A central task of comparative constitutional law scholarship is categorization and classification of constitutions. Recent scholarship, no doubt informed by the populist tide, has sought to develop the concept of a mixed constitution. Broadly speaking, a mixed constitution is a constitution that integrates liberal and illiberal elements, elements that are usually separate and not found under the same constitution. The study of “mixed constitutions” encompasses both descriptive and normative aspects. First, an attempt to ascertain what, exactly, makes a constitution “mixed.” Second, an attempt to analyze either the desirability of such a system or an attempt to figure out how to harness mixed constitutions in the service of particular normative goals, for example the protection of human rights. This article has two goals. First, an inquiry into the descriptive aspect of mixed constitutions. My aim is to show that given the seeming consensus of what constitutes a mixed constitution, the category itself might encompass many more constitutions than is often acknowledged, to the point that many constitutions are likely to be mixed to a certain extent. My second goal is to demonstrate that given this definitional consensus, what makes a constitution mixed is not necessarily because the constitution itself is mixed, but because sub-constitutional norms shape our constitutional understanding. Put differently, the meaning of a constitution is not determined exclusively through an analysis of the constitution, but also by shifts in sub-constitutional understandings. If this is correct, then it turns out that the universe of mixed constitutions is much larger than thought, which casts doubt on the utility of the category of mixed constitutions.