Open Access Published by De Gruyter

Volume 1 Issue 2

Issue of Journal of Social Ontology

Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available September 5, 2015

Frontmatter

Page range: i-iv

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Articles

Open Access June 18, 2015

Is Distributed Cognition Group Level Cognition?

Kirk Ludwig

Page range: 189-224

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Abstract

This paper shows that recent arguments from group problem solving and task performance to emergent group level cognition that rest on the social parity and related principles are invalid or question begging. The paper shows that standard attributions of problem solving or task performance to groups require only multiple agents of the outcome, not a group agent over and above its members, whether or not any individual member of the group could have accomplished the task independently.

Open Access September 5, 2015

What ‘We’?

Holly Lawford-Smith

Page range: 225-249

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to explain why certain authors – both popular and academic – are making a mistake when they attribute obligations to uncoordinated groups of persons, and to argue that it is particularly unhelpful to make this mistake given the prevalence of individuals faced with the difficult question of what morality requires of them in a situation in which there is a good they can bring about together with others, but not alone. I will defend two alternatives to attributing obligations to uncoordinated groups. The first solution has us build better people, who will coordinate their actions willingly and spontaneously when the occasion arises. The second solution has us build better groups, so that when the occasion arises, there is a framework in place for coordinating members into action.

Open Access September 5, 2015

Collective Intentionality and Causal Powers

Dave Elder-Vass

Page range: 251-269

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Abstract

Bridging two traditions of social ontology, this paper examines the possibility that the concept of collective intentionality can help to explain the mechanisms underpinning the causal powers of some social entities. In particular, I argue that a minimal form of collective intentionality is part of the mechanism underpinning the causal power of norm circles: the social entities causally responsible for social norms. There are, however, many different forms of social entity with causal power, and the relationship of collective intentionality to these causal powers varies, depending on the form of the mechanism underpinning the power concerned. Some powers depend on collective intentionality, and others do not.

Open Access September 5, 2015

Ontology of the False State

On the Relation Between Critical Theory, Social Philosophy, and Social Ontology

Italo Testa

Page range: 271-300

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Abstract

In this paper I will argue that critical theory needs to make its socio-ontological commitments explicit, whilst on the other hand I will posit that contemporary social ontology needs to amend its formalistic approach by embodying a critical theory perspective. In the first part of my paper I will discuss how the question was posed in Horkheimer’s essays of the 1930s, which leave open two options: (1) a constructive inclusion of social ontology within social philosophy, or else (2) a program of social philosophy that excludes social ontology. Option (2) corresponds to Adorno’s position, which I argue is forced to recur to a hidden social ontology. Following option (1), I first develop a meta-critical analysis of Searle, arguing that his social ontology presupposes a notion of ‘recognition’ which it cannot account for. Furthermore, by means of a critical reading of Honneth, I argue that critical theory could incorporate a socio-ontological approach, giving value to the constitutive socio-ontological role of recognition and to the socio-ontological role of objectification. I will finish with a proposal for a socio-ontological characterization of reification which involves that the basic occurrence of recognition is to be grasped at the level of background practices.

Open Access September 5, 2015

No Need for Infinite Iteration

A Critique of the Collectivist Copernican Revolution in Social Ontology

Sveinung Sundfør Sivertsen

Page range: 301-319

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Abstract

As part of his argument for a “Copernican revolution” in social ontology, Hans Bernhard Schmid (2005) argues that the individualistic approach to social ontology is critically flawed. This article rebuts his claim that the notion of mutual belief necessarily entails infinite iteration of beliefs about the intentions of others, and argues that collective action can arise from individual contributions without such iteration. What matters is whether or when there are grounds for belief, and while extant groups and social structures may be relevant to some forms of collective action, this does not show that all forms of collective action depends on such such pre-established collectivity.

Book Symposium

Open Access July 4, 2015

Précis of Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology

Tuukka Kaidesoja

Page range: 321-326

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Abstract

This paper introduces and contextualizes my book Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (London: Routledge, 2013).

Open Access July 4, 2015

Of Babies and Bathwater. A Review of Tuukka Kaidesoja Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology

Dave Elder-Vass

Page range: 327-331

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Abstract

Tuukka Kaidesoja’s new book is a welcome addition to the literature on critical realism. He shows good judgement in defending Roy Bhaskar’s argument for causal powers while criticising its framing as a transcendental argument. In criticising Bhaskar’s concept of a real-but-not-actual ontological domain, however, he discards an essential element of a realist ontology, even a naturalised one: a recognition of the transfactual aspect of causal power.

Open Access July 4, 2015

Comment on Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology

Petri Ylikoski

Page range: 333-340

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Abstract

This comment discusses Kaidesoja (2013) and raises the issue whether his analysis justifies stronger conclusions than he presents in the book. My comments focus on four issues. First, I argue that his naturalistic reconstruction of critical realist transcendental arguments shows that transcendental arguments should be treated as a rare curiosity rather than a general argumentative strategy. Second, I suggest that Kaidesoja’s analysis does not really justify his optimism about the usefulness of causal powers ontology in the social sciences. Third, I raise some doubts about the heuristic value of Mario Bunge’s social ontology that Kaidesoja presents as a replacement for critical realist ontology. Finally, I propose an alternative way to analyze failures of aggregativity that might better serve Kaidesoja’s purposes than the Wimsattian scheme he employs in the book.

Open Access July 4, 2015

Tuukka Kaidesoja on Critical Realist Transcendental Realism

Ruth Groff

Page range: 341-348

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Abstract

I argue that critical realists think pretty much what Tukka Kaidesoja says that he himself thinks, but also that Kaidesoja’s objections to the views that he attributes to critical realists are not persuasive.

Open Access July 4, 2015

Fallibilism and Ontology in Tuukka Kaidesoja’s Critical Realist Social Ontology

Daniel Little

Page range: 349-358

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Abstract

This article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.

Open Access July 4, 2015

Elaborating Naturalized Critical Realism: Response to Ruth Groff, Dave Elder-Vass, Daniel Little and Petri Ylikoski

Tuukka Kaidesoja

Page range: 359-375

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Abstract

This paper is a reply to the discussions of Ruth Groff, Dave Elder-Vass, Daniel Little, and Petri Ylikoski of Tuukka Kaidesoja (2013): Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (London: Routledge).

Book Reviews

Open Access June 18, 2015

Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman

Olle Blomberg

Page range: 377-379

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Open Access July 10, 2015

Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality

Bill Wringe

Page range: 381-383

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Open Access July 10, 2015

Relationship Thinking: Agency, Enchrony, and Human Sociality

Corinna Elsenbroich

Page range: 385-387

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About this journal

Journal of Social Ontology has moved publishers and is now reachable via https://journalofsocialontology.org.