Published since May 30, 2014

Moral Philosophy and Politics

ISSN: 2194-5624

Editor-in-chief: Michael Schefczyk

Edited by: Lukas Heinrich Meyer, Jennifer Marie Page, Mark Peacock, Peter Schaber

Managing Editor: Peter Königs

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About this journal

Moral Philosophy and Politics (MOPP) is an international, peer-reviewed journal which invites the submission of original philosophical articles on issues of public relevance. ‘Public relevance’ is to be understood in a broad sense. Of particular interest to the journal are the philosophical assessment of policy and its normative basis, analyses of the philosophical underpinnings or implications of political debate and reflection on the justice or injustice of the social and political structures which regulate human action.

MOPP is committed to the ideal of clarity, evidence-based thinking and intellectual openness; interdisciplinary work and historical approaches will be considered as long as they are relevant to contemporary issues. MOPP will consider publishing both theoretical and meta-ethical work as well as work concerned with conceptual problems, if such work sheds light on political, moral, economic and social issues of contemporary societies. Contributors are expected to make clear how their work relates to these issues.

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Volume 9 Issue 2

October 2022

Publicly Available October 6, 2022

Frontmatter

Page range: i-iii

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Symposium: Ethics and Artificial Intelligence; Guest Editor: Mathias Risse

Publicly Available June 28, 2022

Introduction to the Symposium on Ethics and Artificial Intelligence

Mathias Risse

Page range: 173-179

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Publicly Available August 30, 2021

AI and Phronesis

Nir Eisikovits, Dan Feldman

Page range: 181-199

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Abstract

We argue that the growing prevalence of statistical machine learning in everyday decision making – from creditworthiness to police force allocation – effectively replaces many of our humdrum practical judgments and that this will eventually undermine our capacit y for making such judgments. We lean on Aristotle’s famous account of how phronesis and moral virtues develop to make our case. If Aristotle is right that the habitual exercise of practical judgment allows us to incrementally hone virtues, and if AI saves us time by taking over some of those practical judgments, or if its pattern recognition capacities are very good at learning that kind of behavior – we risk innovating ourselves out of moral competence with the introduction of AI.

January 6, 2022

Rule by Automation: How Automated Decision Systems Promote Freedom and Equality

Jacob Sparks, Athmeya Jayaram

Page range: 201-218

Abstract

Using automated systems to avoid the need for human discretion in government contexts – a scenario we call ‘rule by automation’ – can help us achieve the ideal of a free and equal society. Drawing on relational theories of freedom and equality, we explain how rule by automation is a more complete realization of the rule of law and why thinkers in these traditions have strong reasons to support it. Relational theories are based on the absence of human domination and hierarchy, which automation helps us achieve. Nevertheless, there is another understanding of relational theories where what matters is the presence of valuable relationships with those in power. Exploring this further might help us see when and why we should accept human discretion.

Open Access February 14, 2022

Domesticating Artificial Intelligence

Luise Müller

Page range: 219-237

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Abstract

For their deployment in human societies to be safe, AI agents need to be aligned with value-laden cooperative human life. One way of solving this “problem of value alignment” is to build moral machines. I argue that the goal of building moral machines aims at the wrong kind of ideal, and that instead, we need an approach to value alignment that takes seriously the categorically different cognitive and moral capabilities between human and AI agents, a condition I call deep agential diversity . Domestication is the answer to a similarly structured problem: namely, how to integrate nonhuman animals that lack moral agency safely into human society and align their behavior with human values. Just like nonhuman animals, AI agents lack a genuinely moral agency; and just like nonhuman animals, we might find ways to train them to nevertheless assist us, and live and work among us – to “domesticate” them, in other words. I claim that the domestication approach does well in explaining many of our intuitions and worries about deploying AI agents in our social practices.

Open Access August 5, 2021

An Institutionalist Approach to AI Ethics: Justifying the Priority of Government Regulation over Self-Regulation

Thomas Ferretti

Page range: 239-265

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Abstract

This article explores the cooperation of government and the private sector to tackle the ethical dimension of artificial intelligence (AI). The argument draws on the institutionalist approach in philosophy and business ethics defending a ‘division of moral labor’ between governments and the private sector (Rawls 2001; Scheffler and Munoz-Dardé 2005). The goal and main contribution of this article is to explain how this approach can provide ethical guidelines to the AI industry and to highlight the limits of self-regulation. In what follows, I discuss three institutionalist claims. First, principles of AI ethics should be validated through legitimate democratic processes. Second, compliance with these principles should be secured in a stable way. Third, their implementation in practice should be as efficient as possible. If we accept these claims, there are good reasons to conclude that, in many cases, governments implementing hard regulation are in principle (if not yet in practice) the best instruments to secure an ethical development of AI systems. Where adequate regulation exists, firms should respect the law. But when regulation does not yet exist, helping governments build adequate regulation should be businesses’ ethical priority, not self-regulation.

Open Access January 20, 2022

The Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Some Normative Concerns

Eva Erman, Markus Furendal

Page range: 267-291

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Abstract

The creation of increasingly complex artificial intelligence (AI) systems raises urgent questions about their ethical and social impact on society. Since this impact ultimately depends on political decisions about normative issues, political philosophers can make valuable contributions by addressing such questions. Currently, AI development and application are to a large extent regulated through non-binding ethics guidelines penned by transnational entities. Assuming that the global governance of AI should be at least minimally democratic and fair, this paper sets out three desiderata that an account should satisfy when theorizing about what this means. We argue, first, that an analysis of democratic values, political entities and decision-making should be done in a holistic way; second, that fairness is not only about how AI systems treat individuals, but also about how the benefits and burdens of transformative AI are distributed; and finally, that justice requires that governance mechanisms are not limited to AI technology, but are incorporated into a range of basic institutions. Thus, rather than offering a substantive theory of democratic and fair AI governance, our contribution is metatheoretical: we propose a theoretical framework that sets up certain normative boundary conditions for a satisfactory account.

Articles

February 25, 2021

Everybody to Count for One? Inclusion and Exclusion in Welfare-Consequentialist Public Policy

Noel Semple

Page range: 293-322

Abstract

Which individuals should count in a welfare-consequentialist analysis of public policy? Some answers to this question are parochial, and others are more inclusive. The most inclusive possible answer is ‘everybody to count for one.’ In other words, all individuals who are capable of having welfare – including foreigners, the unborn, and non-human animals – should be weighed equally. This article argues that ‘who should count’ is a question that requires a two-level answer. On the first level, a specification of welfare-consequentialism serves as an ethical ideal, a claim about the attributes that the ideal policy would have. ‘Everybody to count for one’ might succeed on this level. However, on the second level is the welfare-consequentialist analysis procedure used by human analysts to give advice on real policy questions. For epistemic reasons, the analysis procedure should be more parochial than ‘everybody to count for one.’

Open Access March 3, 2021

Prior Residence and Immigrant Voting Rights

Anna Goppel

Page range: 323-343

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Abstract

Although the moral foundations of voting rights regulations have been the subject of widespread scrutiny, there is one aspect of the debate which has gone largely unquestioned and is currently accepted in every state’s actual voting rights regulations. This is the requirement of prior residence, which stipulates that immigrants are granted the right to vote only once they have lived in the host country for a certain period of time. It is this requirement I call into question in this paper. Taking up the most plausible justifications for this requirement, I aim to put substantial pressure on its moral acceptability by arguing that it is not directly grounded by any of the principles that are currently defended as a means to determine the demos , nor a proxy for some other morally relevant feature, nor a warrantor for abilities held to be significant for the right to vote.

Ahead of Print / Just Accepted

Ahead of Print / Just Accepted

Volume 9 (2022)

Volume 8 (2021)

Volume 7 (2020)

Volume 6 (2019)

Volume 5 (2018)

Volume 4 (2017)

Volume 3 (2016)

Volume 2 (2015)

Volume 1 (2014)

Cite Score	0.8
Journal Citation Indicator	0.43
SCImago Journal Rank	0.265
Source Normalized Impact per Paper	0.587

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Manuscripts can be submitted online at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/mopp.

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Editorial

Editor-in-Chief

Michael Schefczyk (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany)

Editors

Lukas Meyer (Graz University, Austria)
Jennifer Page (Zürich University, Switzerland)
Mark Peacock (York University, Canada)
Peter Schaber (Zürich University, Switzerland)
Michael Schefczyk (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany)

Managing Editor

Peter Königs (RWTH Aachen, Germany)

Editorial Board

Elizabeth Anderson (University of Michigan, MI, USA)
Arthur Applbaum (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA)
Dieter Birnbacher (Düsseldorf University, Germany)
Rüdiger Bittner (Bielefeld University, Germany)
Idil Boran (York University, United Kingdom)
John Broome (Oxford University, United Kingdom)
Simon Caney (Oxford University, United Kingdom)
Paula Casal (ICREA/Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain)
Stephen Darwall (Yale University, New Haven, CN, USA)
Andreas Føllesdal (Oslo University, Norway)
Rainer Forst (Frankfurt University, Germany)
Stephen Gardiner (University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA)
Stefan Gosepath (FU Berlin, Germany)
David Heyd (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)
Wilfried Hinsch (Cologne University, Germany)
Duncan Ivison (Sydney University, Australia)
Rahel Jaeggi (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
Matt Matravers (University of York, United Kingdom)
Kirsten Meyer (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
David Miller (Oxford University, United Kingdom)
Nenad Miscevic (Maribor University, Slovenia)
Susan Neiman (Einstein Forum)
Elif Özmen (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich)
Nigel Pleasants (University of Exeter)
Thomas Pogge (Yale University)
Mathias Risse (Harvard University)
Sam Scheffler (New York University)
Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt University Berlin)
Ralf Stoecker (Potsdam University)
Adam Swift (University of Warwick)
John Tasioulas (University College London)
Leif Wenar (King’s College London)
Andrew Williams (ICREA/Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona)
Lea Ypi (London School of Economics)

(Deutsch)

Online ISSN: 2194-5624
Print ISSN: 2194-5616
Type: Journal
Language: English
Publisher: De Gruyter
First published: May 30, 2014
Publication Frequency: 2 Issues per Year
Keywords: Politics; Ethics; Public Debates