore	1.7	2022, Scopus (Elsevier B.V., 2023)
SCImago Journal Rank	0.585	2022, SJR (Scimago Lab, 2023; Data Source: Scopus)
Source Normalized Impact per Paper	1.116	2022, CWTS Journal Indicators (CWTS B.V., 2023; Data Source: Scopus)
Mathematical Citation Quotient	0.35
Index Copernicus Value	121.11	2022, ICI Journals Master List (Index Copernicus, 2023)

More information about journal rankings

Submit

MANUSCRIPTS
Journal of Mathematical Cryptology encourages the submission of substantial full-length bodies of work. There are no specific length restrictions for the overall manuscript or individual sections; however, we urge the authors to present and discuss their findings in a concise and accessible manner.

All submissions must be made via online submission system ScholarOne. In case of problems, please contact the Editorial Office of this journal (jmc_editorial@degruyter.com).

SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS
Manuscripts have to be written in LATEX, AMS-TEX, AMS-LATEX. We do not accept papers in Plain TEX format. For an initial submission, the authors are strongly advised to upload their entire manuscript, including tables and figures, as a single PDF file. Authors are strongly advised to submit the final version of the paper using the journal’s LaTex Template.

For detailed information, please see Instruction for Authors

EDITORIAL POLICY
Unpublished material: Submission of a manuscript implies that the work described is not copyrighted, published or submitted elsewhere, except in abstract form. The corresponding author should ensure that all authors approve the manuscript before its submission.
Ethical conduct of research: The authors must describe and confirm safeguards to meet ethical standards when applicable. See Editorial Policy for details.
Conflict of interest: When authors submit a manuscript, they are responsible for recognizing and disclosing financial and/or other conflicts of interest that might bias their work and/or could inappropriately influence his/her judgment. If no specified acknowledgement is given, the Editors assume that no conflict of interest exists. Authors are encouraged to fill in the ICMJE Conflicts of Interest Form (available here) and send it in the electronic format to the Managing Editor.
Copyright: All authors retain copyright, unless – due to their local circumstances – their work is not copyrighted. The copyrights are governed by the Creative-Commons Attribution Only license (CC-BY) which is compliant with Plan-S. The corresponding author grants the journal the license to use of the article, by signing the License To Publish. Scanned copy of license should be sent to the journal, as soon as possible.
Authorship: Authorship should be limited to those who have made a significant contribution to the conception, design, execution, or interpretation of the reported study. All those who have made significant contributions should be listed as co-authors. Where there are others who have participated in certain substantive aspects of the research project, they should be named in an Acknowledgement section. The corresponding author should ensure that all appropriate co-authors (according to the above definition) and no inappropriate co-authors are included in the author list of the manuscript, and that all co-authors have seen and approved the final version of the paper and have agreed to its submission for publication.
Peer Review process: Our standard policy requires each paper reporting primary research or secondary analysis of primary research, together with relevant supplementary materials, to be reviewed by at least two Referees and the peer-review process is single-blind. The Editors reserve the right to decline the submitted manuscript without review, if the studies reported are not sufficiently novel or important to merit publication in the journal. Manuscripts deemed unsuitable (insufficient originality or of limited interest to the target audience) are returned to the author(s) without review. The Editor seeks advice from experts in the appropriate field. Research articles and communications are refereed by a minimum of two reviewers, review papers by at least three. Authors are requested to suggest persons competent to review their manuscript. However, please note that this will be treated only as a suggestion, and the final selection of reviewers is exclusively the Editor's decision. The final decision of acceptance in made by Managing Editor or, in case of conflict, by the Editor-in-Chief.
Scientific Misconduct: This journal publishes only original manuscripts that are not also published or going to be published elsewhere. Multiple submissions/publications, or redundant publications (re-packaging in different words of data already published by the same authors) will be rejected. If they are detected only after publication, the journal reserves the right to publish a Retraction Note. In each particular case Editors will follow COPE’s Core Practices and implement the advices.

Editorial

Editor-in-Chief
Massimiliano Sala, Department of Mathematics, University of Trento, Italy

Honorary Editor-in-Chief
Nicolas Courtois, University College London, UK

Editorial Advisory Board
Timothy J. Hodges, University of Cincinnati, USA
Wasim Alhamdani, School of Computer and Information Sciences, University of the Cumberlands, KY, USA
Lejla Batina, Institute for Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University, The Netherlands
Joseph J. Boutros, Texas A&M University at Qatar, Doha, Qatar
Ray CC Cheung, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Bernardo David, IT-Universitetet i København, Copenhagen, Denmark
Roberto De Prisco, Università di Salerno, Salerno, Italy
Vipul Goyal, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
Shay Gueron, University of Haifa and Intel Corporation, Israel
Chunlei Li, Department of Informatics, University of Bergen, Norway
Carlos Aguilar Melchor, ISAE-SUPAERO, Toulouse University, France
Dominique Schröder, Department of Computer Science, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
Gil Segev, School of Computer Science and Engineering, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Susanne Wetzel, Stevens Institute of Technology, Department of Computer Science, Castle Point on Hudson, USA
Øyvind Ytrehus, Simula UiB AS, Norway
Chao Zhang, School of Mathematics, Harbin Institute of Technology, China

Editorial Board
Boolean functions, symmetric cryptography and combinatorics
Robert Coulter, University of Delaware, USA
Daniel Panario, Carleton University, Canada
Cloud encryption
Ilaria Chillotti, Zama, France
Miran Kim, Hanyang University, South Korea
Romain Gay, IBM Research, Switzerland
Cryptographic protocols
Paolo D'Arco, University of Salerno, Italy
Pascal Lafourcade, University of Clermont Auvergne, France
Barbara Masucci, University of Salerno, Italy
Khoa Nguyen, University of Wollongong, Australia
Number theory and cryptography
Andrej Dujella, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Federico Pintore, University of Bari, Italy
Post-quantum cryptography
Delaram Kahrobaei, City University of New York, USA
Dmytro Savchuk, University of South Florida, USA
Vladimir Shpilrain, University of New York, USA
Quantum cryptography
Aysajan Abidin, KU Leuven, Belgium,
Other cryptographic functions and primitives
Wai Ho Mow, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong
David Naccache, École Normale Supérieure, France
Jacques Patarin, University of Versailles, France
Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Belgium
Tamir Tassa, The Open University of Israel, Israel
Huaxiong Wang, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Editorial Contact
Kumaran Rengaswamy
Assistant Managing Editor, Compuscript
journal.editor@degruyter.com

Managing Editor
Monika Maleszka
Monika.Maleszka@degruyter.com

(Deutsch)

Type: Journal
Language: English
Publisher: De Gruyter
First published: January 25, 2007
Publication Frequency: 1 Issue per Year
Audience: All those interested in selected areas lying at the crossroads of mathematics and cryptology.