Open Access Published by De Gruyter

Volume 5 Issue 2

August 2019

Issue of Journal of Social Ontology

Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available March 26, 2020

Frontmatter

Page range: i-iv

Download PDF

Articles

Open Access February 24, 2020

Mediational Recognition and Metaphysical Power: A Systematic Analysis

Heikki J. Koskinen

Page range: 147-168

More Download PDF

Abstract

Interhuman relations sometimes suffer from a lack of adequate recognition. Here I ask whether this can be caused by the “third” of representations of a superhuman ultimate object or source of recognition, that is, a personal God. In arguing for a positive answer, I articulate a notion of mediational recognition, and present a systematic analysis of a trilateral form of recognition in which one party claims to mediate normative judgements of another party to a third one. The analysis then focuses on the structure of metaphysical power that can be generated by religious groups and institutions.

Open Access February 17, 2020

Contradiction Club: Dialetheism and the Social World

Emma Bolton, Matthew J. Cull

Page range: 169-180

More Download PDF

Abstract

Putative examples of true contradictions in the social world have been given by dialetheists such as Graham Priest, Richard Routley, and Val Plumwood. However, we feel that it has not been decisively argued that these examples are in fact true contradictions rather than merely apparent. In this paper we adopt a new strategy to show that there are some true contradictions in the social world, and hence that dialetheism is correct. The strategy involves showing that a group of sincere dialetheists can, given an appropriately formed institution, bootstrap contradictions into existence. We discuss objections and consider the implications of this finding for debates over logic.

Open Access February 17, 2020

The Evolution of Social Contracts

Michael Vlerick

Page range: 181-203

More Download PDF

Abstract

Influential thinkers such as Young, Sugden, Binmore, and Skyrms have developed game-theoretic accounts of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. Social contracts are sets of commonly understood rules that govern cooperative social interaction within societies. These naturalistic accounts provide us with valuable and important insights into the foundations of human societies. However, current naturalistic theories focus mainly on how social contracts solve coordination problems in which the interests of the individual participants are (relatively) aligned, not competition problems in which individual interests compete with group interests (and in which there are no group beneficial Nash equilibrium available). In response, I set out to build on those theories and provide a (more) comprehensive naturalistic account of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. My central claim is that social contracts have culturally evolved to solve cooperation problems, which include both coordination and competition problems. I argue that solutions to coordination problems (which I spell out) emerge from “within-group” dynamics, while solutions to competition problems (which I also spell out) result largely from “between-group” dynamics.

Open Access March 26, 2020

Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method

Matthew Andler

Page range: 205-227

More Download PDF

Abstract

Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g. beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g. beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be jettisoned or revised in cases of conflict with beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation. Yet, considering the influence of ideology on beliefs about socially significant phenomena, I argue for an epistemic reversal.

Book Symposium

Open Access March 11, 2020

Précis: Categories We Live By

Ásta

Page range: 229-233

More Download PDF

Abstract

The project of Categories We Live By is to offer a metaphysics of social categories. The strategy is to give a theory of social properties of individuals. The main components of the theory are a conferralist framework for properties; an account of social meaning ; and an account of social construction ; accompanying is also an account of social identity . This theory can be applies to offer concrete conferralist proposals of categories such as sex, gender, race, disability, religion, and LGBTQ categories. This précis describes the main components (conferralist framework, social meaning, social construction, social identity) briefly, but leaves discussions of applications for another time.

Open Access February 24, 2020

Categories We Do Not Know We Live By

Åsa Burman

Page range: 235-243

More Download PDF

Abstract

I argue that a central claim of Ásta’s conferralist framework – that it can account for all social properties of individuals – is false, by drawing attention to (opaque) class. I then discuss an implication of this objection; conferralism does not meet its own conditions of adequacy, such as providing a theory that helps to understand oppression. My diagnosis is that this objection points to a methodological problem: Ásta and other social ontologists have been fed on a “one-sided diet” of types of examples, resulting in a limited view of the paradigmatic social phenomena, thus making conferralism too narrow to fulfill its intended role.

Open Access January 28, 2020

Response-Dependence, Misgendering, and Passing: A Comment on Ásta’s Categories We Live By

Esa Díaz-León

Page range: 245-249

More Download PDF

Abstract

This comment on Ásta’s Categories we live by: the construction of sex, gender, race, and other social categories discusses Ásta’s arguments that the conferralist view on social properties does better than a response-dependence view concerning gender. Her key argument is that a response-dependence does not allow for mistakes. This comment tries to show that a response-dependence view can accommodate misgendering and passing.

Open Access February 6, 2020

Individualistic and Structural Explanations in Ásta’s Categories We Live By

Aaron M. Griffith

Page range: 251-260

More Download PDF

Abstract

Ásta’s Categories We Live By is a superb addition to the literature on social metaphysics. In it she offers a powerful framework for understanding the creation and maintenance of social categories. In this commentary piece, I want to draw attention to Ásta’s reliance on explanatory individualism – the view that the social world is best explained by the actions and attitudes of individuals. I argue that this reliance makes it difficult for Ásta to explain how many social categories are maintained and why certain categories are reliably available to us and so resistant to change. These explanatory deficiencies could be overcome, I argue, by eschewing explanatory individualism and positing social structures to figure in structural explanations of the maintenance and availability of social categories.

Open Access February 24, 2020

Conferralism and Intersectionality: A Response to Ásta’s Categories We Live By

Katharine Jenkins

Page range: 261-272

More Download PDF

Abstract

The conferralist account of social properties that Ásta develops and defends in Categories We Live By is persuasive in many ways. Conferralism could however do better, by its own lights, at handling the phenomenon of intersectionality. This paper first suggests a friendly amendment to the schema for conferrals that Asta offers. This helps to explain the difficulty concerning intersectionality. Finally, the paper suggests a way of developing the conferralist account that would resolve this difficulty.

Open Access March 11, 2020

Response to Critics

Ásta

Page range: 273-283

More Download PDF

Abstract

This is a response to the critical comments by Åsa Burman, Esa Díaz-León, Aaron Griffith, and Katharine Jenkins.

Book Review

Open Access January 24, 2020

Not in Their Name: Are Citizens Culpable for Their States’ Actions?

Avia Pasternak

Page range: 285-288

Download PDF

About this journal

Journal of Social Ontology has moved publishers and is now reachable via https://journalofsocialontology.org.