The minutiae of F.W.J. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie have been perennially dismissed due to its allegedly infeasible and indefensible assertions about Nature, such as his designation of Nature as “universal organism.” In the realm of post-Kantian German Idealism, such a dismissive attitude toward Schelling’s so-called objective idealism , more often than not, develops itself along the lines of Hegel’s critique of Schelling’s conception of the Absolute (i.e., as static, fixed, undifferentiated, dull, and so on). In turn, I aim to accomplish two tasks in the following investigation. First, I intend to clarify Schelling’s characterization of Nature as universal organism through a practical or teleological, instead of a theoretical or metaphysical, approach. Second, I seek to undermine the Hegelian-influenced criticisms of Schelling’s “Absolute” by demonstrating the ways in which the practico-teleological characterization of Schelling’s formulation of Nature extends into his later philosophical works (i.e., his Identitätsphilosophie and his Freiheitsschrift ). Through these clarifications, I hope to emphasize the uniqueness and richness of Schelling’s configuration of Nature.