Tax abuse by multinational extractive corporations should be an important subject of attention for global justice because it exacerbates the unjust global distribution of resources and contributes to the resource curse. The amounts of taxes at stake dwarf the current levels of international aid. This abuse is not necessarily unlawful but is enabled by the interaction of complex international tax rules. It is “abuse” because it contravenes a number of theoretical understandings of global tax justice, several of which are explored here: egalitarianism, two variants of restitution-based justifications and corporate citizenship. Within each of these justificatory frames, global justice in the resource context requires restoring a fair share of the benefits from natural resources to the impoverished populations of resource-rich countries. Justice, thus understood, can and should be achieved through the effective taxation of extractive companies. This article is a first step toward filling a lacuna in the literature on taxation and development, which tends to encourage decreased taxation in order to promote foreign investment, to the exclusion of concerns about justice and which conceives taxation as a purely domestic issue, not one involving international rules that have the effect of distributing revenue among nation states.

April 29, 2014

Global Tax Governance: The Bullets Internationalists Must Bite – And Those They Must Not

Miriam Ronzoni

Page range: 37-59

Abstract

Under conditions of high capital mobility, states are pressurised into various forms of tax competition to attract or retain capital and investors. When this occurs, the capacity of domestic institutions autonomously to generate fiscal policies is constrained. What exactly, if anything, is unjust about this phenomenon? This paper argues that tax competition puts particular pressure on internationalists, who must acknowledge that its occurrence makes our obligations of global justice more demanding, and that such obligations require supranational institutions in order to be discharged. However, to the extent that tax competition is unjust from an internationalist point of view, this is due to the specific harm it does to states. Thus, the paper makes three contributions to the literature: it shows that (1) tax competition has an impact on the demandingness of internationalist obligations of justice; (2) discharging such obligations commits internationalists to accept a higher level of supranational institutionalization than is currently acknowledged; yet (3) both the specific content of such obligations, and the kind of supranational regulation that is needed to discharge them, differ from those which cosmopolitans support. In sum, there are some cosmopolitan bullets which internationalists must bite, and others which they should continue to resist.

February 26, 2014

Redistribution, Globalisation, and Multi-level Governance

Peter Dietsch, Thomas Rixen

Page range: 61-81

Abstract

Global income inequalities are met with increasing calls for direct supranational redistribution. This article argues that from the perspective of political feasibility, this approach should not be prioritised. We use the example of tax competition to show that supranational regulation that stops short of direct redistribution has better chances of being implemented. Moreover, as the case of tax competition illustrates, such regulation can help to shore up the capacity of nation states to redistribute internally, which indirectly tends to reduce global inequalities, too. Against this background, we formulate the conditional subsidiarity principle of redistribution. It states that when the case for direct supranational redistribution is built on the alleged incapacity of the state to redistribute due to the pressures of globalisation, our first instinct should be regulatory reform in order to restore this capacity. Finally, the article asks whether two prominent proposals for global taxation – the global resource dividend and the financial transaction tax – pass the test of the conditional subsidiarity principle.

February 26, 2014

Global Taxation, Global Reform, and Collective Action

Shmuel Nili

Page range: 83-103

Abstract

This article asks how global tax reform relates to other emerging proposals for global economic reform. Specifically, I will try to contribute to the philosophical understanding of this relationship, by comparing global tax reform with a reform seeking to end dictators’ trading privileges in their peoples’ natural resources. Through this comparison, I intend to establish two main claims. At a concrete, practical level, I hope to show that reform of dictators’ resource privilege will be easier to initiate than legal reform against global tax avoidance. Yet the heart of this essay is dedicated to supporting this claim through an argument at a more abstract, methodological level, which intends to make a broader contribution. This argument focuses on a key obstacle facing global taxation reforms, in the form of collective action problems. My key conceptual contribution lies in an attempt to distinguish between two forms of collective action situations (group and rigorist action), arguing that only one of them involves moral collective action problems, while in the other these problems dissolve. I seek to show that this fortunate case obtains for reform of dictators’ resource privilege, but not for global tax reform.

February 28, 2014

Developing a National Foundation for Global Taxation

Marcus Schulzke

Page range: 105-125

Abstract

Two of the most serious obstacles that plans for global taxation must overcome are: (1) that there is no existing cosmopolitan political community that can serve as the ethical basis for global distributive justice and (2) that many states have no strong interest that would lead them to support the creation of global taxes. I argue that it is possible for a system of global taxation to overcome these problems if a tax could provide a clear benefit to existing political communities and if it could offer some benefit to the states that would bear much of the tax burden. A tax discouraging the use of tax havens is the most promising ways of accomplishing this. This type of tax could be legitimized on the basis of existing national political identities, as it would strengthen these communities by discouraging the violation of national ethical obligations through tax avoidance. States would also have a strong incentive for imposing this type of tax, as limiting the use of tax havens would allow states to collect lost revenue.

February 21, 2014

Realising International Justice: To Constrain or to Counter-Incentivise?

Douglas Bamford

Page range: 127-146

Abstract

This paper presents a rival proposal to that presented by Dietsch and Rixen to ensure international background justice. It explains the notion of background justice and how this is challenged by the lack of international co-operation on taxation policy. It then presents the principles which Dietsch and Rixen propose in order to respond to this concern: the principle of membership and the principle of constraint . The paper proposes alternative principles of relationship and counter-incentive , which are argued to be superior means to achieve the aim of global background justice. This is because the alternative principles do not interfere with the right of states to set the tax-rates that they desire. The counter-incentive approach instead rewards the states who set higher taxes and provides them with revenues from taxpayers who have left either to seek lower taxes elsewhere or for any of a number of other reasons.

March 6, 2014

Double Taxation, Multiple Citizenship, and Global Inequality

Ana Tanasoca

Page range: 147-169

Abstract

National membership in itself aggravates global inequality, and plural membership does all the more so. A key mechanism by which that occurs are double taxation agreements that (given certain contingent facts about the world) have the effect of favoring the global rich at the expense of the global poor. One egalitarian solution is a levy on multiple citizenship; another is redesigning double taxation agreements along prioritarian lines. Revising the OECD Model Tax Convention could be a feasible strategy for implementing such reforms.

About this journal

Moral Philosophy and Politics (MOPP) is an international, peer-reviewed journal that publishes original philosophical articles addressing matters of public relevance. The notion ‘public relevance’ is construed broadly to encompass various domains and aspects. The journal has a special focus on the philosophical assessment of policies and their normative foundations, analyses of the philosophical underpinnings or implications of political discourse, and discussions of the justice or injustice inherent in social and political structures that govern human conduct.

MOPP is committed to the ideals of clarity, evidence-based reasoning, and intellectual openness. interdisciplinary work and historical approaches are encouraged when they are relevant to contemporary issues. MOPP considers both theoretical and meta-ethical works, as well as those tackling conceptual problems, provided they offer insights into political, moral, economic or social issues that characterize contemporary societies. Contributors are expected to make clear how their work relates to these issues.

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Current Calls for Papers

‘Relational Equality and Migration’, ed. by Daniel Sharp (for more information, click here)

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‘Power and Sovereignty Across Generations’, ed. by Devon Cass, Manuel Valente (for more information, click here)

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