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Volume 36 Issue 1 - Special Issue: Bayesian Epistemology: Perspectives and Challenges, Edited by Jürgen Landes

March 2022

Issue of KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

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Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available February 24, 2022

Introduction

Open Access February 17, 2022

Bayesian Epistemology

Jürgen Landes

Page range: 1-7

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Research Articles

Open Access December 24, 2021

Learning by Ignoring the Most Wrong

Seamus Bradley

Page range: 9-31

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Abstract

Imprecise probabilities (IP) are an increasingly popular way of reasoning about rational credence. However they are subject to an apparent failure to display convincing inductive learning. This paper demonstrates that a small modification to the update rule for IP allows us to overcome this problem, albeit at the cost of satisfying only a weaker concept of coherence.

Open Access September 29, 2021

Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition

Marc Andree Weber

Page range: 33-50

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Abstract

The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities.

Open Access December 7, 2021

Coherence and Reduction

Andrea Giuseppe Ragno

Page range: 51-81

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Abstract

Synchronic intertheoretic reductions are an important field of research in science. Arguably, the best model able to represent the main relations occurring in this kind of scientific reduction is the Nagelian account of reduction, a model further developed by Schaffner and nowadays known as the generalized version of the Nagel–Schaffner model (GNS). In their article (2010), Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg, and Hartmann (DFH) specified the two main desiderata of a reduction á la GNS: confirmation and coherence. DFH first and, more rigorously, Tešic (2017) later analyse the confirmatory relation between the reducing and the reduced theory in terms of Bayesian confirmation theory. The purpose of this article is to analyse and compare the degree of coherence between the two theories involved in the GNS before and after the reduction. For this reason, in the first section, I will be looking at the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics and use it as an example to describe the GNS. In the second section, I will introduce three coherence measures which will then be employed in the comparison. Finally, in the last two sections, I will compare the degrees of coherence between the reducing and the reduced theory before and after the reduction and use a few numerical examples to understand the relation between coherence and confirmation measures.

Open Access April 21, 2021

Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems

Ted Poston

Page range: 83-111

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Abstract

It is a widespread intuition that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true. Formal results by Huemer, M. 1997. “Probability and Coherence Justification.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 463–72, Olsson, E. 2002. “What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?” Journal of Philosophy XCIX (5): 246–72, Olsson, E. 2005. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification . Oxford University Press., Bovens, L., and S. Hartmann. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology . Oxford University Press, prove that, under certain conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These formal results, known as ‘the impossibility theorems’ have been widely discussed in the literature. They are taken to have significant epistemic upshot. In particular, they are taken to show that reports must first individually confirm the target claim before the coherence of multiple reports offers any positive confirmation. In this paper, I dispute this epistemic interpretation. The impossibility theorems are consistent with the idea that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true even if the reports do not individually confirm prior to coherence. Once we see that the formal discoveries do not have this implication, we can recover a model of coherence justification consistent with Bayesianism and these results. This paper, thus, seeks to turn the tide of the negative findings for coherence reasoning by defending coherence as a unique source of confirmation.

About this journal

KRITERION - Journal of Philosophy provides a forum for rational discussion in any field of philosophy. As dedicated to the analytic tradition, it publishes highly understandable and criticisable work making use of clear and thorough argumentation. We believe that this is the only possible way of contributing to progress in philosophy, which is the journal's main objective.

The journal was founded in 1991. Since 2021, it is published and distributed as an open access journal by De Gruyter. We are convinced that this collaboration will further increase the quality and visibility of the journal.

KRITERION - Journal of Philosophy accepts contributions in English language. All contributions go through a double-blind peer review process. Since we especially want to encourage early career authors, the journal's policy is to reach a decision on every submission within five weeks of receipt. The journal is known for providing friendly and helpful reviewer comments and suggestions of how to improve manuscripts. This becomes manifest also in our current statistics: The initial acceptance rate is 5%, the overall acceptance rate is almost 30%, and over 90% of authors receive reports from external reviewers.

KRITERION - Journal of Philosophy also publishes special issues and monographic sections. For more information on guest-editing a special issue or monographic section, please see the supplementary material below.

Volume 36 Issue 1 - Special Issue: Bayesian Epistemology: Perspectives and Challenges, Edited by Jürgen Landes

Issue of KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

Frontmatter

Bayesian Epistemology

Learning by Ignoring the Most Wrong

Abstract

Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition

Abstract

Coherence and Reduction

Abstract

Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems

Abstract