Published since November 15, 2012

Kant Yearbook

ISSN: 1868-4602

Author(s): Georg Mohr

Editor-in-chief: Dietmar Heidemann

Editorial Board: Henry E. Allison, Karl Ameriks, Gordon G. Brittan, Klaus Düsing, Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Corey W. Dyck, Kristina Engelhard, Brigitte Falkenburg, Hannah Ginsborg, Michelle Gilmore-Grier, Thomas Grundmann, Paul Guyer, Robert Hanna, Lothar Kreimendahl, Angelica Nuzzo, Robert Stern, Dieter Sturma, Robert Theis, Kenneth R. Westphal, Marcus Willaschek

About this journal

The Kant Yearbook is an international journal that publishes articles, historical or systematic, on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. It is the yearbook′s goal to intensify innovative research on Kant on the international scale. Articles are double-blind peer reviewed by an internationally renowned editorial board. Each issue is dedicated to a specific topic announced through a call for papers.

Topics:
Vol. 8/2016 — “Kant and German Idealism”
Vol. 7/2015 — “Kant and Empiricism”
Vol. 6/2014 — “Kant and Rationalism”
Vol. 5/2013 — “Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge”
Vol. 4/2012 — “Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy”
Vol. 3/2011 — “Anthropology”
Vol. 2/2010 — “Metaphysics”
Vol. 1/2009 — “Teleology”

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Supplementary Materials

Publication Ethics Statement

Topics

Volume 14 Issue 1

September 2022

Frontmatter

Publicly Available September 28, 2022

Title pages

Page range: I-IV

Download PDF

Publicly Available September 28, 2022

Page range: V-V

Download PDF

Articles

September 28, 2022

Vulnerabilities in Kantian Constructivism: Why they Matter for Objective Normativity

Susana Cadilha, Francisco Lisboa

Page range: 1-21

Abstract

In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that he might be read as a proto-moral constructivist whose formulas impose standards of correctness upon our moral judgments, from which we formulate moral norms as necessary facts of reason. In section 4 we argue that: 1) vulnerabilities have moral relevance which adds merit to the project of finding objective moral norms, and 2) the inclusion of vulnerabilities as empirical contingencies is compatible with Kantian Constructivism. We do so by considering vulnerabilities a constitutive aspect of finite rational agents which must, therefore, be implied and considered in the process of moral construction.

September 28, 2022

Three Rival Versions of Kantian Constructivism

Ernesto V. Garcia

Page range: 23-43

Abstract

In order to make headway on the debate about whether Kant was a constructivist, nonconstructivist, or instead defends a hybrid view that somehow entirely sidesteps these categories, I attempt to clarify the terms of the debate more carefully than is usually done. First, I discuss the overall relationship between realism and constructivism. Second, I identify four main features of Kantian constructivism in general. Third, I examine three rival versions of metanormative Kantian constructivism, what I’ll call axiological, constitutivist, and rationalist constructivist. I argue that Kant is best seen as a rationalist constructivist. I conclude by arguing that although it’s a constructivist view, this reading avoids the main pitfalls of traditional Kantian constructivism. In doing so, it helps us to achieve a satisfying rapprochement between constructivist and non-constructivist (that is, so-called ‘realist’) readings of Kant.

September 28, 2022

Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Constitutivism: Some Reflections

Andrews Reath

Page range: 45-69

Abstract

Is moral constructivism an account of the basis of the content of morality or of its authority? In fact, different writers have understood constructivism to be addressing different issues. In this paper I argue that Kant should be understood as a constructivist about the content of morality – or better about a limited set of general substantive principles – and as a constititutivist about its authority. After some general remarks in Section 1 about contemporary discussions of constructivism, in Section 2 I discuss Rawls’s understanding of Kant’s constructivism; Rawls takes Kantian constructivism to be a view about the content of morality. In Section 3, I give an overview of Kant’s moral conception as constructivist about the content of morality and as constitutivist about its authority. In Section 4 I address a worry whether certain features of Kant’s constitutivism rest his constructivism on a realist foundation, arguing that they do not.

September 28, 2022

Re-constructing Kant: Kant’s Teleological Moral Realism

Facundo Rodriguez

Page range: 71-95

Abstract

It is common for constructivists to claim that Kant was the first philosopher to understand moral facts as ‘constructions of reason’. They think that Kant, just like the constructivist, proposes a procedure – the Categorical Imperative – from which the order of value can be ‘constructed’ and grounds the validity of this construction procedure not in some previous value but in its capacity to solve a practical problem, the problem of ‘free agency’. I here argue that this reading is misguided and propose that we read Kant as a teleological realist instead. Kant is a realist in that he takes the value of rational nature to be objective and so not ‘constructed’. Kant is a teleological realist insofar as his derivation of the moral law from the objective value of rational nature relies on a teleological understanding of rational nature.

September 28, 2022

Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity

Janis David Schaab

Page range: 97-120

Abstract

While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then try to complete the practical standpoint characterisation by elaborating on Christine Korsgaard’s suggestion that metaethical Kantian constructivism takes up a position on the source of morality’s normativity.

September 28, 2022

Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2023, 2024 and 2025

Page range: 121-121

Volume 2 (2010)

Volume 1 (2009)

Issue 2009

Cite Score	0.3
Journal Citation Indicator	0.57
SCImago Journal Rank	0.285
Source Normalized Impact per Paper	1.511

Editorial

Editor

Dietmar H. Heidemann (University of Luxembourg)

Editorial Board

Henry E. Allison (University of California at Davis)
Karl Ameriks (Notre Dame)
Gordon Brittan (Montana State University)
Klaus Düsing (University of Cologne)
Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Boston University)
Corey Dyck (University of Western Ontario)
Kristina Engelhard (University of Cologne)
Brigitte Falkenburg (University of Dortmund)
Hannah Ginsborg (University of California at Berkeley)
Michelle Grier (University of San Diego)
Thomas Grundmann (University of Cologne)
Paul Guyer (Brown University)
Robert Hanna (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Lothar Kreimendahl (University of Mannheim)
Georg Mohr (University of Bremen)
Angelica Nuzzo (CUNY)
Robert Stern (Sheffield University)
Dieter Sturma (University of Bonn)
Robert Theis (University of Luxembourg)
Ken Westphal (University of East Anglia)
Markus Willaschek (University of Frankfurt)

Editorial Office

Katja Stoppenbrink (University of Luxembourg)

Submissions should be emailed to:

dietmar.heidemann@hofstra.edu

(Deutsch)

Online ISSN: 1868-4602
Print ISSN: 1868-4599
Type: Yearbook
Language: English
Publisher: De Gruyter
First published: November 15, 2012
Publication Frequency: 1 Issue per Year
Audience: Academics, institutes, libraries
Keywords: Immanuel Kant, German Idealism, philosophy

Kant Yearbook

Title pages

Table of Contents

Vulnerabilities in Kantian Constructivism: Why they Matter for Objective Normativity

Abstract

Three Rival Versions of Kantian Constructivism

Abstract

Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Constitutivism: Some Reflections

Abstract

Re-constructing Kant: Kant’s Teleological Moral Realism

Abstract

Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity

Abstract

Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2023, 2024 and 2025