Open Access Published by De Gruyter

Volume 2 Issue 2

Issue of Journal of Social Ontology

Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available August 11, 2016

Frontmatter

Page range: i-iii

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Special Section: Social Kinds

Open Access August 11, 2016

Social Categories are Natural Kinds, not Objective Types (and Why it Matters Politically)

Theodore Bach

Page range: 177-201

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Abstract

There is growing support for the view that social categories like men and women refer to “objective types.” An objective type is a similarity class for which the axis of similarity is an objective rather than nominal or fictional property. Such types are independently real and causally relevant, yet their unity does not derive from an essential property. Given this tandem of features, it is not surprising why empirically-minded researchers interested in fighting oppression and marginalization have found this ontological category so attractive: objective types have the ontological credentials to secure the reality (and thus political representation) of social categories, and yet they do not impose exclusionary essences that also naturalize and legitimize social inequalities. This essay argues that, from the perspective of these political goals of fighting oppression and marginalization, the category of objective types is in fact a Trojan horse; it looks like a gift, but it ends up creating trouble. I argue that objective type classifications often lack empirical adequacy, and as a result they lack political adequacy. I also provide, and in reference to the normative goals described above, several arguments for preferring a social ontology of natural kinds with historical essences.

Open Access August 11, 2016

The Ontology of Interactive Kinds

Rico Hauswald

Page range: 203-221

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Abstract

This paper defends the notions of an interactive kind and a looping effect as features of social and human scientific classifications and aims to give a realist interpretation of them. I argue that interactive kinds can best be modeled as a special case of changing causal property cluster kinds. In order to do so, I develop a typology of looping effects according to the sort of entities that are affected, the main types of which are individual-looping, category-looping, and kind-looping. Based on this distinction, I identify interactive kinds as those causal property cluster kinds that are subjected to kind-looping.

Open Access August 11, 2016

Mind-Dependent Kinds

Muhammad Ali Khalidi

Page range: 223-246

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Abstract

Many philosophers take mind-independence to be criterial for realism about kinds. This is problematic when it comes to psychological and social kinds, which are unavoidably mind-dependent. But reflection on the case of artificial or synthetic kinds (e.g. synthetic chemicals, genetically modified organisms) shows that the criterion of mind-independence needs to be qualified in certain ways. However, I argue that none of the usual variants on the criterion of mind-dependence is capable of distinguishing real or natural kinds from non-real kinds. Although there is a way of modifying the criterion of mind-independence in such a way as to rule in artificial kinds but rule out psychological and social kinds, this does not make the latter non-real. I conclude by proposing a different way of distinguishing real from non-real kinds, which does not involve mind-independence and does not necessarily exclude psychological and social kinds.

Open Access August 11, 2016

Natural Kinds, Social Constructions, and Ordinary Language

Clarifying the Crisis in the Science of Emotion

Cecilea Mun

Page range: 247-269

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Abstract

I argue for the importance of clarifying the distinction between metaphysical, semantic, and meta-semantic concerns in the discourse of what Emotion is. This allows us to see that those involved in the Scientific Emotion Project and the Folk Emotion Project are in fact involved in the same project – the Science of Emotion. It also helps us understand why questions regarding the natural kind status of Emotion, as well as answers to questions regarding the value of ordinary language emotion terms or concepts to emotion research, will not help resolve the observed crisis in the Science of Emotion.

Articles

Open Access August 11, 2016

A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention

Facundo M. Alonso

Page range: 271-302

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Abstract

In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals – including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance – which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations.

Open Access August 11, 2016

A Framework for Ontological Policy Reconstruction: Academic Knowledge Transfer in the Netherlands as a Case Study

Marc Pauly

Page range: 303-323

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Abstract

This paper provides a framework for analyzing the ontology underlying a given public policy, i.e. the categories and concepts used by the policy. It provides a set of questions concerning the language, logic and deontology of a policy and their development over time. The framework is applied to a particular case study, the valorization policy for Dutch universities, in order to suggest the usefulness of the framework in the design and normative evaluation of public policy.

About this journal

Journal of Social Ontology has moved publishers and is now reachable via https://journalofsocialontology.org.