Published by De Gruyter

Volume 6 Issue 1

Issue of Kant Yearbook

Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available August 21, 2014

Masthead

Page range: i-iv

Download PDF

Publicly Available August 21, 2014

Page range: v-vi

Download PDF

August 21, 2014

Mendelssohn and Kant on Mathematics and Metaphysics

John Callanan

Page range: 1-22

Abstract

The difference between the method of metaphysics and the method of mathematics was an issue of central concern for Kant in both the Pre-Critical and Critical periods. I will argue that when Kant speaks of the ‘philosophical method’ in the Doctrine of Method in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he frequently has in mind not his own methodology but rather the method of conceptual analysis associated with rationalism. The particular target is Moses Mendelssohn’s picture of analysis contained in his submission for the 1763 Prize Essay competition. By the time of the first Critique, I argue, Kant wants to maintain his own longstanding commitment to the distinctness of the methods of metaphysics and mathematics. However, Kant wants to use this same analysis of the source of the distinction to diagnose the origins of the dogmatism that is engendered by the method of the rationalists.

August 21, 2014

Our Soul in Place

Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter

Page range: 23-42

Abstract

The majority of Kant scholars has taken it for granted that for Kant the soul is in some sense present in space and that this assumption is by and large unproblematic. If we read Kant’s texts in the context of debates on this topic within 18th century rationalism and beyond, a more complex picture emerges, leading to the somewhat surprising conclusion that Kant in 1770 can best be characterised as a Cartesian about the mind. The paper first develops a framework for describing the various positions on the place of the soul in space as varieties of ‘localism’, since German philosophers of the 18th century all agreed on the fact that the soul is in some sense present in space. Strong localists (Crusius, Knutzen) maintain that the soul occupies a place that cannot at the same time be occupied by a material substance. The Königsberg Wolffian Christian Gabriel Fischer is an ‘epistemic localist’ defending the view that our knowledge about the presence of the soul in space is limited. Bilfinger holds that the soul only represents itself as being present in space, he is a ‘representational localist’. The Cartesians, including Leonhard Euler and his teacher Samuel Werenfels, assume that the soul is effective in a region of space without truly being present there. They are ‘virtual localists’. Kant’s attitude towards this problem before the 1760s is a bit unclear. But his writings in this period are at least compatible with the strong localism defended by Knutzen. In the Herder transcripts (1762-1764) and other texts after 1760, Kant begins to distance himself from this view, but he does not articulate clearly his own position. This trend culminates in Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766), where Kant oscillates somewhat uneasily between epistemic and virtual localism and criticises explicitly the Cartesian thesis that the soul’s presence in the body is limited to a determinate region. The dissertation from 1770 marks another radical change in Kant’s views on the place of the soul. Here, he subscribes to virtual localism and its concomitant thesis that the soul itself is, properly speaking, nowhere. Together with the thesis that the soul knows that it belongs to the mundus intelligibilis this makes Kant in 1770 a Cartesian about the mind.

August 21, 2014

Kantian Space, Supersubstantivalism, and the Spirit of Spinoza

James Messina

Page range: 43-64

Abstract

In the first edition of Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mendelssohn, Jacobi claims that Kant’s account of space is “wholly in the spirit of Spinoza”. In the first part of the paper, I argue that Jacobi is correct: Spinoza and Kant have surprisingly similar views regarding the unity of space and the metaphysics of spatial properties and laws. Perhaps even more surprisingly, they both are committed to a form of parallelism. In the second part of the paper, I draw on the results of the first part to explain Kant’s oft-repeated claim that if space were transcendentally real, Spinozism would follow, along with Kant’s reasons for thinking transcendental idealism avoids this nefarious result. In the final part of the paper, I sketch a Spinozistic interpretation of Kant’s account of the relation between the empirical world of bodies and (what one might call) the transcendental world consisting of the transcendental subject’s representations of the empirical world and its parts.

August 21, 2014

From “Possible Worlds” to “Possible Experience”. Real Possibility in Leibniz and Kant

Osvaldo Ottaviani

Page range: 65-86

Abstract

This paper moves from a disagreement with those interpreters who explain Kant’s doctrine of real possibility in terms of possible worlds. It seems to me that a possible world framework is too much indebted to the Leibnizian metaphysics of modality and, therefore, cannot serve to make sense of Kant’s theses. Leibniz’s theory of possibility, indeed, has been deeply criticized in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). Interestingly enough, however, Kant’s principal argument for rejecting that the field of what is possible is greater than the field of what is real was already anticipated by Leibniz. However, Leibniz employed it to demonstrate that there cannot be more than one actual world only (the others being purely possible ones). Moving from this fact, I argue that there is a certain tension between what Leibniz says about the actual world and his commitment to a plurality of possible worlds conceived as ideas in God’s mind. The first part of my paper is devoted to show that such a tension can be traced back to Leibniz’s claims about the relation between the possible and the real. In the second part, then, I maintain that Kant’s theory of real possibility grows from a dissatisfaction with (and a rejection of) Leibniz’s attempted solution to the problem of characterizing a kind of possibility narrower than the merely logical one and, nonetheless, not identical with existence. Finally, I present a short account of Kant’s theory of real possibility, based on the notion of transcendental conditions as conditions of possibility of experience, showing how it works in the case of the forms of intuition.

August 21, 2014

Kant’s Criticisms of Ontological and Onto-theological Arguments for the Existence of God

Matthew Rukgaber

Page range: 87-114

Abstract

Kant’s objection to the ontological argument in the first Critique is thought to be contained within the claim that ‘existence is not a predicate’. This article maintains that this ‘digression’ on existence is not Kant’s main objection. Instead, Kant argues within the first eight paragraphs of this fourteen paragraph section that there is no meaningful predication - either logical or real - without a synthetic, existential judgment concerning the subject of predication. Thus, the very subject of predication of the proof (God) is an empty concept and an indeterminate nominal definition (rather than a real possibility) that allows for neither meaningful predication nor the generation of a contradiction. I argue that this objection is significantly different than classical objections that are often identified with it and from Kant’s objection in 1763. I also argue that Kant’s target is not simply the Cartesian argument but is also his own pre-critical onto-theological argument. There is little evidence that Kant continues to accept the a priori onto-theological argument, and, in fact, he rejects its core claims in his discussion of the ontological argument and in the final paragraphs of the section on the Ideal of Reason.

August 21, 2014

Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason

Joe Saunders

Page range: 115-136

Abstract

In his pre-critical lectures on rational psychology, Kant employs an argument from the I to the transcendental freedom of the soul. In the (A-edition of the) first Critique, he distances himself from rational psychology, and instead offers four paralogisms of this doctrine, insisting that ‘I think’ no longer licenses any inferences about a soul. Kant also comes alive to the possibility that we could be thinking mechanisms - rational beings, but not agents. These developments rob him of his pre-critical rationalist argument for freedom. In the Groundwork, this is a serious problem; if we are not free, morality will be a phantasm for us. In Groundwork III, Kant attempts to overcome this by offering a new argument for our freedom, involving the standpoint of practical reason. In this paper, I detail these developments and present a practical and phenomenological reading of Kant’s approach in Groundwork III. I also venture a defence of this new argument.

August 21, 2014

List of Contributors

Page range: 137-138

August 21, 2014

Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2015 and 2016

Page range: 139-140

August 21, 2014

Note to the Studi Kantiani

Page range: 141-142

About this journal

Founded by Dietmar Heidemann, the Kant Yearbook is an international journal that publishes articles, historical or systematic, on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. It is the yearbook′s goal to intensify innovative research on Kant on the international scale. Articles are double-blind peer reviewed by an internationally renowned editorial board. Each issue is dedicated to a specific topic announced through a call for papers.

Topics:

Vol. 18/2026 — "Philosophy of History and Culture"

Vol. 17/2025 — "Philosophy of Mind"

Vol. 16/2024 — "Philosophy of Mathematics"

Vol. 15/2023 — "Philosophy of Language"

Vol. 14/2022 — "Constructivism"

Vol. 13/2021 — "Political Philosophy"

Vol. 12/2020 — "Kant and Neo-Kantianism"

Vol. 11/2019 — "Aesthetics"

Vol. 10/2018 — "Philosophy of Religion"

Vol. 9/2017 — "Philosophy of Science"

Vol. 8/2016 —　"Kant and German Idealism"
Vol. 7/2015 — "Kant and Empiricism"
Vol. 6/2014 —　"Kant and Rationalism"
Vol. 5/2013　— "Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge"
Vol. 4/2012 — "Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy"
Vol. 3/2011 — "Anthropology"
Vol. 2/2010　— "Metaphysics"
Vol. 1/2009　— "Teleology"

Volume 6 Issue 1

Issue of Kant Yearbook

Masthead

Table of Contents

Mendelssohn and Kant on Mathematics and Metaphysics

Abstract

Our Soul in Place

Abstract

Kantian Space, Supersubstantivalism, and the Spirit of Spinoza

Abstract

From “Possible Worlds” to “Possible Experience”. Real Possibility in Leibniz and Kant

Abstract

Kant’s Criticisms of Ontological and Onto-theological Arguments for the Existence of God

Abstract

Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason

Abstract

List of Contributors

Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2015 and 2016

Note to the Studi Kantiani