Published by De Gruyter

Volume 20 Issue 2 -

Issue of Metaphysica

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Contents
Journal Overview

Publicly Available October 18, 2019

Articles

October 18, 2019

A Reply to Mellor’s “Propensities and Possibilities”

Robin Stenwall, Johannes Persson, Nils-Eric Sahlin

Page range: 149-150

October 18, 2019

The Aristotelian Context of the Existence-Essence Distinction in De Ente Et Essentia

Angus Brook

Page range: 151-173

Abstract

This paper explores the Aristotelian context of the real distinction between existence and essence thought to be posited in Thomas Aquinas’ early work De Ente Et Essentia . In doing so, the paper situates its own position in the context of contemporary scholarship and in relation to the contemporary trend to downplay Aristotle’s influence in Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy. The paper argues that re-reading De Ente Et Essentia in this way sheds new light on some of the crucial debates in contemporary Thomist scholarship, particularly with respect to the analogous relation between potency and act: essence and existence, the distinction between conceptual and causal explanation, and the relationship between philosophy and theology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

October 18, 2019

Maximality, Function, and the Many

Robert Francescotti

Page range: 175-193

Abstract

In the region where some cat sits, there are many very cat-like items that are proper parts of the cat (or otherwise mereologically overlap the cat), but which we are inclined to think are not themselves cats, e.g. all of Tibbles minus the tail. The question is, how can something be so cat-like without itself being a cat. Some have tried to answer this “Problem of the Many” (a problem that arises for many different kinds of things we regularly encounter, including desks, persons, rocks, and clouds) by relying on a mereological maximality principle, according to which, something cannot be a member of a kind K if it is a large proper part of, or otherwise greatly mereologically overlaps, a K. It has been shown, however, that a maximality constraint of this type, i.e. one that restricts mereological overlap, is open to strong objections. Inspired by the insights of, especially, Sutton and Madden, I develop a type of functional- maximality principle that avoids these objections (and has other merits), and thereby provides a better answer to the Problem of the Many.

October 18, 2019

A Uniform, Concretist Metaphysics for Linguistic Types

Giorgio Lando

Page range: 195-221

Abstract

I argue that it is not acceptable to restrict the claim that linguistic types are concrete entities (type-concretism) to some categories of linguistic types (such as words or proper names), while at the same time conceding that other categories of linguistic types (such as sentence types) are abstract entities. Moreover, I suggest a way in which type-concretism can be extended to every linguistic type, thereby responding to the so-called productivity objection to type-concretism, according to which, whenever tokens of a type t are produced in different, causally isolated circumstances, then t needs to be identified by a certain form or structure. This extension of type-concretism detaches type-concretism from so-called originalism and gives rules a prominent role in type-concretism.

October 18, 2019

Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge

R. Scott Smith

Page range: 223-237

Abstract

Many have written about trope ontology, but relatively few have considered its implications for some of the ontological conditions needed for us to have knowledge. I explore the resources of trope ontology to meet those conditions. With J. P. Moreland, I argue that, being simple, we can eliminate tropes’ qualitative contents without ontological loss, resulting in bare individuators. Then I extend Moreland’s argument, arguing that tropes undermine some of the needed ontological conditions for knowledge. Yet, we do know many things, and trope nominalists presuppose that too. Therefore, I consider three counter-arguments, starting with David Lewis’s rebuttal based on appeal to brute facts. Second, I explore Jeffrey Brower’s recent proposal as a possible solution. Last, I consider Robert Garcia’s recent distinction between module and modifier tropes, to see if it can be of assistance. I conclude, however, that trope nominalism cannot preserve some of the needed ontology to have knowledge.

October 18, 2019

Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation

Peter Forrest

Page range: 239-254

Abstract

In his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason to accept and their opponents have reason to reject. So, neutralism is not neutral on the topic of whether properties are universals. Nor is Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation as naturalistic as he claims. I argue that although compatible with Ontological Naturalism, his theory provides a precedent for the non-naturalistic emergence of mental properties. Finally, I argue that because his theory requires a simple physics it presupposes a more rationalist epistemology than that of Methodological Naturalism.

Book Review

October 18, 2019

R. D. Ingthorsson: McTaggart’s Paradox

L. Nathan Oaklander

Page range: 255-267

About this journal

The journal Metaphysica is published semi-annually. The editors aim to create an international forum of ontology and metaphysics for readers all over the world. In the Anglo-Saxon countries (in particular the USA and Australia) the volume of research publications in ontology and metaphysics significantly increased during the last two decades. European philosophers, on the other hand, initially seemed reticent to address ontological and metaphysical topics, undoubtedly due to deeply rooted Kantian ideas about the “end of metaphysics.” Since the nineties, however, sentiments have changed in favour of a new “ontological turn” within Central European philosophy. In Austria, Switzerland, and Germany an increasing number of philosophical publications present systematic treatments of ontological and metaphysical issues. At the same time there is a new strong interest in reviewing historical contributions to ontology and metaphysics, from Parmenides to Plato, Aristotle, Occam, Leibniz and further to Brentano, Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann. Since there is no other European journal devoted to the discussion of ontological and metaphysical issues in particular, the editors found it necessary to fill this gap by founding the journal Metaphysica.

Volume 20 Issue 2 -

Issue of Metaphysica

Frontmatter

A Reply to Mellor’s “Propensities and Possibilities”

The Aristotelian Context of the Existence-Essence Distinction in De Ente Et Essentia

Abstract

Maximality, Function, and the Many

Abstract

A Uniform, Concretist Metaphysics for Linguistic Types

Abstract

Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge

Abstract

Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation

Abstract

R. D. Ingthorsson: McTaggart’s Paradox